

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES—Tuesday, April 23, 1985

(Legislative day of Monday, April 22, 1985)

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SHAW] has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. JACOBS].

RECESS

Mr. JACOBS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the House recess for 5 minutes in order that the Reverend Andrew Brown, an apostle of peace and dean of ministers in Indiana, might give the opening prayer for April 23, 1985.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Indiana?

There was no objection.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The House now stands in recess for 5 minutes.

Accordingly (at 9 o'clock and 48 minutes a.m., April 23, 1985), the House stood in recess for 5 minutes.

□ 950

AFTER RECESS

The recess having expired, the House was called to order by the Speaker pro tempore [Mr. FOLEY] at 9 o'clock and 54 minutes a.m.

PRAYER

The Reverend Andrew Brown, St. John's Missionary Baptist Church, Indianapolis, IN, offered the following prayer:

Grant us Thy love, O gracious Heavenly Father, that we as a nation may overcome our impatience with the seeming slow results of the redemptive work in which we are engaged. We pray, O God, that our Representatives may not grow impatient in their work against the ignorance or prejudices of our friends; our enemies; or fellow workers. Help us to be militant without being unkind, uncompromising without being intolerant, devoted without being bigoted. Strengthen and embolden these Thy servant's spirits, O God, who art power, seize and possess all of us, that we all will no longer be unsteady in our faith or unsure of the end result of the work we undertake. Through Jesus Christ our Lord. Be with us now and forever. Amen.

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 239, MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR AID TO NICARAGUA

Mr. BONIOR of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, by direction of the Committee on Rules, I call up House Resolution 136 and ask for its immediate consideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as follows:

H. Res. 136

Resolved, That at any time after the adoption of this resolution the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into a secret session of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 239) to approve the obligation of funds available under Public Law 98-473 for supporting military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, the first reading of the joint resolution shall be dispensed with, and all points of order against the consideration of the joint resolution are hereby waived. Pending the Speaker's declaration, he is authorized to declare a recess of the House in order to make appropriate arrangements for a secret session. General debate in the secret session of the Committee of the Whole shall continue not to exceed five hours, to be equally divided and controlled by a Member in favor of the resolution and a Member opposed thereto. At such time as the secret session of the Committee of the Whole shall terminate, the Committee of the Whole shall rise and the Speaker is authorized to declare a recess of the House to make appropriate arrangements for the reconvening of the House in open session. All proceedings in the secret session shall be kept secret unless otherwise ordered by the House on recommendations of the Committee on Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. At any time after the House has reconvened in open session the Speaker may, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the further consideration of the joint resolution H.J. Res. 239. Further debate on the joint resolution shall continue not to exceed five hours plus any part of the five hours not actually consumed during debate in the secret session, and during the further consideration of the joint resolution the procedures contained in subsection 8066(c)(5) of Public Law 98-473 (98 Stat. 1936) shall apply.

Sec. 2. If the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 239) is rejected on final passage, the Speaker may at any time thereafter, pursuant to clause 1(b) of rule XXIII, declare the House resolved into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of a joint resolution relating to Nicaragua to be offered by, and printed in the Congressional Record of April 22, 1985, by Representative Barnes of Mary-

land, the first reading of the joint resolution shall be dispensed with, and all points of order against the joint resolution and against its consideration are hereby waived. There shall be no general debate on the joint resolution, which shall be considered as having been read for amendment under the five-minute rule. No amendment to the joint resolution shall be in order except the following amendments, which shall be considered as having been read, shall be in order any rule of the House of the contrary notwithstanding, shall be considered only in the following order, and shall not be subject to amendment: (1) the amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the Congressional Record of April 22, 1985, by, and if offered by, Representative Hamilton of Indiana, and said amendment shall be debatable for not to exceed two hours, to be equally divided and controlled by Representative Hamilton and a Member opposed thereto; and (2) the amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the Congressional Record of April 22, 1985, by, and if offered by, Representative Michel or his designee, and said amendment shall be debatable for not to exceed two hours, to be equally divided and controlled by Representative Michel or his designee and a Member opposed thereto. If both of said amendments are adopted, only the second such amendment shall be considered as having been finally adopted and reported back to the House. At the conclusion of the consideration of the joint resolution for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the joint resolution to the House with such amendment as may have been finally adopted, and the previous question shall be considered as ordered on the joint resolution and such amendment thereto to final passage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

□ 1000

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR] is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. BONIOR of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, for purposes of debate only, I yield the customary 30 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. LOTT], pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, this rule provides for consideration of House Joint Resolution 239, to approve the obligation of funds under Public Law 98-473 for supporting military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. Under House Resolution 136, the House may take up to 10 hours of general debate on House Joint Resolution 239, with the time equally divided and controlled by a Member in favor of the joint resolution and a Member opposed to it.

The rule provides for a secret session of the Committee of the Whole in

□ This symbol represents the time of day during the House proceedings, e.g., □ 1407 is 2:07 p.m.

● This "bullet" symbol identifies statements or insertions which are not spoken by the Member on the floor.

which up to 5 hours of general debate may be consumed. The rule also authorizes the Speaker to declare recesses prior to and after the secret session to make appropriate arrangements for the secret session and for reconvening the House in open session. The rule provides that all proceedings of the secret session shall be kept secret unless otherwise ordered by the House on recommendation of the Committee on Appropriations and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.

After the Committee of the Whole reconvenes in open session, general debate may continue up to 5 hours plus any part of the 5 hours of debate time not consumed in the secret session.

Mr. Speaker, the procedures contained in subsection 8066(c)(5) of Public Law 98-473—the continuing resolution for fiscal year 1985—will govern further consideration of the joint resolution in open session. These provisions provide that a motion to limit debate is in order and not debatable. These provisions further provide that no amendment, motion to postpone, motion to proceed to consideration of other business, or motion to recommit the joint resolution is in order.

Section 2 of House Resolution 136 provides that if House Joint Resolution 239 is rejected on final passage, it shall be in order to consider a joint resolution relating to Nicaragua to be offered, and printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of April 22, 1985, by Representative BARNES of Maryland. All points of order against the joint resolution are waived. The rule provides that there shall be no general debate on that joint resolution.

Mr. Speaker, the rule further provides that no amendments shall be in order to that joint resolution except two amendments, which shall be considered only in the following order:

First, an amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of April 22, 1985, by, and if offered by, Representative HAMILTON of Indiana, with the amendment to be debated for no more than 2 hours, the time to be equally divided and controlled by Representative HAMILTON and a Member opposed to the amendment, and second, an amendment in the nature of a substitute printed in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of April 22, 1985, by, and if offered by, Representative MICHEL or his designee, with the amendment to be debated for no more than 2 hours, the time to be equally divided and controlled by Representative MICHEL or his designee and a Member opposed to the amendment.

These amendments shall be considered as having been read, shall be in order any rule of the House notwithstanding, and shall not be subject to amendment. If both of the amend-

ments are adopted, only the second amendment adopted shall be considered as having been finally adopted and reported back to the House. Finally, the rule provides for one motion to recommit.

Mr. Speaker, this is a somewhat complicated rule. To make certain that everyone understands what this rule entails, let me repeat the basic provisions.

The rule provides for the consideration of House Joint Resolution 239, which would approve the obligation of \$14 million for supporting military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, pursuant to the continuing resolution passed last year. The rule provides for 10 hours of debate on that joint resolution, no more than 5 hours of which may be in secret session. At the conclusion of this debate, there will be an up or down vote on House Joint Resolution 239.

If House Joint Resolution 239 is defeated, it will be in order to consider a joint resolution offered by Mr. BARNES. No general debate will be in order on this resolution. The rule makes in order two amendments in the nature of a substitute to this joint resolution: First, a substitute by Mr. HAMILTON; and second, a substitute by Mr. MICHEL or his designee. There will be an up or down vote on both of these substitutes. The rule establishes what is sometimes known as king of the mountain procedure, whereby, if both substitutes are adopted, only the second one is considered to have been finally adopted.

Mr. Speaker, this rule allows the Members of the House to consider fully the major alternatives on one of the most critical foreign policy issues of our time. I urge its adoption.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

First, Mr. Speaker, I would like to take a few moments to go over exactly what the rule does. The gentleman from Michigan just went over it, but I want to make sure the Members fully understand what the procedure will be for the rest of the day, and I presume tomorrow, as to how these resolutions, the substitute and the original resolution, will be handled.

The Speaker is authorized to declare the House in secret session in the Committee of the Whole for up to 5 hours for the consideration of House Joint Resolution 239, approving the expenditure of \$14 million for military and paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. I want to emphasize that it says secret session up to 5 hours. That does not mean necessarily, obviously, that we will take the full 5 hours, and I need to emphasize that if we do not take those full 5 hours, the time remaining will be carried over into regular session.

So we will have 5 hours that could be in secret session, and then the next

5 hours will be in open session, plus any time that is left over from the secret session.

All points of order are waived against the consideration of the resolution. The resolution is not subject to amendment and is not subject to a motion to recommit.

If the Michel resolution is defeated, and I want to emphasize that, if it is defeated, the Speaker may resolve the House into the Committee of the Whole to consider a resolution by Representative BARNES of Maryland printed in the RECORD on Monday, April 22. All points of order are waived against the resolution, and the resolution is not subject to further debate.

It first shall be in order to consider an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by Mr. HAMILTON of Indiana, printed in the RECORD on Monday, April 22. The amendment shall not be subject to amendment but shall be debatable for 2 hours, equally divided between Representative HAMILTON and a Member opposed, and all points of order are waived against the amendment.

Even if the Hamilton amendment is adopted, it shall next be in order to consider an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the resolution printed in the RECORD on Monday, April 22, and offered by Mr. MICHEL of Illinois or his designee. All points of order are also waived against this amendment, and the amendment is subject to 2 hours of debate divided between Mr. MICHEL or his designee and a Member opposed, and the amendment is not subject to an amendment.

If both amendments are adopted, both Hamilton and Michel, the last one adopted shall be reported back to the House as the recommendation of the Committee of the Whole and would be subject to a separate vote, of course, in the House.

One motion to recommit is permitted, although the rule does not specify with or without instructions, meaning that if either substitute is adopted, the resolution cannot be further amended in a motion to recommit with instructions, although general instructions would still be in order. If both substitutes are defeated, it would still be in order to offer a germane amendment to the Barnes amendment in the motion to recommit.

Let me assess the rule. If you look at this rule in a vacuum, by itself, it is not too bad.

□ 1010

I have to say that the members of the Rules Committee on the majority side made the best effort possible to make a fair rule out of a bad situation and a bad process. But we did have a considerable amount of discussion about how to frame this rule, and

after meeting in the Rules Committee and in caucus and after a lot of discussion, I think this is about as fair a process, as far as what the rule allows, as we could come up with. Everybody has an opportunity to offer their substitute and make their case. There is adequate time for debate, it is equally divided, both the 10 hours and the 2 hours on the Barnes substitute and the 2 hours on the compromise substitute offered by Representative MICHEL or his designee.

So I have to grant that to my colleagues on the majority side on the Rules Committee. They tried to make the best of a bad situation, and for that reason, while I object to the process and I object to a rule that in effect approves this kind of process, I think that at least we will have our chance to offer a substitute and be heard fairly in the debate.

But let me tell the Members a little bit about how this thing evolved. It is a kind of a part of a rolling arrogance that we went through last week in the way the schedule was changed and altered and rules were violated or waived or ignored. Earlier in the week the Rules Committee met, and there was even some resistance by members of the Rules Committee and others, including the distinguished gentleman from Florida, to taking up two bills from the Science and Technology Committee where we did not even have a committee report. I was frantic during the Rules Committee meeting, trying to find a Xerox copy of the report, because I wanted to go through the report. But we ignored committee rules and rules of the House, and we took up the National Science Foundation and the National Bureau of Standards bills because we had to have something to do later in the week.

Well, that was not so bad, I guess, in and of itself, but it was part of what got to be the way we were doing business last week. Changes in the schedule were made without the basic courtesy of notifying the leadership on the Republican side of the aisle.

Then on Thursday, I had been working on behalf of the leadership on this side of the aisle watching what was happening in the Appropriations Committee, which was required to act by the action we took last year. We fenced these funds for Nicaragua at \$14 million, but we said in what we passed that the Appropriations Committee would reconsider the unfencing of that money. And so on Thursday the subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee started a meeting on this issue. I assumed the subcommittee would act, then the full committee would act, and then there would be the normal 3-day layover when the House would act. But somehow or other, that did not seem to suit the Democratic leadership, because 2 days

seemed to have made an awful lot of difference in this body. Instead of the normal order of events in the sequence of processes required under the law and the rules of the House, the leadership and the Chair apparently did not want us to take this up on Wednesday or Thursday. They wanted it Tuesday. Regardless, it was going to be Tuesday. So if they could not force it through the Appropriations Committee, as was set out in the law, they said we would just ignore that, we would go straight to the Rules Committee and do whatever was necessary or waive whatever was necessary to get this thing out on Tuesday because we were going to get it considered on this particular day.

So somewhere around 2 o'clock on Thursday afternoon I got about 45 minutes' notice and we had an emergency meeting of the Rules Committee to yank this thing away from the Appropriations Committee and set up the process to get it to the floor. Usually there is plenty of notice to the membership, but in this case I cannot say that was the case. Some of the Members on our side of the aisle had already left the city and were going home because they were under the impression we were finishing the business of the day. The Rules Committee had no notice that we would be meeting.

Was the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee notified of this Rules Committee meeting? No. Was the distinguished gentleman from Arizona, the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee, notified of this meeting? No. Was the Republican leader notified? I think there is even question about that.

As a matter of fact, when the Rules Committee was meeting, the leadership was here on the floor talking about the schedule for this week, and so when I got to the Rules Committee meeting, I was the only Member from this side of the aisle in the room. The Republican leader was not there, the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee was not with us, the ranking member of the Intelligence Committee was not there, and the ranking member of the Appropriations Committee was not there.

So I started asking questions about what we were doing, what was the process, what we were considering, and I found that the only Member who was testifying was the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. BARNES], not the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, not a member of the Appropriations Committee. He was the Member who was testifying about what kind of rule he thought we should have. And after asking a series of questions over about 15 or 20 minutes, it finally dawned on me that nobody had bothered to ask about

what the substance was of what we were considering.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LOTT. I am pleased to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, on the point the gentleman was making just a moment ago, I sat on the floor with some of the Republican leadership on Thursday afternoon. In a very specific conversation it became my understanding that there had been a discussion between the ranking member of the Appropriations Subcommittee and the Speaker's people and there had been agreement that the bill would come to the full committee, and that the 3-day rule would apply. So I went back to my home and spent the weekend getting prepared for the debate before the full Committee on Appropriations. And then suddenly on Monday morning we find that the Speaker and those who run this place had decided to arbitrarily exercise their power to fundamentally violate what we understand to be the rules.

I think the gentleman raises a very important point for the membership to know that, that for some reason 2 days were critical; there was not going to be time for Members to prepare themselves, and for some reason it had to be done now. It seems to me at best that it is an arbitrary exercise of power.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Speaker, I would like to respond to the gentleman and say that it was also my impression on Thursday morning that it was going through the normal process at the subcommittee level and the full committee level, and I thought everybody was proceeding on that basis.

I realized that there was a possibility or even a likelihood that the Rules Committee might have to meet at some point on Monday or Tuesday of this week to make in order the substitutes. I understood that, and I basically was in agreement with it. But all of a sudden that apparently was not good enough, so we were summoned to the Rules Committee to carry this deed through to its completion.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my colleague's yielding, and I wonder if he would yield further to me.

Mr. LOTT. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, it occurs to me that this is just another illustration of what is becoming a pattern during this session, an exercise of power almost for the sake of demonstrating it. The American public, I think, is quite sensitive to that. There is no small reason for the public's beginning to react and look again at what is going on in this House. So my colleague on the Rules

Committee raises a very important point, and I appreciate that.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for his comments.

Getting back to that meeting in the Rules Committee, I started asking the gentleman from Maryland, "Could we see the substitute?"

Well, apparently there was no substitute that we were about to grant a rule on. It was not in writing. I could understand that there were negotiations going on, but why did the Rules Committee have to meet right then to report this rule on a substitute that we had not yet seen?

So I thought, well, OK, it is not in writing. Let me ask him, what are his parameters? What is he really thinking about? And I was floored at what I found as I started asking questions. He really was not sure.

I was told one thing in the Rules Committee, and I find that what is actually in this substitute offered by the gentleman from Maryland and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] is quite different from what we were hearing in the Rules Committee.

I understand that we set up a process that allows for changes to be made. But now just envision that. We were in the Rules Committee on that Thursday afternoon—by then it was 4 o'clock—to make in order a rule on a substitute that we had not seen, that in fact was not written down, and the gentleman from Maryland did not really know what it was going to be.

So at that point we were able to get our leader, the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. BOB MICHEL, in the committee, along with the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. STUMP] and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD], to start asking some questions and try to keep this process from being a complete steamroller, where at least there would be some orderly process for substitutes to be developed and offered and so that the compromise that will be offered by Mr. MICHEL and others would at least have a chance.

The gentleman from Maryland [Mr. BARNES] had magnanimously indicated that he would have no objection to Republicans offering an alternative in a motion to recommit with instructions. But, when it was pointed out that we just might need a germaneness waiver because we were interested in providing some kind of assistance to the freedom fighters inside Nicaragua, it was suddenly suggested that we should have our motion ready to file by 8 o'clock that evening. Our poor Republican leader had found himself in attendance at a surprise party in his honor, to which he had not been invited in the first place, and was then being asked to go back home and put on his tuxedo. It all begins to sound a little Kafkaesque, when you think

about it. The Rules Committee had become the twilight zone.

Fortunately, I was able to persuade our colleagues on the committee to permit both Mr. BARNES and Mr. MICHEL to file their amendments in yesterday's RECORD, and also to permit the minority to have an equal shot with a substitute, rather than being relegated to just 10 minutes on a motion to recommit. For that small favor I am sincerely grateful. So what we have here today is probably the best bad rule we could hope to get. It's like being fed a toad instead of a snake: they're both hard to swallow.

All this confusion, irregularity, and flouting of House rules and orderly process could have been avoided if we had followed the procedure prescribed by the continuing appropriations resolution last year, requiring the Appropriations Committee to first report a joint resolution approving the \$14 million.

The continuing resolution also contains language permitting each House to adopt additional procedures and rules, and this would have allowed a special rule to permit both the majority and minority to offer more detailed substitutes which better reflect the administration's current request and the current thinking of those on the other side.

So I just emphasize to the Members that the process stinks, the way this has been handled. Why not the regular process? It would have made 1 or 2 days' difference. So what? Well, I am told in confidence that it is because we want to act the same day the Senate acts.

Is there something magical about that? Do we violate all rules of normal process around here just to make sure we are not influenced by the other body? Come now.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield once again?

Mr. LOTT. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Speaker, I appreciate my colleague's yielding.

An item has just come to my attention that is very appropriate to the comments that the gentleman has been making, and it is most appropriate that the Speaker is in the chair as I review this comment. I say this:

I pledge to be prompt and impartial in deciding parliamentary questions. I pledge to be patient, good tempered and courteous toward the individual Members. I pledge best to employ the talent of the House for full and fair consideration of issues that come before us. In "those moments of agitation from which no deliberative assembly is always entirely exempt," I pledge to "remain cool and unshaken, guarding the permanent laws and rules of the House from being sacrificed to temporary passions, prejudices, or interests."

That quote is from our Speaker, TIP O'NEILL, upon being sworn in during this session. I must say that I believe the Speaker means those words. From time to time around this place, however, our staff members sometimes get in the way and interfere with our ability to control passions, and sometimes they overreact. I certainly hope that we would keep those words in mind as we go forward with our debate today.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California [Mr. LEWIS].

I would like to urge my colleagues briefly in this time for debate under the rule to look today at the substitutes that were printed in the RECORD yesterday. I do not know now whether we will try to get to those substitutes tonight or whether they will come up tomorrow. I presume and I hope that we will have a vote tonight, probably around 7 o'clock, on the Michel resolution, and that then tomorrow we will take up the Barnes substitute and the Michel compromise that has been printed in the RECORD. But I ask the Members to look at these compromises so they will at least know what we are talking about.

□ 1020

The Barnes substitute, as I understand it, would provide nothing for the Contras, nothing for Nicaragua. It would provide aid and the dollar amount has changed, but I presume now about \$10 million for refugees outside of Nicaragua, which has already been basically described as the Refugee Incentive Act. Let us encourage them to come on out of Nicaragua right across the border and get in on the refugee funds that will be available, and then \$4 million will go to the Contadora countries after an agreement is reached to help pay for the implementation of the process.

Mr. Speaker, this is a very unusual substitute, I must say. I have to ask, what does it contribute to trying to get the parties inside Nicaragua to talking with each other?

I have a few other questions that I would like to ask on the substance and we will later in general debate; but please, my colleagues, take a look now at the substitute substance before we get to it so that you can ask legitimate questions.

The compromise that the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL] will offer has also been printed in the RECORD, but the parameters are basically this. There is \$14 million for humanitarian aid and humanitarian aid is described and defined as food, clothing, medicine and other humanitarian assistance.

It says specifically that it is not to be used to provide arms, munitions or other weapons of war to any person, group or organization directly or indirectly. These funds will be adminis-

tered through the Agency for International Development and the President is strongly urged and encouraged to take steps necessary to impose an embargo on trade between the United States and Nicaragua if the Government of Nicaragua does not enter into good faith negotiations with the Nicaraguan democratic opposition.

This compromise is asking for humanitarian aid without a trigger, a carrot or a stick. Humanitarian aid to those people who are fighting against the Communists in Nicaragua—and that is so bad?

I cannot understand really the turn that this debate has taken.

Now, it is especially unfortunate, I think, when we are talking about countering Communist aggression and expansion in the Americas, if we cannot agree on the nature of the threat in our own front yard and how to deal with it, how can we hope to remain the shining beacon of freedom for the rest of the world?

We hear a lot of hyperbole about our policy toward Central America. Some would have us believe that supporting the President's peace initiative is tantamount to voting for a Gulf of Tonkin resolution; but I would suggest that the opposite is the case. The real danger lies in turning our backs on the problem, covering our eyes and hoping it will go away; or that others will somehow fix it and make it right for a few Yankee dollars; or that a little refugee assistance will somehow save our consciences. That is not the way to deal with Communist expansion.

Let us not kid ourselves. Do we really want more Cubas?

Mr. Speaker, let me conclude my remarks on this rule by saying that I hope the next time we have such an important issue before us that we will not resort to the type of process that we have had here. Let us go through the normal procedure so that Members will fully understand how it is coming to the floor, when it is coming, what committee has jurisdiction, so that there will be some hearings on what we are taking up on the floor. I think it would serve us all better.

Our country's foreign policy is too serious a matter for such petty jockeying and political pointmaking. We have established orderly procedures in this House for very sound reasons, including the assurance of a truly deliberative process that includes the benefit of a committee report, the protection of minority rights, and the maintenance of a civil environment in which to conduct our debates. When we short-circuit any of these procedures and protections, we risk losing the comity on which democracy is dependent. We can ill afford such a breakdown on an important foreign policy debate with the rest of the world watching. Let us demonstrate in

the future that we are capable of better.

I have to say if we do not report this rule, then we will be I guess right back at the gate as far as trying to devise a process to consider it on the floor. At least our substitute will have a chance to be considered under this rule.

Mr. Speaker, I would urge my colleagues to express themselves against this process, but I have to acknowledge that the rule is probably the best that we could get under the worst possible conditions.

Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time and I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BONIOR of Michigan. Mr. Speaker, I have no requests for time and I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered.

The SPEAKER. The question is on the resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the ayes appeared to have it.

Mr. LOTT. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were—yeas 286, nays 127, not voting 20, as follows:

[Roll No. 62]

YEAS—286

Ackerman
Addabbo
Akaka
Alexander
Anderson
Andrews
Annunzio
Anthony
Applegate
Aspin
Atkins
AuCoin
Barnard
Barnes
Bates
Bedell
Bellenson
Bennett
Bentley
Berman
Bevill
Blaggi
Boehlert
Boggs
Boland
Boner (TN)
Bonior (MI)
Bonker
Borski
Bosco
Boucher
Boxer
Breaux
Brooks
Broomfield
Brown (CA)
Broyhill
Bruce
Bryant
Burton (CA)
Campbell
Carper
Carr

Chappell
Clay
Clinger
Coats
Coelho
Coleman (MO)
Coleman (TX)
Collins
Conce
Conyers
Cooper
Coughlin
Coyne
Daniel
Darden
Daschle
Dellums
Derrick
Dickinson
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Donnelly
Dorgan (ND)
Downey
Duncan
Durbin
Dwyer
Dyson
Early
Eckart (OH)
Edgar
Edwards (CA)
English
Erdreich
Evans (IL)
Fascell
Fawell
Fazio
Felghan
Filippo
Florio
Foglietta

Foley
Ford (MI)
Fowler
Frank
Frost
Garcia
Gaydos
Geddeson
Gephardt
Gibbons
Gilman
Glickman
Gonzalez
Goodling
Gordon
Gradison
Gray (IL)
Gray (PA)
Green
Guarini
Gunderson
Hall (OH)
Hall, Ralph
Hall, Sam
Hamilton
Hammerschmidt
Hawkins
Hayes
Hefner
Henry
Hertel
Hillis
Holt
Hopkins
Horton
Howard
Hoyer
Hubbard
Huckaby
Hughes
Hutto
Hyde
Jacobs

Jenkins
Jones (NC)
Jones (OK)
Jones (TN)
Kantoraki
Kaptur
Kasich
Kastenmeier
Kemp
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Kolbe
Kolter
Kostmayer
LaFalce
Lantos
Leach (IA)
Leath (TX)
Lehman (CA)
Lehman (FL)
Leland
Levin (MI)
Levine (CA)
Lipinski
Livingston
Lloyd
Long
Lowry (WA)
Lujan
Lukens
Mack
MacKay
Manton
Markey
Martinez
Matsui
Mavroules
Mazzoli
McCain
McCurdy
McDade
McHugh
Meyers
Mica
Michel
Mikulski
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Mitchell
Moakley
Molinaro
Mollohan

Montgomery
Moody
Moore
Morrison (CT)
Mrazek
Murphy
Murtha
Myers
Natcher
Neal
Nichols
Nowak
Oaker
Oberstar
Obey
Olin
Owens
Panetta
Parris
Pease
Penny
Pepper
Perkins
Pickle
Price
Pursell
Quillen
Rahall
Rangel
Ray
Regula
Reid
Richardson
Ridge
Rinaldo
Robinson
Roe
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roukema
Rowland (GA)
Roybal
Russo
Sabo
Scheuer
Schneider
Schroeder
Schuette
Schulze
Schumer
Sharp
Shelby
Sikorski

Siskiy
Slattery
Smith (FL)
Smith (IA)
Smith (NE)
Smith (NJ)
Snowe
Solarz
Spence
Spratt
St Germain
Staggers
Stallings
Stark
Stokes
Stratton
Studds
Stump
Swift
Synar
Tallon
Tauxin
Thomas (GA)
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traficant
Traxler
Udall
Valentine
Vander Jagt
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmeyer
Walgren
Watkins
Waxman
Weaver
Weiss
Wheat
Whitley
Whitten
Williams
Wirth
Wise
Wolpe
Wright
Wyden
Yates
Yatron
Young (MO)

NAYS—127

Gregg
Hansen
Hartnett
Hendon
Hiler
Hunter
Ireland
Jeffords
Johnson
Kindness
Kramer
Lagomarsino
Latta
Lent
Lewis (CA)
Lewis (FL)
Lightfoot
Loeffler
Lott
Lowery (CA)
Lungren
Madigan
Marlenee
Martin (IL)
Martin (NY)
McCandless
McCollum
McGrath
McKernan
McKinney
McMillan
Miller (OH)
Miller (WA)
Monson
Moorhead
Morrison (WA)
Nelson
O'Brien
Oxley
Packard
Petri
Porter
Ritter

Roberts
Roemer
Roth
Rowland (CT)
Rudd
Savage
Saxton
Schaefer
Sensenbrenner
Shaw
Shumway
Shuster
Siljander
Skeen
Skelton
Slaughter
Smith (NH)
Smith, Denny
Smith, Robert
Snyder
Solomon
Stangeland
Stenholm
Strang
Sundquist
Sweeney
Swindall
Tauke
Taylor
Thomas (CA)
Vucanovich
Walker
Weber
Whitehurst
Whittaker
Wilson
Wolf
Wortley
Wyle
Young (FL)
Zschau

NOT VOTING—20

Badham	Fuqua	Ortiz
Bustamante	Grotberg	Pashayan
Byron	Hatcher	Rodino
Crane	Hefel	Rogers
de la Garza	Lundine	Seiberling
Dowdy	McEwen	Young (AK)
Ford (TN)	Nelson	

□ 1040

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Ortiz for, with Mr. Grotberg against.
Mr. Rogers for, with Mr. Crane against.

Messrs. BOULTER, HUNTER, and McMILLAN changed their votes from "aye" to "nay."

So the resolution was agreed to.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

A motion to reconsider was laid on the table.

WAIVING REQUIREMENT FOR SECRET SESSION IN CONSIDERATION OF HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 239

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the requirement in House Resolution 136 for a secret session be waived and that 10 hours of debate proceed under the provisions of section 8066 of the Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 1985, as incorporated in Public Law 98-473.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Mr. NIELSON of Utah. Mr. Speaker, I was unable to be present for the votes yesterday.

Mr. Speaker, had I been present I would have voted "yes" on rollcall No. 59 concerning the Journal, I would have voted "yes" on rollcall No. 60, the Nicholson resolution, and I would have voted "no" on No. 61, the Chilean resolution.

MAKING APPROPRIATIONS FOR AID TO NICARAGUA

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to House Resolution 136 and rule XXIII the Chair declares the House in the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 239).

□ 1047

IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 239) to approve the obligation of funds available under Public Law 98-473 for supporting military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, with Mr. REID in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the joint resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to the rule, the first reading of the joint resolution is dispensed with.

The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL] will be recognized for 5 hours and the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABO] will be recognized for 5 hours.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL].

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, at the outset of this historic debate, I would like to say a few words about the parliamentary situation that shaped the course of these votes.

Our first vote today will be on language which, if I had the choice, I would not have introduced. I would have preferred language which would implement the essence of the President's peace plan, based on the San Jose Declaration.

But I was precluded from offering such language. Let me explain why.

You will all recall that when the continuing resolution was passed in the last Congress and the funds for the Contras were fenced off as we did similarly with the MX, there was specific language written into that resolution which obliged us or anyone introducing the resolution to fence it in, to specifically read as follows: "Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled that the Congress approves the obligation and expenditure of funds available for fiscal year 1985 for supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua."

Mr. Chairman, this first vote is, in essence, an artificial contrivance, designed to put the President's position in the worst possible light.

I think our Members should know that this first vote will be held on language which distorts the President's wishes.

Later we will introduce an amendment that will allow Members to make a realistic decision as to where they stand.

And the issue is this: Do you want to help the forces of democratic pluralism in Nicaragua or do you want to consolidate the power of the Marxist-Leninist dictatorship?

Recently, the Sandinista leader Mr. Ortega insulted the Congress by holding out a carrot. He promised a ceasefire if we would just do his bidding and abandon the democratic forces in his country.

This is the kind of cynicism one expects from such a source. I can understand Ortega saying it; what I can't understand is anyone in the Congress believing it.

If you have a sense of déjà vu about all this, so do I. Today we are repeat-

ing a ritual that we have gone through many times.

It goes something like this:

The United States goes to the aid of a group or country that is fighting Communists. The cry is raised that our side isn't good enough to support. It is corrupt. It is immoral. It commits atrocities. A propaganda campaign is mounted against the allies of the United States.

Then the critics of the administration tell us the Communists are open to change if only we would be more generous in our treatment of them.

When the true facts of Communist tyranny become inescapably clear, the administration's critics tell us they oppose what the Communists are doing. But they don't like the means the administration has chosen to stop it. They offer no realistic alternative themselves.

Does this sound familiar? It should. We have been through this scenario over and over again in the past 30 years. And in every case the Communists proved to be worse than forces we had originally supported but then abandoned. Millions of innocent men, women, and children have paid the price of our refusal to acknowledge that communism is the worst form of tyranny.

In the present case, we even have some critics of the President who do not want to call the Sandinistas Communists.

But the Sandinistas are self-proclaimed Marxist-Leninists. And if someone can point out the substantive differences between Marxist-Leninists and Communists I'd sure like to hear it.

Gertrude Stein said "A rose is a rose is a rose." I say a Sandinista is a Marxist-Leninist is a Communist. So I'm going to call them what they are.

They believe in their ideology the way religious people believe in God. They will ultimately sell their nation to the Soviet Union the same way Castro sold Cuba if we give them the chance.

We will hear a lot today about the real and alleged sins of the democratic forces of Nicaragua.

I'll let other Members correct these distortions.

As for myself, I don't care if the democratic forces of Nicaragua are good enough to go to Heaven. I'm interested in seeing that they are strong enough to save their country from a Communist hell.

We are told we should not be supporting a group that wants to overthrow the Government of Managua.

Overthrow the Communists in Nicaragua? Fat chance, the way we're providing aid.

Fourteen million dollars worth of aid isn't going to help them overthrow an armed force of 62,000 active duty

personnel, a total force of 119,000, including reserves and militia.

This Sandinista force has Soviet MI-24 hind attack helicopters. It has 150 tanks, 200 other armored vehicles and some 300 to 400 surface-to-air missiles. The Sandinistas have nearly completed a runway long enough to service any aircraft in the Soviet or Cuban inventory.

But, we are told that if we give \$14 million worth of aid—in any form—to the democratic forces, they will suddenly run into Managua and take over.

What nonsense! I for one wish this country could make a decision to give the democratic forces what they really need to make a difference in Nicaragua. But the political facts dictate we argue about \$14 million to help those engaged in a struggle with the largest standing army in Central America.

We are not faced with a choice between force and dialogue. We are faced with a choice between a mixture of force and dialogue on one hand and inevitable Marxist-Leninist consolidation of power on the other.

Saying you are against the Sandinistas but don't want to help the democratic forces is not enough. That's like saying you are against a disease but unwilling to treat it. It's like saying you are against arson but don't want to fund the fire department. It's like saying you are against crime in the streets but want to provide the police with food stamps and not weapons.

The bishops of Nicaragua, in their Easter pastoral letter, condemned the Sandinistas and asked them to enter into negotiations with the democratic forces.

Those religious groups closest to the scene recognize the true character of the Sandinistas. Listen to Jews whose synagogue was closed and were forced to leave the country. They'll tell you about freedom of religion in this new Communist state. Listen to the Miskito Indians whose clergy were killed by the Sandinistas.

One newspaper columnist recently wrote that the Sandinistas can't be all bad because they like baseball and they even jog.

This is the same kind of argument that we heard when Andropov became head of the Soviet Union. He drank scotch and liked jazz.

Sometimes you wonder how these scotch-drinking jazz-loving baseball-playing, jogging, lovable Communists ever find the time to read Karl Marx and to do away with dissenters.

Let me read to you one of their goals as outlined in the definitive statement of principles of the Sandinistas, in 1969. They have never repudiated this goal.

Struggle for a true union of the Central American peoples within one country beginning with support for national liberation movement in neighboring states.

Stripped of the Communist jargon that means the ongoing revolution.

They said it themselves.

We should at least pay them the tribute of acknowledging they believe deeply in their own principles.

If the United States doesn't believe we have the moral and political right to aid the democratic force fighting communism, then God help the future of freedom in this hemisphere.

The Communists have no legitimacy. Their legitimacy comes through the barrel of a gun. Why do critics of the President insist that they are legitimate rulers? The people didn't give them power. They took power from the people.

Let me read to you the report of the Bipartisan Commission on Central America, still the most definitive and objective study of the current tragedy in Central America. This is what the Commission had to say about Nicaragua:

The consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Managua would be seen by its neighbors as constituting a permanent security threat. Because of its secretive nature, the existence of a political order on the Cuban model in Nicaragua would pose major difficulties in negotiating, implementing, and verifying any Sandinista commitment to refrain from supporting insurgency and subversion in other countries.

Let me now tell you what I believe the real issues are:

I believe, with the bipartisan commission, that the current Communist government in Nicaragua is a threat to peace and stability in the region. I believe the Communists are ideologically committed to human rights violations as matter of Marxist-Leninist principles. I believe they will aid the Soviet Union in establishing an enclave in this hemisphere.

Because of that threat I believe the United States, along with its democratic allies in the region, has the moral, diplomatic, and geopolitical right and duty to aid Nicaraguans who wish to have a pluralistic, democratic society in Nicaragua.

I believe that to abandon the signers of the San Jose Declaration would constitute a grave historic and irrevocable error that we will pay for dearly in the years ahead.

I believe it is not enough for Members of this House to state they don't like what the Communists are doing, but are unwilling to take action against them. This is de facto handing over of Nicaragua to allies of the Soviet Union.

Spare us the stale, ritualistic, generalized criticisms of the Communists. We'll believe you are sincere about them when you do something about them.

I am reminded of an old saying:

Things are what they are. The consequences of them will be what they will be. Why then do we seek to delude ourselves?

I hope the debate that follows discusses some of the points I have raised, for I sincerely believe that if all the facts are taken into consideration, a bipartisan majority in this House will do the right thing and continue to help those democratic forces of Nicaragua.

□ 1050

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 10 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I rise to express my opposition to renewal of U.S. military aid to the Contras fighting against the Government of Nicaragua.

Mr. Chairman, the issue of how the United States can best protect its own national interests in Central America is the subject which is often debated and discussed in simplistic terms—communism versus freedom, right versus wrong, good versus evil. In reality, America's long-range national interest in Central America is an extremely complex subject involving issues such as how poverty can be ameliorated in the Third World; what is the proper mix of foreign policy initiatives to free the Third World from the yoke of dictatorships of the right or left.

□ 1100

What can effectively be done to counter high infant mortality rates and health problems. How can social justice be achieved in an evolutionary way.

Mr. Chairman, I too, am concerned at the growing Soviet and Cuban adventurism in Central America. The Soviets and/or their surrogates have a long history of seeking to exploit economically, socially, and politically depressed areas of the world. We have had a lot of experience in dealing with their "fishing in troubled waters."

In countering previous attempts by the Soviet Union to subvert depressed or troubled areas, the United States has frequently implemented programs such as the Marshall plan, the Truman Doctrine and the Alliance for Progress. We used the "arsenal of democracy" and the riches of our country to build up the infrastructure of the threatened areas that they would ward off the seductive appeals of Marxism. But this tradition appears to have been abandoned in the implementation of certain aspects of our Central American policy.

Now we seem to feel that the way to combat such Soviet "fishing expeditions" is to overthrow the government which has allowed the Soviets a foothold. I know and I have heard it all before that our policy is not to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua. Even if the Contras publicly state that is their goal, we are to believe our goal is to interdict arms, bring the Sandinistas to the negotiating table, and re-

store the original principles of the Sandinistas' revolution.

Mr. Chairman, do any of us really believe that our ultimate goal is not the replacement of the Sandinistas with a government more to our liking? It is surprising we do have diplomatic relations with the present government, we even have a most-favored-nation trade agreement with the incumbent government. Is it the American way to covertly or overtly overthrow them? I think not and I hope not. Even if we were successful, would not the Sandinistas merely take to the hills and become the Contras themselves? We supported the Sandinistas and the Contras were the ones under Somoza, and we threw them out. Now, would that not be reversed?

I fully recognize the burden of being a great and powerful nation dictates that many tough decisions must be made in the international arena. I also recognize that the moral high ground can be a lonely and sometimes frustrating position in the hardball game of international relations. However, I believe that totally abandoning the moral high ground through actions such as mining of the Nicaraguan harbors is a step which simply must not be supported by the people's branch of the American Government.

Mr. Chairman, the response to the covert war of the Contras has been a significant expansion of Soviet arms pouring into Nicaragua. Escalation of the violence and bloodletting is ongoing. We hear in the press that the President proposes that initially the additional aid should be for humanitarian purposes, but it is clear to me that the escalation of violence and bloodletting would continue since this nonlethal aid would simply permit other resources going to the Contras to be used for arms.

Let us look at the main problem facing Congress if it approves this joint resolution. Notwithstanding all the other negative factors involved, there is an impression that the initial assistance to the Contras, if approved, will consist of humanitarian aid.

However, my colleagues, when you look at the exact language contained in the formal documents presently pending before the Congress, the documents pending before this Committee today, you find no mention, no mention of humanitarian assistance. There is no distortion; the language is absolute and clear. If you had read and if you have not read, you should read the President's classified report, you will find no distortion as to the meaning of the resolution presently before this House.

The letter transmitting the classified report to Congress on April 3, 1985, reads as follows, and this is what is before us today.

The letter reads:

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to the provisions of Title VIII, Section 8066 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985 (Public Law 98-473, enacted October 12, 1984; 98 Stat. 1935), I herewith—

And this is the President's message to the Congress, and I am quoting exactly—

I herewith transmit a classified report on U.S. support for the democratic resistance movement in Nicaragua. On the basis of this report, I have determined that assistance for military or paramilitary operations now prohibited by section 8066(a) of that Act is necessary.

No distortion; pure and simple language. Military aid.

Then we look at the resolution which we will be voting on later today. House Joint Resolution 239, introduced by the gentleman from Illinois on April 15, 1985. Again, the resolution reads as follows:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves the obligation and expenditure of funds available for fiscal year 1985 for supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.

I repeat, gentlemen, at no place in the letter of transmittal, the classified report or the joint resolution is mentioned "humanitarian assistance." If we vote for this resolution, we are giving military aid, we are voting for another Gulf of Tonkin resolution.

Again, all that has been mentioned specifically, not by inference, but specifically, is military and paramilitary assistance. If the Congress approves this joint resolution, we are approving nothing else but arms assistance to the Contras.

Mr. Chairman, I recommend the disapproval of House Joint Resolution 239.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, on Monday, Secretary of State Shultz summarized our dilemma and our goals in Central America very simply. He said:

We confront a fundamental challenge, challenge to our national interests and to the freedom and security of our neighbors. Our goals in Central America are clear: We seek peace, security, economic progress, and the growth of freedom and democracy in every country.

Nothing could be more clear or reasonable.

Yet, Mr. Speaker, I have the feeling we are not listening to the lessons of history and are eager to repeat the mistakes of our own past.

Unless we are prepared to tighten our belts and get behind the President's policy, history will record this debate as just another footnote to the long chapter entitled: "American Foreign Policy Shoots Itself in the Foot—Again."

Forty years is half a lifetime for most of us but little more than a blink of the eye in history.

With a few notable exceptions, the dominant theme of the last 40 years has been one of unprecedented Soviet expansion in the face of remarkable U.S. foreign policy vacillation, weakness and wishful thinking.

Cuba, Cambodia, Iran, Vietnam were foreign policy disasters for the United States in which many of the major battles were fought and lost right here at home rather than on overseas battlefields.

If Harry Truman is watching, he is spinning in his grave at the prospect of another self-imposed setback in a long list of foreign policy defeats since World War II to which he provided the strongest exception.

He stood up to Communist expansion in Western Europe in a way that has helped contain the Soviets and maintain the status quo there as nowhere else in the world.

Had he not been the strong exception to modern U.S. history, Western Europe might well have gone the way of the Eastern bloc nations.

As the dominoes continue to topple in the Southeast Asian vacuum we helped create, we are preparing the same sort of free-fire zone Communist aggression in Central America.

And, while our policy weaknesses are the same as in the past, this time the revolver is clearly in the hands of the Congress and aimed squarely at America's achilles heel.

Central America is not Southeast Asia or even Western Europe—it is our own front yard.

Even our isolationist forefathers had the good sense to recognize the Western Hemisphere as an area in which America's vital interests were permanently at risk.

Let's face the facts. To some people in this Congress, it is more important to defeat the President's program in Central America than to save democracy in that nearby region. To some, it is more important to politicize this issue than to understand the reality of Central America today.

By failing to understand what the Contras represent, many in this Congress are missing the big picture. They fail to see what is developing in Central America and what the future will bring.

What kind of neighbors do we want to have in this hemisphere? It is easy to criticize a program. Many of you oppose the President. I challenge you to come up with a workable and realistic alternative to what we are doing in Central America.

It is easy to see that the Sandinistas are dyed-in-the-wool Marxist-Leninists who continue to talk like Soviet-style dictators. They have attacked the church in that country, the press,

small businessmen, unions, independent farmers and the poor Miskito Indians.

The poor neighbors in Nicaragua have suffered from the Sandinistas' efforts to export their revolution. With Soviet and Cuban help, Commandante Ortega and company are still working to consolidate their power. Their goals and objectives remain the same. They will soon turn Nicaragua into a full blown Communist state. Should they succeed, we would face a second Cuba in this hemisphere, this time on the mainland of the Americas.

Can any of you deny the strategic dangers that this implies? If Cuba can be a guide to Communist intentions, Nicaragua would intensify efforts to undermine its neighbors in the name of revolution.

The first casualty of a Communist consolidation in Nicaragua would be the freedom and hopes for democracy of the Nicaraguan people. They have already suffered too much. The second casualty would be the security of the region.

Our efforts have succeeded in Central America. Our Government's policy in the region is designed to build Democratic institutions and to avoid a second Cuba as well as a second Vietnam, with American troops mired in combat. On the whole, our policy is working. Nicaragua, however, continues to destabilize its neighbors and deny human rights to its own people.

In April President Reagan made an appeal in the name of peace. He called upon the government and the armed opposition to stop fighting and to begin talks on reconciliation. He asked for the restoration of democracy and an end to tyranny. The call for peace included a cease-fire and church-mediated talks. The funds provided for the Contras would be used for humanitarian purposes for a specific period of time. After a 60-day period, the President could restart military assistance to the Contras.

Sad but true, the Sandinistas have so far turned a deaf ear to the calls for dialog, for peace and democracy. While our Government is trying to get Nicaragua to move toward peace with its own people, with its neighbors, and therefore, with the United States, only Congress can give the President the means to make peace work by supporting the President's efforts.

All too often, Congress embroils itself in critical foreign policy issues. Some in this body like to micromanage what America is doing around the world. More often than not, our meddling in these sensitive matters has made a mess out of what the executive branch was trying to do.

Just a few days ago, a number of Senators were in Managua receiving peace overtures from the Sandinistas. Our own Embassy in that country was

unaware of the Sandinistas' latest peace ploys. How can a world power turn the conduct of its foreign policy over to the 500-or-so Members of Congress? Chaos would reign supreme. The Contra issue is a case in point.

The Sandinistas are tough and determined. They are street fighters who will use every trick in the book to win over popular sentiment in our own open democratic society.

The recent public relations campaign is a case in point. Throughout their years in power, the Sandinistas have been flexible only when they were convinced they had no choice. They have made solemn pledges in the past to the OAS, but failed to keep them.

The Sandinistas themselves have admitted that opposition from the Contras forced them to hold an election. Hesitation or neglect now on our part will allow the Sandinistas the time they need to consolidate their totalitarian control.

We must keep the pressure on the Marxist Nicaraguan Government.

I have urged the President to go even further and consider the immediate cutoff of trade with that nation.

Why should we continue to subsidize a government which is promoting revolution among its neighbors and denying basic rights to its people by buying its exports?

Why should we help sustain its economy and its military machine by providing it hard-to-get American products, including spare parts?

The time for a trade cutoff is now.

As a cosponsor of the joint resolution before us, I strongly urge my colleagues to vote for funds for the Nicaraguan democratic resistance. Should we approve these funds, they will be used for humanitarian purposes if the Sandinistas accept the offer of the Democratic opposition for dialog, peace and democracy.

A vote for this resolution is a vote for peace. A "Yes" vote on this issue is a commitment to democracy and stability in our front yard. A vote for funds for the democratic resistance is a frank acceptance of freedom and democracy for future generations of Central Americans. Now is the time for this Congress to decide.

This is not the time to take a cheap shot at the President, central America cannot afford another setback.

As Secretary Shultz said yesterday:

The choice before Congress is grave and cannot be avoided.

We are at a pivotal moment that will help determine the future of Central America and directly affect the national security of the United States.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I would be happy to yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. GIBBONS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman for a fine speech, and the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABO] for a fine speech, and the minority leader for a fine speech.

The gentleman from Michigan heard Mr. ADDABO's statements about the classified information that had been transferred to the Intelligence Committee about this, saying that none of this aid was for humanitarian purposes.

What is the gentleman's response to Mr. ADDABO's statement? As I understand Mr. ADDABO, he said that the Michel resolution does not refer to humanitarian aid. The transmittal of the request to Congress does not refer to humanitarian aid, or economic aid, and puts all the emphasis upon military aid.

Does the gentleman agree with Mr. ADDABO on that?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I would say to my good friend, the gentleman from Florida, that the resolution before us was set up last October. What we are really considering here is the personal commitment of President Reagan that the money would be used solely for humanitarian purposes, and there was a deadline set up. It has been indicated that it would go to the end of the fiscal year and then if there was not any movement on the part of the Sandinistas, then the money could be used for lethal weapons.

Mr. GIBBONS. I thank the gentleman for his clarification. Would the gentleman yield for one more question?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I would be very happy to yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. GIBBONS. In the earlier part of the debate, the gentleman mentioned President Truman and what he had done for Europe and Japan immediately following World War II in order to prevent them from going Communist. Obviously that was a very important move on the part of the President.

As I remember it, it was essentially three things that were done.

One, there was a Marshall Plan which called for the appropriation of relatively small amounts of money considering what we spend today.

□ 1120

No. 2, there was a deliberative tilting of the value of the dollar at Bretton Woods so as to encourage the building of infrastructure in both Europe and Japan, allowing them to revitalize their industrial base and go immediately into the export market and earn currency.

No. 3, there was a deliberative tilting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade rules at that time in order

to encourage those countries to revitalize their economies.

Now, those are the three important things that I remember Mr. Truman did. How does that comparison of Truman then and this program now parallel each other?

I recognize that we have done something through the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and that is beginning to work in the rest of the Caribbean. But, of course, it is denied to Nicaragua because of the statute we passed.

Is there anything that we can hope for in the future that the administration will try to do in order to build a greater amount of private infrastructure in these economies than just humanitarian aid or pure military aid?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman is hitting on a very important point of the entire problem down there. I think that while the Caribbean Basin Initiative is a good first start, it is not the only solution to the problem down there.

The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America issued an extensive report recommending economic and military assistance for the countries in the region. Last year, Congressman MURTHA and I offered an amendment to the foreign aid bill to implement the Commission recommendations which was accepted by this House. We need to maintain this strong commitment to economic development to help solve the serious economic problems faced by the countries in the region.

Obviously we cannot do much when we have a government like that Sandinista whose overall objective is really regional domination. It is obvious to me that it is much more than just the country of Nicaragua.

If the Sandinista hold free elections, stop exporting their revolutions and so forth, I think it would be incumbent upon our Congress to take another look to see if there is something further we can do to benefit the people of that country. I think the whole region has been ignored for too long.

Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his question.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] has consumed 14 minutes.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BOLAND], the former chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution. I do so, not simply as one who has opposed aid to the Contras in the past. During my service on the Intelligence Committee, I made a sincere effort to understand the facts that underlie the situation in Central America. And I saw to it that

those facts were provided to the House.

The facts were that the Government of Nicaragua was providing arms, ammunition, communications, logistics, training, and safe haven to insurgents attempting to topple the Government of El Salvador. The facts were that the Government of Nicaragua was on a Marxist-Leninist drift. The facts were that the Cubans had a large presence in Nicaragua and a great deal of influence with the Nicaraguan Government. The facts were that there was a military build up in Nicaragua.

I no longer serve on the Intelligence Committee, but my information is, that these are still the facts. But, the issue before us today cannot be limited to those facts. There are other facts—ones which supporters of the Contras like to forget—ones which the Intelligence Committee pointed out years ago—ones which the administration ignores.

Those facts are, that no matter what you call the Contras—freedom fighters, brothers, or brigands—their is a particularly vicious war. Its casualties are not only combatants, they are coffee pickers, medical workers, evangelical workers. The facts are, that the Contras can operate effectively in only a very small part of Nicaragua's mountainous areas. They have no hold in the cities and with the population at large. And the result is that the Contras have little likelihood of defeating the Sandinistas.

That is not just my judgment, or that of our Intelligence Committee, it is the judgment of Gen. Paul Gorman, until recently, commander in chief of the U.S. Southern Command in Panama.

Overthrow of the Sandinistas is "not feasible in the near future," he said.

Mr. Chairman, those are the facts. Those are what we have to work with, and from them, we must somehow mold a policy that meets the goals on which we all agree. And let us make no mistake—we all want the same goals in Central America: peace, democracy, economic development, and an end to a possible threat by Nicaragua to its neighbors.

The proposal before us today offers only one alternative—armed conflict, and armed conflict with a terrible hidden cost. It is conflict, to which we would be committed in the most public and painful way, a conflict which cannot succeed without the use of U.S. forces.

I know of no one, no Member of this body, who would stand up today and endorse the use of American forces in Nicaragua. Yet, that is what this commitment could well mean, and that would be a tragedy for both Nicaragua and the United States.

Mr. Chairman, this commitment—this war—is supposed to produce a political opening in Nicaragua. It seeks

the beginning of genuine democratic pluralism.

Mr. Chairman, 3 years of this conflict have brought us no closer to that goal. In fact, as this administration points out in great detail, we are farther from that goal. The war has failed, as an instrument of pressure on the Sandinistas. It has not encouraged them to do what we want them to. It has driven them into a corner, from which they place increasing reliance and dependence of the Soviet Union and Cuba. In sum, our efforts have turned counterproductive.

We do not want to see a Soviet-dominated Nicaragua. We do not want to see increased Cuban military presence. Yet, the war has brought us both.

It has also brought us a draft, increased censorship, and harassment of the church. And perhaps, most troubling of all to this Member, having spent 7 years attempting to rebuild the strength and image of the Central Intelligence Agency, this war has brought down public scorn upon that great agency. Worse, the Contra war has so politicized some elements within the CIA, that the objectivity of its analytical judgments in this area are now subject to question.

Mr. Chairman, U.S. policy must seek to encourage and develop viable political processes in Nicaragua that can ensure popular democracy and a renewed economy. The Contras do not offer us that. All they offer us, or their fellow Nicaraguans, is a means of striking back at the Sandinistas.

We must develop a policy for the region, that does more than lash out at the Nicaraguans. We must devise a policy that creates real, but positive, pressures on them, and we must realize that a commitment solely to force cannot avoid the further use of force.

What is the solution to the problem that Nicaragua represents to this country? This House offered the opportunity to the President in the last Congress on several occasions. At every turn, we gave the President opportunities to slow down this program, to rethink, to develop additional alternatives, to pursue diplomatic means. The cutoff, in funding the Contras, gave him the opportunity to restructure support for democratic forces in the region.

Yet, the proposal before us today, differs little from the failed policies of the last 3 years. Instead of demanding that the Sandinistas cry "uncle," now we are giving them 60 days—or else.

I want to support the President and his foreign policy initiatives in Central America, and I must say I have in the past. I want U.S. policy to be effective and enlightened for that region. I would like to see successful completion of the Contadora process, a disarmament of the Central American nations, and a revitalization of their economies.

But, I cannot see in the proposal before us a way toward any of those goals. I oppose this resolution.

Mr. Chairman, let us realize one thing about this debate and about the proposal to keep funding the Contras—whether we give them guns or not. This is not a way out of the problems which beset U.S. interests in the region, this is not a way to achieve a better Nicaragua. This is a way into a morass, into a commitment that can only lead to a deepening of civil war in Nicaragua, and further frustration of American goals.

Mr. Chairman, this House will have the opportunity tomorrow to vote on two particular amendments. There is an opportunity there to resolve the problem in a better way than we would resolve it with this resolution, and I would hope that the House would use its best judgment in adopting that the Hamilton-Barnes amendment which seeks the goals which we all want in Central America.

□ 1130

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. BOLAND. I am delighted to yield to the very distinguished gentleman.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, in reference to the gentleman's statement concerning General Gorman's belief that \$14 million would not suffice in order to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua, is the gentleman aware that also General Gorman supported increased funding to the Contras and that General Gorman felt that aid to the Contras was an integral and most vital part of the pressures that we need to exert on the Nicaraguan Government in order that they may install the democratic institutions which they promised to the Nicaraguan people?

Mr. BOLAND. I am glad the gentleman raised that question. What the gentleman says, incidentally, is correct, but let me say that in the hearings we had with Gen. Paul Gorman, I hope I am not divulging any classified information, because it was a statement that he gave to the Intelligence Committee; that particular hearing lasted I think almost 3 hours.

Frankly, I have never listened to a better witness in my life in the long years I have served in this Congress than General Gorman. He did indicate that the \$14 million would not be enough, that there would be additional funding. He knew what the situation was down there as the commander of the Southern Command in Panama. He was responsible, as the gentleman knows, for all the intelligence of the area. His operations included that and a number of other things in that area.

During the course of that hearing, I was asking myself, what would be the real question to ask General Gorman?

What country really is the country that would give some stability to Central America?

I said to my staff, "I think I'll ask General Gorman what his judgment is on what country would stabilize Central America."

They said, "No, don't do that. Don't ask that, because I'm sure—we are sure that he will probably say Nicaragua."

But as the hearings came to a close, I thought perhaps it would be a good time to ask, so I said, "General, how important is El Salvador to the interests of the United States in Central America?"

He said, "Terribly important."

I asked him, "Would you say that El Salvador is a linchpin to the stability of Central America?"

And he said, "Absolutely."

El Salvador with a population of almost 5 million people, as the gentleman knows, and I know of no one who is more knowledgeable about the area than the gentleman who is now on his feet, El Salvador with 5 million people has a lot of problems; but this House dared to have some confidence in the President of El Salvador, Mr. Duarte, and gave some military assistance to that country last year.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman.

Mr. BOLAND. So my feeling is that we are in the wrong pew in the wrong church in the wrong area by providing military assistance to the Contras.

I think that what will be offered tomorrow by this side can be agreed to by the membership of this House, that we can adopt the Hamilton-Barnes amendment. I think that offers a real chance for a more successful U.S. policy in Central America.

All of us on this side and everyone on that side agrees that Central America is important. The sea lanes of the Caribbean practically could be controlled by the countries in that area. It is really the bridge to South America. We all know it and if we cannot get stability in Central America, we are not going to have stability anywhere in that area. I am conscious of this; so I have some very deep feelings about it. I have expressed those deep feelings in the past.

I also want to say that I want to express my deep appreciation and respect to the Members on both sides who served on the Intelligence Committee during the term that I served as chairman for 7 years; it was a committee that was run in my judgment in a nonpartisan manner. There was no better Member of this Congress than the distinguished ranking minority member from Virginia, my friend, KEN ROBINSON.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BOLAND] has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. McCAIN].

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I believe that the admiration shared by both sides of the aisle for the gentleman's outstanding service as chairman of the Intelligence Committee is without question.

I also believe we are voting on another resolution tomorrow, proposed by our distinguished minority leader, that I believe would more closely align with the thinking of General Gorman, who you mentioned earlier.

I think it is very important when we quote a general of the distinguished reputation of General Gorman not just to say that he said Contra aid was not enough to overthrow the Sandinista government. It is also important to add to that that he is in strong support not only of that aid, but of increased amounts of aid.

I think if asked, he would say that the linchpin, El Salvador, cannot survive very long if we enact the Barnes-Hamilton amendment tomorrow, unless we allow some kind of humanitarian aid to be given to the Contras along with a cease-fire, along with mediation by the bishops, and most of which I believe that we are in agreement with.

The tragedy I think of what is going on now is that we are voting on what is obviously a moot point, that is the resolution that is before us, instead of getting to whether we adopt the Hamilton-Barnes amendment or the Michel amendment, which is really what this debate should be all about.

But please make no mistake about the admiration and respect all of us have for the services of the gentleman from Massachusetts as chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the ranking member of the Select Committee on Intelligence, the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. STUMP].

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, the President's plan is clear, specific, and designed for success in Central America.

The President has asked both the Sandinista government and the Nicaraguan resistance to lay down their arms and to accept church-mediated talks on internationally supervised elections and on ending repression of the church, the press, and individual rights. The President also has asked the Congress to release the \$14 million it conditionally appropriated for aid to the Nicaraguan resistance.

The President has pledged that, during the period that the cease-fire offer is on the table, the released

funds will be used solely for humanitarian support to the Nicaraguan resistance groups, which specifically excludes arms and munitions.

The President's plan combines the key elements of a successful policy. The cease-fire stops the bloodshed in Nicaragua. Mediation by the church ensures that the mediators will have the trust and confidence of the people of Nicaragua.

The Governments of Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador have endorsed the President's plan. On April 12, President Suazo of Honduras informed a House Intelligence Committee delegation that his country supports the President's plan, especially since it goes hand in hand with the Contadora process.

On April 13, Acting President Arauz and Foreign Minister Gutierrez of Costa Rica told the committee delegation that Costa Rica supports the President's initiative.

In addition to Honduras and Costa Rica, El Salvador has expressed its support for the President's plan. President Duarte recently wrote to President Reagan, stating in part:

Your initiative and approach have my complete support and I strongly urge all of the friends of Central America in your Congress to give it their full backing. It is the right step at the right time in our quest for peace and democracy in this region.

We remain concerned, as we have been for some time, by the continuing flow of supplies and munitions from Nicaragua to Guerrilla forces here in El Salvador which are fighting against my government and our programs of reform, democracy, reconciliation, and peace.

Mr. Chairman, our friends and allies who are most directly affected, support the Reagan plan for peace. The plan is a carefully balanced approach to a difficult situation and every element in the plan is critical to its success, including the release of the \$14 million for the Nicaraguan resistance. Congress must do its part to give a just peace a chance by supporting the President's plan and releasing the funds.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR].

Mr. BONIOR of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, this is an issue which the House has debated extensively in the past. It is an issue on which the House has acted repeatedly, with conviction and courage. Today, the American people are once again looking to this body for decisive leadership.

The current administration's policy of financing, organizing, training, and arming counterrevolutionaries fighting to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government is leading this Nation into a widening war in Central America. This is a policy that is illegal, unjust, and does not have the support of the vast majority of the people of this Nation.

Today, we debate far more than whether the United States should provide an additional \$14 million to the Contras. We face, instead, the larger question of whether the United States will continue to seek an ever-increasing military role in the region.

A recent New York Times article clearly documents that the administration views this \$14 million as part of an effort to expand the U.S.-supported guerrilla forces to a 35,000-member army. This enlarged army will require substantially increased U.S. funding of at least \$100 million per year. Even more disturbing, the administration sees aid to the Contras as part of a policy which considers the "direct application of U.S. military force" as an "eventual option."

Mr. Chairman, Americans do not shrink from battle when the cause is just. Around the globe, there are places of honor, where Americans have fought bravely for the values we hold. There are ever-present reminders of the wars we have won when principle was on our side. But our policy in Central America today has confounded those values, and clouded those principles.

We are asked to embrace as freedom fighters paramilitary forces who burn homes, and destroy crops, who murder, torture, rape, and kidnap innocent civilians.

We are asked to accept as spiritual descendants of our Founding Fathers, a counterrevolutionary army in which 46 out of 48 leaders in the command structure—including the entire general staff, 5 out of 6 regional commanders, and all 30 task force commanders—are former members of Anastasio Somoza's National Guard. This is the same national guard that, during 1978, its last year in power, was condemned by the OAS for its "numerous atrocities" including "mass murders of minors and summary executions of civilians . . ."

We are asked to endorse a policy which is so out of control that, in order to rein in the very forces we are supporting, the CIA published and distributed its infamous special operations manual giving instructions for hired assassins, and sanctioning numerous violations of the laws of war.

We are asked to resume funding for a policy that has encouraged state-sponsored terrorism in the mining of Nicaragua's harbors; a policy that this administration has refused to defend before the World Court; a policy that has undercut not only our own standing in the international community, but the very foundation of international law itself.

This policy is neither just nor justifiable. In the past 2 years, we have watched its architects fumble for a rationale. First we were told, the goal was to interdict arms, then, to pressure the Nicaraguans toward internal

reforms, and now we are told that we will not be satisfied until the Nicaraguan Government says "uncle."

Lacking a foundation in principle, law or reason, the administration has recently tried to use the prestige of others to cloak its own weakness. We were told by the White House that President Betancur of Colombia, a leader of the Contadora peace process, had endorsed U.S. policy. We were told this, until President Betancur himself came forth to repudiate directly any renewed aid to the Contras as "intervention in the internal affairs of the continent."

Next, we were told Pope John Paul II endorses U.S. policy in Central America. We were told this, until the Vatican, too, came forth to state that the church does not favor increased military aid to the region. Indeed, Archbishop John O'Connor, speaking for the U.S. Catholic Conference, has warned that military aid to the forces seeking to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua " . . . undermines the moral standing of the U.S. in the world community."

Finally, in a move that can only be interpreted as a sign of profound desperation, the administration has turned its attacks on those who oppose its policy. It has accused its critics of being tools of foreign governments, and it has called upon the FBI to investigate U.S. citizens who dare to see for themselves the full force of our policy in Central America.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the President was correct in invoking the spirit of our Founding Fathers in this most important debate. For that spirit is very much alive in this country today. It has been kept alive by a people who remember that our Founding Fathers fought for a government of laws, for human dignity, and for the sovereignty of nations. And, I am proud to say, that spirit had also been kept alive by this House, which over the past 2 years has voted time and time again to end a policy which so cynically betrays these principles. I hope the Members of this body will keep that spirit in mind today, and vote no further funding for the Contras.

□ 1140

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back 3 minutes.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN of California. I hope the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR] will respond in a colloquy, particularly about the figures he stated earlier concerning the Somoza leadership within the resistance forces, the democratic resistance forces.

I was there in their main logistical headquarters somewhere near the border of Honduras, and so was a distinguished Member on your side of the aisle who is a foreign affairs subcommittee chairman, the distinguished gentleman from New York, Mr. STEPHEN SOLARZ. He was there 3 weeks before the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. VIN WEBER, and I visited the headquarters 3 weeks ago.

I have a list put in my hands by the resistance commanders of whom you spoke, giving Mr. WEBER and me each one of the 56 regional commanders' names and their background by profession. There is 1 former university student, 1 medical student, 1 evangelical pastor, 1 radio technician, 12 campesinos, that is peasant commanders, 27 Sandinistas who feel that their revolution was betrayed, and only 13 members of the former Somoza Guardia Nacional.

Of those 13 former Guardia members there are 5 former first lieutenants, 3 former second lieutenants, 2 sergeants, 2 privates, and Commandante Michael Lima who was a 19-year-old student in the military academy in Managua in July of 1979 when No. 1 hero Eden Pastora led the victorious revolutionary forces into Managua, driving out the Somoza Guardia.

There is not a single former captain or major or colonel in the command structure of the resistance left over from the Somoza Guard.

Enrique Bermudez, commander of the FDN forces in the north of Nicaragua, as you well know, was in this city, Washington, DC, as the military attaché assigned to the Nicaraguan Embassy. He was here because he was an enemy of Somoza, and Somoza had virtually banished him by sending him up to Washington, DC, for over a 3-year period.

I do not know what wall you plucked your figures off. I am sure you honorably believe they are correct. But they are just not the facts.

Since the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLARZ] also visited this command headquarters and was introduced, the first Member of this body so introduced, to a little girl whose throat had been severely scarred by Sandinista soldiers. In that same command headquarters with the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. VIN WEBER, we were introduced to a little 10-year-old girl and her mother. The younger brother had been killed and the little girl had been shot in her arm by Sandinistas. Why? Because they were at a prayer meeting. If we are going to trade atrocity for atrocity in this Chamber we at least should first make statements as clear and as straightforward as the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. BOLAND] made. Then we can deal with these fraudulent and bloated figures about former Somosistas. I do not know where you

are getting these figures unless it is from the disinformation campaign that the Sandinistas have beat us over the head with on this Hill for over 3 years.

Mr. BONIOR of Michigan. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORNAN of California. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BONIOR of Michigan. I thank the gentleman for yielding. The figures were obtained from the arms control and foreign policy caucus of the U.S. Congress, of which we have Members of both parties, headed by the gentleman from New York [Mr. McHUGH] and the vice chairman is Senator MATHIAS.

Mr. DORNAN of California. I am a member of the official House Subcommittee on Arms Control and International Security, but not of that caucus he mentions. We have had no figures like these ever come before our Committee on Foreign Affairs that so grossly twist the truth. A 180° twist. I can gladly make available to the Member, as I have done to every member on the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, every single one of these resistance commanders' names, which I am sure puts them in jeopardy. But they were willing to let me bring this command structure list up here to the Congress, and they said, "No, we do not want you to keep the list secret. We know that it jeopardizes our lives, but we are out there in the hills fighting anyway. We are more jeopardized, our cause is more jeopardized, by the disinformation lies that come out of Managua orchestrated by Cuba and the East Germans."

□ 1150

So please, I yield to you to continue.

Mr. BONIOR of Michigan. Well, I do not think these are lies. I do not think Senator MATHIAS or Congressman PETRI would take as gospel what comes out of East Germany or Havana. I mean this is a part, this is a report by Members of the U.S. Congress from both parties.

The gentleman suggested in his statement earlier that these people were schoolteachers, ministers, and other things.

I suggest to you that one can easily have two vocations. One can certainly be a laborer, one can certainly be a campesino but one can also be a former member of the guard and have participated in the atrocities that I alluded to that the OAS condemned them for.

Mr. DORNAN of California. My friends, any one of these resistance leaders would be made available to us for questioning, if we would give them a month's notice before our trip they would bring these men out of the field, it takes up to a month to cycle into combat areas by foot, to come up to these camps in Honduras to meet with

Congressmen because the resistance fighters now realize that they are losing severely a propaganda war. I am sorry for using a harsh indictment but it is true so I must. We are witnessing the Joseph Goebbels technique of the big lie, the massive big lie, the unrelenting 180° twisting of truth stated over and over and over and over again. You find naive nuns going down to Managua on the so-called revolutionary tourist trips. The nuns and naive ministers and naive priests return here and spread these Marxist lies. We've had 4 years of this baloney so of course you are going to get Members of Congress accepting figures off the wall and putting them into semi-official reports. I just believe that there are real figures and our embassies have them and deserve to be trusted. We should at least try to participate in this debate on the high level of disagreement that Mr. BOLAND started it off.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORNAN of California. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I want to applaud the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] on his statement because actually every time that we have ever made an attempt to confirm these alleged atrocities on behalf of the Contras, we strike out. Let me not refer to us; let me refer to an unbiased source: Two missionaries, experienced young missionaries, one Wesley Smith, a 23-year-old senior studying international relations at Brigham Young University who served as a missionary to Spanish speaking people in Argentina and Arizona and Richard Rygg, a 28-year-old receiving his MBA from Pennsylvania State University in the year 1985.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes additional to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. DORNAN of California. I yield further to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Mr. Rygg served as a missionary in Nicaragua and in Costa Rica and Honduras in 1977 to 1979. They went down between December and January just a few months ago to Nicaragua and they interviewed hundreds of people. These are Mormon missionaries who went down there and interviewed hundreds of people throughout the countryside in Nicaragua.

They found absolutely no evidence of systematic abuses conducted by the Contras from the people they interviewed, no accusations were received

which spoke of Contra forces intentionally killing, torturing or raping civilians or Sandinista war prisoners. In fact, they found almost the opposite was true. Of those Nicaraguans who spoke of civilians being killed, nearly all mentioned that only the Sandinistas were participating in such activities, indiscriminate bombing, shooting, torture, and so on.

And of the abuses that they allege against the Sandinistas which is documented in a 30-page report ad nauseam and with some degree of distaste I might add, there were allegations, documented by Nicaragua citizens of forced recruitment of Nicaraguan youth by the Sandinista military, religious persecution, indiscriminate shelling of villages, mistreatment of prisoners, forced voluntarism in the co-op system which is forced labor, and repression of the opposition. That is an authoritative well-documented report. I think it really does much to negate a lot of the statements that the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR] has made.

Mr. DORNAN of California. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. McCAIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I think it would be a serious mistake if we allow this debate to degenerate into who has perpetrated the most atrocities because the tragedy of civil war is that there are atrocities committed on both sides.

I would submit to the gentleman from Michigan that I would like to see him recheck his facts as to the leadership of these freedom fighters in Nicaragua because I think it is a very important part of this debate.

Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues not to get into a debate as to who has perpetrated the most atrocities because that would put us into an endless dialog which is based on a difference of opinion.

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORNAN of California. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LEWIS of California. I appreciate my colleague yielding.

Frankly I would strongly endorse the comments of the gentleman from Arizona. I present my facts quite as colorfully as the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] but I submit for the record the following, a list of 56 of the most prominent Nicaraguans from all walks who in 1979 worked with the Sandinistas to overthrow Somoza, showing the present situation of each person. Twenty-seven of those are currently in exile, 23 inside Nicaragua are opposing the FSLN. There are six who remain within that government movement. The fact is that there has been a significant shift among those who

originally opposed Somoza and supported the Sandinistas.

Following that is a list of some of the prominent or senior members of the FSLN who are now calling for its removal from power.

Mr. Chairman, I submit that for the RECORD:

WHERE ARE THEY NOW?

The following is a list of 56 of the most prominent Nicaraguans who in 1979 worked with the Sandinistas [FSLN] to overthrow Somoza, showing the present situation of each person.

	Still supporting FSLN	Neither supporting nor opposing the FSLN	Opposed to FSLN		
			Inside Nicaragua	Exile	Dead
Ramiro Sacasa					X
Socrates Flores					X
Jorge Salazar, COSEP					X
Donald Castillo, CTN				X	
Zacharias Hernandez, CUS				X	
Amador Vaneegas, CTN				X	
Edgard Macias, PPSC				X	
Jose Davila, PSC				X	
Alvaro Taboada, PPSC				X	
Henry Benavides, PSC and CSC				X	
Roberto Ferrey, PSC				X	
Roger Miranda, PSC				X	
Alfonso Robelo, MDN				X	
Fernando Chamorro				X	
Pedro Joaquin Chamorro				X	
Anibal Ibarra, PSC				X	
Adolfo Calero				X	
Wilfredo Montalvan, PSD				X	
Alvaro Jerez, MDN				X	
Alfonso Callejas, PLN				X	
Frank Berdona, COSEP				X	
Jose Cardenal, COSEP				X	
Jaime Monteleagre, COSEP				X	
Hernando Monteleagre, COSEP				X	
Rudy Ybarra, PAN				X	
Adriana Guillen				X	
Humberto Belli				X	
Jaime Pasquier				X	
Jose Esteban Gonzalez				X	
Violeta Chamorro			X		
Jaime Chamorro			X		
Bishop Obando			X		
Bishop Vega			X		
Enrique Bolanos, COSEP			X		
Silvio Robelo			X		
Pablo Antonio Cuadra			X		
Adan Pletas, PSC			X		
Arturo Cruz, Junta			X		
Alvin Guthrie, CUS			X		
Agustin Jarquin, PSC			X		
Jose Espinoza, CUS			X		
Eduardo Rivas					X
Jastezaro					X
Luis Levia, PSD					X
Mario Rapacholli, CTN					X
Carlos Huembes, CTN					X
Alejandro Solorzano, CTN					X
Virgilio Godoy, PLI					X
Bishop Salazar y Espinosa				X	
Luis Sanchez				X	
Chauitillo PSN				X	
Luis Sanchez, Sanchez PSN				X	
Felipe Mantica				X	
Xavier Chamorro	X				
Joaquin Cuadra Peltas	X				
Ernesto Cardenal	X				
Miguel D'Escoto	X				
Edgar Parales	X				
Ismael Reyes				X	
Carlos Mantica			X		
Joaquin Cuadra Chamorro	X				

The following is a list of some of the prominent or senior members of the FSLN who are now calling for its removal from power:

Carlos Coronel; Francisco Fiallos, FSLN Ambassador to U.S.; Sebastian Gonzalez;

Eden Pastora; Leonel Poveda; Jorge Alaniz; Donald Costello-Rivas; Alfredo Cesar; and Harold Martinez.

Mr. DORNAN of California. I thank the gentleman. I do not know what part of my remarks he finds too colorful but the Joseph Goebbels big lie technique has prevailed in this country for 4 years. There was a network of disinformation orchestrated by the country called Nicaragua. Those nine commandantes owe their allegiance to Leninist philosophy, not the truth.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BONIOR] to respond to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BONIOR of Michigan. I just want to respond briefly: There is no question that some of the political leadership of the Contras, Mr. Robelo, Mr. Cruz, Mr. Colero, obviously were not members of Somoza's National Guard. They made a break with Somoza, I acknowledge that.

The question is are these facts right? They are. The military leadership of the Contras are former National Guardsmen. There can be no dispute about that.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. GIBBONS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I take the floor only to ask a question of Mr. MICHEL, the author of House Joint Resolution 239.

Mr. MICHEL, I am disturbed by just the pure wording of the resolution and I want to ask the gentleman what his interpretation of this is. It says "that the Congress approves the obligation and expenditure of funds available for fiscal year 1985 for supporting directly or indirectly military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua." Now, Mr. MICHEL, let me ask the gentleman: First of all, are we declaring war on Nicaragua?

Mr. MICHEL. Well, of course not. And the gentleman, if he will just refer to my earlier remarks when I said I was obliged to introduce it in this form as a result of the continuing resolution. Had I my own volition this morning, it would have been other words. But we were obliged to do it this way. No matter who would have made it.

Mr. GIBBONS. I want to make it clear: You are not giving to the President any power or authority to commit American troops?

Mr. MICHEL. Of course not.

Mr. GIBBONS. To combat in Nicaragua?

Mr. MICHEL. That is the furthest thing that any leadership meeting which I have attended with the President; he has never ever talked about infusion of military forces on our part in that area.

Mr. GIBBONS. I want to make it clear. I am not accusing the gentleman of doing that. I am just trying to establish the clear, unequivocal history of this language.

□ 1200

I do not want somebody coming back here a few years from now and saying, "Oh, this is what Mr. MICHEL intended."

Mr. MICHEL. I understand that. And, as a matter of fact, that is why, in prefacing the debate, I made it very clear that this was the structured kind of tightly structured rules under which I had to frame the resolution. As I said, had I my druthers, it would have certainly taken a different form that would have been consistent with what the President has been talking about to implement the San Jose agreement in Costa Rica.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. GIBBONS] has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. GIBBONS. I see Mr. BROOMFIELD, Mr. McDADE, and Mr. STUMP here on the floor. Do all of you agree with the statement that is made by Mr. MICHEL, the principal sponsor of this resolution, that, one, this is not a declaration of war and, two, it does not give the President the authority to introduce U.S. military forces into Nicaragua? Is that your interpretation of this resolution?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. That is my interpretation.

Mr. GIBBONS. And yours, Mr. STUMP?

Mr. STUMP. I concur completely. Mr. GIBBONS. And yours, Mr. McDADE?

Mr. MICHEL. He is not on the floor. Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GIBBONS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. MILLER of California. With all due respect to our colleagues, their interpretations are of little value because what it does is in fact give the President the authority either directly or indirectly for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua. That is what the law would say, that is what the resolution would say if passed. I assume that is why the House and the Senate and the American people have found it to be so disagreeable, because it may only allow a little \$14 million war, but nevertheless it allows that war either directly or indirectly by the U.S. Government.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DURBIN].

Mr. DURBIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the President recently referred to the Contras as the moral

equivalent of our Founding Fathers—this comparison may have moved many Americans who venerate George Washington, Ben Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and their cohorts who risked everything to found our Nation.

But those of us who honor our own Founding Fathers will find it difficult to reckon their high-minded ideals with the barbaric tactics of the Contras in Nicaragua.

The April 29 issue of Newsweek shows in graphic detail a Sandinista prisoner digging his own grave, then lying down in it as one of these so-called freedom fighters sticks a knife through his throat. Another purported Founding Father then stabs the Sandinista collaborator in the stomach and leaves him to bleed to death.

During a recent visit to Nicaragua I met a woman whose young daughter was gunned down by one of these Contra freedom fighters as she walked up a hill to teach in a rural school.

Reckoning the finest traditions and the noblest heroes of the American Nation will not enhance the image of terrorism which now characterizes the Contra effort. This loose language by the administration serves only to besmirch the memory of our own noble patriots. Profaning that memory cannot legitimize or enhance the bloody tactics which the administration's policy in Nicaragua would have us endorse and finance with American dollars.

The spectacle of American foreign policy supporting the Contras and inflicting grievous damage on the lives of poor and helpless people produces reactions by millions around the world detrimental to the image we would like them to hold of this country.

As the President's characterization of the Contras falls so far from the facts, so also do his statements concerning the realities of Nicaraguan life and the image of our country in the minds of Nicaraguans.

The United States has invaded Nicaragua three times in this century. We had troops stationed in this tiny, impoverished country for 21 years, from 1912 to 1933. Our foreign policy was not impelled by any evangelical fervor for the spread of democracy—we were determined to protect American companies doing business in Nicaragua and to guarantee that any government in that country would be our client. We presided over the installation of the Somoza family into power and the United States nurtured that family's corrupt takeover of the economy of Nicaragua. We turned a blind eye to the degrading poverty in Nicaragua so long as our companies and diplomats were welcomed.

Is it any wonder that we are now reaping the bitter harvest of a century of foreign policy decisions in Central America which stifled any nationalistic aspirations or any hope of breaking the chains of poverty?

In February I traveled to Managua and met in Managua with a peasant woman, standing barefoot, in a dirt street in a barrio in that city, and I asked her: "Is life different or better since the Somozas are out of power and the Sandinistas are in power?" She said: "It is better. We have electricity, our children are in school, they have been immunized." She said the prices of milk were going up and she conceded that was a worry, but there were not the same reports of corruption in the government of the Sandinistas that she had heard of the government under Somoza.

The Contras in Nicaragua have a long road to travel before they can win the hearts and minds of people like this peasant woman.

I harbor no delusions about the Sandinistas. I left their country with grave concerns over their treatment of the Catholic Church, press censorship, the militarization of their nation and their treatment of the Miskito Indians. But despite these obvious failings, by any objective, democratic standard, the Sandinistas still have a society where the private business community can meet openly and criticize their government; where the Catholic Church, despite harassment, can publish pastoral letters encouraging Nicaraguans to defy the draft; and where a principal newspaper in Managua can accept financial aid from the United States and continue to publish articles critical of the Sandinistas. If the Sandinistas do not fit easily into any democratic mold, neither do they conform with any image of a totalitarian Communist state. The real question is how the United States can force the Sandinistas closer to our democratic values. Lending our financial support to the Contra effort which is doomed to fail does not serve our strategic or national goals. We must push forward with a regional response, working with our allies to bring stability to Central America and seek nonmilitary methods to encourage and force change in the Sandinistas government.

I left Nicaragua realizing that our challenge there is substantial; it is clear that our present policy only serves to drive the Sandinistas closer to the Soviets and Cubans.

We continue to assess the Nicaragua situation in terms of preconceived, fixed notions while ignoring any contrary signs. No experience of the failure of our policy can shake our belief in its essential value.

I am troubled by our role in Nicaragua and the smell of the swamp we are getting into.

Denying the sovereignty of Nicaragua, investing our Nation's resources in prolonging the death and suffering in that nation, escalating our military role in the region are the key elements in this hopeless enterprise.

The House of Representatives by denying the President's request for \$14 million in aid to the Nicaraguan Contras does not endorse the Sandinistas. But by our actions today we make it clear that we are not so woodenheaded as to deny our history or so savage as to follow a policy which will leave the blood of innocents on our hands.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. DURBIN. I yield to the gentleman from Arizona.

Mr. McCAIN. It is my understanding that your statement is that we wish to encourage change through regional activity; is that correct?

Mr. DURBIN. That is correct.

Mr. McCAIN. Would the gentleman be a little bit more specific as to what form these actions might take?

Mr. DURBIN. I will use two specific examples. I recently had an opportunity to reread the history of the Cuban missile crisis. The Kennedy administration, before embarking on their policy, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and Cuba, initially made contact with the OAS, to make certain that we had the regional support of our allies in the activities we were undertaking. I think that is an essential element and one that this administration has ignored.

Second, I believe that we should invest more of our political capital in the Contadora process. We have all heard the President of Mexico come before this House and ask the United States to stop militarizing the conflict in Central America. If we are concerned about the spread of communism into Texas or the southern United States, certainly the Mexicans must share that concern. I think we should invest our capital into supporting the Contadora process for our strategic purposes and our strategic security.

Mr. McCAIN. If the gentleman would yield further, I believe that this administration and all of us here strongly are supportive of the Contadora process, as has been displayed, and I would hope that we would continue in that effort, too.

Mr. DURBIN. If I might reclaim my time for just a second, the conversations which I had with the Mexican Government during that trip, as well as the people in our Embassy, really betrayed the statement which the gentleman just made. There was an open skepticism that anything would come of the Contadora process from our Embassy officials in that part of the world. That kind of a cynical attitude suggests to me that we really have not told the countries in that region that we are prepared to stand by any regional pact.

Mr. McCAIN. If the gentleman will yield for just one more question, does the gentleman believe that an important part of this settlement should be

a dialog between the government and the Contras or freedom fighters?

Mr. DURBIN. Yes, I do.

Mr. McCAIN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. DURBIN. I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. LAGOMARSINO], a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, the security of the United States depends on our ability to counter the spread of Marxist-Leninist regimes, whether in Cambodia—14,000 miles away, in Afghanistan—10,000 miles away, or in Nicaragua—900 miles away.

Our security also depends on our ability to assure our allies that our commitment to their security is just as strong as to our own, whether to the ASEAN nations, to NATO or to the Organization of American States.

For those who look at the threat represented by Nicaragua and state they are worried about involving U.S. troops in another Vietnam or who say they are concerned about human rights, then the most appropriate action is to support the President's proposal.

If we do not support the Contras with American funding now in their opposition to the Sandinista regime then we may well have to use American manpower later to stop the spread of Marxist-Leninist regimes in this hemisphere.

As a recent Washington Post commentary explains: Even the Mig scare last November demonstrates that—

Nothing is more likely to force American military intervention than the consolidation of an aggressive, highly militarized, pro-Soviet regime in the area. The Contras want to do their own fighting. Cut them off and the only body in the hemisphere able to restrain the Sandinistas will be the U.S. Army.

If the concern is truly for respect for human rights, then we must vigorously oppose a system, as represented by the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, whose sole means of survival is the implementation of a policy that institutionalizes the repression of human rights.

For those who now say we should accept the promises of the Sandinista regime for their latest peace proposal, we need only remember the promises of the Sandinistas to the OAS in 1979 to doubt their sincerity once again.

Miguel Bolanos is a former Sandinista intelligence official who has described the Sandinista view of negotiations:

We wanted dialogue. The strategy is that we are willing to dialogue to allow more time for clandestine operation. Especially with the U.S. with dialogue there is more political space that is advantageous to Nicaragua. . . . But dialogue is more a political

tool than anything else; you can use it as a cover.

The Sandinistas use whatever tactics they believe will serve their own political or propaganda purposes. Their invitation to visit military installations in their country to confirm they are not intended for offensive use was a pure propaganda ploy. As Congressman MIKE DEWINE and I, and several others who have visited Nicaragua, can attest to, the Sandinistas refused to let us visit their military bases. That is one more example of the insincerity of the Sandinista motives.

Last week, our Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs held a series of hearings on U.S. support for the Contras. A long list of witnesses testified at length on both sides of the issue. In spite of the deep divisions among the witnesses and the members of the subcommittee on support for the Contras, one general conclusion was apparent from those hearings. Almost everyone agreed the Sandinistas are repressive, have exported revolution, and that something must be done about them. Adm. Stansfield Turner agreed in his testimony saying:

I am not supporting the Sandinistas, sir. I think they are terrible. It is how to get rid of them.

As Dr. John Silber, president of Boston University and a Democrat who served on the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America told us last week:

The island of Cuba has become a massive Soviet forward base from which revolution is exported to Central America . . . [Is] the United States . . . prepared to tolerate in our hemisphere the consolidation of a second Soviet satellite[?].

Jean Francois Revel, the distinguished French political commentator, recently wrote "Can the Democracies survive?" In his commentary he describes a Soviet official's statement to a cabinet minister under former French President Giscard d'Estaing. The Soviet official said:

We took Angola and you did not protest. We even saw that you could have beaten us in Angola—the Government was on our side, but it was within an ace of giving up—and that you did nothing to win; on the contrary. And when, to save ourselves, we sent in 30,000 Cuban soldiers, Ambassador Andrew Young, a member of the American Cabinet, said it was a positive step and an element of stability. All right, we noted the fact and included it in our analyses. Then we took Mozambique. Forget it, you don't even know where it is. Then we took Ethiopia, a key move. There again we noted that you could have replied via Somalia or Eritrea or both. No reply. We noted that and put it into our analyses. Then we took Aden and set up a powerful Soviet base there. Aden! On the Arabian peninsula! In the heart of your supply center! No response. So we noted: We can take Aden.

You can add to the list by including Nicaragua and Afghanistan.

Revel also describes the irony that "democratic civilization is the first in history to blame itself because another power is working to destroy it." That fits into the "blame America first" school of thought. Revel goes on to say:

Not only do the democracies today blame themselves for sins they have not committed, they have formed the habit of judging themselves by ideals so inaccessible that the defendants are automatically guilty. Clearly a civilization that feels guilty for everything it is and does and thinks will lack the energy and conviction to defend itself when its existence is threatened . . . Strategic necessity is regarded as justification enough for a Soviet presence in another country, or a Soviet alliance with or aid to that country . . . A democracy, on the other hand, is not granted the right to defend the vital barricades of its own security unless the democratic imperative is obeyed . . . Progressive and even centrist opinion throughout the world granted North Vietnam "popular" legitimacy on trust, which its history after 1975 did not support, but which its totalitarian and aggressive behavior even before 1975 never seemed to diminish.

The lessons of history are clear for those who study them. Marxist-Leninist regimes are not isolationist. They have expanded their power wherever the opportunity has permitted. The Sandinista commandante communists have said they will export their revolution. Tomas Borge was quoted in the September 1983 *Playboy* in answer to a question about the domino theory. He said, "that is one historical prophecy of Ronald Reagan's that is absolutely true."

Again, as John Silber told our subcommittee:

Totalitarians do not stop; they must be stopped.

As he added—

All historical experience suggests that hopes of a merely diplomatic solution to the crisis posed by the Sandinistas are almost certain to be disappointed. The only solution likely to come from diplomacy unsupported by intensive pressure is the sort reached at Munich in 1938. Diplomacy is a complement to, not a substitute for, the measured application of geopolitical pressure.

As Congressman MIKE DEWINE and I were told when we were in Nicaragua last month, the only way to prevent the Sandinista Communists from consolidating total control over their country and enabling them to export their revolution is to keep the pressure on them. The way to keep that pressure on them is to continue to support the Contras. It is only through that kind of pressure that you can expect meaningful negotiations with the Sandinista. Democratic opposition groups told us they had been public enemy No. 1. Now they are No. 2. The Contras are now public enemy No. 1. But they, the pluralistic groups, will again be No. 1. If the Contras disappear, many of the groups said we should support the freedom fighters. Even those who did not, said they

would be in serious trouble if the Contras cease to be.

The security of the United States cannot wait until we have to fight at our own borders. We must stop the threat now. I urge my colleagues to support the President's proposal to aid the Contras and thereby protect our own national security.

□ 1210

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. KEMP. I thank the gentleman for yielding to me.

Mr. Chairman, in listening to my colleague read that quotation, from whom did it emanate?

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. John Francis Revel.

Mr. KEMP. In his book, "Why Democracies Perish."

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. It was a quote from "Can a Democracy Survive?"

Mr. KEMP. I was thinking how eerie it was to hear that comment. I do not think a lot of folks were listening, but how strangely reminiscent it was of the 1930's. This is the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Europe and the end of World War II. One could go back to the thirties and recall that some of the countries alluded to by the gentleman in the quotation from Revel's book, "Why Democracies Perish."

In 1935, when the Nazis were violating the Versailles Treaty and the Fascist Italian Government of Mussolini was invading Abyssinia, the argument was made that the West need not worry, Abyssinia was too far away and besides it does not affect us what an error to let Hitler and Mussolini think we didn't care. This is the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Europe, but it's the 50th anniversary of the passage by Congress of the Neutrality Act.

One of the previous speakers said that, "A vote against the aid to Contras would not be an endorsement of the Sandinistas." I agree, but let me tell you what it would be, it would be an act of neutrality as to what will be the final outcome in this hemisphere of the struggle going on not only in the Isthmus of Central America, but in the eastern Caribbean between freedom and communism. It seems to me the gentleman's statement is right on target when reminding us that we must learn a basic lesson of history. That is that weakness is provocative and that we can't turn our back and declare our neutrality about what happens in Central America. Neutrality and isolationism is going to affect every other country in that region of the world, and ultimately the whole hemisphere in an adverse way detrimental to freedom, peace and democracy.

I compliment my friend from California for his remarks, and I particularly appreciate his allusion to the historical significance of what failures the West made in Africa and the third world in the seventies. I wanted to rise and not only compliment the gentleman, but to suggest that I had the eerie feeling that I was living through another repeat of some of the same mistakes of the thirties as well.

Let me say that I support this resolution because I believe it is morally right for the United States to help people who are fighting for democracy.

As Charles Krauthammer has written:

The great moral dilemmas of American foreign policy arise when the pursuit of security and the pursuit of democracy clash. "Contra" aid is not such a case.

We have vital strategic interests in maintaining the security and stability of Central America. And we have a deep and abiding interest in seeing democracy flourish in our own hemisphere. In supporting the resistance in Nicaragua, we support both our security interests and the cause of freedom.

It has been said that there is no man so blind as one who will not see. Similarly, there is no country so powerless as one that will not act. Managua is almost precisely the geopolitical center of our own hemisphere. If we cannot muster the national will to help those who would resist communism here, who beyond our shores can be confident of our support?

I do not understand how it is that we can reach a bipartisan consensus on the need to help El Salvador and Costa Rica and Honduras and the other countries of the region defend themselves, while remaining so divided on the central question of what to do about Nicaragua. So long as the Nicaraguan Government remains free to continue its weapons buildup and to promote subversion against its neighbors, the security of all nations in the region will be threatened. All our efforts to bring peace and democracy to El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica will come to naught if we create a sanctuary next door—guaranteed by congressional legislation—for those who bring war and totalitarianism to El Salvador.

Many opponents of covert aid to Nicaragua have argued that it is wrong for us to intervene in the internal affairs of another country. Yet just last year, we approved \$250 million in aid to the Afghan freedom fighters. Here, we are arguing over less than one-tenth that amount for freedom fighters in our own hemisphere.

And we have stood by in anguish over our inability to help the cause of solidarity in Poland. Are there any in this Chamber who would have refused to help, if we had the means to do so?

Today, in Nicaragua, a country so close to our borders, we do have the power to help. Will this Congress vote to turn our backs on these people struggling for their basic human rights? And if we do turn away, how will we erase our callousness from our conscience?

The Sandinistas have rejected every effort at a negotiated peace:

Earlier this year, the different factions among the freedom fighters joined together in a show of unity at San Jose. In an appeal to end the war, and to begin to resolve the grievances that brought Nicaraguans to arms, they proclaimed a unilateral ceasefire and called on Daniel Ortega to join in negotiations for peace. But Ortega rejected their overture for peace, just as he rejected the pleas of the Catholic bishops last year for negotiations with the resistance.

This month, when President Reagan renewed this appeal for negotiated reconciliation, placing the good faith and credit of the United States behind the offer, the Sandinistas impugned his motives and scorned his appeal, just as they repudiated their promises to the OAS to hold free and fair elections and to respect the rights of the people of Nicaragua.

We must not reward Sandinista intransigence by abandoning the freedom fighters.

After the sham elections in Nicaragua last year, there are no responsible internal voices that view the Sandinista government as having any moral legitimacy. Nicaragua's most respected national leaders, who fought with the revolution—men like Arturo Cruz and Adolfo Calero, and Eden Pastora—are the most ardent advocates of the freedom fighters' cause. They know perhaps better than anyone the great gap between the promises of the revolution and the betrayal by the Sandinista regime.

The Catholic bishops, in a display of courage and leadership, have denounced the abuses of the Sandinista regime, and have criticized the control and guidance it is receiving from Cuba. On Good Friday last year, 100,000 Catholics took to the streets in Managua, in a demonstration of defiance against the Sandinista regime. And their ranks are growing.

It is this resurgence of the spirit of freedom that our aid to the freedom fighters helps keep alive. If we withdraw that support now, we will certainly demoralize those who have dared to oppose the ruling dictatorship.

I have heard some say that things are not as bad as they seem, that there is still a measure of freedom in Nicaragua. But we are only 5 years into the rule of a new totalitarian government, in a country new to Marxist controls. And in that short a time, Freedom House reports that:

Several thousand Miskito Indians have been forcibly resettled;

The Catholic Church intimidated;

There are thousands of political prisoners; many detainees—including labor leaders—are prisoners of conscience;

Killing and intimidation occur, especially in rural areas;

Thousands of disappearances have been reported;

Foreign travel is restricted;

Internal travel is restricted;

Enterprises and farms are being nationalized;

Newspapers and radio stations are mostly under Government control;

Private television is not allowed;

La Prensa is under censorship; and

Political opposition is severely restricted; and Government gangs break up opposition rallies;

Freedom House also reports that Nicaragua is still freer than Cuba. But the history of totalitarian regimes has been tragically consistent: If the free world looks away, the Sandinista regime will consolidate its hold over the country, wiping out what vestiges of freedom remain and establish another Cuba in Central America.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union and Cuba want to see communism spread further in Central America. The question is, Will the United States support those people that want democracy and are willing to fight for their own freedom?

The great liberal philosopher John Stuart Mill believed that the desire for liberty was an irrepressible human drive. In this regard, the people of Nicaragua are no different from the people of the United States. With this vote, we will decide whether we will give them the assistance they need to establish their democracy, just as others two centuries ago were generous and compassionate enough to help us establish ours.

Mr. ADDABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I would hope that at the end of the debate today we would come to the end of a long and tortuous road and end our involvement with the military actions by the Contras in Nicaragua.

These are actions that were conceived because of an absence of a policy by the Reagan administration, because they could not conceive of a policy to deal with the Sandinista government; to deal with what they viewed our security interests in Latin America to be. They decided that they would turn it over to the CIA Agency. They would allow them to get rid of this problem.

It is the absence of that policy that created the quagmire, the death, the

violence that we now see in Latin America. Because when they were handing the CIA the possibility of putting together a small strike force to interdict arms, the CIA went to the Argentinians, procured the best of those who could train terrorists, hired them, went to the September 15th Brigade, who had formed after the ouster of Somoza, and put them together with American money and American know-how and created a terrorist organization that we now know as the Contras.

□ 1220

Those people who were high in the command of the National Guard continue to be high in the command of the Contras. Those people who engaged in the atrocities of Somoza continue to engage in the atrocities of the National Guard.

As we have heard on this floor time and again, as we have debated this issue, all of the precepts for this policy have disappeared. They have not interdicted any arms. They have not uncovered any massive flow of arms, personnel or material from Nicaragua to Salvador, but the forces continue to grow, and as that rationale evaporated, as our own Intelligence Committee started to question the continued buildup and the absence of results, as we debated again, as we spent \$80 million to create this strike force, what we saw time and again was that we were creating a proxy force so we could engage in a war against the people and the government of Nicaragua.

That proxy war has now been in existence for some 3 years. It has brought discredit upon this Nation. It has brought discredit upon this administration. Hopefully by the vote of this Congress to end that proxy war, we will not concur in that operation.

We have said to this administration time and again that the Congress of the United States does not agree with this policy, we believe that it is bankrupt, we believe that it is counterproductive to what even the goals of this administration says that it desires in Nicaragua. But somehow, this administration has never gotten that message, so they have decided to continue to prosecute these acts of violence that are well documented, documented by church organizations, documented by independent observers, documented by nonpolitical observers, the acts of violence by the Contras as they roam northern Nicaragua, acts against the Nicaraguan economy, against the private sector, against anybody who can provide income for that government, those acts are well documented.

The tragedy is that it was planned for, it has been paid for, it has been assisted by the United States of America. We hold our hand in hand with

the Contras. We are responsible for their actions because we continue to fund their actions, and apparently there is no level to the atrocities that can get us to reconsider our policies. There apparently is even now some rational for why we see the person who was on the pages of Newsweek who had his throat sliced and his stomach cut open, that somehow that was justified because the Sandinistas were in the area and they would have heard a shot had he simply been shot, suggesting that that would have been a more humane way to treat that prisoner.

What we must consider is that this is a basic policy decision for the Congress of the United States. I am sorry to see the compromises being offered both by the Democratic side of the aisle and by the Republican side of the aisle, because again we continue to indirectly be involved in the support of the Contras.

I would hope that for once this administration and this Congress would truly define what its security interests are. There is no support in the Congress of the United States for the Nicaraguan Government receiving advanced fighters from the Soviet Union or from Cuba or from Bulgaria or wherever. There is no support to seeing offensive weapons coming into Nicaragua for the purpose of invading their neighbors. And interestingly enough, we find that our Pentagon tells us that it is exactly what we expect, that the buildup that is taking place in Nicaragua is in direct response to the threat by the Contras posed by the funding of this administration for their efforts.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER] has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from California.

Mr. MILLER of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding this additional time to me.

Mr. Chairman, we see that they are outdated tanks, that they could not survive the Honduran Air Force should they try to invade Honduras, so what we see is that once again President Reagan has been a little loose with the facts, a little loose with the rhetoric to suggest that, in fact, a massive buildup is taking place. We find out, in fact, that according to the Pentagon that the troops strengths in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Costa Rica vary very little between those nations; that these are not offensive, but that is the pretext on which we are seeking to rally the American people behind this policy.

This administration has never supported the Contadora process. They used the Kissinger Commission to undermine the Contadora process to suggest that we had the answer to the

problem in Latin America, that the Contadora process had not really thought it through. When the Contadora process came very close to arriving at a peace initiative with the Sandinistas, to be signed by their neighbors, the White House immediately jumped into that process and prevented that from going forth.

So, Contadora has been held in a weakened state by this administration so, in fact, the goals of the Contadora that every Member of this House has gotten up and expressed support for have not been allowed to be realized, have not been allowed to go forward, and then the suggestion is that the failure of Contadora justifies the actions by the Contras. It is morally bankrupt. It is immoral for us to participate in it, and the Congress ought to get some backbone and understand what we understood many months ago: that the policy will not reach the objectives of a more democratic Nicaragua; this policy will not reach the objectives of a less military Nicaragua, it will reach all of the opposite of the concerns Members on both sides of the aisle have expressed over the years.

I hope that we vote down the President's request for the \$15 million with a resounding no, and I will express my concern about the compromises when those debates arise.

□ 1230

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. CHENEY].

Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

As a member of the Intelligence Committee, let me say that we spent a lot of time on this issue over the last several days. I am disturbed this morning by what I see on the floor of the House as to the amount of misinformation that has been spread about with respect to the backgrounds and qualifications of the men who are the leaders of the opposition to the Sandinista Communist regime in Nicaragua. Therefore, I would like to take just a minute and review, if I may, for the record, the names of some of those key individuals, as well as their backgrounds, so that once and for all we can put to rest the notion that somehow the Contra movement is simply a collection of ex-Somozistas.

Of course, we have to begin with Adolfo Calero, a lifelong opponent of Mr. Somoza and commander in chief of the FDN since December 1983. He began his political career in the 1950's when he joined with Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the great hero of the Nicaraguan revolution. After the fall of Somoza, Mr. Calero attempted to cooperate with the Sandinistas in rebuilding Nicaragua, but by the end of 1982 he had to flee into exile.

Indalecio Rodriguez is a doctor of veterinary medicine, a professor and president of the University of Central America inside Nicaragua. He participated in the anti-Somoza youth movement, was jailed twice in the 1950's for anti-Somoza activities, returned to a position at the University of Central America where he remained throughout the revolution in 1981, and abandoned the university and went into exile to take up the struggle against the Sandinistas.

Lucia Cardenal Salazar. Mrs. Salazar is the widow of a prominent Nicaraguan businessman. Her husband and she provided refuge for the Sandinista militants during the revolution. Her husband was ultimately shot by the Sandinista state security police. She fled into exile.

Alfonso Robelo, political coordinator of ARDE, head of the MDN, trained as a chemical engineer, director of the University of Central America in the early 1970's, president of the Nicaraguan Chamber of Commerce. After the revolution he was one of the five original members of the junta that governed Nicaragua under the Sandinistas. He resigned in 1980 over the Communist tendencies of the FSLN and complained about the ever growing Cuban presence.

Fernando "El Negro" Chamorro, leader of the FRN and commander of ARDE's military forces, a prominent anti-Somoza figure since the 1940's, participated in numerous military actions against the dictator, repeatedly jailed or exiled by Somoza. In 1979 he fought on the southern front with the Sandinistas.

Eden Pastora, the legendary Commandante Cero, leader of the FRS, the Sandinista Revolutionary Front. He was the Sandinistas' most popular hero and a senior official of the Government until he broke with them in 1982 and took arms up against his former colleagues.

The list is very long, and there is no doubt that anybody who has taken the time to study it would find that in fact the people that are in opposition to the Sandinista regime, both those within Nicaragua who were involved in peaceful opposition as well as armed resistance, are not ex-Somozistas. The overwhelming number of them were in fact opponents of Somoza, and a great many of them served in the Sandinista government after 1979. Charges to the contrary are part of the campaign of disinformation put forward by the Sandinista government.

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. CHENEY] has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest, if one starts at the top of the military command and works his way down, he will go some distance before, according to his own committee, the Intelligence Committee, before he runs out of former national guards and starting with Enrique Bermudez, who is a colonel in the guard and is now the strategic commander for the military actions in the field. Then he can go down to the No. 2 person.

I appreciate the political people, and it is these very people that caused Eden Pastora such difficulty in linking up and has caused such difficulty in trying to get the coalition within the Contras that the administration has always sought, because there is recognition that you will never win the hearts and the minds of the Nicaraguan people with these very people leading the military actions.

I would suggest that it is the leadership of these people that is reflected in the kinds of actions we have seen taken in the field by the Contras. So the accusations may not be 100-percent correct.

Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER] has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER of California. So, Mr. Chairman, my point is that the accusation is not correct. Neither one of those accusations is in fact correct.

I recognize that many of the people in the political leadership of the Contras or, if not the Contras, in opposition to the Sandinistas are people who were former allies, either during the revolutionary struggle or afterwards. But by the same token, let us not suggest to this House that they have purged the people from the military leadership and from military involvement within the Contras of all the guardsmen or officers of the guardsmen. These were not all university students at the time of Somoza.

I think we have got to understand that at the very best we have a mixed bag, and when we understand again how this was put together in the very beginning in 1981 after the finding by the administration, what is very clear is that in fact these were people who left because they were non gratis in the country because of their involvement with the national guard.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER] has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 additional minutes to the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. CHENEY].

Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding this additional time to me.

No one has suggested on our side, I would remind my friend, the gentleman from California, that there are no individuals in the FDN operation who were not previously involved in the national guard. Colonel Bermudez was indeed involved in the national guard, but at the time of the revolution he was the attaché of the Nicaraguan Embassy in Washington. He had no involvement in the conflict in Nicaragua.

Earlier today the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] put into the RECORD detailed information that the Intelligence Committee and others have collected on the backgrounds of the top echelon of the FDN forces. Of 56 members, I would remind my friend, the gentleman from California, 27 are former Sandinistas. They fought for the Sandinistas first. Thirteen formerly were members of the national guard, 12 were farmers, 1 doctor, 1 evangelical minister, 1 fourth-year university student, and 1 civilian radio technician. Those are the facts.

Less than 2 percent of the FDN troop total are former Somoza national guard members. Twice as many of the military leadership of the Contras fought against Somoza as were involved with the national guard on behalf of Somoza.

So the suggestion that we are somehow supporting ex-Somozistas trying to overthrow the Government—

Mr. MILLER of California. I would say to the gentleman—

Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I have not yielded. The time is mine.

Mr. Chairman, that frankly is simply not accurate. The bottom line is that the overwhelming number of people involved in overthrowing Somoza now have serious doubts about the Sandinistas. The number of people who have taken up arms against the Sandinista government is three times as great as the number who were involved in fighting on behalf of the Sandinistas against Somoza. This is truly a broad-based revolutionary movement, and it deserves the support of the United States.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CHENEY. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding.

I would simply bolster his comments by reference to a Washington Post article dated February 28, 1985, which indicated that the Contra army was made up of 14,000 people, mostly peasants, of which only about 40 officers and about 200 fighters even served with Somoza's National Guard. If you figure that out, that is only 2 percent. And they go on to concede, as the gentleman has already pointed out, that Enrique Bermudez, who is the leader of the Contras in the field, was a Nicaraguan military attaché and had nothing

to do with the atrocities under Somoza.

They go on, and there is abundant evidence that the leaders of the Contra movement really have very little, if any, relationship with Somoza. In fact most of the leaders were against Somoza and fought with the Sandinistas and stayed with the Sandinistas until they learned what they truly were.

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CHENEY. I continue to yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. CHENEY] has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. CHENEY].

Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman's yielding further, because there is another point I want to make.

I was concerned when I was with the gentleman in Managua just a week or so ago that there seemed to be a continuing trend of well-intentioned American citizens trooping down to Nicaragua and all around the Nicaraguan countryside, I might add, at subsidized air fares and subsidized hotel rates paid for by the Sandinista government, and going around and viewing a dog and pony show. That is really how it could be described. They were getting information, as it was elaborated on by Sandinista representatives for their edification. They were being convinced that the United States is the wrong party in this conflict and that the Sandinistas are simply trying to provide peace and harmony for the future of Nicaraguan citizens.

Then we come back and we find that the so-called Brody report, which reaches similar conclusions, concocted by a 31-year-old lawyer, Reed Brody, was based on the same kind of a well-intentioned atmosphere and reached on the basis of a \$320,000 grant paid by the Nicaraguan Government to the firm of Reichler & Applebaum right here in the District of Columbia.

□ 1240

Then we go on and we find other evidence that Mr. Brody, who was supposed to have concocted the Brody report which gives evidence for all these good intentioned people to come back with their conclusions that the United States was wrong, actually was a friend of the Sandinistas and was quoted by Bayardo de Jesus Payan Hidalgo, the head of the Human Rights Commission down in Nicaragua, who says:

I was struck by the kindness extended to them by (Sandinista) officials * * * they

were provided with transportation, food, and lodging from the very beginning.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wyoming [Mr. CHENEY] has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from Wyoming.

Mr. CHENEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman—
They were provided with transportation, food, and lodging from the very beginning. Mr. Brody was characterized by his fondness for the FSLN (the Sandinista government) for he made it known that he was a friend of Commander Daniel Ortega Saavedra, showing a picture of him hugging the Commander.

Now, this is the type of interrelationship of well-intentioned people who go down there and develop a friendship for Mr. Ortega or Mr. D'Escoto or other members of the junta and come back and presume to tell us the truth about what is happening in Nicaragua, totally overlooking the abuses of human rights, the imprisonment, the forced labor camps, the torture, the execution that is going on at the hands of the Sandinista government.

It concerns me greatly and I think that when we hear allegations such as have been brought out by the other side to the effect of how horrible the Contras are, we have to look to the source of their material.

I would hope everybody in this Chamber would question the source of the material that is being discussed today.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CHENEY. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to make another point here as some on the other side try to smear the entire leadership of the democratic resistance forces in Nicaragua as though all so-called Contras were colonels in the Guardia Nacional and that all of them were part of that shameful segment of the Guardia that was guilty of human rights abuses.

Well, consider this fact. The very first Minister of Defense of the Sandinista government after July 1979 was a former full colonel in the Guardia Nacional named Bernardino Larios; when he saw the Government going Communist he resigned, but before he could leave the country he was arrested and thrown in jail for 4 years. He has just been released, and I suppose if we brought him up here and questioned him in the Rayburn Room to talk to some of the Members who attack the so-called Contras, our Members would say no." As one of the majority members said to me when I asked him to come off the floor to meet Enrique Bermudez, so that Senor Bermudez could testify to his face that he spent

the 3 years of Somoza struggle here in Washington. "I won't dignify them with even talking to them."

That gentleman is on his feet right now at the leadership table on the Democratic side.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, I think the fact remains that the military side of the operation clearly is still under the leadership of the National Guard and I think clearly you have got to understand that the fact still remains that the atrocities that we see committed in the field are being committed by the Contras.

We can argue the numbers of people who are in the positions of power back and forth, both on the political side and on the military side. The fact of the matter is that we see atrocities. These have not been, as the gentleman suggested, by patronizing American citizens who tried to go down and to develop the facts for themselves, but by independent organizations that have found atrocities on both sides; American Watch and other organizations.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. MILLER of California. When I am finished—that have clearly outlined that in fact the Contras are responsible for many atrocities. And those are not people who have gone down to swallow hook, line, and sinker, the Sandinista line. The fact of the matter remains that that is the case. There have been rapes, there have been kidnappings, there have been murders by Contras in the field.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. MILLER of California. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I simply point out again that the two independent missionaries, Mormon missionaries, who have no allegiance to the Federal Government or the Sandinista government at all, who have experience as missionaries in the field, went down there for exactly that purpose, and point out very clearly in their report that they were unfunded by anybody. They went down at their own expense.

They found no evidence of Contras atrocities and abundant evidence of Sandinista atrocities, including forced labor camps, executions, religious persecution, indiscriminate shelling of villages, mistreatment of prisoners, forced voluntarism in the co-op system and repression of the opposition political parties, as well as forced recruitment.

Mr. MILLER of California. Mr. Chairman, if I can reclaim my time, I

think clearly this is the tragedy of the situation which has been created, and that is the overall violence in Nicaragua, which I must add was not there prior to the entrance of this policy.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. WEISS].

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, Joe Louis once said about one of his opponents, "He can run, but he can't hide."

My distinguished colleagues on the other side of the aisle have been dancing around and trying to hide from what really is the issue in this situation. The United States of America, through the Reagan administration, has waged war against a country with which we have full diplomatic relations and the people of the United States of America in every poll and survey that has been taken have said that they will not sit still for that and they oppose the President's policy. What the Congress of the United States and this House will be doing at the end of this debate is to transform into action, once again, the will of the people of the United States and keep Ronald Reagan from getting the United States directly militarily involved in Nicaragua.

I have been to Nicaragua twice now. I was there about a week and a half ago. I had occasion to speak, to witness, to listen to people at all levels, opposition as well as government people. I have also visited other Central American countries. I want to tell you something. If you are an average citizen in most of the Central American countries, if you are a citizen of El Salvador, if you are a citizen of Guatemala, you have nowhere near the capacity to openly criticize your government as you do if you are a citizen of Nicaragua, and there is no question about that.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield on that point?

Mr. WEISS. No. When I finish, the gentleman will get time from his side of the aisle.

Let's talk about freedom of the press. Yes, the newspaper La Prensa, one of the largest newspapers in Nicaragua, is censored, and I oppose that; but if you are a press person in El Salvador and you owned an independent newspaper, nonsupportive of the military-government position, you no longer publish. You either had your plant bombed out from under you or you have been threatened with assassination or have been assassinated and you are no longer there.

The gentleman from California [Mr. LAGOMARSINO] had occasion to mention before that the Sandinistas would not let him visit a military camp and that proved that they did not have an open government.

I want to tell my distinguished colleague from California—

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield? He used my name.

Mr. WEISS. No, I will not.

I want to tell my distinguished friend from California that on Friday a week ago, Congressman EDGAR of Pennsylvania and I were about to go to the country of Guatemala in order to observe a demonstration by the relatives of people who had disappeared or been killed in Guatemala and we could not go because word came through from the Government of Guatemala that death threats had been received against the life of myself and the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. EDGAR] if we were to go there.

It seems to me that we ought to be concerned about freedom and liberty everywhere, but we also ought to be concerned about how the United States of America supports freedom and liberty everywhere. One of our very fundamental constitutional principles is that the United States goes to war only upon a declaration of war by the Congress of the United States. It is a principle that we ought to abide by.

The President and the Secretary of State and just about every Government spokesman for this administration has twisted facts, has distorted facts, has lied about what in fact is going on in Nicaragua and who supports or who does not support their policy.

□ 1250

The President said baldly that the Pope supports every aspect of his policy in Nicaragua, only to have the Vatican come forward to deny that representation.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WEISS. No. When the gentleman wants, he can get time from his side of the aisle.

From the various and wholesale disinformation provided by the Government of the United States of America, the people of this country have winnowed out the facts and said that they will not, we will not have our sons and our fathers and our brothers go to war in Central America.

Yes; we ought to be providing inducements and encouragements for a peaceful resolution. When we were in Nicaragua we met on the 11th of April with the President of Nicaragua who had just gotten a report back from the proceedings at the resumed Contadora hearings. The Contadora proposals presented that day for verification of all the various agreements as to the removal of advisers and the removal of military forces and the reductions of arms and so on in the conflicted areas of Central America had been drafted

by the Contadora countries with the assistance and involvement of the Canadian Government. The Nicaraguan representative said—and this has been carried publicly in our newspapers—that his government would accept without any amendments whatsoever the recommendations of the Contadora countries and the Canadians.

We opposed it? Who is still quibbling about it and refusing to accept it? Honduras and El Salvador and Costa Rica; not because they do not like it, but because the Government of the United States, in spite of all of the protestations and representations about how we want a diplomatic settlement, in fact, have done everything within our powers to prevent a diplomatic settlement.

You do not have to love the Sandinistas, you do not have to support their reneging on commitments for a free press or for political pluralism and I do not, to know that the dirty war that the U.S. Government has been funding and directing and been engaging in without congressional or popular approval cannot be allowed to continue. It certainly ought not to be allowed to be continued by action of this House of Representatives. We have the right and the opportunity to set this country's policies back on the path of our Constitution. That is what we as a nation are about. That is what we ought to be doing.

In December 1981, CIA Director William Casey came before the House and Senate Intelligence Committees seeking \$19 million he said, to interdict arms traffic from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran rebels. The beneficiaries were a 500-man paramilitary force. Most were former members of Somoza's national guard. The same national guard who maintained the Somoza dynasty's 40 years of iron-fisted terror. At the behest of our CIA, this paramilitary force was trained by the Argentine military. The same military responsible for disappearing 6,000 Argentines.

Four years later, Mr. Reagan is seeking another \$14 million. Most will go to the FDN [Democratic Revolutionary Force], the son of that 500-man paramilitary force. Four years, and \$80 million U.S. dollars later, the Argentine trainers have been replaced by the CIA. The same CIA whose only contribution to the Contras' democratic training has been providing them with a primer on assassination.

The FDN's military command are the same national guardsmen, who terrorized Nicaraguans for more than 40 years.

Enrique Bermudez, the Contra's self-proclaimed defense minister, served as Somoza's former military attaché in Washington. His second in command, Capt. Armando Lopez, was a guardista.

The heads of logistics, intelligence, operations, special warfare, and most

key combat commanders are national guard alumni.

The Contras' former intelligence chief, Col. Ricardo Lau, who has been accused of directing the 1980 assassination of Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero, was a guardista.

But don't just take my word for it. Let me quote from Arturo Cruz, former junta member, Nicaraguan Ambassador, and now a Contra supporter, who wrote in a 1983 Foreign Affairs article:

The fact remains, however, that most of the persons in positions of military authority within the FDN are ex-members of the National Guard who unconditionally supported Somoza until the end, against the will of the Nicaraguan people.

This is the same national guard, who, according to Eden Pastora, "killed our people for 45 years. The guardsmen killed this guy's brother. They killed my father. Everybody in Nicaragua has a relative killed by the national guard."

These are the same guardsmen, who have pledged that—and I am quoting from one Contra officer—"Come the counterrevolution, there will be a massacre in Nicaragua. We have lots of scores to settle. There will be bodies from the border to Managua."

These are the same Contras whose killings and human rights abuses were so indiscriminate that the CIA had to prepare a manual to instruct them how to selectively assassinate.

These are the same guardsmen Mr. Reagan calls freedom fighters and compares to our Founding Fathers.

Neither the Congress, nor the American people, are immune from the lies and distortions this administration has used to promote its immoral war in Nicaragua.

Until last year, CIA Director Casey claimed we were supporting an interdiction operation. Four years of white papers, aerial photos, and secret documents have not provided hard evidence of arms shipments. A May 1983 House Intelligence Committee report stated "the program has not interdicted arms." According to former CIA analyst, David MacMichael, there has not been a verifiable interdiction of arms or anything else since 1981.

Then, the Contras were "bargaining chips" who would bring the Sandinistas to the negotiating table. In September of last year, the Nicaraguans not only came to the table, they signed a draft Contadora treaty. The proposal—drafted by the Contadora nations, not the Sandinistas—provided for free and fair elections, an end to the regional arms race, and the withdrawal of foreign military advisers. But just as soon as the Nicaraguans accepted the treaty, the United States, and its regional allies—after we coerced them—backed away. It should be apparent that until the Sandinistas

are removed from Managua, Mr. Reagan will never see a Contadora treaty that he likes.

Now, Mr. Reagan, while still professing the fiction that he doesn't want the Sandinistas overthrown, claims he only wants them removed "in the sense of [their] present structure." The distinction between overthrowing someone and getting them to cry "uncle" is lost on Contra defense minister, Col. Enrique Bermudez, who has unequivocally stated: "We are Nicaraguans and our objective is to overthrow the Communists."

However sincere such recent Contra converts as Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo may be in their commitment to democracy, the fact is that the war is directed by former national guardsmen, who are terrorists, not democrats. They have promised to bring to Managua a reign of terror that will make the French Revolution look like a labor day picnic. Their methods are those of the Marquis de Sade, not the Marquis de Lafayette. And, according to Eden Pastora, "the Nicaraguan people will not support the National Guard."

For 4 years, Mr. Reagan has sacrificed our values, our respect for the law, our commitment to democratic institutions, and our international standing. It's our turn now, finally, to put a halt to his "dirty little war" against Nicaragua.

I thank the gentleman for yielding this time.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. BOXER].

Mrs. BOXER. I thank the gentleman very much for yielding me time.

I think at this point in the debate we should take a deep breath and ask ourselves what we are trying to achieve in Nicaragua.

Do we want to add to the suffering there? Do we want to add to the instability there? Do we want to strengthen the lack of freedom there?

If that is what we want to do in Nicaragua then we should vote for the package of military aid to the Contras that lies before us.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Will the gentlewoman yield?

Mrs. BOXER. No; I am sorry. I have no time to yield to you.

But if we want to help the people of Nicaragua, if we want to bring stability, if we want to be in a position to strengthen democracy in Nicaragua, we should vote down the funds for the Contras. We should work for peace with the people of the region through the Contadora process.

We must learn from history. I say to my colleagues that in the 1950's the CIA backed a coup to overthrow the second democratically elected President in Guatemala because our country did not like his policy of land reform. We backed the rebels, and

then when they were too inept to win that victory, the CIA people got involved in the combat and the military achieved its goal and the Government of Guatemala was overthrown.

I ask my colleagues: What has happened in Guatemala since that day in the 1950's dubbed as "Operation Success?"

Guatemala has yet to see a democratically elected government. There is suffering in Guatemala. There are problems in Guatemala.

We have to look for another way as we look at the situation in Nicaragua. So there must be something, something in between completely walking away, which I do not support, and using military means, which I do not support, to solve the problem in Nicaragua. That is something that we call the Contadora process. It is called diplomacy. It is called using America's strength to bring peace and democracy, not to prolong war, killing, and suffering.

Finally, I would say to my colleagues, I feel compelled to say that one of my colleagues from California, Mr. DORNAN, has several times in this debate referred to "little nuns" who have appeared in Members' offices to spread disinformation. I wonder if my colleague would describe Mother Theresa as a "little nun"?

I find it reprehensible, Mr. Chairman, that people with conviction, and concern, and love of God, and love of country, would be accused of spreading disinformation.

Those people have been in Nicaragua, they know the score and we know the score. Let us work for diplomacy and against giving aid to the Contras.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentlewoman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. BOXER] has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] to respond.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Of course, I assumed that the gentlewoman was speaking with a broad brush when she talked about people being reprehensible.

I have quite accurately, as a loyal and practicing Catholic, assessed that there are some nuns in Orange County of California and elsewhere who have made one of these revolutionary tourist trips down to Nicaragua and come back parroting the Leninist line of lies pumped out by the nine commandantes or the suspended former priest named Miguel d'Escoto who periodically plays the role of Foreign Minister. And I repeat what I said last week. d'Escoto is like the little man Tatoo on TV's Fantasy Island. He yells at this boss, Ortega, "Boss, De plane, de plane, de plane, here comes another

bunch of naive fools," or what Lenin called useful idiots to be brainwashed with the Communist line.

Now, it is true that some of the nuns who have come back home have gotten themselves straightened out by talking to other nuns who have been persecuted down there in Managua. In other words they have recanted. I will send to the gentlewoman's office the recantations of the nuns who have become smarter than your average Congressman on Central America.

Mrs. BOXER. If the gentleman wants to call those nuns fools, that is his choice of words, not mine.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Useful idiots is what I also said. Useful to the Leninists who persecute their church, which is also my church which I love.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. DEWINE], a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEWINE. I yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. I would just make a couple of brief points.

While I was in Nicaragua at the same time as my colleague from New York [Mr. WEISS] we had occasion to have dinner with the Ambassador and a former labor minister who was the head of the liberal party down there. This gentleman, who affectionately touched the gentleman from New York [Mr. WEISS], and said, "We as liberals share a great deal in common," said to Mr. WEISS that he would like for him to come down to Nicaragua for about 3 weeks to see what was really going on. He said, and I cannot quote him verbatim, but the gist of the conversation was that the present pressure and the censorship and the religious persecution had increased dramatically, and that if Mr. WEISS had an opportunity to see for himself really what was going on down there, Mr. WEISS would vote for aid to the Contras, because if aid for the Contras was not forthcoming the repression would increase, the Communists would solidify their positions, and the revolution would be extended throughout Central America.

Now this gentleman philosophically did not agree with me at all. He did with the gentleman from New York [Mr. WEISS], on most issues. But he told Mr. WEISS point blank that the aid to the Contras was absolutely essential if they were to have any chance at freedom in the future.

Mr. DEWINE. I thank my colleague for his statement.

If the American people had any idea, Mr. Chairman, of the intensity and the expertise of the Sandinista propaganda, I think they would be shocked.

There is an excellent article in the Wall Street Journal of April 23, and I

invite all of my colleagues to read it. It is by Jim Denton and it details part of this propaganda.

I think all of us could have expected what we saw last weekend. The vote on the Contras was coming up. The Sandinistas' action was predictable. What did we think Daniel Ortega was going to do? He communicated a peace proposal, not to our Embassy or State Department, but rather to some Members of Congress.

□ 1300

What he did was to communicate to some Members of Congress a peace proposal, a bogus peace proposal, a last minute peace proposal. It was reported on NBC and ABC that same night in very, very serious tones that certainly this would make it more difficult for this House to support aid to the Contras. The networks were right. Daniel Ortega was right. He accomplished exactly what he intended to accomplish. The Sandinistas have constructed a huge propaganda machine. It was reported in this article that the Nicaraguans paid \$320,000 per year to a Washington based law firm to lobby on their behalf. This \$320,000, which I just cited, is only a drop in the bucket. As my colleague from California, Mr. DORNAN, has pointed out, this regime started in 1979 and in 1980 having people come down for trips. Everybody, everybody's congressional district has had people who have gone down there. Well-intentioned, good-hearted, sincere Americans. But what they have been shown has been an orchestrated campaign; what they have been shown is exactly what the Sandinistas want them to see. This article in the Wall Street Journal goes into two of the so-called objective reports that our colleagues on the other side of the aisle so frequently cite. The first one has been referred to. It was the Brody report, bought and paid for, and let us get the terms right, bought and paid for by the Communists in Nicaragua. Those are the facts, and nothing more needs to be said.

The Fox report was an attempt, an attempt as we heard in our committee last week, to make the first report valid. Even though it never came out in the report, never came out in any of the press releases, never came out in any of the press conferences, we found that Mr. Fox's wife's step-brother is a Sandinista, a high ranking Sandinista official. I do not question Mr. Fox's integrity, I will not do that at all. But isn't that a relevant fact? Isn't it important for this body to know that his brother-in-law is a Sandinista? We never would have known that except, quite frankly, for the investigation of Jim Denton.

So let us keep everything in perspective as we look at the propaganda campaign that is being waged right now in Members' offices.

Congressman LAGOMARSINO and I several months ago had the opportunity to travel to Nicaragua. I am not an expert, only being down there for a few days. I am not claiming to be an expert. But what has been described by some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle is not the Nicaragua I saw. The Catholic priest whom we talked to who told us that in the Catholic schools they have to teach Marxism. We asked, well, what happens if you don't teach Marxism? The answer was: "The schools don't run." Marxism in the Catholic schools, it just sickens me.

Now, the situation with La Prensa has been made light of La Prensa, to my knowledge, is the only independent paper left in that country. It has been made light of, the fact that 40 percent of that paper every single day is censored; 40 percent. Some days they do not even publish.

Private enterprise? There has been reference made to private enterprise. Let me tell you what we found out about private enterprise.

I asked one of the small businessmen who remains in the country about what percentage of the economy was private. He laughed at me. "Another dumb American question." He said "when the state buys everything and sells everything and controls everything and tells you what to do and when to do it, how much enterprise, private enterprise is left?" Congressman LAGOMARSINO and I talked to a little vendor, literally a little vendor, who had been selling produce on the street for a number of years. That very day the Communists, the Sandinistas told this vendor, "You can't sell anymore. No, you can't. You're out of business. The reason you're out of business is because it is all going to be sold through a state-run store."

We talked to labor leaders, we talked to political opposition, or what is left of it. We talked to people throughout the country who would turn on their radios because they knew for a fact, at least they told us, that they were being bugged.

Now that is the Nicaragua we have.

What conclusions do we bring back to this body that will help us make a decision? What did we learn? Several things.

Congressman LAGOMARSINO referred to this, let me refer to it again: This is a direct quote from my notes which I looked at today. "Things will be bad for us if the Contras go away." Nobody wanted to tell us or everyone was afraid to tell us, "Give aid to the Contras." They knew better than that. If your office is being bugged you do not want to say that.

But what they would say in a roundabout way, every single one of them, "Things will be bad for us if the Contras go away."

Now, another quote, "We used to be public enemy No. 1, now we're No. 2. If the pressure that the Contras are putting on the Sandinistas ever goes away they will turn on us in a moment, they will be back at our throats, they will eliminate us." What little bit of opposition, whether political or business, whether it is in the press or whether it is the church, will be gone.

My friends, it is clear what they will do. There are three things going to happen when we completely dry up the aid from the Contras, which it clearly looks like we are going to do today and tomorrow; three things are eventually going to happen. No. 1, they are going to consolidate their revolution. No. 2, they are going to move against and strike out all opposition.

And, No. 3, if that does not wake you up, maybe the third should, after consolidating the revolution they are going to go right back to what they have been doing, only they are going to do a better job of it, they are going to export the revolution. The ammunition, the arms going into El Salvador, which we found in El Salvador, and which we traced back to the Soviet bloc, is going to continue. We are going to have in Central America another Cuba, only this one is going to have two ports, one on the Pacific and in the Atlantic. They are going to be on land instead of surrounded only by oceans. That is a natural consequence of what we are doing. We have got to keep the pressure on them.

We are not faced in this body with easy choices, we never are. But I think today is probably the toughest but most important day for Congress since I entered Congress a little over 2 years ago. The choice is not easy. The easiest thing for me politically and probably for everybody else in this Chamber to do would be to say, wash our hands of it, stick our heads in the sand and say, "No, we don't want to give aid to the Contras. We don't want to have any part of what is going on in Central America. Let's walk away from it and use the excuse that we are avoiding another Vietnam."

Vietnam hangs heavy over this Chamber as it should.

It was a tragedy.

But I would submit to you today that what you are about to do today is going to result in one of two things. No. 1, you are going to consign that region of the world to communism.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. DeWine] has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield an additional 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. DeWine. That is the first thing that is going to be done. The second potential is that you are risking, and I choose my words very carefully, by this action you are risking American

lives. If there is one thing that I would hope everybody in this room could agree on it is that we want no more Vietnams and we want no more Cubas.

What in the world—and I have been listening for 3 hours, I guess, and have not heard anybody stand up at this mike from your side of the aisle and tell me how your plan—you have trashed the President's plan, you have trashed Bob MICHEL's plan—yet no one has told me how your plan is going to achieve peace.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEWINE. Let us finish, let me finish. I have the time. As you told Mr. LIVINGSTON, you will have ample time to answer.

Mr. WEISS. Well, the gentleman asked.

Mr. DEWINE. No; just as you did for Mr. LIVINGSTON. What is fair for one side is fair for the other.

Now, what is the proposal? What have we heard from your side of the aisle? We are going to have more negotiations? Well, we want negotiations. We want peace proposals, but what did the Sandinistas do when a very significant proposal came forth from the opposition parties, what is left of them, and the Contras?

□ 1310

An offer was made to have the Catholic bishops in Nicaragua mediate, and it was not an unreasonable proposal. The proposal was they would have a cease fire, Daniel Ortega would stay as President, there would be free elections, and there would be allowed freedom of the press and the basic things that are necessary to have a free election. Several weeks elapsed, as I recall. Because when Bob and I were down there, no response had been made from the bishops. The bishops then came back and said, "Yes, we will offer to mediate that." And what did the Sandinistas do? No, they would not do it. They rejected the offer. The peace proposals have been made. The Contadora process is ongoing. They all should continue. But the basic facts of life are that if you really want peace down there, you have got to have a little stick or maybe, as Theodore Roosevelt said, a big stick. You have got to have something to prod them to do that. Your proposal has no prod. There is nothing contained in there that has not already been on the table. Absolutely nothing. What we are saying is, give some aid to the Contras, keep the pressures on, listen to the people who talked to Congressman LAGOMARSINO and me when we were down there, listen to what they said. The only way you are going to keep pressure on these Marxist-Leninists—and that is what they are, there is no doubt about it—the only way you are going to keep pressure on them is by the Contras.

Now, before I yield to my colleague, let me say one other thing: The natural consequences of your action is, I think, that some day—I hope to God I am wrong—Americans are going to die because of your action or rather your inaction.

Let me take you through some testimony that we had in our committee last week. I am just going to cite one. There are several, but I am just going to cite one. McGeorge Bundy testified, a Kennedy-Johnson administration adviser, actively involved as an adviser during the Vietnam war. He testified and said aid to the Contras is no good, the CIA cannot accomplish anything, it will not work and, besides, you always have American naval power to fall back on. My God, I heard that, and I read it before he said it, and then he said it, and I could not believe it. I said, "What in the world are you talking about?" I said, "Are you really saying that if this doesn't work, if we don't give aid to the Contras and if the Nicaraguans don't become peace activists, don't become democrats overnight, that the only result, the only natural result is a naval blockade?" He said, "No, Congressman, you have it wrong." He said, "In the Kennedy days we called it a naval quarantine."

That is the natural consequences of what I am afraid we are about. That puts us to a brink of war. It is 20 years later. What President Kennedy did was right. I supported him. But that is going to take us to the brink of war. It is 20 years later. There is a different navy that the Soviets have, we are not talking about an isolated island, we are talking now about an entirely different situation.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DEWINE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I want to compliment the gentleman on his tremendous statements. He laid it all out, gave the options the way they really are, not the way some people would like them to be.

An interesting thing occurred to me, and I have discussed this with the gentleman several times. He and I and other members of our subcommittee on the Republican side of the aisle sat there through the five hearings last week that were held on this subject—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. DEWINE] has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Most of the time there were only one or two or, at one point, three on the other side of the aisle, even though they had called the hearings and had called the major-

ity of the witnesses. The thing that really impressed me about those hearings, perhaps more than anything else, was that even the opposition witnesses, opposition to the President's proposal, said, most of them in so many words, that the Sandinistas were Communists, that they were repressing their people, that they had been exporting revolution. Some of them did not like to make those statements. Adm. Stansfield Turner, who was the head of the CIA during the Carter years, took a long time to admit what he finally did admit, that indeed the Sandinistas had violated U.S. law by exporting revolution and, therefore, the Carter administration had cut them off.

They all agreed, I think almost without exception, that the Sandinistas were repressive, were exporting revolution, as I said, and, further, that something had to be done about it. They all said there should be some pressure, but very few of them had any good ideas at all. It was interesting—I mentioned Turner—that Turner opposed the proposal not even having read it, apparently, because he did not know that the President's proposal called for a truce, and that was some of the type of opposition. But none of the people who had been to Nicaragua came back praising its glories.

Mr. DEWINE. It was certainly unanimous.

I yield to my colleague, the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I want to commend him for his outstanding statement on this subject. I might point out, with respect to his comments about the disinformation that is going on that seems to be leading to some of the arguments on the other side, Clare George, Deputy Director of the CIA, testified with an Assistant Secretary of State, before an unclassified meeting of the Intelligence Committee the other day, and I would like to quote him, quickly:

A worldwide propaganda campaign has been mounted and carried out in behalf of the Sandinista regime and Salvadoran guerrillas which would not have been possible without the capabilities, the contacts and the communication channels provided by the Soviet bloc and Cuba. The Sandinistas themselves have shown remarkable ingenuity and skill . . .

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. DEWINE] has again expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman—

The Sandinistas themselves have shown remarkable ingenuity and skill in projecting disinformation into the United States itself. Perhaps the best example of this is the systematic campaign to deceive well-inten-

tioned members of the Western media and of Western religious institutions.

Now, that point being made, I would like to also point out to the gentleman, and he seems to have followed up on the comments by the gentlewoman from California [Mrs. BOXER], with respect to what we really want, and the gentleman has eloquently pointed out what we want is peace and, preferably, democracy in Central America.

Now, I think it is significant that the gentlewoman refers to the 1950's and what happened in Guatemala way back then. She somehow forgets what happened in the last 6 years when in El Salvador, against the protestations of the other side time and time again, against the attempts of the other side to keep us from funding the Salvadoran Government against the Marxist guerrillas, despite the fact that the other side had constantly tried to keep that money from helping the democracy in El Salvador, what happened was, because we stayed in there, because the Reagan administration and the Carter administration decided that it was important to protect democracy in El Salvador, we now have had four free, open, fair elections. We have had a constituent assembly, we have had a President popularly elected, and Jose Napoleon Duarte is now that popular President of El Salvador. Democracy exists in El Salvador. And if we follow through with that same policy, democracy will exist in Nicaragua some day when the Sandinista regime yields its power.

Mr. DEWINE. I thank the gentleman very much for his statement.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we want no more Vietnams, we want no more Cubas. We want peace.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. DEWINE] has again expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 additional seconds to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. DEWINE. We want peace in the region. Give us some way of doing it. Give us some stick. Give us some way to prod these Communists into doing what everyone in this Chamber wants, and that is engaging in meaningful peace negotiations.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds. I would tell the gentleman he has made an outstanding statement, but if he has heard nothing from this side, one thing we have stated is that we are not for providing military aid, and that is the question before the Congress at the present time. House Joint Resolution 239 deals only with military assistance and has nothing to do with humanitarian assistance. I would suggest the gentleman read the classified report that was transmitted to the Congress in support of this release of the \$14 million for military aid.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DELLUMS].

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I have tried to listen with diligence and with rapt attention and with respect to the debate that has gone forward and as a result I would like to make a few comments.

Several speakers have spoken powerfully and dramatically to a group of people that have been referred to on the floor as the "Marxists and the Leninists and the Communists," this great threat and this great conspiracy. Someone ought to try to address that. I would like to do it, try to put this debate in some perspective.

It would seem to me that if you listened to the structure of the debate, the largest single group of Marxists, Leninists, Communists are in the Soviet Union. But nobody here, I would like to hope, in their rational persona, is suggesting that we go to war with the Soviet Union.

The second largest group of Marxists, Leninists, Communists are in the Eastern bloc in Europe, but no one is proposing that we go to war with Czechoslovakia, Poland, East Germany. In their rational minds, they would not do it. So where do we end up fighting these proxy wars against these great menaces?

□ 1320

In Third World countries; in the Vietnams, the Laos', the Cambodias, the Central Americas of the world where people of color, dying of poverty and hunger and disease and malnutrition, starvation, human rights violations, torture, killing, and maiming and imprisonment, we suddenly find these are the places that must access to great and powerful battlefields upon which we fight the great Communist menace; upon which we battle the Marxists and the Leninists.

We are not throwing nukes at the Soviet Union, thank goodness. That would destroy the planet. We are not talking about going to war with the Eastern Europeans; thank God; that would probably again destroy the planet. So we fight it out in impoverished countries where we engage in this East-West struggle to the total exclusion of the North-South dimension of the poverty and the hunger and the disease and all the other crippling problems that plague and confront human beings.

So I have come to the conclusion that maybe the statement "a rose is a rose", and that "a Communist is a Communist is a Communist," is not really true. Maybe there are good Communists, and maybe there are bad Communists. It may be that good Communists are the ones that have big bombs that can bomb us back. Maybe the only bad Communists are those people struggling in the develop-

ing countries of this world where we ought to be addressing their human misery, we choose to engage in the madness of war.

I would suggest to my colleagues that peace would not come through the barrel of a gun; that peace will come when we address the problems that give rise to war, death, and destruction. It is the human misery that human beings field; it is the destruction of the human spirit that creates war. What are we doing in this situation? I would stipulate this list. One of the most absurd points in this debate is to debate whose names are more accurate on the list of 56. Who cares? That is not the issue here. You are putting a smiling face on death and destruction, because if you take war to its bottom line, it is killing and dying and death. It is funky stench is what it is all about. There is nothing glamorous about it.

People are dying in Central America, and I do not care how glorious a speech on this floor, we cannot deny that American peoples' money is being used to perpetuate death and destruction. We are a mighty superpower; we ought to have the capacity to say to the world we can show how to solve human problems short of the absurdity and the cruelty. We should have the capacity and the boldness and the courage to think beyond war.

How can we say to the people in the Middle East: "Sit down around the table and negotiate Israel, Arabs, and other people." How can we say to Iran and Iraq: "Sit down around the table and negotiate," when, in this hemisphere, where we live and where we reside, we lack the capacity to say, "Sit down and let us talk about the power of the spoken word; let us demonstrate our capacity to address our problems through political solution."

Why are we financing death and destruction? Are we not as a mighty nation capable of structuring an environment within which we can begin to talk out these problems. I ask this rhetorical question. Even if you disagree, my friends, with the idea, how do you fight an idea? I would suggest you challenge an idea with a better idea; not with a bigger bomb; not with a bigger budget to finance Contras. But you come with a better idea.

If the United States and the Soviet Union want to compete, then let us compete not over who can destroy human life in the Third World, but who can best address the misery of the Third World. You do not do that by spending \$14 million more to engage in war and destruction. Let us solve the problems of hunger and poverty and disease and human rights violations. Then you will see a great groundswell of people moving toward us. The most powerful thing we as Americans have is not our ability to

export \$14 million but to export a fantastic idea, the idea of democracy; the idea of people's involvement.

So why, if we are so democratic, are we not prepared to embrace a process that allows democratic discussion back and forth across the table as we build a consensus that ultimately leads to a nonviolent political solution to how we solve our problems.

I do not want to debate over whether the form of government is a good form of government or not. Let us stipulate your analysis. My question here is how do we solve the problem? I am saying that war in a nuclear age is not an acceptable option. And so to fight it out in proxy countries is both racist and repressive and insensitive and arrogant and unnecessary.

We as a powerful nation of democratic people ought to be willing to say let us sit down and negotiate the nature of our differences. So let us stop debating over who has the good list of names and who has the bad list of names. People killing are people killing. People dying are people dying, and we have a responsibility here not to impress ourselves with who can pronounce the names the best or who has the best list of names. We are here to debate policy. I say unequivocally that moving down this road toward greater violence and greater misery and greater participation in the process of death and destruction and war is not the answer to the problem. Let us show the world the magnificence of the ability to sit down around the table and negotiate. Ultimately, my friends, we are running out of places to fight wars, and if we can ever get it through our heads that peace is an imperative in the nuclear age, that we will begin not to play games in the Third World, but to embrace the process that brings us to freedom.

My final point: I urge all of my colleagues to vote against this resolution. I would have liked very much to not even see my Democratic colleagues come with a compromise. I believe American people did learn something from Vietnam. They do not want us fighting in Central America. I think that if we stripped away all the compromises, the majority of my colleagues, in a rational and sane moment would sit down and come to the realization that pursuing war is not the answer. That they should vote to strike down this resolution.

I hope that the Members vote to strike down this resolution, because that is the hope for human life on this planet.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DELLUMS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DORNAN of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the distinguished gentleman has made an eloquent plea for peace as is usual.

Mr. DELLUMS. That is why I came to Congress.

Mr. DORNAN of California. As is usual, his case. So did most of us, I believe. There are young men who do not want to be impressed, dragooned, shanghaied into military service under a Sandinista government that has betrayed the principles and goals of a noble revolution.

These young men are fleeing, most of them south to Costa Rica where they arrive in such emaciated condition they must be fed intravenously. Am I not correct that both you and I voted against the draft in prior Congresses?

Mr. DELLUMS. That is correct.

Mr. DORNAN of California. What would you tell these young men, citizens of Nicaragua, who do not want to serve in the military forces of Sandinista, once they have reached Costa Rica, to stay refugees for the rest of their life? Do you advise them not to take up the fighting option; to come back into their country and join the resistance forces to fight against the government they find oppressive. What would you advise them to do?

Mr. DELLUMS. I would say first of all, if you disagree with the politics of your country and the policies that are prevailing policies, do what I am doing: Stand up and oppose it and be willing to suffer whatever the risks necessary to stand up and do that.

Second, I would say to them that at some point, we have to stop the killing and the dying. This particular gentleman is getting tired of turning on the 6 and 7 o'clock news and seeing people in Third World countries face down, and it is not a movie, because no one can say at the end "cut," and they get up.

Mr. DORNAN of California. True.

Mr. DELLUMS. These are dead human beings and I am tired of that misery. We as human beings on this planet ought to have gained the sophistication to take us beyond the barbaric act of killing each other in the name of political differences.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE], a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

□ 1330

Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, that was a brilliant speech, the sort of speech we are accustomed to hearing from the gentleman from California. I wish he could have made it in Pnom Penh where some Cambodian prisoners could have heard him. I wish he could make it in the Parliament in Warsaw. Perhaps some Solidarity undercover members could hear it through the window. I

wish he could have made it in Kabul, where carpet bombing is going on and 100,000 Soviet Troops are pulverizing the patriotic, indigenous Mujahadeen.

Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. Yes, I yield to my friend, the gentleman from California.

Mr. DELLUMS. I will not take much of the gentleman's time, but I would say this: I would be willing to make the speech to defend human life on this planet and in the name of peace anywhere. You set up the speech. I will be there to make it.

Mr. HYDE. I am sure you will, and I hope you will include Communist oppression and Communist killing in your speech, because you always seem to say we have to stop the killing. Let them stop the killing. Let them stop the oppression. Let them stop the oppression.

Mr. DELLUMS. Will the gentleman yield briefly?

Mr. HYDE. Of course, I will yield to my friend.

Mr. DELLUMS. The gentleman knows very well how I feel about killing and dying on either side. When I speak about "us," I speak about us only when I take the well as an American citizen, an integral part of the body politic charged with the responsibility of making decisions on policy that we advocate. I am not a member of the Supreme Soviet. I am a Member of the U.S. Congress and I function in that context.

Mr. HYDE. I think the gentleman has made his point, and I recapture my time.

Mr. Chairman, I do not think anybody in their right mind today who is moderately informed doubts that Nicaragua is deeply involved in exporting subversion to its neighbors, particularly El Salvador. The bipartisan Kissinger commission found this to be true, and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, on which I serve, has found this to be true, and I refer you to section 109 of the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1984, which has a finding as follows:

By providing military support, including arms, training, logistical command and control, and communications facilities to groups seeking to overthrow the government of El Salvador and other Central American governments, the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua has violated Article XVIII of the Organization of American States, which declares that no state has the right to intervene directly or indirectly for any reason whatsoever in the internal or external affairs of any other state.

Now, this fact is important in rejecting the claim that aiding the democratic resistance in Nicaragua is somehow illegal. When this argument of illegality is made, you only hear half the law, and then you hear it applied to the wrong forces. If you will see yes-

terday's CONGRESSIONAL RECORD at page E1630, you will find a brief on the law prepared by John Norton Moore, a professor of law at the University of Virginia, and a constitutional scholar.

But just briefly let me say there are 3 treaties involved, the United Nations Charter, the OAS Charter, the Organization of American States, and the Rio Treaty, and all of them assert the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense.

Moreover, article III of the Rio Treaty goes even farther and it says an attack on one signatory is an attack on all. And, lest we get lost in fine legal distinctions, legal scholars have held that an armed attack need not be armies on the march but can take place by organization, instigation, and support of a sustained insurgency.

So while the law forbids one nation intervening in the internal affairs of another nation, it is Nicaragua and Cuba that violate this provision, and by responding to this breach through collective self-defense we are within the law and the only violators are Nicaragua and Cuba. Not only is this law; it is common sense. To claim that the law protects Communist subversion from any effective defense is just patent nonsense. In World War II, support for the resistance in France and the underground in Germany was not illegal, and defending yourself is never state terrorism. To even make the charge is to undermine the most important distinction in the United Nations and the OAS charters, that between aggression and defense.

Democrats do not like Republicans quoting from Democratic Presidents, and I do not particularly like to do it either, but it is so appropriate that I must share with you a speech made by John F. Kennedy on April 20, 1961, before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. Listen to what President Kennedy said, and ask yourself if he could get elected anything in the Democratic Party today:

No greater task faces this country or this administration. No other challenge is more deserving of our every effort and energy. Too long we have fixed our eyes on traditional military needs, on armies prepared to cross borders, on missiles poised for flight. Now it should be clear that this is no longer enough—that our security may be lost piece by piece, country by country, without the firing of a single missile or the crossing of a single border.

It is clear that this Nation, in concert with all the free nations of this hemisphere, must take an ever closer and more realistic look at the menace of external Communist intervention and domination in Cuba. The American people are not complacent about Iron Curtain tanks and planes less than 90 miles from their shore. But a nation of Cuba's size is less a threat to our survival than it is a base for subverting the survival of other free nations throughout the hemisphere. It is not primarily our interest or our security but theirs which is now, today,

in the greater peril. It is for their sake as well as our own that we must show our will.

The evidence is clear—and the hour is late. We and our Latin friends will have to face the fact that we cannot postpone any longer the real issue of survival of freedom in this hemisphere itself. On that issue, unlike perhaps some others, there can be no middle ground. Together we must build a hemisphere where freedom can flourish; and where any free nation under outside attack of any kind can be assured that all our resources stand ready to respond to any request for assistance.

Fraud in the inducement is a well known legal concept and I suggest to you that the Sandinista government has no legitimacy. They made promises to the Organization of American States in 1979 and in exchange for which they got the support of the OAS and the support of the United States. They promised that they would have a pluralistic political society, that they would have a mixed economy, that they would have a free press and freedom of religion, and they have broken every one of those promises.

Therefore, they ought to be delegitimated. Archbishop McGrath of Panama has said, and I quote:

Today's Sandinista government has usurped power from the broad-based coalition that overthrew Somoza in 1979.

So it is clear that usurpers are violating the law and in coming to the collective self-defense of our allies and friends, El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica, we are in keeping with the law.

So do not be misled. When I was in law school, one of my professors said the first thing a lawyer must learn to do is to be plausible in support of groundless motions. Well, I suggest you will hear some plausible arguments that we are the lawbreakers, but do not be misled and check yesterday's RECORD for the brief.

Why give military aid to the democratic resistance? Very simple. To keep the pressure on. To force a return to the promises of 1979 by the Sandinistas.

Notice how the argument has shifted. It used to be that the Contras, the democratic resistance, were ineffective. Let us not support them, they are ineffective. They are not doing the job. Now that they have become effective, now that their ranks are swelling every day and every month, the argument shifts now. Somehow it is illegal and we ought not to interfere in the internal affairs of another country.

I suggest to you that Somoza was not overthrown by military force. He was not overthrown by political force or by economic force, but by a combination of all three. The synergistic effect of all three together is much greater than the sum of the parts, and I suggest to you that a continuation of the military pressure through the Contras, a tightening of economic

pressure and political pressure will bring them to their senses.

The Contras keep the Communist revolution in Nicaragua internalized. They keep the Nicaraguan Marxists-Leninists introverted. Once we pull the rug on the Contras, once they become refugees instead of freedom fighters, then the revolution gets externalized. They become extroverted, and God help the countries that surround this revolutionary Marxist-Leninist surrogate of Cuba/the Soviet Union.

May I say there is a touch, it seems to me, of moral exhibitionism in those churchmen and others who tell us that aiding the democratic resistance is immoral. Is it immoral in Cambodia? Is it immoral in Afghanistan? I was raised in the same church as some of them were and I will tell you that I do not know what is moral about helping Communists consolidate their grip on people, whether it is Solidarity people or it is campesinos. What in the name of the Lord is immoral about resisting communism, the greatest assault on the spirit of man since recorded history?

Whatever became of Thomas Jefferson's motto: Resistance to tyranny is obedience to God. Lenin had a term, it is "useful idiots." I would not call these people useful idiots. That is too harsh a term. I prefer the term, "There is none so blind who will not see."

President Reagan wants war, we are told. I would not question anybody's motivations for making that statement, but I do question their understanding of history and judgment. The road to peace does not go through Munich. That ought to be very simple if you will just read a history book.

□ 1340

The foreign policy of the gentlemen and gentlewomen on the left is "talking and trusting." This has been tried in Angola, it has been tried in Iran, where we traded in the Shah and got the Ayatollah, they have been tried in Southeast Asia where we no longer hear the cries of the boat people and the people in the refugee camps in Thailand, and now they want to try another laboratory experiment with the same McGovernite policy in Central America.

If you retreat from San Salvador, where do you make your stand? San Antonio?

Those who oppose aid to the democratic resistance, it seems to me, and with due respect, are guilty of political incoherence. They recognize the Communist-supported guerrillas in El Salvador as significant and legitimate, and they mandate an internal dialog on President Duarte, but the Salvadoran insurgency has less vitality and less

support than the Contras in Nicaragua.

Why are you not as consistent with the Sandinistas, President Ortega, and Father D'Escoto, the Maryknoll priest, as you are with President Duarte?

Today's Washington Post editorial is one of the most interesting I have ever read. There is one sentence in there that I do not think I will ever forget. It says, "Congress should at least express a decent concern for people who took the chance of relying on American constancy."

What twinge of conscience produced that sentence? What pangs of guilt, I wonder? All right. All right, editorial writer, we are "decently concerned." Does that assuage our responsibility as leaders of the free world?

It is axiomatic that poverty and hunger are major factors in Central America, but they are not the only factors. Now, Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador are beginning to improve their economies, and now that their gross national products are being pushed upward, how hospitable will a Communist Central America be for investment? You will undo all the progress we have made, we will turn Central America into a basket case if we pull the plug on the Contras and let the revolution in Nicaragua consolidate itself and spread. What contribution to solving the problems of poverty and hunger will turning Central America into a giant refugee camp make?

There are two bottom lines that I draw from the lessons of Vietnam, lessons we have been inundated with this month. The first is that isolationism dominates the Democratic Party's foreign policy. George McGovern's cry was "Come home, America." That is what you would have us do, come home from our responsibilities as leaders of the free world.

We have now reached the point where I think even you must concede that the Sandinistas are revolutionary Communists. If you do not think so, what are the Bulgarians doing there, the North Koreans, the East Germans, the PLO, and 9,000 Cubans? By any fair estimate, by any objective appraisal, the Sandinistas are bad guys.

Now, you have to concede that the democratic resistance is led by serious Democrats, Arturo Cruz, Alfonso Robelo, and Adolfo Calero, and others. So faced with good guys and bad guys in Nicaragua, you are forced to excuse your neoisolationism by taking what you choose to call the moral high ground of noninterference in the internal affairs of another country. In other words, let us drop the pretense that we are leaders of the free world anymore. We are like neighbors seeing a crime on the street and pulling the shade; we do not want to get involved.

So lesson No. 1: America is incapable of acting for good ends in the world. We no longer understand the relation-

ship between force and diplomacy. You say you want negotiation? But you need an instrument of negotiation. With whom will the Sandinistas negotiate if we turn the democratic resistance into refugees?

Lesson No. 2: So consumed by partisan politics are we that a fixed determination has been reached that Ronald Reagan shall not have a significant victory in the case of Nicaragua. Never mind that democracy and security for the whole area are at risk, Reagan must be defeated. The partisan and destructive edge to this debate is there for fair-minded people to read.

There are two sides down in Nicaragua. One is supported by the Soviets, and one is supported by our Government. Too many have ideological filters which color and distort what they see in Nicaragua. But who is really for peace? Do we want a negotiated settlement? You cannot support peace and the Sandinistas. The people who are for a negotiated settlement and peace are the democratic resistance in Nicaragua. Those are the folks you want to turn into refugees and drive them out of their country or make them disarm and surrender. Do you think disarming the resistance is going to advance anybody's cause except Cuba's? The Soviet Union's?

And what are you doing to democracy? In Brazil the President just died. The outpouring of anguish over that sad event is very significant. In Argentina the democratically elected Government is wrestling with the problem of the generals. Peru just had an election. El Salvador has had three in the last 2 years. The forces of democracy are resurgent in Latin America.

Why in the midst of this remarkable and blessed turn of events do we facilitate the Communist cancer in Nicaragua and help it to metastasize up and down the Isthmus? For us to turn our backs on the democratic opposition in Nicaragua is no less than tragic, and make no mistake, this is not a localized issue; it has worldwide implications. Our signals here are false, confused, and spread despair. We tell the world, do we not, that when the real crunch comes, "Don't look to the United States?"

We have very little margin for error. All right, gentlemen, you are going to win this, and go ahead and write your "Dear Commandante" letters. Write a dozen of them and see what happens. And draft your toothless resolutions and wallow in your impotence. But someday our children are going to ask, "Why did you let it happen?"

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman quoted Lenin a little while ago, and I thought he would be interested in this quote. This is from

Lenin, and perhaps it has some relevance today.

Lenin said: "We must be ready to employ trickery, deceit, lawbreaking, withholding and concealing of the truth. We can and must write in language which sows among the masses hate, revulsion, scorn, and the like toward those who disagree with us."

Now, is the Sandinista government not doing that very effectively today?

Mr. HYDE. Yes. Prince Otto von Bismarck said of his enemies, "Leave them only their eyes to weep with."

That is what we are going to leave the people of Nicaragua after we pull out and absorb ourselves in whatever else interests us that is more important than democracy and freedom in Central America.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. Of course, I yield to my friend, the gentleman from California.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, I have a simple, direct question. Is your church and faith that you love, the Catholic Church, being persecuted, in your estimation, in the nation of Nicaragua?

Mr. HYDE. Well, I attended the People's Church down there, Father Malina's church, and I saw Christ portrayed as a guerrilla fighter behind the altar. That is an obscenity as far as I am concerned.

Yes, I think the church, in America which once was the bulwark against communism, has unfortunately in too many ways been much too tolerant of those whose hostility to organized religion is historic and unchanging.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has a fine reputation for doing deep research and applying himself to his work when he approaches a problem.

Why does the gentleman think over a 4-year period there has been a persecution of the Catholic Church, with the expulsion of nine good foreign priests? One of them has come up here to Washington and could not get interviews with some gentleman of a different opinion than ours.

And why do you feel this message of religious persecution of fundamental Protestant churches, particularly among the natives along the eastern seaboard on the Caribbean Atlantic side, has taken place, and why has that persecution message not swept across this country?

Mr. HYDE. I think that too many churchmen feel guilty about the former identification of the church with the rich and the oppressive people in Central America, and they are trying to make up for it by bending over backward and now identifying with the liberation theologians who combine the form of the church and the substance of Marxist analysis, and they cannot blame the people, they

blame the system and alleged exploitation by the United States and the multinational corporations. And I think it is clear that the hierarchy has moved far to the left. Obviously the first draft of the bishop's pastoral letter on the economy showed that. The pastoral letter on the nuclear bomb showed a sympathy for appeasement and pacifism that is disturbing. And I think their failure to understand that there are two irreconcilable faiths, freedom and communism; and that communism is organized and aggressive some 900 miles from our border, is tragic, tragic, tragic.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, does the gentleman believe that Archbishop O'Connor was trying to tell us something in this Congress when he said, "The so-called Contras are impeding"—that is the action verb in this sentence, "impeding"—"the solidifying of communism in Managua"? Is that not a strong statement?

Mr. HYDE. Well, I have no comment at all on that because I read Archbishop O'Connor's statement to our subcommittee, and I am bewildered, frankly. He said military aid to the democratic resistance in Nicaragua is both illegal and immoral. I find myself in sad and comprehensive disagreement with him and the many other bishops who share his view.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. Yes, I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Mississippi.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I certainly appreciate what the gentleman in the well said, and I think he has just been right on target on Central and South America. We have just gotten back from a trip where several Members of Congress went to five countries in Central America and two countries in South America.

□ 1350

I had been in Central America 12 months before. It seems that things are settling down now in Central America and it seems to me that democracy is going to work if we continue to support those persons who are seeking democracy.

We met with President Duarte. I think you can get a lesson from him as to what democracy really means and generally he supports what we are about to vote on today.

I want to commend the gentleman. He certainly has been helpful and he has been down there, like most Members of the House of Representatives have.

Mr. HYDE. The gentleman knows that all the leaders in that area support what we are doing privately. Not all of them will tell you that publicly, but anyone who has been down there and has not been escorted around by Sandinista soldiers gets the straight story.

I was amused by a story in the Post today where they asked the former Minister of Labor whether we should aid the Contras. He smiled and said, "That is up to you."

Do you think that gentleman could say, "Yes, give money, military aid to the Contras" and stay free down there for very long?

They also refer to the Archbishop as a pro-Contra archbishop. That is the sort of thing we would not talk about up here because we do not want those people thrown in jail, but the Post reporter did not seem to mind.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. It seems also that if we vote down this resolution, and it has been said here before that in effect that pulls the rug out from what we have been trying to do down there for a number of months, and as I said earlier, our Latin American program is working.

Mr. HYDE. The Soviet long-range strategic plan is to get us out of Europe. What better way than to cause us so much trouble in Central America that we will have to pull back from NATO and focus our attention below the Rio Grande. That is precisely what they want, and you people who are so dedicated to our commitment in the Middle East better look around the corner and see what happens when Central America goes and we retrench from our commitments in the Middle East and in Europe, because that is the Soviet long-range strategy. We do not have any. We react from Congress to Congress and have to micro-manage foreign policy with transient Congressmen.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. MILLER of Washington. The speaker before, the gentleman from California, had said that the answer to this was that we should try to help alleviate poverty, that that was the way to bring peace. I would be interested in hearing the response of the distinguished gentleman from Illinois in the context of this Nicaragua situation.

Mr. HYDE. The Kissinger Commission, a bipartisan Commission with some very prestigious Democrats on it, decided that they need about \$8 billion in Central America over 5 years, three-quarters of it in economic aid and one-quarter in military aid, because you cannot build up the infrastructure and the economy of a government if they are busy fighting a civil war; so first, you must settle the guerrilla insurgency in El Salvador and then you can look to reconstruction and building up the economy. That is the way to raise the standard of living down there to foster democracy and to bring freedom to that area.

But instead we are tolerating and by this vote encouraging the maintenance, the continuation of a fraudu-

lent revolutionary government, the Sandinistas.

I stood where the gentleman stood in 1979 and voted for millions of dollars for the Sandinista government in the hope and in the expectation that they would be democratic. I relied on the expressed hopes of the majority leader, "Give us these tools," he said, "to make democracy work."

I was willing to do it, but we were lied to by the Sandinistas and I have seen these promises broken and rebroken. They are a Communist revolutionary government. They have got over 3,000 political prisoners in jail. No one ever bothers to see them.

If the Contras were so vicious, why are they growing every day? Fifteen thousand people are in their forces and the Sandinistas have to have a draft that everyone is trying to dodge.

You do not have to be too smart to understand that the Contras, which is not a bad term, by the way, Contra tyranos, "against tyranny" are fighting for freedom. They are fighting to free their country from the plague of communism.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman pointed out what the Soviets would really like is for us to divert our forces from Western Europe over to Central America; yet one of the presumed arguments from the other side is that, oh, my goodness, if we feed the Contras we will somehow involve ourselves in a bigger war and ultimately have to send our troops to Central America.

Is it the gentleman's position, does the gentleman understand that our assistance to the Contras will in any way do that?

Mr. HYDE. Let me tell my friend something. If you have ever been to Cuba, it is a beautiful, warm country, with happy people who love America, but it is also a tragic country because since 1959 they have rationed food and rationed clothes. It is an economic basket case. Why? Because Mr. Castro has geared his country for conflict. They have their army in Africa and elsewhere. They are not geared for economic growth.

Now, Nicaragua is going the same way. It is one of the most desperately poor countries I have ever seen and yet it is not moving toward economic growth—it is geared for conflict, geared for the biggest army in the whole area. The people are being ground down but this is what Communists do all over the globe.

I was one who wanted to send them millions of dollars so they could establish a decent government, but immediately they turned to Cuba. They turned to the Soviet Union and they

started to spread revolution down there.

We cannot run away from it. Lebanon is 6,000 miles away. South Korea is 9,000 miles away. El Salvador is 900 miles away and you can ride a bicycle from there to here.

I suggest we had better wake up and foreign policy had better be determined by people who understand what the struggle is about in our hemisphere and in our time.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, does the gentleman not agree that assistance to the Contras will avoid us ever having to send our young fellows down there?

Mr. HYDE. They are willing to die for freedom down there. They just want us to write a check. We are unwilling to even do that, so they will die and they will die hungry and without shoes. That is the result of this policy of abandonment being urged by the majority party.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. Yes.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I think if we look at the model in Central America, and you look at Mr. Duarte, I think everybody in this House admires him to some degree. I think the Speaker thinks he is a good man. He has compassion. He has a real promise in ruling that country and running that country.

You will never find people of that caliber in Central American Communist states. You will find people like Mr. Calero and Mr. Austin, the Grenada leaders, who believed that the way to run a country is to line people up against a wall and kill them.

Mr. HYDE. Can you imagine being the head of a country that is poverty-stricken and following as a model Cuba, Albania, Angola, Ethiopia, the Soviet Union, the great losers of the world. They cannot even feed their people. That is the model that Nicaragua is following. It is a great tragedy.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. They may be losers. The only thing they can do effectively is to kill people. That is what the Bulgarians, the Libyans, the North Koreans, and North Vietnamese are teaching them to do.

Mr. HYDE. Oh, yes. The Soviet Union and its client states cannot make anything for export except refugees. They make refugees better than anybody in the world and refugees are human beings who bleed, who weep, and who suffer, and they are going to make more refugees than you can imagine as the result of what is happening in Central America and our default, our abandonment, our turning

our backs on the people who are willing to die for freedom if we will just give them a little hand, a little help.

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HYDE. I yield to my friend, the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman referred a moment ago to the People's Church, about them being misguided.

I wonder, can the gentleman from his investigation and what he has been reading comment about the attitude of the vast majority of Catholics in Nicaragua and particularly the church leadership, Archbishop Obando Y Bravo, for instance?

Mr. HYDE. There are about 910 priests in Nicaragua. Fifty of them are working with the so-called People's Church, which is a political church attempting to dilute and adulterate the faith of the people and elevate the state as the source of all blessings.

Do you know what they do with the kids in school? They say, "Hold your hands out. Pray to God for a piece of candy. Then close your eyes. Did you get the candy? No."

"Now close your eyes and ask the government to give you a piece of candy."

Of course, when they open their eyes, the candy is there. That is what they are doing.

Mr. DEWINE. So the statistics the gentleman quoted show that the vast majority then of the bishops and priests are not with the Communists?

Mr. HYDE. Oh, no, no.

Mr. DEWINE. I want to make that clear.

Mr. HYDE. Exactly. The church in Nicaragua is very loyal and understands what is at stake and they are beleaguered, they are embattled and they live in danger.

Mr. ADDABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. RICHARDSON].

□ 1400

Mr. RICHARDSON. I rise in opposition to the CIA funding of the Contras. I do so because I think it is the wrong approach for U.S. policy, and not because I am a supporter of the Sandinistas or an opponent of the Contras. I am appalled by their repression, their lack of commitment to democracy, and their Marxist ties. I also believe that militarization of the area through the United States is wrong, too.

On the other hand, I find that many of the claims of colleagues of mine from the other side of the aisle are valid, especially when they condemn Sandinista activities. I believe, however, that the best approach in pursuing a viable Central American policy for the United States should be based on what the national security interests of the United States are and regional stability and cooperation.

We can bring peace to the area through the Contadora process and they should reconvene immediately. I believe that the Nicaraguans, the Sandinistas, and the Contras, have to get together and negotiate. I believe that the United States and the Sandinistas have to resume their bilateral talks in Manzanillo.

But the reason I am casting my vote today against the Contra funds is because I believe it would further destabilize the area, increase Soviet and Cuban influence, and undercut the Contadora process. Once again, my vote is not for the Sandinistas or against the Contras, who I believe have matured politically. My vote is because I think our policy is wrong. Nonetheless, I commend the President for his willingness to compromise, to be willing to use humanitarian aid.

I think there are a lot of claims of human rights abuses by Sandinistas that are accurate. And I must say that when I first went to Nicaragua I was unaware of all the repression that existed. I will even add to some comments made about Nicaraguan repression. They are repressive and they have betrayed their revolution. There is a lack of freedom of the press. I am a Roman Catholic and I categorically state that there is religious persecution. There is a lot of forced relocation involving thousands of helpless Nicaraguans going on that I think is unfair to many peasants who only want to be left alone.

By the way, I think everyone has talked about what the Nicaraguan people want, all of us U.S. experts knowing what is best for the Nicaraguans. What the Nicaraguan peasant wants in the course of my two visits is that Nicaraguan peasants and the Nicaraguan people just want to be left alone. They do not care about Ronald Reagan or Karl Marx or BILL RICHARDSON or HENRY HYDE. They want to be left alone, to live their lives in peace.

I think that what we need to do is fundamentally assist that objective—to stay out militarily, but to assist the objectives, peace through negotiations.

The Sandinistas, furthermore, in my judgment, are interested in increasing their own power internally—I think their elections, if you compare them to many others, were probably unfair in that they harassed the opposition and prevented active campaigning. On the other hand, I think it was a mistake for Mr. Cruz to withdraw from the race. He might have done better for his cause if he had men. I think that there is no question that they are not wearing white hats.

I have submitted a resolution which I hope my colleagues sponsor that condemns the human rights abuses and the lack of democratic principles of the Sandinistas, but also condemns

the activities of the Contras. And my colleagues cannot tell me that America's Watch and Amnesty International and many other respected human rights organizations that say that the Contras militarily have engaged in gross human rights violations are not true, because they are true. And certain Contras elements have been involved in a number of incidents including the destruction of property, and the death of civilians. And I think if we are going to be calling a spade a spade, we should do so. Both sides violate human rights rather blatantly. Neither side wears white hats.

So what do we do? What do we do about this peace process of the Contras group, the Caleno group and the Pastora group in March submitted a peace plan? I think that peace plan of the Caleno group is a good way to start. I think that peace plan which calls for elections, an amnesty, a ceasefire, and a return to democratic principles and many other sound points is a sound way to start. I believe we should take the Contra peace plan seriously—the Sandinistas should respond. It is important that we and the Contra group get the Sandinistas and the Contras to the bargaining table. The Sandinistas should be held accountable if they disapprove.

The issue then is how do we best pressure the Sandinistas to reduce their Soviet ties and moderate their behavior, and how do we protect U.S. security. There are no pure and clean good guys in this whole Nicaraguan process, but we should strengthen any moderate forces. I must respectfully disagree with them. Those that say that all of the Contras are bad. There are some good people there like Adolph Caleno and Arters Cruz. There is a detailed study, however, that shows that most of the Contra military leadership, are former members of the Somoza regime. This is not good, because Somoza was a disastrous ruler, worse than the Sandinistas. And I will submit for the RECORD a report by the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus to support my contention:

WHO ARE THE CONTRAS?

(An analysis of the makeup of the military leadership of the rebel forces, and of the nature of the private American groups providing them financial and material support)

The United States has been supporting armed opposition to the Nicaraguan Government since 1981. Over \$80 million reportedly has been spent to build and maintain a force of from 10,000 to 15,000 "contras." In the next week, Congress again faces the decision of whether to resume funding for the contras.

The purpose of this report is to analyze the leadership and membership of the contras, and the nature and goals of the private organizations which provide their financial and material support. The report is divided into two sections. The first describes and assesses the make-up of the contras; the

second describes the private American organizations that assist them.

Information published by the Nicaraguan Government has not been used in this report. Instead, the report is based primarily on extensive interviews with former high-ranking officials of the primary contra force (the FDN), literature published by the FDN, and interviews with representatives of organizations that aid the contras. While we recognize there are limitations in this approach, the Executive Branch has thus far failed to respond to our requests for specific information on the structure and leaders of the FDN military command. We hope that publication of this report will focus closer attention on the significant questions it seeks to address.

SUMMARY

In summary, the conclusions of the report are as follows:

While the "foot-soldiers" of the FDN Army are largely peasants, the army is organized and commanded by former National Guardsmen. In the first publicly available organizational chart of the high command of the FDN military force, the report finds that 46 of the 48 positions in the FDN's command structure are held by former Guardsmen.

While the FDN's civilian directorate has been cleansed to minimize the role of former Guardsmen and Somoza associates, the military leadership has not been. As a result, the key military strategist positions, including the Strategic Commander, are held by ex-National Guardsmen; as are all of the General Staff; four out of five of the Central Commanders; six out of seven of the Regional Commanders; and probably all 30 Task Force commanders.

Up to 20 private groups in the United States have provided the contras with substantial financial and material aid (apparently some \$5 million) in the past year. Most of these groups are not traditional relief organizations or other established groups recognized as providing humanitarian aid, but rather are ultra-conservative or paramilitary groups on the fringe of American political opinion.

These groups are largely operated by a small group of about half a dozen men, mostly with military or paramilitary backgrounds, whose close association often means that the groups work in tandem.

A major "relief" effort for the Miskito Indians living on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border has had the effect of maintaining the MISURA "contra" army. One of the groups contributing to this effort is funded in large part by Rev. Moon's Unification Church.

SECTION I—WHO ARE THE CONTRAS?

An analysis of the military leadership of the FDN

Contrasting claims have been made about the background of the contras by the United States and Nicaraguan Governments. Nicaragua states that they are "basically former Somoza National Guardsmen who are engaged in terrorism against the Nicaraguan people," while the United States maintains that in the "democratic resistance . . . nearly all of the opposition leaders opposed Somoza." Our research indicates that the truth is somewhere in between.

This section attempts to resolve the differences between these two extreme positions by describing for Congress—to the best of our knowledge, for the first time in un-

classified form—the military make-up of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN).

This section concludes that:

FDN and U.S. Government claims that the FDN is largely a "peasant army" of Nicaraguans disaffected with their government are accurate.

In contrast to FDN claims about the military leadership of the contras (which the State Department has given credence by publishing), 46 of the 48 positions in the FDN military leadership are held by ex-National Guardsmen. These include the Strategic Commander, the Regional Command Coordinator, all five members of the General Staff, four out of five Central Commanders, five out of six regional commanders, and all 30 task force commanders.

While the core of the General and Central Command Staff is admittedly fluid, with personnel changing titles and duties over time, regional and task force commanders acquire personal control over their forces, and change infrequently. In any event, the over-all structure detailed here has existed for the past 16 months, and the personnel and duties listed were verified less than two weeks ago.

Certain individuals in the leadership, including especially controversial ones such as Ricardo Lau (an ex-National Guard officer reputed to have engaged in numerous atrocities both in the Gurad and in the FDN), have taken a less "visible" role in recent months in order to make the nature of the contra army more acceptable to Congress. Our interviews with former FDN officials, as well as the recent refusal of ARDE commander Eden Pastora to ally his forces with the FDN because of the involvement of Lau and other ex-Guardsmen, indicate that these individuals nonetheless retain significant power in the FDN.

Blanket FDN denials of the military structure and individuals and their Guard background described in this section appear to lack credibility. The FDN representative in Washington, for example, claims that ex-Guard officers Armando "the Policeman" Lopez and Walter "Tono" Calderon Lopez, identified by three independent sources and numerous on-site news reports as two of the top three FDN commanders, serve in the minor ancillary roles of "warehouse keeper" and "supply assistant for a base camp." Further, the FDN representative denies that Col. Enrique Bermudez is the strategic commander who runs the military effort (this task is attributed to the civilian President of the FDN directorate), or even that a conventional military command structure exists in the FDN. These denials directly contradict literature published by the FDN in Honduras, which displays a military command structure, and places Bermudez at its head.

While the Executive Branch will likely dispute some of the findings in this report at a later date, it has thus far failed to respond to a written request for specific information on the military leadership by Caucus Chairman McHugh, or to numerous telephone inquiries. At this point, the only information the Administration has made public about the FDN military command appears to concede that FDN claims may not be verifiable: rather than submit to Congress its own analysis of FDN leadership, the State Department attributes virtually all of its information to "FDN reports."

This section focuses on the FDN because it would receive the great majority (if not all) of U.S. funds approved for expenditure, and because the FDN is the only significant

contra military force at present. Leadership struggles and lack of funds have combined to virtually bring to a halt major military activities by ARDE's roughly 1,000 fighters in the south and the Miskito Indians' roughly 1,500 fighters in the north.

This section analyzes the military rather than the political leadership of the FDN for three reasons: (a) because it is the military leaders who make the key decisions on military strategy and on the direction of the war. For instance, it is the military and not the political leaders who decide on military operations, on tactics, and on the disciplining of commanders and troops for human rights abuses; (b) because it remains an open question whether the civilian leaders, who have little if any decision-making power now, would be able to wrest power from the military leaders, should the rebel forces gain victory; and (c) because very little information has heretofore been made available on the military leadership of the FDN—in contrast to the wealth of material the Administration has provided on the "new" civilian leadership. Critics call this leadership "repackaged"; prior to a reorganization in 1982, nearly the entire FDN directorate was drawn from the 15th of September Legion, formed by ex-Guard officers and associates of President Somoza shortly after his ouster in 1979. For example, a recent State Department publication provides biographical information on 27 "top leaders" of the contras, only one of whom—Bermudez—is in the FDN military apparatus.

The conclusions in this section are based on extensive interviews with two former high-ranking FDN officials, and with one of the foremost American experts on the Nicaraguan National Guard. News reports, including those in the Central American press and those based on on-site interviews, formed the basis for the interviews. Information published by the Nicaraguan Government, which was found to be dated and of questionable accuracy, was not used.

The two ex-FDN officials, Edgar Chamorro Coronel and Salvador Icaza, served respectively as a member of the FDN civilian directorate and the FDN's communications liaison from 1983 to 1984. Both spent substantial time at the FDN's central base and other bases in Honduras, assisted in the investigation of regional commanders for alleged human rights abuses, and left the FDN largely because it failed to purge itself of high personnel with connections to President Somoza or the National Guard. In the course of the interviews, Chamorro checked with sources still in the FDN and brought this material up to date.

The academic expert interviewed was Professor Richard Millett of Southern Illinois University—a frequent Congressional witness who is widely respected as one of the most knowledgeable Americans on politics and power within Somoza's National Guard.

The following chart displays the current structure and leadership of the military command of the FDN. Most leaders are identified by their "noms de guerre," as they are in the FDN. Of the 48 positions in the command structure, our two sources who were formerly in the FDN claim that 46 are filled by former National Guardsmen.

Military Command Structure: FDN

Strategic commander: Enrique Bermudez (el Comandante Estrategico), Supreme commander and chief of staff; coordinator, regional commands: W. "Tono" Calderon Lopez, coordinates from 8,000 to 12,000 combatants.

General staff

G-1, Personnel: "The Deer"; G-2, Intelligence: "The Bull"; G-3, Operations: "Mike Lima"; G-4, Logistics: Armando "The Policeman" Lopez; G-5, Psychological Warfare: "Invisible".

Central commanders

Air Operations: Juan Gomez; Counter-Intelligence: Ricardo Lau; MISURA Liaison: Justiciano Perez; Special Forces: "Little Bird"; Infantry Training School?

Regional commanders—direct from 500 to 2,000 combatants

Nicarao: Commandante "Mack"; Segovia: Commandante Dr. "Aureliano"; Jorge Salazar: Commandante "Quiche"; Rafaela Herrera: Commandante "Little Tiger"; Dirian: Commandante "Dimas"; San Jacinto: Commandante "Renato".

Task force commanders

2 to 8 task force commanders serve under a regional command; each directs some 250 combatants.

General Description

In this command structure, the Strategic Commander is the director of military strategy and operations. He is assisted in planning and implementing strategy by his general staff and central commanders. All but one of the 12 top central staff were formerly in the Guard. Overall control of the primary combat units is given to the second-ranking officer, the coordinator of regional commands.

Each of the six regional commanders (five of whom were in the Guard) has a number of task force commanders operating under his control. The regional and task force commanders are referred to as "commandante" and command the personal loyalty of their troops. These are the key military field leaders. Our sources claim that most and probably all of the 30 task force commanders are former Guards. These commanders in turn break their 250-combatant commands into three "groups" of 70 (with the remaining personnel performing central command duties for the task force).

Roughly 80 percent of the group leaders have no prior service in the National Guard; this ratio is the reverse of what existed two years ago, before the expansion of the FDN. The groups are then broken down into three detachments of 20 combatants each (again, with the remainder performing central command duties for the group). Nearly all the detachment leaders have no prior Guard service.

FDN combatants are estimated at between 8,000 and 12,000, rather than the 15,000 claimed by the FDN. The lower figure was provided by Chamorro, who states that when he was responsible for public relations for the FDN, he was under instructions to routinely double the actual size of the FDN. Whatever the true figure, FDN combatants are largely peasants who are disaffected with Sandinista policies. In sum, the FDN is a peasant army with ex-Guard leadership.

Identification and Description of Military Leaders

Strategic commander: Enrique Bermudez
Mr. Bermudez is a former Colonel of the National Guard. Along with Aristedes Sanchez (General Secretary of the FDN's civilian directorate, formerly a wealthy landowner and close associate of the late General Somoza) and Adolfo Calero (head of the civilian directorate, and a leader of the business opposition to Somoza) Bermudez is part of the informal triumvirate that de-

cides strategy for the civilian directorate. Bermudez controls military operations.

Bermudez, who led the Nicaraguan contingent in the OAS occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1965, was Nicaragua's military attaché in Washington for the last three years of Somoza's rule. Following Somoza's ouster, he helped found the 15th of September Legion with some 60 former Guard officers, which was the nucleus of the FDN at its founding in 1981.

Bermudez increased his operational control over the FDN when he dismissed his Chief of Staff, former Guard officer Emilio Echevarry, and a number of his assistants in 1983 following a CIA-assisted investigation into Echevarry's handling of FDN funds. Bermudez did not replace Echevarry, and instead has assumed many of his functions.

Bermudez is assisted, in addition to the military staff described below, by a number of former Somoza supporters and National Guard officers who arrange for the procurement of weapons and supplies, and carry out a variety of special missions in surveillance, communications and special military tasks. These individuals are not part of the formal structure of the FDN, but are an important operations component. They include: Enrique "Cuco" (The Cuckoo) Sanchez, a former landowner and deputy for Somoza's party in the Nicaraguan parliament and brother of General Secretary Aristedes Sanchez; the Tefel brothers, Jose and Jaime, associates of Somoza; and two brothers, former Guard officers, the "Shermans."

Bermudez' presence in the FDN has been cited by some contra leaders, such as Eden Pastora and Brooklyn Rivera, as a primary reason why they refuse to join in a coalition with the FDN. Chamorro and Icaza left the FDN in large part because Bermudez would not remove his associates from the 15th of September Legion from the FDN command structure.

Coordinator, regional commanders: Walter "Tono" Calderon Lopez

"Tono," a former Guard officer who was once a regional commander in the FDN, occupies this second-most powerful military position—the equivalent of what is known in western military parlance as a Theater Operations Commander. He directs the six regional commanders, and he can call on the general staff and central commanders to assist them. Tono is identified in a February, 1984 publication of the FDN in Honduras as commander of tactical operations, which appears to be the same functional role as regional coordinator.

General staff, personnel (G-1): "El Venado" (the Deer)

"El Venado," a former Guard officer, was a Task Force commandante for the FDN. When he was badly wounded in an attack on the town of Ocotal, in the northern-most Nicaraguan province of Nueva Segovia, he moved to the general staff. G-1 is responsible for record-keeping and advises the Strategic Commander on personnel placement.

General staff, intelligence (G-2): "El Toro" (the Bull)

"El Toro" was a colonel in the National Guard. G-2 is responsible for ascertaining the whereabouts and abilities of Nicaraguan military units. "El Toro" replaced Edgar Hernandez, a former Guard officer dismissed with Chief of Staff Emilio Echevarry in 1983.

General staff, operations (G-3): "Mike Lima"

"Mike Lima," or "M.L.," was the most widely renowned of the FDN's regional commanders prior to moving to the General Staff. A former Guard officer, he led the Diriangen regional command, with up to 2,000 fighters. This was the most militarily active of the commands. While a regional commander, he was badly wounded in a mortar explosion, and lost an arm. G-3's responsibilities include planning overall requirements and strategy for operations, in consultation with the Coordinator of Regional Commands.

General staff, logistics (G-4): Armando "El Policia" (the Policeman) Lopez

Armando Lopez, a former captain in the National Guard, was one of the founders of the 15th of September Legion; he is extremely close to Bermudez, and has been seen by some as his second in command at times. He has dismissed the possibility of a negotiations with the Nicaraguan Government, although this is a stated goal of the FDN's civilian directorate: "He who speaks of dialogue with the Communists speaks of wasting his time." G-4's responsibilities focus on supplying the regional commands and task forces.

General staff, psychological warfare (G-5): "El Invisible"

"El Invisible," a former Guard officer, is responsible for planning activities that weaken the control of the Nicaraguan Government over its armed forces and the civilian population. Such activities can include distributing leaflets that offer rewards for desertion, or broadcasting information that discredits the Sandinistas. "El Invisible" replaced Manuel Caceres, a former Guard officer now living in the Dominican Republic. This staff position has rotated more frequently than others, and "El Invisible" may shortly be returning to Task Force command.

Central command, head of air operations: Juan Gomez

Gomez was a Guard officer who served as Somoza's personal pilot. He now performs the same function for Bermudez, as well as overseeing the operation of the small number of reconnaissance, cargo and rotary aircraft that form the FDN's air force. Gomez was in the 15th of September Legion, as well as the original FDN directorate.

Central command, head of counter-intelligence: Ricardo Lau

Lau is a former Guard officer whose service in the FDN has been cited by contra leaders Eden Pastora and Brooklyn Rivera as a primary reason for their refusal to participate in a coalition with the FDN. Lau has recently been accused (by a former Salvadoran Army colonel) of procuring former Guards to assassinate Salvadoran Archbishop Romero in 1980—a new accusation which comes on top of long-standing charges that he has engaged in numerous atrocities, both as a Guardsman and in the FDN.

Lau was in the 15th of September Legion, as well as the original FDN directorate. In 1983, the FDN announced that Lau had been removed from the formal post of head of counter-intelligence, apparently to encourage the formation of a broad coalition of "contra" groups. Nonetheless, our sources contend that Lau continues to function as he had before, albeit with a lower public profile, and retains responsibility for preventing infiltration of the FDN by agents of

the Nicaraguan Government and for enforcing discipline for Bermudez.

Lau's extremely close alliance with Bermudez leads our former FDN sources to believe that as long as Bermudez is Strategic Commander, Lau will play an important role in the FDN—"forever." Lau is assisted in counter-intelligence by Armando Lopez's son, known as "El Polico" (the little policeman) and "El Bestia" (the beast).

Central command, MISURA liaison: Justiciano Perez

Perez, a former Guard officer, has also been cited by other contra leaders as an unacceptable member of any military or political coalition. Perez commanded Somoza's infantry training school, and was personally close to Somoza. He too was formally removed from the FDN leadership in 1983, but continues in a key role as Bermudez's liaison with the MISURA military force, which operates in North-eastern Nicaragua under the command of Miskito Indian leader *Steadman Fogoth*.

Central command, special forces: "El Pajarito" (Little Bird)

"El Pajarito" leads small groups (of up to 75 fighters) into Nicaragua to perform sabotage and other special missions requiring rapid movement. He is a young man, and although his father was a Guard officer, he was a medical student in Mexico during the revolution and never served in the Guard.

Central command, infantry training school: name unknown

A former Guard officer commands the infantry training school at Las Vegas, and which is currently diminishing in size. This officer replaced Hugh Villagra, a former Guard officer whom Bermudez allegedly ousted as a rival in 1984. Assisting the head of the training school in the recent past was a third Sanchez, Victor, whose two other brothers, Aristedes and Enrique "Cuco", have been discussed above.

Regional command, Nicaragua: Commandante "Mack"

The Nicaragua (a popular contraction of "Nicaragua") command is led by Commandante "Mack," a former Guardsman. His four Task Forces are all commanded by former Guardsmen, known as "El Cascavel" (the Rattlesnake), "03", "Ersi", and "Ocran". FDN publications in Honduras confirm Mack's identity as head of this command.

Regional command, Rafaela Herrera: Commandante "Tigrillo" (Little Tiger)

The Rafaela Herrera command, named after a legendary Nicaraguan heroine, is commanded by Commandante "Tigrillo," the only Regional Commander (in fact, the only one of the top 48 military leaders in the FDN besides "El Pajarito," Head of the Special Forces) who is not a former National Guardsman. Tigrillo participated in the revolution, although he may not have been a Sandinista. His Task Force commanders are all former Guards. Two of them are identified by their nicknames, "Atilla" (Atilla the Hun) and "Tiro Al Blanco" (Target-Shooter). FDN publication in Honduras confirm the identities of Tigrillo, Atilla and Tiro Al Blanco in these roles.

Regional command, Diriangen: Commandante "Dimas"

The Diriangen command, named after a legendary Indian chief, is commanded by Commandante "Dimas." Dimas, a former Guardsman, had been a Task Force commander in Diriangen. He replaced "Mike

Lima" when Lima was wounded and became G-3. All of Dimas' Task Forces are commanded by former Guards. FDN publications in Honduras confirm Dimas' prior role of Task Force commander.

Regional command, Segovia: Commandante Dr. Aureliano

The Segovia command, named after the province of most FDN activity, the mountainous border province of Nueva Segovia, is commanded by a former Guardsman who also has studied medicine. All of Aureliano's Task Forces are commanded by former Guardsmen. FDN publications in Honduras confirm Aureliano's role in this regional command.

Regional command, Jorge Salazar: Commandante "Quiche"

The Jorge Salazar command, named after a leader of the business coalition COSEP who was killed by Nicaraguan police in 1980 (and whose widow serves on the FDN's civilian directorate), is commanded by a former Guardsman. Commandante "Quiche" has adopted an Indian name, although he is not himself an Indian. He was a Task Force commander under Walter Calderon "Tono" Lopez, who left this regional command to become coordinator of the regional commands. All of Quiche's Task Forces are commanded by former Guards. One task force is led by "Franklin."

Regional command, San Jacinto: Commandante "Renato"

The San Jacinto command, named after a famous battle in Nicaraguan history, is commanded by a former Guardsman. Commandante "Renato" presides over this smallest of the regional commands (probably some 500 fighters). His Task Forces are all commanded by former National Guards. Renato has been identified in this role in FDN publications in Honduras.

SECTION II—WHO AIDS THE CONTRAS

An analysis of the private American groups providing financial and material assistance

Close to 20 privately incorporated U.S. groups have reportedly sent (or plan soon to send) aid, supplies or cash contributions to Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras and to the contras themselves. This section analyzes the activities of these groups and their backgrounds.

An analysis of these groups, with an emphasis on the six or seven which provide the lion's share of the \$5 million in private funds which has reportedly reached the contras in the last year, shows the following:

They are not the establishment conservative groups known to support administration policies in Central America, but rather are ultra-conservative, even approaching fringe, activist groups. For instance, one group helped provide mercenaries to protect the white government in Rhodesia and another has included in its international membership at least one neo-fascist party, whose chief had served in Mussolini's government.

While some of these ultraconservative groups have existed for decades, others have been formed in the last year or even in the last six months—with the primary if not sole purpose to aid the contras.

The groups receive their funds from a wide variety of sources—including individual Americans, U.S. corporations (such as pharmaceutical companies who have contributed medical supplies), and Rev. Moon's Unification Church.

Although many of the groups argue that they provide "humanitarian aid" only, they are not in any way associated with (nor do they coordinate efforts with) the broad community of recognized humanitarian relief or refugee organization, such as Catholic Relief Service, the World Relief Organization, or the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). In fact, some of these recognized relief organizations have expressed concern that the private groups will politicize their relief efforts, and have contended that the so-called "humanitarian" aid to Miskito refugees on the Nicaraguan border actually sustains the MISURA contra army's military base camps.

The individual driving forces behind the major groups are a small group of about a half a dozen men, most of whom have military or paramilitary backgrounds or mercenary experience, and who often participate in more than one organization. For instance, three assistant editors of *Soldier of Fortune* magazine (which has sent direct aid to the contras) also run or are board members of three other separate groups seeking to aid the contras. And the chairman of the group which may have provided the most aid, retired Gen. John Singlaub, also is closely associated with four other U.S. groups aiding the contras. (Prior to being relieved by President Carter of his South Korea command, Gen. Singlaub headed the Unconventional Warfare Task Force in Vietnam.)

While many of the groups work closely together, they have different stated purposes. Some openly admit their aid is for military purposes (and includes boots, uniforms and even personnel.) Others insist their aid reaches only needy refugees, and is in no way related to the contra war. Most groups call their aid "humanitarian," but either privately or publicly acknowledge that some of it (e.g. medical supplies and food) ends up at contra camps. These groups also have conceded that their "humanitarian" aid to refugees (which include families of the contras) may indirectly aid the contras by freeing up the contra accounts to purchase weapons and pay combatants.

The research for this section is based primarily on individual personal interviews with spokespeople or directors for virtually all of the groups, as well as publicly available information.

A description of each of these groups and their activities follows:

WORLD ANTI-COMMUNIST LEAGUE

The World Anti-Communist League, formed in the 1960's by Nationalist Chinese to fight communism, claims to act as an "umbrella group" for many of the smaller and newer groups aiding the contras. Headed by retired Army General John Singlaub (who commanded U.S. troops in South Korea until he was relieved by President Carter, and who previously pioneered new techniques of unconventional warfare as head of the Joint Unconventional Task Force in Vietnam), the group coordinates fund-raising from U.S. groups, U.S. individuals, U.S. corporations, and foreign governments. According to the Gen. Singlaub, funds raised by WACL have purchased food, medicine, boots, outboard motors, and office supplies, and have thus allowed the contras to use their cash for weapons and ammunition.

The WACL, in recent years, has been subjected to increasing charges of anti-semitism and neo-fascism. In 1973, charging anti-semitism, its British chapter resigned. Five years later at an annual convention, its Mexican delegation attacked NBC's "Holo-caust" program as "another gigantic cam-

paign of Jewish propaganda to conceal their objectives of world domination." In the same year, WACL extended membership to Italy's principal neo-fascist party, which was headed by a member of Mussolini's government. One of its former chairmen has espoused the concept of genetic purity and calls for artificial insemination and sperm banks to maintain racial purity.

Soldier of Fortune: El Salvador/Nicaragua Defense Fund

According to the magazine's editor, *Soldier of Fortune's* Defense Fund has provided boots and military uniforms to the Nicaraguan contras. In conjunction with several other groups (see Air Commandos, Refugee Relief International, and Institute for Regional and International Studies), *Soldier of Fortune* is one of the larger and more aggressive recruiters on behalf of private aid to the contras.

Soldier of Fortune is a monthly journal widely considered to be a major source of information for mercenaries. Its classified ads offer information on how to obtain and use weapons and explosives, as well as references on individual mercenaries. It assisted the white minority government of Rhodesia in procuring mercenaries. Among its more recent projects have been the raising of funds for Afghan guerrillas, and the offering of a \$100,000 reward in gold to any pilot defecting with materials implicating the Russians for participating in biological warfare.

The Caribbean Commission

The Caribbean Commission, formed in 1979 with the help of pro-Somoza Nicaraguan exiles when Somaza's fall seemed imminent, has provided some 50,000 pounds of materials—particularly clothing and medical equipment—to Nicaraguan refugees on the Honduran border, including families of the contras. In addition, they have provided some specific medical equipment to the contras, including an x-ray machine.

The Commission is headed by Dr. Alton Oschner, Jr., whose father's similarly oriented organization (Information Council of the Americas) broadcast "truth tapes" throughout Latin America in the early '60's warning about the spread of communism in Latin America. According to Dr. Oschner, he was also involved in establishing Friends of the Americas (see below.)

The purpose of the group is to "maintain, promote and strengthen the free enterprise system in the western hemisphere in order to prevent totalitarian infiltration in this part of the world."

Friends of the Americas

Friends of the Americas was founded in April of 1984 as a charitable organization which aids, among others, Miskito Indian refugees in Honduras. According to its co-director Diane Jenkins, it has in the past year sent to Honduras 10 medical teams, 5,000 pairs of children's shoes, and some food.

Mrs. Jenkins vehemently denies providing any aid to MISURA, the major military arm of the Miskitos. However, Congressional staff members and Catholic Relief Service workers who have visited the area contend that aid from FOA and others has the effect of keeping the refugees directly on the border (rather than north of the border where the United Nations has bona fide refugee camps) and thus of sustaining MISURA base camps.

Further doubts about the ultimate destination of the aid are fueled by advertisements such as one which appeared in a FOA Newsletter last fall, which appealed for "cash contributions," for "a large airplane,"

for "boats and outboard motors," and for such militarily-oriented equipment as radios, walkie-talkies and a satellite dish.

Friends of the Americas is one of the better known groups in large part due to its leadership: Director Woody Jenkins, a Louisiana State Representative who resigned the Democratic National Committee in 1980 to campaign for Reagan, also now serves as secretary of the Conservative Caucus' research branch and as the director of the Council for National Policy. Mr. Jenkins (whose wife Diane is co-director) was the dinner-chairman of the Nicaraguan Refugee Fund (see below), which hosted President Reagan April 15.

International Relief Friendship Foundation

Funded largely by Reverend Moon's Unification Church, the IRFF in the last year has shipped 1,000 pounds of clothing and seven tons of food and medicine to Miskito Indian refugees in Honduras. The group denies providing any aid to the military arm of the Miskitos, and asserts that much of the aid has gone to children.

According to the director of IRFF, the organization was started in 1976 with a \$225,000 grant from the Unification Church. 90 percent of their present annual budget of under \$200,000 still comes from the Church.

Also according to the director, IRFF has worked with the political arm of the Church, Causa International, which he asserted had paid \$3,000 to fly one of IRFF's shipments to Honduras last summer.

As with aid provided by FOA (see above), IRFF's aid is distributed to "recently arrived refugees" directly on the border, rather than to internationally-sponsored (eg UNHCR) refugee camps north of the border. As a result, this type of aid has been subject to criticisms from relief workers and Congressional staff that it has had the effect of maintaining the MISURA military base camps, which are also located directly on the border.

Civilian-Military Assistance

CMA, which received press notice when a helicopter carrying two of its men was shot down while participating in an attack in northern Nicaragua last fall, was formed in 1983 to take direct action against communism in Central America, and specifically to provide training and equipment to the contras.

According to CMA's director and Vietnam veteran Tom Posey, CMA has sent the contras over \$200,000 (over 60 tons) in military equipment (not including humanitarian aid) including boots, canteens, and other supplies.

In addition, perhaps more important, they have provided manpower: in the last year, CMA has sent Americans to work with the contras as mechanics and medical relief teams. CMA also claims that its personnel operate as forward observers alongside the contras inside Nicaragua, and, in some cases, have handled "small weapons." According to Mr. Posey, CMA provided "less than 100" Americans to the contras in the past year.

Most recently, in early April, 14 CMA-supported men were asked by the U.S. Embassy in Honduras to leave the area.

Air Commando Association

While the Air Commandos have not to date provided any aid to the contras, its director aims to start aid as soon as possible. The group is awaiting clearance from the Honduran government for delivery to the contras of a complete 25-bed hospital.

Air Commandos is run by retired Gen. H.C. Aderholt, who is also an assistance editor of *Soldier of Fortune* magazine. In addition, Mr. Aderholt served in Vietnam as deputy to Gen. Singlaub in the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force.

Christian Broadcasting Network (Operation Blessing)

Through Operation Blessing, its worldwide relief agency, news stories report that CBN has sent food, medical supplies and clothing to families of the contras. CBN refused to admit or deny these reports, asserting only that they "help starving, displaced people in Central America," and that while no "direct" aid is given to the contras, "aid is provided to needy people wherever they are."

Founded by M.G. (Pat) Robertson, CBN owns four TV stations and grosses over \$50 million a year. Besides its regular show "the 700 Club," CBN provides news and prayer programming. In 1982, Robertson launched a political lobby named the National Planning Committee, which works to change First Amendment laws.

Refugee Relief International

Refugee Relief International, headed by one of *Soldier of Fortune*'s editors, has provided an unspecified amount of aid to Miskito Indian refugees in Honduras—some in "direct funds" (cash), but the majority in medicine, food and clothing. According to news reports (Boston Globe, 12/30/84), a RRI pamphlet makes clear the ultimate military purpose of these funds, by saying "this type of (humanitarian) aid will defray costs that the U.S. government would ordinarily incur, thereby freeing a portion of its financial allocations for additional military and other assistance."

RRI is headed by Thomas Reisinger, the Assistant Director of *Soldier of Fortune* for Special Projects. On the Board of RRI is retired Gen. John Singlaub.

Veterans of Foreign Wars

Although the VFW voted in August of 1983 to establish a fund to provide food, medicine and other non-military aid to the Nicaraguan "freedom-fighters", the fund claims to have lasted only one year and raised only \$2,000. The VFW turned the funds over to the American Security Council Foundation. The ASC Foundation claims to have transferred the funds to the International Red Cross. A spokesperson for the International Red Cross reported that after an extensive search, no record of this transaction could be found.

Institute for Regional and International Studies

The Institute for Regional and International Studies seeks to make available to Salvadorans and "perhaps" to the Nicaraguan contras (B. Globe, 12/30/84) intelligence gathering and psychological operations.

The group is directed by Alexander M.S. McColl, military affairs editor of *Soldier of Fortune* Magazine. It was founded in 1982 under the auspices of the World Anti-Communist League. *Soldier* editor-in-chief Dale Dye asserted he did not know if any Contras have yet been trained at IRIS.

Nicaraguan Refugee Fund

The Nicaraguan Refugee Fund is presently seeking to raise \$2-\$5 million to aid Nicaraguans in Honduras—in part through a gala \$250-a-head fund-raising dinner honoring President Reagan on Monday, April 15. A substantial amount is expected to go through FOA (see above), but to date, this

group is not known to have provided any funds to the contras or to Nicaraguan refugees.

The sponsors and dinner committee of the NRF represent a virtual "who's who" of private U.S. citizens involved in aiding the contras—the dinner committee is chaired by Friends of the America's Woody Jenkins and includes J. Peter Grace (also affiliated with the Knights of Malta), Nelson Bunker Hunt, CBN's Pat Richardson and Caribbean Commission's Dr. Ochsner. Its Honorary Committee includes conservative stalwarts such as Joseph Coors and W. Clement Stone; and its Special Committee includes Wayne Newton and Roger Staubach.

Although this group has not yet provided any aid to the contras or their families, it is noteworthy because the fund-raising dinner in its honor appears to be drawing key Administrative leaders, including the President—representing the first time U.S. Government officials have provided their names and stature to such a private pursuit.

Knights of Malta and Americares Foundation

The Knights of Malta, a 900-year old fraternal organization of Roman Catholics, has reportedly (WP 12/27/84) distributed \$680,000 to Miskito Indian refugees in Honduras, in conjunction with the Americares Foundation. While the Knights deny raising any funds for the contras, a spokesperson at the Americares Foundation contends that Americares raised the money (targeted to six destinations in Honduras) and the Knights distributed the aid.

The head of the American division of the Knights of Malta is J. Peter Grace. The honorary chairman of the Americares Foundation is Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Other Groups Involved in the Private Aid Effort

Over half a dozen other groups, whose purpose was unclear or on which little information was available, have reportedly aided the contras in the last year. These include:

Causa International, the political arm of Rev. Moon's Unification Church, which refuses to comment about aid to Nicaragua or Honduras, but which others (including IRFF) have asserted helps finance their efforts to aid the contras;

Human Development Foundation, reported by the Washington Post as aiding the Contras and by The Nation as the unofficial operating arm of the FDN in the US;

Nicaraguan Patriotic Association, which is reported to have collected half a million dollars in aid and to have provided daily food supplies for seven refugee camps in Honduras; and

Pro-America Education Foundation, which in the past year has sent \$1 million in medical supplies contributed by major pharmaceutical companies to Nicaraguan refugees in Honduras.

(This report was prepared by the staff of the Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus. It does not seek to reflect the views of the members of the Caucus.)

But, on the other hand, I do think there are people like Mr. Calero, and Mr. Pastora and Mr. Robelo, who are moderate. Who support democracy, and who should not be dismissed unilaterally as obstacles to peace or warmongers. In fact, these three are ex-Sandinistas who were disaffected. I must say that among the Sandinista leadership did I find too many moderates.

I am here voting against military Contra aid because there is a Democratic/Republican bipartisan alternative which stands for peace and negotiations and might work. I think it was initiated on the Democratic side, and I am proud of that, that members of my party have taken this initiative. That proposal supports negotiations, supports the Contadora process and gives refugee assistance through an independent group. But most importantly it sets a timetable of October 1, a date we reassess this entire process to see if it is working. We will see whether the Nicaraguans, and the Contadora nations respond to this peace offering. If they don't, then we know where the blame lies and we should in a bipartisan fashion forge another alternative.

Mr. Ortega has said that he will respond with a cease-fire and negotiations with the Contras. On the other hand, Ambassador Mr. Tunnerman, contradicts him when he says in a newspaper article that they will never negotiate with the Contras. I do not know whether the Nicaraguans are telling the truth or not. I am not going to sit here and tell you that the Sandinistas have been always truthful and accurate, that they have not lied, because I think they have lied in some cases and have made many statements for propaganda reasons. I think in relating to the peace process I believe the U.S. negotiator, Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman, who is a good man, who tells me that there has been deception on Sandinistas part, I know, too, however, that there are people in this administration, in the White House, in the CIA, and I will name Mr. Casey, whom I do not think want to have a negotiated solution. They want a military solution—a victory at all costs, with or without committing U.S. troops.

I would ask my colleagues to read the testimony of Gen. Paul Gorman of the Southern Command before the Senate he very clearly said before the Foreign Relations Committee before he retired that the Contras cannot win. That you cannot give them short-term or long-term aid and expect them to win. It is a conflict that has no military solution. Gorman states that the rebels are incapable of overthrowing the Sandinista government in the foreseeable future regardless of whether they received American aid.

So if we are looking at pressuring the Sandinistas, I think the ultimate pressure is this Congress, which four times has refused Contra aid. If we threaten to change, the Sandinistas will respond.

Mr. RITTER. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I will yield at the end of my statement.

The last point we are trying to make is that if we are going to talk about

pressuring the Sandinistas, the best pressure is the Congress of the United States that consistently has been voting against Contra aid. And I suspect that come October 1, unless the Sandinistas have responded with, No. 1, supporting the Contadora process, which up to now I don't think that they have, we should reassess our policy. I do think there have been cases where they have been willing to negotiate bilaterally with us, thus bypassing the Contadora process.

No. 2, the pressure should be increased so that the Sandinistas negotiate with the Contras. I think that is the ultimate solution. Let the Nicaraguans decide their future for themselves—but the United States should be a catalyst.

No. 3, I would like to see them moderate their behavior, cut off their ties to the Soviets and the East Germans, the Cubans, and the Palestinians. The Sandinistas are bad guys, they are bad dudes. No one is defending them. But to achieve these goals of changing their behavior and reducing their Marxist ties will require negotiations and give and take on all sides.

We should focus on how we achieve peace in that area. And I submit that this package of \$14 million which if it does not pass, ladies and gentlemen, we all know here that there is a lot of private aid that is going to flow to the Contras. The conflict won't end with this vote. We know that. There is going to be an emergence of that kind of private effort. It is going to get more and more protracted, and we are going to have more and more problems to deal with. Regardless of the outcome of this vote, negotiations, bilateral and multilateral, are paramount.

So what I am saying here today is I will be voting for a package that contains support for the Contadora process, but one that requires another look on October 1. It also, at my urging condemns the human rights violations of the Sandinistas and the Contras, a little stronger on the Sandinistas because I think they have gotten away with unnoticed repression. On both sides of the aisle, we have been inconsistent in criticizing governments on the right as well as the left.

So I am here to just offer an optimistic view that we can reach peace, but that we can do it through an alternative that I think is bipartisan. And I think the President may have started this positive process of saying that he is willing through humanitarian aid to try to deal with this problem. But you do not do it through the CIA, which has shown deception through the mining of harbors and the secret pamphlet which is a branch of government that has not been consistent and has often undercut other executive branches of the administration, that I think genuinely do want peace such as

the State Department and the Department of Defense.

Mr. RITTER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RICHARDSON I yield to my colleague.

Mr. RITTER. I thank my good friend from New Mexico for yielding.

The gentleman mentioned that an official of the U.S. Government stated that the Contras could not win. I think more accurately his quote is they are not going to win overnight.

But let me ask the gentleman a question. Does the gentleman believe that the freedom fighters in Afghanistan are about to triumph over the invading Soviet occupation forces?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I do not think so. I think it is going to be a very protracted and underdog struggle—but a legitimate one nonetheless.

Mr. RITTER. OK. I think the gentleman and I are probably in agreement that the guerrilla war and the fight for freedom on the part of the Mujahadin in Afghanistan is not one that is going to defeat Soviet military forces on the field. The whole idea behind guerrilla war, be it in Afghanistan, be it in Cambodia, which a number of Members of the other side of the aisle are supporting, the whole idea behind guerrilla warfare is to tire the enemy and to inflict damage, to have the enemy expend resources.

We are all too familiar with these kinds of conflicts that have engaged non-Communist governments around the world. The idea of the guerrilla war in Salvador is not necessarily to gain a great military victory on the field. It is to tire the government. It is to tire the United States.

□ 1410

These guerrilla wars have been fought to tire American public support for governments. Indeed we are trying to do the same thing; we are trying to encourage the Soviets and the Cubans to tire somewhat of their support for the Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I yield to my colleague from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank my friend for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I have a serious question with the gentleman's proposal. One proposal, one part of that involves the Contadoras. I know the gentleman is intimately acquainted with Mexico, with the Government of Mexico, with the people that run that Government. In looking at them and the other Contadoras you find very few government officials who are willing to say anything in public that will upset the Cubans or the Nicaraguans. I mean that has been a fact of life. Castro has been sending young Cubans to be killed by young Africans

for many years and you never heard a word of protest from Mexico.

My first question to the gentleman would be: How are these Contadoras who are fairly intimidated by their very fierce neighbors going to somehow instill a sense of discipline into this process? I think it is naive for us to believe that they can handle the situation.

The second thing I would like to ask the gentleman is: We gave them essentially \$100 million when they started out. We have pictures now of Mr. Ortega meeting, even then, with Eastern European Communist leaders even while he was receiving money from the United States. The Soviets have put some \$70 million into military installations including runways and large airports in Nicaragua.

Why would the Sandinistas give up their tremendous advantage, this tremendous linkage with the Soviet Union when \$100 million and possibly the promise of many times that, was not enough initially to turn them away from the Soviet bloc?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Let me answer both questions to my colleague.

There are two sides to the Contadora process. What the Democratic plan says is let us support it. It has instruments and funding to do so, for peacekeeping and verification.

The problems are this: On our side I think there are people in our administration that are subverting the Contadora process. They do not want to see it succeed. At all costs they want a military victory and they are against Contadora. On the other hand the gentleman is right, there are some Contadora countries that tilt toward the Nicaraguans. Mexico is one. I think it is going to take constructive effort to get the Contadora countries to deal legitimately with the problems of verification and peacekeeping forces within the negotiations. The Contadora process has not had an outstanding record. It needs to be buttressed and strengthened—but not undercut it. And we have done that in many instances.

What I am saying to my colleague is the Contadora may be our only hope for peace. I think that Contadora coupled with bilateral talks with the Nicaraguans, resuming the Manzanillo talks, which have been suspended. I think these two forums provide the best opportunity for a dialog. Presidents that have not been previously supportive of the President's effort like President Betancur of Colombia, is now cooling down his negative attitude toward what the President has been doing because of the President's latest humanitarian aid initiative. I think that is good. It seems we are getting more constructive forces, moderate forces, behind us. So why spoil ev-

everything with a bad vote that will further militarize the conflict.

On the second point that my colleague made about Sandinistas: there were men and women in this House that supported them, gave them that early infusion of support and we were involved getting Somoza out that must feel repudiated and disappointed because the Sandinistas have reneged on their revolution in large part. But that is not the issue. The issue is how do we bring peace, one that is in our best security interests? How do we stand up for that peasant, that little person in Nicaragua who does not care about Ronald Reagan or Karl Marx or my good friend Mr. HUNTER or myself; they want to be left alone. I think that should be our objective—peace through negotiations.

Mr. HUNTER. But how do you get the Soviets out?

Mr. RICHARDSON. Through negotiations, through the Contadora process and Manzanillo. More U.S. arms will only increase the Soviet presence.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I yield to my colleague from Arizona.

Mr. MCCAIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to remind the gentleman that that is all the Cambodians wanted was to be left alone; that all the South Vietnamese wanted was to be left alone; that all that the Laotians wanted was to be left alone.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. RICHARDSON] has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes additional to the gentleman from New Mexico.

Mr. MCCAIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman continue to yield?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I yield to my colleague from Arizona.

Mr. MCCAIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding further.

Mr. Chairman, I would just like to ask my colleague from New Mexico to elaborate a bit. He does agree that an important part of this solution is a dialog between the Sandinistas and the Contras.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Yes, I do.

Mr. MCCAIN. What method can we use to pressure that dialog to begin since so far it appears as if the Sandinistas have rejected dialog with the Contras?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think the main source of pressure would be several Latin American countries, Mexico, Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela principally. The vote today, which I hope will reject the military/CIA assistance to the Contras, will be a sign of pressure because Mr. Ortega will be put on notice. Mr. Ortega knows that the Congress is going to come back again and there are going to be waver-

ing legislators like myself who come back October 1, and if he has done nothing except his hypocritical statements, and if he does not respond I will not support his continued efforts to deceive everybody. Mr. Ortega has to put up or shut up.

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. RICHARDSON. I yield to my colleague from Minnesota.

Mr. WEBER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

First of all, Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman has been one of the genuinely agonized Members over this issue.

I appreciate his honesty and his diligence and although I do not agree at all with the conclusion, I respect it a whole lot. I just want to ask and get the gentleman's opinion about the Contras. I think the gentleman accurately portrayed them as not being perfect. But in the gentleman's opinion have they not achieved legitimacy within Nicaragua with the nonmilitary opposition to the Sandinista government? I am talking about the church, the very people that you have cited as being repressed by the Sandinista government. I just want to know if the gentleman agrees with me that whatever the situation a couple of years ago, today the Contras, even given their warts, have achieved legitimacy with just about everybody that is being subjected to oppression by the Sandinista government.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I cannot answer entirely.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New Mexico has again expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from New Mexico.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I think first of all we have to understand that there are members of the Contras that used to be Sandinistas that are disappointed and they are out and I think their concerns are legitimate, like Mr. Robelo and the Chamorros and Cruz and Caleno. All I can tell the gentleman is that there are businessmen, there are students, there are Nicaraguans who have opted to stay in Nicaragua in the opposition rather than become Contras. And I would hope the gentleman would join me, through the National Endowment of Democracy, or other areas, to support these dissidents within Nicaragua that are democratic forces. I would be prepared to sponsor an amendment that would do that if it would strengthen democracy, to help these dissident forces within Nicaragua.

So I do not know the exact answer to my colleagues except to say that there are members of the Contras who have been disaffected with the Sandinista revolution. You cannot call them all Somozistas and dismiss them. They

are legitimate. That is why I wanted to make the point that I think they have achieved a relative degree of political maturity. That peace plan of Mr. Cruz and Mr. Caleno is something that should not be dismissed. It is a good start. We should look at it seriously. The best way to pressure the Sandinistas to vote no on military aid because they will be put on notice.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. McHUGH].

Mr. McHUGH. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 239, which would authorize the release of \$14 million in military aid to the Contra guerrillas fighting the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, and also in opposition to the substitute to be offered by Mr. MICHEL of Illinois if House Joint Resolution 239 is rejected. In the alternative, I urge my colleagues to support the resolution to be offered by Mr. BARNES of Maryland and the substitute to be offered by Mr. HAMILTON of Indiana.

It is important that this House reaffirm its position that no military support be provided to the Contras. Some have argued that this is no longer the issue, because President Reagan is now asking only for "humanitarian" aid, not military assistance. However, it is clear that the President is taking this position solely for tactical reasons. He has concluded, albeit reluctantly, that he does not have the votes in Congress to support his policy of military intervention in Nicaragua. There is no doubt, however, that the President's fundamental policy has not changed. Clearly, he hopes to sustain the Contras with "humanitarian" aid so that, on another day, he can try again to renew the flow of military aid.

There is also no doubt that this military aid has been used, and would be used in the future, to seek the forcible overthrow of the Nicaraguan government. The President has hedged on this point, at times claiming the purpose of our aid is to interdict arms going to the rebels in El Salvador, at times saying it is for the purpose of "putting pressure" on Nicaragua to negotiate, and at times coming closer to the truth, which is the real purpose of our aid is to overthrow a sovereign government. The Contras themselves are much more straightforward about it. They declare that their purpose is to overthrow the government, and we should be under no illusions about it.

In my judgment, providing aid for this purpose in Nicaragua will not work and is not in the interests of the United States. The time for Congress to say so, clearly and strongly, is now.

It is fair to ask: Are there any circumstances when it is legitimate for the United States to support revolution or counterrevolution in a foreign nation? Under certain circumstances,

such support may be an appropriate means of defending the legitimate interests of the United States. It is one of the many tools available in the conduct of American foreign policy. Because of its inherent limitations, however, it is a tool of policy that should be employed sparingly.

The United States is a global power with legitimate interests beyond their borders. Those interests are political, economic, and strategic. They are generally consistent with a stable international environment, and to maintain such a stable environment we must actively promote a credible Western deterrent, equitable economic growth, the rule of law, and basic human rights, among other things.

These interests are shared with many other nations. But since the United States is the dominant power committed to such interests, we have a special responsibility. Other nations look to us for effective leadership in advancing our common goals. In formulating our foreign policy, therefore, we must first have a clear understanding of where our vital interests lie, and then carefully select the particular tools which are most likely to secure those interests.

Most Americans are quite properly skeptical of intervention in a foreign nation. Unless a vital American interest or a fundamental principle is clearly at stake, most Americans will not long support an interventionist policy. In that event, the policy is sure to fail. In a democracy like ours, a policy that is not understood and supported by the people is not a sustainable policy.

In Nicaragua, the United States is supporting the forcible overthrow of an established government. Granted, it is a government we do not like. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was grounded on the same premise. Can we credibly argue that superpower intervention is justified in our case, but not in theirs?

Our people, and others throughout the world, were deeply offended by Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. It was aggression, pure and simple. That invasion was a violation of international law and has been condemned as such by the United Nations. Our people can understand and support aid to a people that is defending its homeland, and therefore our current policy on Afghanistan is a sustainable policy.

But in the case of Nicaragua, the United States is violating international law. When called before the World Court for illegally mining harbors, we denied jurisdiction and refused to argue the merits of the case. Unlike Afghanistan, our friends are embarrassed by our policy, and so are our citizens.

The American people do not want their government printing pamphlets advocating murder, violating the rule of law, demeaning our expressed

values, and alienating our friends. They do not understand and support this activity and therefore it is not a sustainable policy. It simply will not work.

It is also counterproductive to American interests in Central America, for it actually strengthens the hands of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, in the region, and in the eyes of the international community.

Another unfortunate byproduct of our Nicaraguan policy is that it erodes public confidence in the Central Intelligence Agency. Only a fraction of the Agency's time and money is spent on such "covert" activities. Its primary responsibility is to collect and analyze information, a critically important function if our decisionmakers are to formulate sound policies. Yet, when the Agency is directed to undertake so flawed a covert operation, the integrity of the CIA as an institution is called into question, undermining the credibility of legitimate functions truly vital to our national security.

As I said at the outset, support for revolution or counterrevolution can be an appropriate tool of American foreign policy. However, its appropriateness depends on the facts of each case, and specifically on whether its use is consonant with American interests and values. In the case of Nicaragua, it is not. For that reason, we should vote down House Joint Resolution 239.

It is not enough, however, to simply reject the President's policy of military intervention. We do have legitimate interest in Central America. We do have legitimate concerns with certain policies of the Sandinista government, particularly to the extent that they may threaten other nations in the region. And we do care about legitimate refugees who may have been displaced by the conflicts in that region. For this reason, I urge my colleagues to support the alternative resolution to be offered by Mr. BARNES of Maryland and the substitute to be offered by Mr. HAMILTON of Indiana.

These proposals reject the policy of military intervention and focus on a more constructive approach. They would provide true humanitarian assistance to real refugees, not to combatants. This would be assured by delivering the aid through the Red Cross or the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Moreover, these proposals would set aside \$4 million to implement any regional agreement that might be reached as the result of the Contadora initiative. In adopting the Barnes-Hamilton proposals, we would be sending a clear signal to Central America that this Nation is committed to a political and economic approach, an approach which our people can understand and will support. That is a sustainable policy. That is a policy that has a chance to work.

I hope that today, once and for all, Congress will reject military intervention and opt for a policy which reflects our values as well as our interests. I urge the adoption of the Barnes-Hamilton proposals.

□ 1420

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McHUGH. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. DICKS. I want to compliment the gentleman from New York for a very balanced presentation. I think one that goes directly to the issue. I believe that the key phrase is sustainability. I agree with the gentleman. I think our policy in Afghanistan is one that can be sustained and one that the American people can support. I quite agree with him that the policy in Nicaragua is one in which the American people have already, I think in a very demonstrative way, indicated that they will not support, and, therefore, I think the gentleman's solution, emphasizing economic and political solutions, is the correct way, and I want to compliment him for his statement.

Mr. McHUGH. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McHUGH. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. RITTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Does the gentleman feel that the goals of the Contras, the small "d" democratic goals of the Contras, are any less small "d" democratic than the goals of the Mujtahidin in Afghanistan?

Mr. McHUGH. Well, I have a hard time reading what the goals and motivations of the Contras are.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York (Mr. McHUGH) has expired.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute if the other side will yield 1 additional minute.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Washington has 3 hours, 22½ minutes. The gentleman from Michigan has 3 hours, 7½ minutes.

The gentleman from Washington is recognized.

Mr. DICKS. I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute.

Mr. McHUGH. In response to the gentleman, I would say that I cannot be so precise as to read the intentions and motivations of the Contras. I am sure some of them are truly committed to the goals that the Afghanistan freedom fighters may be, but my basic point is that that effort, in trying to overthrow an existing government, is not understood and supported by the American people, and in my judgment

is therefore not a sustainable, workable policy.

To the contrary, when we are helping the people in Afghanistan, we are helping them to defend their homeland against an invasion, against aggression, and that is sustainable and understandable.

Mr. RITTER. If I could ask the gentleman to further yield, the fact is that the developed small "d" democratic ideals of the Contras are far, far more small "d" democratic than the goals of the Mujtahidin, the societies being quite different, the societies being quite less undeveloped in the sense of understanding democracy.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. McHugh] has again expired.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Studds].

Mr. STUDDS. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to associate myself with the calm and I think very eloquent remarks of the gentleman who preceded me in the well, the gentleman from New York.

Mr. Chairman, when the rhetoric is stripped away, this debate is about war. The President has not asked Congress simply to agree that Nicaragua's Government is extreme; or to express our unhappiness with restriction on the press and with the harassment of political parties; we are not being asked simply to acknowledge the good intentions of men like Arturo Cruz; we are not being asked to authorize the use of military force to defend against Nicaraguan aggression, or to halt whatever material support Nicaragua may be providing to the rebels in El Salvador.

We are being asked to lend American weapons, dollars, and prestige to a movement whose aim is the violent overthrow of a government with whom we are at peace, and against whom we can fully protect ourselves and our other regional friends without resorting to armed invasion or support for violent counterrevolution.

We are told that we need the Contras—now that they have failed so dismally at arms interdiction—because they can keep the pressure on Managua; they can cause economic hardship that will undermine the popularity of the regime; and they will provide an alternative to which dissident or disgruntled Nicaraguans may turn.

But the issue today is not whether Nicaraguan dissident groups—internal or in exile—should exist; the question is whether they should be an instrument—indeed, whether they should owe their very existence—to the foreign policy of the United States.

We would all like to see democracy take hold in Nicaragua, as we would in Guatemala, Chile, Paraguay, and in El Salvador, where its grasp is still far shakier than this administration

would like publicly to admit. But we are not this hemisphere's only experts on democracy, social justice, the fair treatment of indigenous populations, or human rights. There are many other supporters of these concepts in Latin America, and the fundamental question we are being asked today is whether we should approach the Nicaragua problem on a unilateral or on a regional basis.

The bipartisan policy being put forward today as an alternative to the course suggested by President Reagan includes a willingness to respond forcefully to acts of lawlessness or aggression, but it contains, as well, a commitment to work seriously with the Contadora countries for a regional peace, and to rely on legal methods for encouraging democratic Nicaraguans both inside and outside the country.

Some in this body who see the wisdom of regional action believe, nonetheless, that pressure from the Contras is needed to give that regional approach a chance to work. I do not agree.

With respect to security matters, the Contras are not needed to respond to whatever threat Nicaragua may pose to us or to our neighbors, a threat that has, in any case, been grossly exaggerated.

With respect to internal issues, there exists more evidence to contradict than to support the notion that Nicaragua will liberalize its political system due to pressure from the Contras.

But Nicaragua has shown, through its participation in Contadora, that it does care about its reputation within Latin America. And Latin American leaders have shown an increased willingness to embrace and encourage the spread of democratic principles throughout the region, Nicaragua included.

But U.S. support for the Contras is not the lever that will make regional pressure work; it is the wedge dividing U.S. methods and goals from those of our democratic neighbors. Not a single Latin American head of state has given—or could give—public support to CIA or U.S. military aid to the Contras.

The Contra operation has been, from the beginning, a violation of international law, and Latin governments care about that; their concern is heightened by past American intervention in the region, especially in Nicaragua. Latins know, too, that military control of the Contras is held by officers who are more killers than freedom fighters, ex-national guard who may share with our President Reagan a strong belief in anticommunism, but who also possess, in the tradition of their own past President Somoza, a vicious and self-righteous intolerance for those with whom they disagree.

For these reasons, our support for the Contras is a distraction, shifting

the world spotlight away from Nicaragua's misdeeds to our own. We have mined harbors, taught political assassination, and allied ourselves with killers. In so doing, we have fulfilled the predictions and helped to consolidate the power of Nicaragua's most extreme leaders.

This is not a sensible policy for encouraging change in Nicaragua. It is a policy, rather, of reaction. It is as if our country had lost faith in the sanctity of law, in the skill of our diplomats, in the good will of our neighbors, in the resilience of democratic values, in our ability to learn from history, and in our commitment—enforced by the will of the American people—not to unleash the forces of war without fully exploring other options and never without due cause.

Not long ago, Secretary of State Shultz complained that America was becoming the hamlet of nations; that we were too introspective, too principled, too fearful, too plagued by guilt to act when action was required. That is a provocative image, but today's debate will decide whether we will go to the other extreme. Whether we will act without regard for law, facts, principles, or consequences; whether in rejecting Hamlet we will become the Bernhard Goetz of nations; or whether we cannot with confidence in ourselves and our values, and with the help of regional friends, find a better way.

Mr. Chairman, it is not everyday in this body that—on a matter of major consequence—the right thing to do—and the popular thing to do—coincide. But that is the case today.

The American people overwhelmingly reject the policy of this administration in Nicaragua.

Common sense, international law, and simple humanity reject the policy of this administration in Nicaragua.

And there is no reason on earth that this House ought not—with pride, and without any need to temporize or compromise—reject out of hand the policies of this administration in Nicaragua.

□ 1430

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STUDDS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. The gentleman gave a very eloquent speech for which I heard very little documentation, but I would refer to the gentleman, when he talks about those killers, as he refers to the Contra or counterrevolutionary forces, to their document on national dialog of the Nicaragua Resistance, dated March 2, 1985, in which they advocated to recognize the primacy of civilian society; a dissolution of the totalitarian state party army trilogy; full respect of human rights and

fundamental freedoms of expression, assembly, religion, and education.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. STUDDS] has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STUDDS. I continue to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

The economic system which provides for the development of the private sector; institutionalization of the multiparty electoral system; free elections; freedom to organize unions; a modern productive process of the integral agrarian reform; administrative decentralization; general amnesty and pardon for political crimes and related crimes, and expulsion from the country of all foreign internationalists such as military advisers and troops.

In contrast, the government, which controls Nicaragua, and I assume in which the gentleman espouses hope and credence, is consistently violating the human rights of its own citizens, repressing its economy, imprisoning and executing its people.

Now, I just wonder how in the world can the gentleman give that wonderful speech and relate to us in eloquent terms a defense of his position, when this is the position of the Contras which was overlooked by the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STUDDS. I would say to the gentleman that I was about to say "Without objection, so ordered," to that long list of unarguable things which he read.

No one could object to that. I would remind the gentleman that the Constitution of the Soviet Union reads somewhat the same. My reference was to the fact that the overwhelming majority of the military leadership of the Contras are former members of the Somoza national guard.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM].

Mr. McCOLLUM. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, peace in Nicaragua is not enough. To preserve freedom and democracy in Central America and to protect our southern borders from terrorism in the future, the spread of Communist dictatorship in Central America must be stopped.

There is no question that the Sandinista movement must be fundamentally changed in order to obtain the goals that I just outlined. In order to stop that kind of aggressive tendency on the part of the Sandinistas as Marxist-Leninists and Communists intent on expansion and interventionism in their neighborhood countries next door we have to bring a certain

amount of pressure. The question before us today is over what kind of pressure will be effective, and whether or not we should engage in military pressure indirectly through the Contras.

I rise today to support the military aid to the Contras as the only logical pressure to be brought to bear that is going to yield meaningful results in terms of fundamental change in the policies of the Sandinistas, and that is what it is all about. Economic pressure, political talk, dialog, all of the other simply is not going to make the movement that is necessary when you are dealing with hardcore Communist regimes, and that is what the Sandinista regime is.

I want to demonstrate that by quoting from one of the comandante's speeches in May of 1984. Comandante Arce, one of the nine member ruling directorate of the Sandinistas, gave a speech before the Nicaraguan Socialist Party which was recorded and reprinted a number of times. Just a couple of quotes will demonstrate what I am talking about.

In his speech he talks about the democratic principles that after their 1979 revolution the Sandinistas originally stated they were going to support. He says:

Those principles were non-alignment abroad, a mixed economy, and political pluralism. With those three elements, we kept the international community from going along with American policy in Nicaragua.

Of course, once defined in specific terms, this imposed certain commitments. One was that we said we were going to elect a constituent assembly, that we were going to have elections. While we might view those commitments as negative, if we analyze our revolution in black and white, we still consider them to be positive at this time. Of course, if we did not have the war situation imposed on us by the United States, the electoral problem would be totally out of place in terms of its usefulness, what a revolution really needs is the power to act. The power to act is precisely what constitutes the essence of the dictatorship of the proletariat—the ability of the [working] class to impose its will by using the means at hand [without] bourgeois formalities.

For us, then, the elections, viewed from that perspective, are a nuisance, just as a number of things that make up the reality of our revolution are a nuisance.

□ 1440

He goes on to say, and I think this is exceedingly important, what Comandante Arce said last year:

Imperialism asks three things of us: to abandon interventionism, to abandon our strategic ties with the Soviet Union and the socialist community, and to be democratic. We cannot cease being internationalists unless we cease being revolutionaries.

We cannot discontinue strategic relationships unless we cease being revolutionaries. It is impossible even to consider this.

I submit to you the character of the Sandinistas in this regard is very clear. We have to treat them as we treat the Soviet Union. We have to treat them

as we treat the PLO because they are allies of the PLO, and I know some of you do not believe that, but in 1966, when Cuba first became associated with Arafat, an arrangement was made for some training of Cuban troops by the Palestine Liberation Organization, and then in 1969, after a meeting in Mexico City, the PLO invited some of the Sandinistas over to be trained in Lebanon. At the same time they were over there being trained in terrorist tactics they participated in the war against Jordan and King Hussein, and actually some of them were participants in the hijacking of an El Al airliner. That relationship continues to this day, with Arafat toasting the Sandinistas in Managua and the fact that the PLO have an embassy of 70 personnel in Managua. This is testament to the fact that there is still a close relationship. In fact, the PLO have loaned over \$12 million, and I did not think they had that kind of money, but they have loaned over \$12 million in order to support the Sandinista cause.

I submit to my colleagues that what we need in this whole debate is some reasoned understanding that what we are dealing with, putting aside all the propaganda of good will that is trying to emanate out of Managua at this point in time, to play on our presses, to bring up the emotions of our people, to charge us up against the aid to the Contras, the fact is what we are dealing with in Managua today is not only a Marxist-Leninist regime; in polite terms it is a Soviet Communist satellite regime. We have to deal with it the same way that we would the Soviets, and that means with the kind of pressure they understand. It does not mean simply relying on talk that buys them time; time, if they get the time, to go forward with consolidation internally, denying more freedoms and opportunities for their people and preparing more opportunities for intervention and bringing down the Salvadoran regime of President Duarte that is the one true democracy in the hemisphere.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. McCOLLUM] has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Florida 1 additional minute.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCOLLUM. I yield to the gentleman from New Mexico.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, assuming that all of the charges the gentleman made about the Sandinistas are correct, and many of them I think are, about their Marxist orientation, I would like to know to what extent he wants to see the United States military effort par-

icipate. I think he was saying, from his statements, that he wants to go beyond the pressure point of the \$14 million. Is he talking about \$100 million? Is he talking about eventually a strategy of committing troops?

I would like to know what the gentleman's objective is.

Mr. McCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, if I may reclaim my time, in my judgment, it does not take a lot of money to support the cause of bringing about pressure. It takes the continued existence of the Contras in a war movement to bring hurt to bear on the Nicaraguan Sandinistas. It does not require American military involvement.

What I want to avoid, and I think most of us who support the aid to the Contras want to avoid, is the eventuality that if in fact we do not see success, if we do not see the Sandinistas stop their interventionist policies, that some day, not in Nicaragua, but perhaps in Mexico at our borders, we will see American bloodshed, and I do not want to see that. That is the bottom line that concerns me.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. SAVAGE].

Mr. SAVAGE. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I am a bit disturbed and puzzled by some of the arguments that I hear from the other side. It seems to me that you propose doing pretty much the same with regard to Nicaragua as we did in the 1960s regarding Cuba and found it to be counterproductive.

We say that we deny economic aid to Nicaragua because they are moving toward the Soviet sphere. We arm counterrevolutionaries in that nation for the same reason. Well, if rebels are armed in that nation, do you not think that government must then have arms itself, and if we will not sell arms to them, they have to go somewhere else to get them? If those Contras go down into the farmlands and burn up the tractors, as I saw in visiting Nicaragua, and we will not sell them tractors, do you not think that is pushing them into the Soviet sphere? And yet we claim that that is the rationale for our policy, rather than the result.

It makes me think of the story about the teenager who murdered his parents, and then after being found guilty in court, pleaded for mercy on the basis that he was then an orphan. We are producing counter to what we propose.

And may I add, I am just as disturbed about the business of humanitarian aid. Any aid to the Contras promotes the violent overthrow of a duly elected government with which we are not at war, which violates many of our treaty obligations. A dollar is a dollar. If you came to me and you wanted to buy a hamburger and also a beer, and each cost \$2 and you only had \$2 in

your pocket, and you walked up and said, "Gus, how about letting me have \$2 so I can get a beer?" You are going to use yours to buy the hamburger. And if I am against alcohol, I might say, "No, I will not loan you \$2 for a beer." I will loan you \$2 for food or for something worthwhile," and you say, "OK, then loan me \$2 to buy a hamburger." So I loan you \$2 to buy a hamburger, which frees up your \$2 to buy the beer and you end up with the hamburger and the beer. What difference does it make? A dollar is a dollar.

Aid to promote violence inside of a duly elected government is wrong. It is not for us to dictate to others. The elections in Nicaragua, in my estimation, were fairer than the elections in El Salvador, because I talked to a candidate who ran in the election in Nicaragua who was in favor of the Contras and did not mind saying so. You cannot find someone who ran against Duarte in El Salvador who would admit being in support of the guerrillas of El Salvador. Certainly the elections in Nicaragua were more fair than the elections in Guatemala because you never have had elections there at all. That country is ruled by brutal, military dictatorship.

So I wonder about the veracity of these arguments. Very soon the very people who are here today arguing about spending some money to overthrow another government will be arguing that we do not have a dime to spend to help provide postsecondary education for our children, that we do not have money to spend to help increase the cost of our seniors for Medicare. They will argue then that we do not have a dime, so we do not have to tax pensions and insurance annuities.

I think the problem here is that we have our values wrong. That is where the money needs to be spent, and if this country still insists on wanting to intervene in the internal affairs of some other nation in defense of democracy, why not Guatemala, a far better example than Nicaragua, but better still, why not in the most prominent example of fascism in the world today, the government of South Africa, where there is no question that democracy does not exist because by their own laws 75 percent of the population that is black is denied the right to vote.

I say not a dime to declare war and send our youth into Central America.

□ 1450

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. TRAFICANT].

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I have just recently completed a trip during which I was in Nicaragua for 4 days. I was able to visit the combat zone near Ocotal and Somoto. Some of the things I have learned were basic-

ly many of the things that have been repeated today.

Of the FDN, 46 of their 49 leaders are old Somoza National Guardsmen. Many of the peasants do not think too kindly of the FDN.

Second of all, there is no unification among this Contra organization. Many of them fight among themselves. They do not have a unified front, and they cannot be successful against this Sandinista regime.

Now, it is true the Sandinista regime is a Marxist-Leninist philosophy of government. But I think the question comes here as to the real issues, and I think there are basically three options.

The first one is, do we continue our present course of action to pressure the Nicaraguans economically through embargos and militarily through the Contras?

Second of all, do we negotiate to resolve our differences with Nicaragua diplomatically in concert with other countries in the region?

Or, finally, do we commit U.S. combat forces in a conventional war in Nicaragua?

I had the opportunity to question and meet with President Ortega, and I want to tell the Members something, he is pretty sharp. He will get on television and you can bring up all the atrocities that exist in Nicaragua and he will look you in the eye and say, "We are a nation at war, a war that has been brought about by American intervention, and when a nation is at war, I must do what I have to do to protect my people. You mine my harbors, you produce the CIA manual which attempts to assassinate and overthrow my government, and," he says, "you name me one time, Congressman, one time we have gone out of the borders of Nicaragua. Name me one time, because," he said, "We haven't."

And he said, "In the U.S.A., if I wear my fatigues, they call me Castro, and if I wear a three-piece suit and comb my hair, they call me Gorbachev." He says, "I am just protecting the good people of Nicaragua."

He is pretty good at selling, and he has public opinion on his side, because this world was upset and people everywhere were upset about the mining of those harbors. I was upset, and I was not in Congress. I think there should have been some indictments come down with that.

But here is the point I am trying to make: If we would take off the military support, he cannot have us as the whipping boys over there, and then those people, with their empty stomachs, those people who are upset with living conditions where poverty is so rampant, will attempt to overthrow any government, and the process from

within is the one we must attempt to manifest now.

The military situation is going to continue to lead us down the line, and we cannot even have a military success. But now we have special forces in Honduras, and I have some suspicions about that. Are those special forces dealing with covert operations, really dealing with Hondurans? Or is there now an involvement with CIA that could be reaching into the Contra operation at a heavier pace than what has been reported to us?

I would just like to say that a government that becomes a power like the Sandinistas did by force has to govern by force, and they will be overthrown by force. But if they are overthrown right now, the government that will take power in Nicaragua will be another one just like it, and there is not going to be a settlement there with guns. There has to be a diplomatic resolve.

I am for humanitarian aid, but I would like to see us structure it a little differently. There is a tremendous health need there in that country, and I think our specific U.S. aid should be directed in a tangible measure to the Nicaraguan people, the average person, the people who can recognize and understand it and say "thank you" for it. And we should continue the pressure from within that country on the Nicaraguan Sandinista regime, because what they are doing is they are taking those people in the gray area and they are coming over to their side. Public opinion is on his side, and he is good at it.

So I just believe particularly that a military continuation is not only going to be the answer, it is going to commit us further into a military confrontation.

I would just like to add, after being there, that those conditions are very bad, and there are too many people there who do not like to see Americans. There is too much Yankee imperialist talk. And while it is not the best government—we know that; it is a Marxist-Leninist government—I think in our spirit of self-determination, somewhere along the way we have to project that to these other countries themselves. The self-determination for the future of their government is a very important issue, and I think it is one that is integral here.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to my good friend, the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. WISE.]

Mr. WISE. Mr. Chairman, I, too, rise in opposition to this resolution.

I am reminded, as I look back through the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD and as I listen to this debate, and as I listened to it last year and listened to the debate the year before, and as I read the newspapers, that there is a lot of similarity here to the MX. The MX has been, if you remember,

couched in terms that "You can't pull the rug from under the President."

Well, now the President has come up with a last-minute bargaining proposal, and in order to get them to the table, "You can't pull the rug out from under me. You've got to vote \$14 million."

But there is another similarity to the MX also. The similarity is this: In order to rationalize this, in order to explain it, we have gone through almost as many basing modes with the Contras as we have with the MX. I listened to the Members who supported this 2 years ago standing in this well and saying, "We are not out to overthrow any government, we are not out to subvert a government, we are out simply to stop the arms flow"—the alleged arms flow, to whatever extent it was—"from Nicaragua into El Salvador."

Now, the arms flow we were stopping was through Honduras and hundreds of miles then to the west. That was always a little controversial anyhow as to whether that existed, but let us assume for the moment that it did. That is all these folks wanted to do. They just simply wanted to put some pressure on at the border, and there were just a thousand or two of them.

But now we have shifted the rationalization. We are not stopping the arms flow anymore. What we are doing now, in the second stage, we are simply putting pressure on Managua. Well, we are not serious about it. Nobody is going to Managua. They say nobody is seriously going to affect the peasantry, but we are just putting pressure on. Now, finally, in the last summary we are making them say, "uncle." That sounds to me like we are trying to go to Managua.

So you can see that we are constantly shifting our focus. And to those who do not think there is an expansion going on, I refer them to the non-classified sections of the report the President has submitted to this Congress, and I submit the New York Times analyses of the classified sections which say that the proposal is to increase in the north the Contra forces 20,000 to 25,000—that is up from 15,000—and to increase in the south 5,000 to 10,000. So definitely there is an escalation planned.

Mr. Chairman, I am not here to make an argument for Daniel Ortega. This is not a referendum on Ortega. Quite frankly, I think it is a referendum on us. I think it is a referendum on what we say is acceptable behavior.

I do not agree with Ortega, I do not agree with the Sandinista government, I do not agree with the human rights violations, I do not agree with the military posture, I do not agree with the military posture incidentally in Chile, I do not agree with the human rights situation in Guatemala,

I did not support it in Argentina, and so whether it is Ortega or whether it is Guatemala or Honduras or South Africa or whoever it is, you can just say that you are not participating and you are not going to condone that kind of activity.

A gentleman previously spoke about the metastasizing of communism through Central America. Yes, it may be, but I would like to suggest that what is metastasized is hunger and poverty and need and deprivation. And sometimes what you do, when you go out to fight Communists, so-called, you make them. And if I were a peasant and everytime I looked up to see who was causing me the harm, who was burning my village, who was shooting up my wedding party, who was making my brother lie down in a grave, as was depicted in Newsweek, and then cutting his throat, and I saw that person was armed and supplied by the United States, what would I think after a while? I would think that the United States was my enemy, and that maybe this fellow over here, who is a hustler for Fidel Castro or Ortega—name or call them what you will; put a name on them, they are exactly the same because he or she is a salesman—maybe that person will help me; at least they are not doing that to me and they are offering me something.

□ 1500

I think we ought to be offering something, too. I do not think it ought to be bullets. I think it ought to be ideas. I think it ought to be aid. I think it ought to be the kind of things this country has spoken for.

I guess the greatest insult I have heard during this whole discussion that has gone on across the country for months is this somehow likening the Contras to freedom fighters.

Mr. Chairman, on my right is George Washington. On my left is Lafayette. I do not rank them with the Nicaraguan Contras. I do not think they would have participated. I hope they would not have. Indeed, I know they would not have in the same kind of activity that we seem to have depicted. I do not think they would have stood for the same kinds of things that Somoza stood for and that some of those still active in the Contra movement have stood for.

So I guess what I am urging is that we say that we are not making this a referendum on Ortega. I am not here to defend or to stand up for him. I simply do not support those policies, but by the same token, I do not support those in many other areas, either. What I do think we have to look at is yes, you can fund the Contras all the way to Managua. Maybe they will get there, maybe they will not; but on the way there, they are going to kill a lot

of people and those are the hearts and minds that I thought we were supposed to be winning.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Wolf].

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of aid for the Contras who are fighting for freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly in Nicaragua.

Mr. Chairman, last summer I headed a congressional delegation to visit Nicaragua and because of my experiences while there and my concerns about the Central American region generally, I would like to join my colleagues in commenting on the Nicaraguan situation today and urging support for the President's request for \$14 million to aid Nicaraguan insurgents who are attempting to defeat the brutal Sandinista regime.

During my trip to Nicaragua I met with people on all sides of the political spectrum. Since my return I have followed developments in that country with intense interest and concern. The situation in Nicaragua concerns me because this country so closely linked to the Soviet Union and Cuba is so near to American shores and is thus a threat to the American people. My interest also stems from the conversations I had with the Nicaraguan people I met and their expression of hope for the possibility of a political solution over the problems that separate the United States and the current Nicaraguan Government.

My introduction to Nicaragua came through El Salvador. With the assistance of our colleagues Representatives TONY HALL, BOB McEWEN, CHRISTOPHER SMITH, and DAN COATS, I coordinated a public/private partnership which provided 95 tons of humanitarian relief supplies to the displaced people of El Salvador.

In announcing the result of our efforts to solicit contributions from American companies, I said that the people of El Salvador—infants, children, women, and families—were both the real victims and the real future for El Salvador. What so often is lost in the headlines and reports on El Salvador reaching this country is the magnitude of the suffering and deprivation of the people of that struggling nation; fortunately the El Salvadorans now have a President who is pursuing reforms to rebuild their country and take the path that leads to democracy.

After meeting with people of all sides of the political spectrum in Nicaragua, I believe it can also be said that the people of that country are victims too and their case is also lost in the headlines. The Nicaraguans are victims because rights that were promised to them during the 1979 revolution are being systematically denied as seen by the abuses of human rights,

censorship of the press and harassment of the church. Yet, the situation seems to go largely unnoticed and unreported by the press as personal liberties are denied; freedom of the press is almost nonexistent and the church is constantly harassed and threatened.

There are tremendous violations with the leftist regime in Nicaragua that took over with the promise of freedom. In fact, just the opposite has happened. For example, in his April 22, 1984, pastoral letter, Archbishop Obando y Bravo noted attempts to "defame legitimate pastors, censor the media, stifle new ideas, the disregard for moral and religious ideas and the lack of respect for human dignity." The letter also urged in a straightforward and nonpartisan manner that everyone should participate in a constructive dialog.

All Nicaraguans inside and outside the country must participate in this dialogue, regardless of class or partisan belief. Furthermore, we think that Nicaraguans who have taken up arms against the Government must also participate in this dialogue. If not, there will be no possibility of a settlement and our people, especially the poorest among them, will continue to suffer and die.

His words to me were equally telling: "A major part of the people are unhappy but they are also afraid * * * we are fighting a monster that includes the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Cuba * * * and this revolution could spread to Mexico or other parts of the Hemisphere." He also noted that since the Government controls the media, its propaganda and facade of fairness and spirituality incorporated in the Government structure mislead observers outside the country.

Another example Lic. Pedro J. Chamorro, the editor at that time of *La Prensa*, which is the only vestige remaining of a free newspaper: He had defied the Government by refusing to include propaganda in this newspaper. The Government already censors *La Prensa*. He also told of being awakened to a machinegun going off at the opposite end of the phone to frighten him and of moving his family to Costa Rica to avoid episodes like the one when a mob defaced his home and demonstrated outside.

Another story was related to me about a church group whose office was ransacked and the office employees attacked by unidentified armed individuals believed to be members of state security. This individual said: "The biggest crime in Nicaragua is to tell a foreigner what is really happening. If you tell anyone, you will commit treason."

He also offered this observation: "Everything that is Christian is considered the enemy." This same young man also told of young people being forced to join the Army and sent to fight untrained in order that the Government will have hundreds of mar-

tyrs and of a teaching situation that does not permit students to argue against professors. In an attempt to disguise the fact that religious persecution exists he also told us the Government has created a special office to talk to and mislead outside visitors.

These allegations were substantiated by others whom I met. Another man told of a movie house that was emptied midway through the movie and the young men were taken away to join the Army, a person who was handing out bulletins with human rights violations was jailed for 2 months, a man's wife was tricked into wearing a prison gown to visit her husband while he was then told she too had been jailed causing him to submit to Government pressure.

"In a systematic way, they've gone about instituting a Marxist regime," one man said. "Nicaragua is divided into three groups—those who have left, those getting ready to leave, and those who will leave on or about November 4—election day, 1984—when the Sandinistas reelect themselves."

Aid to the Contras would ensure the continuance of the only existing pressure on the Sandinista government. I am pleased that we are considering some aid to the Contras and I urge my colleagues to support the President's request for \$14 million to aid the Contras. The President has made it clear that if the Sandinistas agree to a cease-fire and church-supervised peace talks to produce a new election, the aid money would be used to buy food, medical supplies, and clothing for the insurgents. I would welcome this development and I believe this aid package would create incentives for dialog and peace, a goal to which we all can strive to achieve. I urge my colleagues in the House to support the President's proposal.

To lend further support to the case for aid to the Contras I would like to include an article by George Will, which appeared in the *Washington Post* on April 21:

FOR THE PRESIDENT, A SHATTERING DEFEAT

This is the most important congressional moment since May 1947, when Congress supported U.S. intervention-through-aid on the anticommunist side in the Greek civil war. Congress thereby transformed containment from a theory into a policy.

Congress has now effectively killed aid for the anticommunist side in Nicaragua's civil war. Congress has forbidden even modest financial support for the military effort of a mass movement prepared to do the dying to prevent consolidation of the second Soviet satellite in this hemisphere and the first on the North American continent. The evisceration of containment is complete.

What President Reagan's aides are calling a compromise (aid restricted to nonmilitary uses) is a shattering defeat. He sought military support for a military movement and lost, utterly. On an issue he characterized—correctly—in the starkest moral and national security terms, his characterization was

disproportionate to his effort. He did not go to the country on television. A great communicator does not deal exclusively in good news (it is time for a tax cut; America is back and standing tall). He also rallies majorities for hard decisions. Reagan has chosen to hoard his political capital—for what? The great battle over Amtrak subsidies?

In 1947 President Truman told Congress: "I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure." Reagan's policy was—the past tense is required—the Truman Doctrine after 38 years of communist advance. An armed Nicaraguan minority, sustained by outside (Soviet, Cuban, East German, etc.) forces, is sovietizing Nicaragua in the way that was being done in Europe in 1947.

The Soviet Union's Sandinista clients have no more right to rule Nicaragua than Vidkun Quisling had to rule Norway. Yet the world continues to speak of Sandinista steps toward Stalinism as "failings." The Sandinistas are not somehow failing to implement democracy; those "failings" are premeditated successes.

FDR spoke of "quarantining" dictators, but an isolationist Congress resisted, until the big war arrived. Now that today's Congress has essentially spurned the contras, communist dictators on four continents will know that Congress will not permit even small inoculations, let alone quarantine.

The sum involved—\$14 million—is 12 percent of the sum (\$117 million) the U.S. government had given to the Sandinista regime by 1981. Familiar voices are saying the usual things: that the United States "drove" the Sandinistas into Soviet clutches. But in their first two years, the Sandinistas received more aid from the United States than from any other country—five times more than the Somoza regime received in its last two years. (Someone should calculate the value in 1985 dollars of the aid France gave the American Revolution. It was, I will wager, much more than \$14 million.)

During the Vietnam war, people eager to believe were encouraged by Hanoi to believe that South Vietnam was experiencing an "indigenous peasant revolt" and that the ferment in Indochina was only cosmetically communist. The Sandinistas deny their American protectors the comfort of that pretense. The Sandinistas do not deign to disguise their Stalinism at home, their "socialist solidarity" with the Soviet Union and its other clients, their "revolution without borders" against neighbors.

In 1947 Congress had fresh memories of the terrible price paid because of nonresistance to Hitler at the time of the remilitarization of the Rhineland. Today the historical memory of many members of Congress consists entirely of Vietnam and its putative lessons. But congressional management of U.S. policy toward Central America—too little aid, too late; pursuit of the chimera of negotiated settlement with a regime that does not believe in splitting differences—is a recipe for another Vietnam; another protracted failure.

Surely the Americans who should talk least about negotiated liberalization of the Sandinista regime are those Americans who, by trying to destroy the contras, are removing the only serious pressure on the Sandinistas.

Nicaragua's communist president, writing in *The New York Times*, says U.S. support for the contras is "contrary to American

values." That is an odd complaint from someone who proclaims his detestation of American values, and it is an ignorant charge, given the long history of U.S. support for resistance to tyranny.

Mikhail Gorbachev hit the ground running—right at Pakistan, threatening reprisals if Pakistan continues to facilitate aid for the Afghan resistance. Now that Congress has spurned the contras, how long will Pakistan resist Soviet pressure? Now that Congress will not countenance support for the contras, the increasingly tiny voice of the United States will have decreased resonance in South Africa, the Philippines and other places where freedom is at issue.

It is said that an optimist is someone who believes his future is uncertain. Optimism about democracy, and not just democracy in Central America, is irrational now that, six months after a landslide reaffirmation of a president, Congress, acting in the name of fastidiousness, has removed the keystone of his foreign policy: support for democratic revolutions.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Virginia has expired.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman for the purpose of a question.

Mr. WOLF. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I wish the gentleman would stop referring to the gentlemen on the other side, because there are Members on his side that are going to be voting against this resolution. Let us try to be bipartisan in approaching this problem.

I would caution the gentleman that the bipartisan alternative is sponsored by Mr. BARNES, Mr. HAMILTON, Mr. JONES, Mr. FISH, Mr. LEACH, and Mr. ZSCHAU.

I think another point the gentleman is making is that there is Sandinista-Soviet-Cuban connection. We know that, and the gentleman should not be repetitive. I think most of the speakers here have conceded that Marxist tie.

The question I want to ask the gentleman, if that is the case and if we agree on our objectives of national security, promotion for the United States and peace in the region, is the \$14 million that even our General Gorman says will not do anything militarily, is that the way we are going to achieve peace?

One of the arguments we heard today in support of U.S. aid to the Contras is that the Nicaraguan regime is antidemocratic and a source of subversion in the hemisphere. Some of my colleagues move from this premise to the conclusion that we ought to be supporting the Nicaraguan insurgents, based in Honduras and Costa Rica, in order to place pressure on the Nicaraguan Government to mend their ways. A more extreme conclusion is drawn by other colleagues that we cannot in any way coexist with the Sandinistas, and that they must in some way be removed from power. If not we will have the Communists in our front yard.

I think there is bipartisan agreement that the Sandinistas have committed human rights violations and continue to consolidate power under a single party. These violations are well documented by private sources, as well as Amnesty International and State Department documents. If there is one oversight that many well-meaning Americans have after visiting Nicaragua, it is that the Sandinistas can do no wrong. Let them read the detailed reports of the forced relocations of the indigenous peoples; the intimidation, the burning of homes, and in some cases executions. But it is wrong, Mr. Speaker, to simply ignore the testimony of constituents in many of our districts as coming from leftists, "little nuns" and "idiots." It is a desperate logic which seeks to reduce an argument by attacking the character of the person holding the argument. Private testimonies have added to reports of gross violations of human rights by the Contra forces. I wonder why some of those who cry out on behalf of democracy in Nicaragua are not as ready to condemn the Contra abuses, as well as human rights violations in Chile, South Africa, and other countries.

If so many Americans are convinced that we should not be funding the Contras, this does not mean our constituents are "little nuns" or gullible "idiots." I reject the tone and nature of such arguments. In fact, many Americans have taken a great interest in this issue. After reflection and observation they have come out against a military solution to a problem we ought to be working out by supporting the Contadora initiatives and resuming bilateral talks with the Nicaraguan Government.

Humanitarian aid sent through two highly respected organizations, the UNHCR and the International Red Cross, will help alleviate some of the suffering of the casualties in this conflict. Some financial support for the Contadora process will demonstrate that we promote Latin American initiatives and solutions to regional conflicts. Meanwhile we can prevent a disaster—funding the escalation of violence, an escalation, Mr. Chairman that could lead to a direct U.S. intervention in Central America.

I do not think any Member would hesitate to support whatever measures are necessary to ensure the national security of the United States. But it is not in our interest to promote the escalation of hostilities prior to exploring all diplomatic alternatives and economic pressures. It is not in our interest to circumvent the Contadora process. The Contra war has not brought Nicaragua closer to pluralism; It has provided an occasion for Nicaragua to dig bomb shelters throughout the country, arm local militias, and militarize the economy. We will not find out

if there is room for a peaceful solution to conflict in this region by supporting a military solution. We do know that just this weekend a limited agreement was reached between the Misurasata Indian organizations and the Nicaraguan Government which holds great promise for a negotiated settlement to the conflicts on the eastern coast of Nicaragua. Let's explore and promote such negotiations and not contribute to their destruction.

Mr. WOLF. Our commanders have not said that.

No. 1, that is not the only way to achieve peace. I think negotiations are very important, but it is an important ingredient of achieving peace. Negotiations without force will be meaningless.

The reason I refer to the gentleman's side of the aisle is I think that is where we have the opportunity for good, decent, and honest people to honestly consider this.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has again expired.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WOLF. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleague for yielding.

I think the statements that have been made by the last several Members on the Democrat side of the aisle have pointed out the biggest flaw in their argument.

The question arises very simply when they talk about political and economic aid and giving ideas to the Contras and giving ideas instead of weapons.

Is there a single time in this century when an American economic or political plan has stood up to Soviet tanks? If you answer that question, then you can predict the success of the so-called alternatives that the gentleman has talked about.

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, I think the gentleman makes a very good point. Negotiations are important, but we need the force with these negotiations and with that force and with this \$14 million, we can bring about peace, freedom and the right of religious freedom and assembly and freedom of speech in Nicaragua. I think that is what we all want. So let us vote for that \$14 million.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to my colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. MARKEY].

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, Nicaragua has two problems, poverty and war. Additional funding to the Contras is not going to help solve either problem.

Last week I went to Nicaragua and took a 6-hour drive north of Managua

up to Jinotega, where the resettlement camps are beginning to be constructed. Hundreds, thousands of people are planned to be herded into these resettlement camps over the next year or two.

As you talk to these villagers, one thing becomes clear. The do not care whether the Sandinistas win or the Contras win. As you go from person to person and ask them, they do not even know who Ronald Reagan is. All they know is that there is a war in their countryside, their God-forsaken countryside, which is ripping their young men out of their homes as the Sandinistas draft them into their army or the Contras come through at night and try to conscript them into their forces. War is ruining these families, dislocating the entire countryside and, in fact, making it impossible for a country, which with Honduras, with the exception of Haiti, is in the worst economic situation in the Western Hemisphere, to keep its people out of poverty.

□ 1510

I have become convinced that the almost guaranteed result of additional war, additional fighting in this region will be that we will antagonize, radicalize, Vietnamize, and ultimately communize this country as we will in any other country that we seek to use military muscle as the basis for solving of problems.

These people want peace and it is clear that the only way that this war continues is by the continued American support for the Contras. Let us get down and admit it, 15,000 Contras cannot overthrow the Government of Nicaragua. It is not going to happen.

Although we would like it to be so, all evidence to the contrary indicates that the longer this war continues, that the more justification this government has for restrictions of freedom of the press and speech and the criminal justice system, and for the importation of Soviet and Cuban advisers. In fact, there has been an escalation of this kind of conduct over the past 4 years almost in direct response to the commitment which we have made to the Contras.

There has been a disproportionate commitment made to their military budget over the last 4 years, almost a direct result of, in fact, their need to beat back any attempts to, in fact, have a military overthrow in their country.

If we were, in fact, serious about bringing peace to this region, we could not have constructed a more systematic undermining of a long-term peaceful solution to the problems of this region. But what we now see is in fact, as General Gorman has stated, an impossibility of a military overthrow and at the same time an exacerbation of the military and militarization of the

society in which we should be seeking to bring a peaceful solution.

Mr. WEBER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MARKEY. Let me finish my opening statement and then I will be glad to yield to the gentleman.

The Sandinistas are no angels. We will stipulate that at the outset.

But funding the covert war in Nicaragua is not going to soften the hard liners inside the Sandinista movement. That war has been going on for years, and it has hardened and radicalized the positions in the region.

I talked to an opposition leader in Honduras last week. He said to me that the United States is using Honduras in an attempt to destabilize Nicaragua. But what may well really happen is that instead of destabilizing Nicaragua we are going to wind up destabilizing Honduras because of the tremendous military buildup inside of the country.

The Reagan administration is trying to prevent another Cuba in Nicaragua. But we are in fact creating another Cuba in Nicaragua by forcing them to become more and more dependent upon Soviet and Cuban aid in order to beat back the Contra attempts to overthrow their Contra war.

Mr. WEBER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MARKEY. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. WEBER. The gentleman has said our policy is going to lead to the communization of the region. That is the gentleman's word, not mine. We have provided a justification for the continuing repression by the Sandinista Government, that our policy is leading to the destabilization of Honduras.

I just want to make sure I understand. Is the gentleman saying that the primary source of problems in Central America is the United States?

Mr. MARKEY. The primary source of the problem in Central America is poverty, injustice, hunger, lack of commitment to the real underlying concerns.

I will reclaim my time. I reclaim my time.

The underlying problems in that region are that. Rather than addressing those problems, we have decided, as we have over the past 5 years in that region, to continue to try to find a military solution to a problem which is ultimately social and economic in cause. And in fact, as a result, exacerbating a problem which could have been alleviated if in fact we had tried to build an umbilical cord of economic and social relationships between our country and the Contadora countries, and a small poverty stricken country which cannot in any manner, shape or form expect the Soviet Union, 5,000

miles away, to serve as their long-term economic relief.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 8½ minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. RITTER].

Mr. RITTER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask my colleagues on the other side of the aisle whether they realize that the position they are taking on this issue flies in the face of Democratic leadership from FDR to Harry Truman to Hubert Humphrey to John F. Kennedy to Henry Jackson to Zbigniew Brzezinski.

I would like to go back to statements John F. Kennedy made at the time of the Cuban crisis in 1961. He states:

... it is clear that the forces of communism are not to be underestimated, in Cuba or anywhere else in the world. The advantages of a police state—its use of mass terror and arrests to prevent the spread of free dissent—cannot be overlooked by those who expect the fall of every fanatic tyrant. If the self discipline of the free cannot match the iron discipline of the mailed fist—in economic, political, scientific, and all the other kinds of struggles as well as the military—then the peril to freedom will continue to rise.

Does not that same statement apply today?

He went on to say:

The evidence is clear and the hour is late. We and our Latin friends will have to face the fact that we cannot postpone any longer the real issue of survival of freedom in this hemisphere itself. On that issue, unlike some others, there can be no middle ground.

In 1947 another Democrat, President Harry Truman, told the Congress:

I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free people who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.

Yes, the dictatorship in Nicaragua is controlled by an armed minority that involves a few Nicaraguans at the top, thousands of Soviet and Cuban advisers, and a litany of what Jeane Kirkpatrick, up until recently, I might add, a well-known Democrat, calls the Soviet International Fighting Force.

Michael Novak, another Democrat, in a recent letter to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. HYDE] closes by saying:

That is why I urge you and your colleagues to proceed with the most clear eyed realism. To my mind, it is indispensable that the power of the democratic forces seeking a democratic, non-Marxist Nicaragua be kept as strong as possible. Indeed, they should be encouraged to grow as powerful as the people of Nicaragua desire.

The false test is to wait to see how far the Sandinistas, unchecked, will go. The proper test is to see how strong the revolution against Sandinismo can grow. The latter is the proper course for those whose priority is liberty. Our own Revolution in the U.S. could not have been successful without outside assistance from France, Poland, and elsewhere. One should always bet on liberty.

I would like to quote some recent remarks from the last debate we had on this very issue by another well-known figure in the Democratic Party, the

majority leader, who aspires to be Speaker of the House. On the situation in Nicaragua he stated:

There is no question that the Sandinistas have very nearly completed a transition to a police state in Nicaragua. They have installed in each city residential block an informer whose official responsibility is to report to the government whenever there are meetings of as many as four or five people gathering in any home—reminiscent of Hitler's Nazi Germany.

On the threat that Nicaragua poses to its neighbors the distinguished gentleman from Texas [Mr. WRIGHT] went on to say:

I do not think there is any question that they pose a threat to their neighbors, not only to those neighbors into whose territory they have sent armed guerrillas. Also that threat is felt in Costa Rica and Panama.

... in Costa Rica they have tried to create general strikes. They have been unsuccessful because of the popularity of the Costa Rican democracy and the Costa Rican leaders. Nevertheless, such attempts are being made.

On Central American hesitation for publicly closer relations with the United States, the words of the gentleman from Texas [Mr. WRIGHT] are telling. "One national leader ... whose identity will evoke real credibility with you, said a very revealing thing to me in private, in answer to a question. He said the reason leaders in Latin America are loathe to cozy up very closely in public to the United States and publicly to endorse our policies is because of our habit, he said, of abandoning those who have been our best friends." I repeat, "... abandoning those who have been our best friends."

□ 1520

Zbigniew Brzezinski says, in a recent newspaper article:

These policies are logical extensions of those the Carter administration was beginning to adopt in its last few months in office. They include plans for social and economic development and aid for the anti-Sandinista resistance as well as pressure on Managua for pluralism and democratic reform.

Another democrat with a small "d" respected here in the Congress, Jose Napoleon Duarte, said about the President's initiative: In a recent letter to President Reagan:

Your initiative and approach have my complete support and I strongly urge all of the friends of Central America in your Congress to give it their full backing. It is the right step at the right time in our quest for peace and democracy in this region.

While House democratic leadership seeks to pull the rug out from under our assistance to democratic forces in Nicaragua, Fidel Castro continues his support for armed insurrection in Central and South America. According to a recent article in the Washington Times, Roger Fontaine stated that "Fidel Castro's top intelligence operation officer recently made clear that

Cuba would continue its aid to Salvadoran Marxist guerrillas and other insurgent forces in Latin America."

Thus, under pressure from democratic leadership, the United States curtails its support, pulls the rug out from the democrats, small "d", fighting in Nicaragua while Castro goes on supporting so-called revolution.

Certainly this is not the democratic leadership of FDR, Truman, Kennedy, and Humphrey. Recently there has been a nationwide debate over the future of the Democratic Party. Mr. ASPIN, the distinguished chairman of the Armed Services Committee of this House, said that "Democrats need to cease to be naysayers on defense issues."

Arizona Governor Babbitt talked recently about Democrats shifting toward the center. The issue of aiding democratic resistance in Central America is a major test of the Democrats' actions not just words in their effort to shift back into the center. This issue will have a chilling effect if the House democratic leadership has its way; it will have a chilling effect on the more conservative and moderate democratic efforts to move their party back into the center.

Mr. ADDABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 30 seconds. I will tell the gentleman who just left the well that the Democrats do remember the Gulf of Tonkin resolution and that is why we oppose the resolution before us, House Joint Resolution 239. This joint resolution approves military assistance only and has nothing to do with humanitarian assistance. We should not supply arms to the Contras and encourage armed conflict in the area.

Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Colorado [Mrs. SCHROEDER].

Mrs. SCHROEDER. First of all, Mr. Chairman, I am putting in the RECORD the letter that all of us were sent by over half of America's living Nobel laureates urging this body to turn down the aid to the Contras. I think it is a very, very important letter; it is one of the most elite and distinguished and intelligent groups this country has produced. I certainly hope that everybody reads it. I know you all have copies in your office.

I also hope the people look at the bipartisan alternative which I think is the way that we should be going. We should be trying much harder to go back to our tradition of a bipartisan foreign policy.

Now what can be said here that is new? I'm trying to respond to the debate rather than just give a standard speech.

What I have heard from Members over and over again is they keep citing Democrats and keep saying today's Democrats have not learned from them.

Well, let me tell you, I think these Members have their history wrong. We Democrats did learn something. We learned something under Kennedy, and because we Americans tend to be so poor in history let me refresh your memory.

Under Kennedy we had two things that went on in Latin America. One happened to be very successful and one happened to be an absolute disaster. We only tend to remember the disaster.

The disaster was the Bay of Pigs. The Bay of Pigs was analogous to what we are being asked to do in Nicaragua by funding the Contras. Because the Bay of Pigs policy failed, Cuba has been a real thorn in the side of the hemisphere ever since.

Where was the success? Maybe I am a dinosaur, but I remember when I was in college in the early 1960's people were afraid that the Castro-type revolution was going to be exported all over Latin America. Remember the people that we saw in our news magazines in the 1960's that we were all taught to be very fearful of, and rightfully so. They were Che Guevarra and others of that type who had been trained by Castro and were actively working in Latin America trying very hard to overturn governments.

Colombia happened to be one of the countries they wanted the worst. La Violencia was the guerrilla group working in that country and was doing an absolutely excellent job of trying to subvert the Government. I remember this and I remember this very well because I was in law school with many students from Colombia. One of the days that sticks in my mind the most was going over for breakfast one morning and one of my friends, a Colombia student was reading a letter from home saying "I don't think I can go back home." The reason was the letter was from a friend of his in the Department of Agriculture in Colombia.

La Violencia had approached him and asking him to do certain illegal things and the friend had rightfully said, "No." Nevertheless, the guerrillas had their own way of handling it. They had kidnapped the man's young daughter, 5 years old, cut off both her hands and when he went to work the next morning she was sitting outside his office with a note pinned to her saying, "Next time you will do what we say, La Violencia."

The guerrillas were a real force in Latin America in the 1960's. They had taken over the taxicabs in many of the urban cores, which was a very effective strategy; and there were many, very many dangerous things going on. In the 1960's there was concern in America, for those of you who have forgotten, that all of Latin America could have gone the way Cuba went. Instead, Kennedy, to his credit,

learned something from his Bay of Pigs policy and approached the rest of Latin America differently. He formed the Alliance for Progress and he sent the Peace Corps into Colombia and Latin America, not the Marines.

By changing the approach, Kennedy turned the situation around. The United States beat the guerrillas by building roads, by building schools, by educating people, by teaching people to form cooperatives, by teaching people how to get coffee beans to market and on and on and on.

I think what is going on in Central America today is terribly analogous to Latin America in the 1960's. Please, let us look at the historical precedent we tend to forget, but the one that worked. If you look at what is going on in Central America today you find poverty, poverty, poverty, poverty; you find a long history and really no experience with democratic traditions. We tend to call them banana republics up here. I must say that I have toured Central America. I have not seen anything that looks like a republic except for maybe Costa Rica. They are not republics as we know them north of the Rio Grande.

Let us look at the root causes, let us look at the poverty, let us look at the history, let us not do the wrong thing and let us look at what our Nobel laureates are pleading with us to do and vote "no" on this resolution.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Washington [Mr. MILLER].

Mr. MILLER of Washington. Mr. Chairman, I believe the resolution before Congress demands that we know what the issue is, and what the issue is not.

It is not whether some rebels fighting the Communist regime in Managua have committed some atrocities. I am sure that, as with every guerrilla war, some atrocities have been committed on both sides—and I deplore and condemn them. But, that is not the issue.

Nor is the issue whether to send American combat troops. Nobody here is suggesting that. Giving arms is not sending American combat troops.

Nor is the issue whether we can afford the \$14 million. For a nation that spends many times that on one missile, that certainly is not the issue.

Then, what is the issue?

I believe, Mr. Chairman, the issue is simply this: In a contest between a Communist regime and forces that seek a more democratic form of government will we choose to support the Communist regime, stay neutral, or support the democratic resistance?

On the one side is a regime led by avowed Marxist-Leninists. This regime promised fair and open elections; yet junta member Bayardo Arce himself admits that the elections were a propaganda ploy and that the Communist

Sandinistas had no intention of handing over power to their opponents. This regime promised political pluralism; yet the Army, the militia, and the police are the private property of the ruling political party. This regime promised to remain nonaligned; yet in addition to inviting some 10,000 Cuban, East German, Bulgarian, and Soviet advisers to help run things, the Communist Sandinistas receive some \$300 million per year in aid from the Soviet bloc, aid which they have used to arm the largest and best-equipped army in Central America.

To what sort of a Nicaragua do the Communist Sandinistas aspire? They have sought to disrupt and to intimidate independent labor unions and to replace them with such party-controlled unions as exist in the Soviet Union—run by Communist stooges. They have set up a nationwide network of neighborhood defense committees modeled after the Orwellian spy system of their Cuban mentors. They have so restricted the freedom of the press that today the one independent newspaper must submit its stories to a censor. They have used the resources of the state to advance the interests of their favored side in a controversy within the Catholic Church. Finally, they have categorically refused to engage in any negotiations toward national reconciliation.

On the other side of this choice are the groups which espouse democratic ideals and economic opportunity. These groups are led by individuals who for the most part helped to lead the democratic opposition to the Somoza regime—and without whose cooperation Somoza would never have been overthrown. Many of these individuals were prominent in the government of National Reconstruction—until the Communist Sandinistas stages a de facto coup d'etat.

Mr. Chairman, in this struggle between these two sides we cannot just remain above it all and sprinkle food and medicine on both sides or sprinkle our dollars around among other neutral mediating countries.

We must choose. In this contest between those who seek Communist rule and those who aspire to democracy and economic opportunity, we must choose the latter.

This issue and choice, Mr. Chairman, will not go away. The struggle in Nicaragua will go on. And so will the struggle for democracy in other places. The United States must always take the side of those who share our ideals. That does not mean that we need to send American troops or that those who we help will be perfect. But, I believe it does mean that we should help those who are trying to help themselves.

If we do not choose we must answer the question posed to me by the leader

of one of the Nicaraguan democratic resistance groups, the famous Commander Zero, Eden Patora: "Why is it," he asked me, "that when I fight Somoza I am a hero in the United States, but when I fight the Communists, nobody cares?"

□ 1530

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. LEVINE].

Mr. LEVINE of California. Mr. Chairman, we are here today to debate the question of whether or not to authorize funds to support the Nicaraguan Contras. What is at stake here, however, is not merely the immediate question of whether or not the U.S. Government should allocate a certain amount of money for a particular purpose. What is at stake is something more important. That is: What is the direction of U.S. Central America policy to be? Will it be to go down the path of greater and greater dependence on military power in an attempt to force a solution to the conflicts in the region? Or will we reject that path, as well we should, and give peace and diplomacy a chance?

Mr. Chairman, on April 3, President Reagan, as required by the 1985 continuing resolution, submitted to Congress a report requesting release of \$14 million for military operations in Nicaragua. At the same time this request was submitted, the President announced a so-called peace plan, which proposed a cease-fire between the Contras and the Nicaraguan Government, and church-sponsored negotiations between the two parties. Under the President's plan, the \$14 million in U.S. aid for the Contras could only be used for "humanitarian" purposes, such as buying food and medicine, for 60 days. If the Sandinista government of Nicaragua was not negotiating with the Contras at the end of 60 days, the U.S. funds could be used for military purposes.

The President's plan has been characterized as an apple with razors, and that is indeed what it is. This proposal offers much to the Contras, but little real measures to obtain peace. If the Sandinistas do not accept this plan, then the United States could resume military aid to the Contras. If they do accept it but don't reach agreement with the Contras within 60 days, then the Contras can refuse to prolong the negotiations, and the United States would be able to resume military aid to them. Under the guise of offering an olive branch, President Reagan is clearly attempting to legitimize military aid to the Contras. This amounts to an effort on the part of the Reagan administration to obtain congressional approval indirectly for what Congress has indicated three times it would not approve directly, for even if the \$14 million were used for humanitarian

purposes, this U.S. contribution would free up other Contra funds for military purposes.

Around this time last year—on April 12, 1984, to be exact—this body was debating a resolution expressing the sense of Congress that no appropriated funds shall be used for the purpose of mining the ports or territorial waters of Nicaragua. That vote was important because it was thought that how Congress voted would determine whether we chose blindly to accompany the Reagan administration down its path to war in Central America, or whether we chose to put the brakes on a dangerous and misguided policy. The resolution carried overwhelmingly.

During debate in the other body last April on providing military assistance to the Contras in Nicaragua, it was repeatedly assured that the Contras were not engaged in efforts to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government. The other body was repeatedly told that the Contras were not conducting a war to destroy the economic infrastructure of that country. President Reagan himself sent a letter to the other body assuring it that the United States did not seek to destabilize or overthrow the Government of Nicaragua; nor to impose or compel any particular form of government there."

Yet, last April, two disturbing reports appeared in the newspapers about possible future administration action regarding Central America. On April 8, 1984, the New York Times ran a story, "U.S. Said to Draw Latin Troops Plan." The lead sentence said:

Senior officials in the Reagan administration say that contingency plans are being drawn for the possible use of U.S. combat troops in Central America if the current strategy for defeating leftist forces in the region fails.

And on April 10, 1984, a Washington Post headline read, "CIA Views Mining Part of Covert 'Holding Action'." The first line read:

The CIA views its involvement in the laying of mines in ports off Nicaragua as part of a holding action until its covert war against that country's leftist Sandinista government can be stepped up if President Reagan wins reelection, according to senior administration officials.

The contents of these stories were repudiated in an April 10, 1984, White House statement. But what are we to believe with respect to White House policy on Central America? President Reagan himself has described the Contras, who are armed insurgents who seek to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government, as "freedom fighters" and the "moral equivalent of our Founding Fathers." He has characterized Nicaragua as a "totalitarian dungeon" where a "Communist reign of terror prevails," and has all but called for the overthrow of the Sandinista government. In order to help the Contras achieve that goal, some 2,000 copies of a manual, "Psychological Op-

erations in Guerrilla Warfare," was prepared and distributed by the CIA to the Contras. Among other things, the manual instructs on the "selective use of violence" and, among other things, explains how "to neutralize carefully selected and planned targets."

Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman many violations of human rights by the Contras have surfaced. While some Contra leaders have undoubtedly behaved properly, respected human rights groups have chronicled a terribly disturbing pattern of attacks on civilian targets resulting in the killing of unarmed men, women, children, and the elderly; premeditated acts of brutality including rape, beatings, mutilation, and torture; kidnapping of civilians; assaults on economic and social targets, intimidation of civilians; and kidnapping, intimidation, and even murder of religious leaders who support the government.

Two attorneys of a fact-finding delegation wrote:

To the extent that it is reasonably foreseeable that—the Contras—will continue to engage in such acts, any provision of aid to the Contras, directly or indirectly, by the Government of the United States would render our Government responsible for their act.

Mr. Chairman, there is much to criticize about the Sandinista regime. To put it mildly, it has proven to be a great disappointment to those of us who were willing to give it a fair chance. Its abuses include restrictions on religion, speech, press, and assembly; the establishment of special courts outside the regular judiciary system that politicizes the administration of justice; the mistreatment of prisoners; incommunicado detention; the failure to acknowledge arrests leading to the disappearance of some of those arrested; and the horrible mistreatment of its Indian minority. But giving \$14 million to the Contras will do nothing to bring about needed reforms by the government in power. In fact, such a military threat will have the opposite effect, will entrench them further, and will drive the Sandinistas into more and more dependency on Cuba and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Chairman, the path of the Reagan administration's Central America policy is littered with the debris of a misguided endeavor. At the heart of this flawed policy is the administration's failure to understand the underlying causes of the problems and conflicts in the region and to pursue a peaceful resolution of them. Surely there is no responsible Member of this body, indeed no responsible American citizen, who wants to see Communist dictatorships in Central America, or anywhere else for that matter. We all want democracies in that region.

Yet, Mr. Chairman, perhaps one of the greatest tragedies of this President's policy is that in the name of a rigid anticommunism, this President has perhaps become Fidel Castro's and the Soviet Union's best ally in Latin America. In trying to forcefully wrench the Nicaraguan Government from the grips of Marxist-Leninist ideology, he appears to be driving them right into the arms of those who espouse that very ideology. This is a tragedy, for no democratic country or citizen in the Western Hemisphere has benefited from this misguided effort.

A mechanism exists, however, for a peaceful resolution of the conflicts, but it is one that has been undermined by the Reagan administration. It is the Contadora process. The Contadora nations—Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela—have long been seeking a basis for peaceful settlement of the fighting in Nicaragua and elsewhere in Central America. How little interest this administration has in the Contadora process is evidenced by the fact that they did not even consult with the Contadora group before announcement of the proposal we are debating today.

A bipartisan alternative to the President's proposal, the Hamilton-Barnes substitute, will be voted on tomorrow. Based upon progress being made toward peace and democracy, it continues in effect the prohibition on funding for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua without regard to fiscal year until Congress enacts a joint resolution repealing that prohibition. It does, however, provide \$4 million for expenses arising from the implementation of a Contadora agreement, such as expenses for peacekeeping, verification, and monitoring systems.

In addition, \$10 million is provided for humanitarian assistance for refugees who are outside of Nicaragua, regardless of whether they are associated with the Contras. This assistance may be provided only through the International Committee of the Red Cross or the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees upon the determination of such organization that the assistance is necessary for humanitarian purposes, and may not be provided for provisioning combat units. It also provides that the President must report to Congress every 3 months on the progress made in achieving the objectives of the resolution and on any expenditure of funds under the resolution.

Mr. Chairman, I support this compromise because its goal is peace, arrived at peacefully through the 21 Contadora principles. It provides for a congressional role in determining whether progress is made toward peace and democracy in Nicaragua, and explicitly states that that determi-

nation will be made within the context of a regional settlement.

It is reassuring to me that the \$10 million in humanitarian aid would be provided only through the International Committee of the Red Cross or the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. These are organizations with established reputations, and there is reasonable assurance that this money would be used for humanitarian aid and nothing else.

Mr. Chairman, the Reagan administration's Central America policy is based on increasing militarization and force. Make no mistake about it: It is up to this body to stop this dangerous drift into direct military involvement in the region, for that is indeed where this administration is leading us. In response to the question of what is the direction of U.S. Central America policy to be, we must state clearly and strongly that it is in the direction of searching for a peaceful settlement to the conflicts and problems in the region. It is the only rational policy to endorse. Any other is fraught with danger for this country and this hemisphere.

Mr. Chairman, our President has become fond of quoting President Franklin D. Roosevelt. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, one of the greatest and most authentic freedom fighters of this century, put it this way: "More than an end to war, we want an end to the beginnings of all wars." Rejecting the President's proposal on Central America, on the Nicaraguan Contras, will help achieve that goal on this vital issue.

□ 1540

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Speaker, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. GALLO].

Mr. GALLO. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, I had the opportunity just 2 short weeks ago to visit—along with a colleague of mine, DAN BURTON from Indiana—Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. I would like to just focus in on Nicaragua itself, because I think El Salvador, although it has some problems, it has democracy and a foundation for democracy that is moving in the right direction.

On the other hand, when coming into Nicaragua, I must admit I had some preconceived feelings in support of the President's peace proposal. I had one question in my mind as to whether or not the moneys we were talking about would have any impact on the Nicaraguan. I wanted to find out whether or not a lot of the innuendos I have heard and a lot of things published in the press were things of fact or fiction.

Let me say to you that there is no democracy in Nicaragua and certainly there is no peace. We had the opportunity to meet with the private press, La

Presia, finding from the editor and also the owner that they have been closed down some 36 times as a result of censorship. What were some of those things that were being censored? The New York Times editorial in favor of the President's peace proposal. The editorial of the Washington Times in favor of the peace proposal.

What else was censored? The President's peace plan. And also censored was the Speaker's objections to that peace plan. What was very obvious to me and Congressman BURTON is that they did not want the people of Nicaragua to know anything about a peace proposal. That is one of the first things I was confronted with: A lack of freedom of the press.

I went to a radio station that has been in existence 26 years. A non-denominational radio station, religious in nature, having priests and pastors give sermons and also religious information. To find that they are in fact after that sermon is put on tape, to find that they have to be transcribed and given to the government for approval, again shows the censorship and the lack of sensitivity to those original concepts that many people fought for in that revolution.

So there is no question in my mind that there is no freedom of expression and there is no freedom of religion. We had an opportunity to talk with a civil rights organization independent of the government; independent of any government, they have five areas or five offices in Nicaragua. They have received over 100 complaints a month dealing with atrocities by the Sandinista government.

The question was asked by Congressman BURTON: How many have been registered by the freedom fighters or against the freedom fighters? Eight. He clarified that: Is it eight a month? No; it was eight since 1982.

We talk about free enterprise. We had an opportunity to talk to a cotton grower, a coffee grower, a bottling company, and also Texaco refinery. We said, "Is there free enterprise there?" We have heard it. He said let me tell you what free enterprise means to the Communists. One, they tell me who I hire. They tell me how much to pay; they tell me what I grow; they tell me who I sell it to; and they tell me how much. That went right down the wire, every single one of those.

We had one opportunity to talk to an official of the Nicaraguan Sandinista government. Asked if he was a Communist, he said, "What is a Communist? What is in a name? A Communist, a socialist, a capitalist?" We went down every one of those violations I just mentioned and he admitted every single one of them, and he blamed it on the war.

This bill is very important. It is going to send the right message to the right people. It deserves your support.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK. I thank the very able chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee for the excellent work he is doing here and on other measures.

Mr. Chairman, we ought to be clear that we are not simply talking about messages here. We are talking about killing people. We are talking about appropriation today American tax dollars to help people kill each other in Nicaragua. Sadly, there are times in this world when it is necessary for us to do that. We are not pacifists here, very many of us, and we cannot afford to be.

We ought to be very reluctant to commit our tax dollars to situations in which we subsidize people to kill each other. There has been a lot of talk about atrocities, and people on the left have talked about the atrocities of the Contras and people on the right have talked about the atrocities of the Sandinistas. I am inclined to believe that both sides are guilty of them, because when men go to war, they do not just kill each other; they inevitably, with the best will in the world, with modern weapons, will kill innocents. In some cases, the best will in the world is not there and I think that is true on both sides here.

We are not talking now about whether we like the Sandinistas or not. Since when was it a rule that if we decline to spend American tax dollars to finance civil war in a country that meant we were supporters of the country. That meant that we somehow endorsed their form of government.

Let us point out again that this administration is about the best friend in the world today of the racist government of South Africa. I would like to change that policy, but I do not know anyone in this House who is advocating that we take \$40 or \$50 million, the equivalent of the 14 with this population, and finance armed revolt in South Africa. Let us not present that there is any great sense in this House that because of an absence of democracy in Nicaragua we are so outraged that we will finance for that reason an attack on it. Not when we have in the White House and the State Department and the Defense Department South Africa's best friends. A government far more repressive in the treatment of the overwhelming black majority than the Nicaraguans have ever been.

Let us not present that the Chilean Government, which is more repressive and less involved in civil liberties, is going to see us finance an attack. The issue is not whether or not we are trying to force a democracy; that has not been a major goal with this admin-

istration, and if it was, it is not by force of arms. I do not think people want seriously to advocate that America becomes the international 911 of the Civil Liberties Union. They are censoring a newspaper, which they are and which I regret and which I criticize; send down an American hit squad. They indicted an archbishop in South Africa, are we going to send out another American hit squad? We only have a right to commit American tax dollars to subsidize warfare when our national security is at risk.

I do not believe that the world's greatest superpower is threatened by this poor and disorganized and badly governed country. There has been in this House a consensus from 1981 on, if they are threatening their neighbors, funds could easily be voted for interdiction. There is no dispute; if Nicaragua were to threaten Costa Rica, I think there would be overwhelming support in this House on both sides to say we will step in and prevent that.

□ 1550

But we are being told that it is simply that we cannot tolerate the presence of this Marxist-Leninist regime. The President is, of course justly proud of the great relations he has forged with the People's Republic of China, and I think they are making some strides there, but let us not confuse Deng Xiaoping with the head of the Chamber of Commerce. Let us not lull ourselves into thinking that somehow the mainland Chinese have abandoned Marxism-Leninism because we have chosen for strategic reasons to be their friends.

We are being asked to subsidize warfare, the killing of people, with American tax dollars, because why? The only argument could be that they threaten our security. I do believe that Nicaragua under certain circumstances could be a threat to its neighbors and I regret that they have, unfortunately, been willing to act as a threat in some ways, although exacerbated somewhat by us.

It is a little hard to be making war on people and then criticize them for having a big armed service. We do not, in my judgment, face that kind of threat. We do not face the kind of threat to our security that justifies this kind of revolution.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FRANK. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I would submit to the gentleman that the Killing Fields that occurred in Cambodia was a direct result of the U.S. Government, particularly the Congress, taking the stance that the gentleman has advocated just now and that is to say there

is no direct threat to the United States and, therefore, we are not going to get involved in a civil dispute.

Would the gentleman say in retrospect that we should not have helped the resistance against the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia?

Mr. FRANK. I would say to the gentleman I was not in Congress right then, that by our involvement in Southeast Asia and in bringing the war into Cambodia when it had not been, we contributed more to the killing. The analogy simply fails.

If we vote for this \$14 million, and this is just the down payment on hundreds of millions more to come in this administration, the cost, by the way, if you believe the only justification for making war down there, which is what you are asking us to do, when you send people down to shoot other people, that is called war, and let us not kid people.

The CHAIRMAN. The time to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK] has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK].

Mr. FRANK. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this additional time.

Mr. Chairman, if we really believe that our security is at stake, then we have to believe the plan the Reagan administration has been talking about of sending down American troops, because no one thinks the Contras can win. No one thinks at this level they are going to win.

So I would say to the gentleman that I think there were mistakes made in Southeast Asia, but a greater mistake will be made today in terms of what we can control if we continue to subsidize war and killing. The notion, the fig leaf, that we are concerned because of the lack of democracy, yes, I am very critical of the lack of democracy in Nicaragua, but I am more critical—

Mr. HUNTER. Is the gentleman telling me that the killing of 3 million people in Southeast Asia was right?

Mr. FRANK. I have not yielded, and I would ask for regular order, Mr. Chairman. I do remember the last time I asked my friend to yield, and he did not.

I have to say that it seems to me not quite legitimate, intellectually or morally, for people who have been as supportive of South Africa and the Philippines and Chile and South Korea to claim that they have democracy as a justification for killing in this instance.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER].

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me, and I thank him particularly for yielding so

I can respond to my friend from Massachusetts.

Mr. Chairman, let me just say that I think U.S. policy with regard to interference in other countries has been basically a policy of abandonment. In fact, we encouraged the freedom fighters in Cuba. We abandoned them in the Bay of Pigs. We encouraged the resistance in Cambodia. We abandoned them.

I do not think any gentleman, even the gentleman from Massachusetts, would contend in retrospect that allowing the genocide to take place, the Killing Fields that took place because of America abandoning the resistance in Cambodia, reflected an appropriate action by the U.S. Congress.

Mr. FRANK. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNTER. I will yield to the gentleman when I finish. I will give the gentleman a chance to comment or ask a question.

We encouraged our friends in South Vietnam, and we abandoned them. So I would contend that what is being advocated today is really a policy of abandonment, and let me just say to my friends who have naively said what we really need are ideas, we need economic approaches, we need political approaches.

There is nobody in the world who would contend that when Golda Meir was in trouble, when it looked like Israel was possibly headed for destruction, that instead of C5 aircraft that had M-60's that rolled out of those C5's to save Israel, we should have somehow sent a program of ideas and an economic campaign. Most Members of this House would have said that is baloney, and I can tell you today that nobody can cite a case in which an American campaign of ideas or an American economic campaign has stood up to Soviet tanks.

I will make one fast statement and yield to my friend.

It is a fact, regardless of how you construe the Contras or the Sandinistas, that in fact they are building military establishments that can be used by Soviet aircraft. In Grenada, the President showed a picture of a field that was being built, and he said this thing is going to be used by Cuban and Soviet aircraft. A great many Members said that is baloney, the President is hyping this thing again.

When we captured the 26,000 pounds of documents in Grenada, we got a document of a central committee meeting, a secret central committee meeting in which the recorder of the meeting said it has been decided the airfield will be used by the Cuban and Soviet military, and I think that is a pretty close quote.

Let us face it. No matter how you figure the Contras, no matter how you figure the Sandinistas, you have to concur and presume, everybody, liber-

als and conservatives, the Soviets are going to use the military equipment they are making this huge, multimillion-dollar investment in. We are giving them, whether you like the Sandinistas or not, or whether you think they are going to become more liberal or not, we are giving the Soviet Union military bases in Central America. If you can accept that, then that should be your argument that it is not worth it to go in and try to do something about it. If you cannot accept it, then we should do something about it, but let us not kid ourselves about campaigns of ideas overcoming Soviet tanks.

Mr. Chairman, I yield to my friend from Massachusetts.

Mr. FRANK. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I did not talk about campaigns of ideas and it would not seem to me a useful one at this particular time. My point is, and I appreciate that the gentleman from California is not pretending that democracy internally has anything to do with it, I appreciate his honesty. What he is saying is that we should be afraid because there will be some Soviet weaponry in Nicaragua. The Soviets have had Cuba as an ally for 25 years. That has caused some problems in Africa and I regret the way they have governed, but they have not threatened directly the security of the United States and no one that I know of is suggesting that if the Nicaraguan Government begins to threaten its neighbors that we ought to stay our hand, but that is not the policy the gentleman is defending.

The Reagan policy is four points, and one of them he says is until they agree to have free speech and free elections, we are going to make war on them. If the gentleman wants to talk simply in strategic terms, let us get a policy that deals with it and talk about it. That is not the policy. We are not being asked to send \$14 million as a downpayment on hundreds of millions more, to have more killing, simply because of bases. The inevitable part of the policy as they advocate it is to include this facade of democracy.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. HUNTER] has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding this additional time to me.

Mr. Chairman, let me just answer my friend that I remember a few years ago people were saying Cuba poses no threat to the United States and we can always do something if the Soviet Union puts weapons in Cuba. They did put weapons in Cuba. It was called the Cuban missile crisis, and the world was brought to the brink of nuclear war.

So the idea that somehow we can hold on and watch these massive air-bases going into Nicaragua, and somehow we can say that is OK, if they bring Blackjack bombers in, if they bring Backfires in, if they bring missiles in, then we can do something about it, is to pay very little attention to the lesson that was taught to the Kennedy administration in 1962.

Mr. MARKEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HUNTER. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MARKEY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Just for the record, in 1962 President Kennedy, in an agreement with the Cuban Government, got a concession that would agree that there would be no offensive missiles, no offensive weapons that would be based in Cuba.

Mr. HUNTER. I take my time back.

Mr. MARKEY. For the past 23 years there have been no offensive weapons in Cuba.

Mr. HUNTER. Would the gentleman say that that was a dangerous time for America?

Mr. MARKEY. And without question, it was resolved on the part of both parties.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. TORRES].

Mr. TORRES. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I would like today to associate myself with those colleagues who have stood here in the well and opposed this resolution. I do not do this lightly, but I do it because I have studied and experienced the situation not just in a period of 4 weeks or 4 days or a month, but I have been a student of Central America and I have been a worker and I have traveled the hemisphere for over 30 years looking at the situation as a trade unionist, as a diplomat, as a Member of Congress.

I believe the President's policy for Central America is an incorrect one. I believe his policy for Nicaragua is an incorrect one. It is flawed because I believe that our foreign policy for Central America is one at this time that advocates a military solution to what should be a diplomatic solution, one that we could resolve by simple diplomatic means, as I just heard my two colleagues before me articulate as to how President Kennedy was able to get the Soviet Union to keep its missiles away from Cuba, and for 22 years we have seen that situation prevail.

Last April I had the occasion to travel to South America, and Central America, visiting the major Contadora countries of that region, Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and Panama, and I was encouraged by the statements by the chiefs of state of those nations in the kind of work they were trying to

bring about for peace in the region through the Contadora process.

□ 1600

But each and every time they expressed to me the frustration they experienced at each step of peaceful conclusions that our foreign policy seemed to thwart those efforts.

Subsequent, to my trip to the Contadora nations, I did travel to Nicaragua in the company of congressional colleagues. We did meet with the opposition parties in Nicaragua. We met with trade unionists, we met with the *Prensa* newspaper, we met with Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats, and we listened to their grievances and problems that they said they were beset with under the Sandinista regime. We took those grievances and we took those complaints directly to Commandante Ortega, and we questioned him, and we said in no soft terms—we did not mince any words—we said, "Is it true you are doing this and that? Are you oppressing the people? Are you oppressing the press? Are you preventing trade unionists from carrying out their democratic prerogatives?"

To some of those queries he gave us some acceptable answers. Some answers were that the very Contras that they are opposing, as we have heard today, were former members of the Somozista government, that now that they were outside of office, now that they were on the outside, they wanted to impose their will upon the Nicaraguan people, and since this was a revolution, the revolutionary government was not going to let them come back in and take over where they left off.

Ortega was also concerned about our own actions, our own mining of Nicaraguan harbors, our own overhead reconnaissance flights, our own instructional manual for assassination attempts, and they were concerned about those very Contras he talked about, those representatives from the former terrorist regime.

Mr. WEBER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TORRES. I will yield when I have finished my statement.

They were concerned with the kind of killing these people were perpetrating upon the peaceful people of Nicaragua, the peasants, the coffee growers, the businessmen. And yes, I think that all of us in this Chamber are dismayed by the kind of violence that prevails on both sides. It is a plague on both Houses. But I am dismayed to know that, as my colleague pointed out earlier, this Government, our House of Representatives, would perpetuate that violence through this resolution by killing with taxpayer dollars the people of Nicaragua.

Look at today's copy of this news journal "Newsweek" and see for yourself the kind of violence that Ameri-

can taxpayers dollars now perpetuate in Nicaragua. We should be dismayed by this kind of dispicable situation. It is true that I do not agree and my colleagues do not agree with all aspects of the Sandinista regime, but military intervention is not the answer.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. TORRES] has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. TORRES].

Mr. TORRES. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this extra time.

Mr. Chairman, I implore upon my colleagues here today, after having heard the debate on both sides, that we must choose a direction that does not—does not, I repeat—move us in the direction of killing more of these people. As my colleague, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK], has just stated, we are perpetrating killing in this hemisphere, and I believe it is wrong.

Mr. Chairman, I believe the only solution to deal with this problem is to accept and adopt the Barnes-Hamilton substitute language that will be before us tomorrow.

Mrs. BURTON of California. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TORRES. I yield to my colleague, the gentlewoman from California.

Mrs. BURTON of California. Mr. Chairman, I really am very impressed with the gentleman's statement, and I know he is a statesman and a diplomat and knows the language. He has been to those places, and I want to join him in his statement. I say to the gentleman, you are very profound.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. TORRES] has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from New York [Mr. TOWNS].

Mr. TOWNS. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say that I agree with the gentleman from California [Mr. TORRES] that we need to make certain that no additional money goes for this purpose, recognizing the fact that the United States should not be involved in intervening in the internal affairs of another country. I think on that note alone that we should vote this down.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today in opposition to House Resolution 239, which would provide \$14 million in military assistance to the Contra forces fighting against the government and people of Nicaragua.

The administration's war against Nicaragua has become the centerpiece of its Central America policy. The administration's cavalier attitude toward legal restrictions which should govern its actions toward Nicaragua exemplifies its approach to the law with re-

spect to Central America in general. Support for the Contras, whose aim is to undermine and potentially overthrow the Nicaraguan Government, violates both international law and treaties. Moreover, one must ask how we can fund an armed insurgency against a country with whom we have diplomatic relations?

Too little has been said about the terrorist activities of the Contras. There are well-documented reports of kidnappings, torture, and rape of both Nicaraguan citizens and foreigners in the Atlantic coast area. The brutality of the Contras is described in two recent reports "Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in Nicaragua 1981-85," by Americas Watch, and "What We Have Seen and Heard: The Effect of Contra Attacks Against Nicaragua" by the witness for peace project. Both reports indicate that human rights abuses by the Nicaraguan Government are far less severe than actions by the Contras. As the witness for peace project indicates "to equate the Contras to our Founding Fathers as President Reagan has done, does violence both to our history and to the reality being lived by the Nicaraguan people; while some discontent with the Sandinista Government does exist, the methods used by the Contras only convince the people that the Contras are carrying on the brutal tradition of Somoza's former national guard. The United States is pouring millions of dollars into a group that will never become a viable democratic alternative to the Sandinistas."

I urge my colleagues to reject this \$14 million appropriation which will only lead to more killings and suffering for the Nicaraguan people. We would all do well to remember the words of John Quincy Adams on July 4th in 1821, when he said:

The true American goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. . . . (America) well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself, beyond the power of extrication, in all wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition. She might become the dictatress of the world: She would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. COURTER].

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COURTER. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I thank my friend for yielding.

I was over in my office and heard some of the spirited debate, and I just want to comment on what I can only characterize as hypocrisy in talking about our making war, subsidizing war in Nicaragua.

At least three times this House has voted and the Democrats overwhelmingly have defeated our effort to have the funding of the Contras on a reciprocal basis. If the Nicaraguan Sandinistas would stop exporting revolution to El Salvador, we would stop funding the Contras. And they voted no. They said, no, they would not accept that as a basis for the funding. So obviously the fact that they are exporting revolution does not bother them.

Then I heard praise for the settlement by President Kennedy in Cuba, saying that negotiation is the way to go. There was a naval blockage as I recall. Let me say that Cuba has 2,800 Soviet combat troops over there, 2,800 Soviet military advisers, 2,100 Soviet technicians at their Lourdes electronic intelligence facility, 950-plus tanks, 250 Mig-21's and 23's, and 3 submarines. That is some solution.

Now, if you look at Punta Huete, the airfield that has just been built in Nicaragua, that is not for Piper Cubs or tourism; that is for long-distance reconnaissance planes, and the Soviets fly those up the east coast out of Cuba, and now they can fly them up the west coast out of Nicaragua.

So it is very serious, but some Members just do not take communism and the penetration in our hemisphere seriously enough. I do not know what it takes to get them awake.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for his observation.

I would like to ask the gentleman a question, too. Perhaps he can answer it for me.

It was mentioned during the debate that this was a United States war in Nicaragua. It seems to me that the Contras were not created by the United States, but they were in fact created by the totalitarian Sandinistas in Nicaragua. They abandoned the revolution. It was hijacked in 1979. They said they were for pluralism, they said they were for democracy, and they said they were for free speech and freedom of the press, and, therefore, because of their subjugation of their own people, they created the Contra movement; is that correct?

Mr. HYDE. Well, of course. They have definitely followed a time schedule.

We were sending them money as fast as we could, and they were in Cuba consolidating the guerrilla groups in El Salvador. We wanted to send our Peace Corps down, our lovely, dew-eyed, pink-cheeked Peace Corps, to help those people. They did not want the Peace Corps. They wanted Cuban technicians in there, and Bulgarians, East Germans, and PLO. Then they started building the biggest military machine in Central America while we were still here dumfounded and sending them the money. That is what

happened. The revolution was betrayed.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman very much, and he is absolutely correct.

As well as the Cubans and East Germans and Bulgarians and, as the gentleman mentioned, the PLO, the Soviets are sending about 7,000 barrels of oil a day to Nicaragua. And the Libyans are sending materials. In fact, the Libyans are the greatest supplier of war materiel at the present time in Nicaragua.

Very often we can tell a country's plans and which direction they are headed and what their policy is going to be not only by what they say, not only by the policies they adopt and what they do, but by who their friends are. We look at Iran that is helping Nicaragua, we look at the Communist-bloc countries and their involvement there, and we see the fact that Mu'ammarr Qadhafi is sending aircraft to Nicaragua. He has sent about \$140 million of military aid. He has sent surface-to-air missiles, SA-7's, and he has sent a large variety of helicopters. That is Mu'ammarr Qadhafi. For those people who forget, he is the gentleman who runs Libya and does not believe that the Israelis have a right to exist.

The PLO is now involved in Nicaragua, for those people who forget about the PLO, we cannot forget Yasser Arafat. He is the person who specializes in affirmative action in the marketplace of Israel.

□ 1610

You can go on and talk in terms of the East Germans. They are there as well. So you can tell what is happening to a country not only by what they say, not only by what they do, but also who are their friends, who they associate with.

I, too, was in Central America, in Nicaragua.

I remember talking to an individual who owned a shop. He had a daughter that was about 7 years of age, 6 or 7 years of age, I am not sure.

And he said, "Congressman, do you realize what is going on in the educational system in Nicaragua?"

And I said, "Well, I'm not positive." He said, "Let me show you."

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New Jersey has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield an additional 5 minutes to the gentleman.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

He gave me a textbook that his daughter was using in grammar school. I looked at it and thumbed through the pages. I happened to Xerox a couple of the pages from the textbook and I would like to hold both of them up for you for your perusal and edification. One, as you can see,

this little goody here, this is what they are teaching young Nicaraguan students, young boys and girls, that is how you add in the totalitarian Communist Marxist Leninist Nicaragua. Two plus two machineguns plus two hand grenades is six. Three hand grenades plus three hand grenades, that equals six. Two times three, that equals six as far as hand grenades is concerned. Also the same thing with regard to submachineguns and people in uniform.

Everybody should recognize precisely what is happening in Nicaragua today. It is a Communist regime that is gathering its momentum, that is consolidating, that is, in fact, if not today will be a security threat to this country.

I also want to mention the fact that in the other body there was some testimony earlier this week, it has not really been mentioned during the debate we have had so far on Nicaragua. The testimony is very interesting by Commissioner of Customs of the United States before the Senate Subcommittee on Children, Family and Drugs, by William Von Robb. William Von Robb says the following:

Tomas Borge—Tomas Borge is the Interior Minister in Nicaragua—reportedly allows Colombia drug traffickers to use Corn Island as a trans-shipment point for drugs bound for the United States and he was arranging Cuban assistance for this operation.

The testimony goes on, and I will just conclude here by saying on page 9 of his testimony:

United States Customs Service recently concluded an investigation which in my opinion proves the involvement of certain Sandinista officials in narcotics trafficking.

Also the testimony of John Keeney, and we did not have the opportunity to listen to his testimony on the House side. He indicates the fact that during his investigation on international drug smuggling, the investigation dealt with the large variety of transactions, none of which really caused undue attention. They were rather routine, according to him.

"The exception will, I believe" he said, "be of interest to you." He was testifying to the other body.

This transaction involved an apparent attempt by representatives of the government of Nicaragua, with the assistance of Robert Vesco, "we all know Robert Vesco," to establish a cocaine distribution network which would operate both in Europe and the United States; but the evidence gathered during this investigation suggests that during 1983 the Nicaraguan government personnel attempted to make all the arrangements necessary to establish Nicaragua as a major cocaine exporter in the world.

I will conclude by citing toward the end of his statement:

During the course of the investigation of these events, a great deal of evidence has been amassed which confirms the involve-

ment of Nicaraguans in cocaine trafficking in the world.

That is another instance, another idea, another glimpse as to what is happening.

Now, the reason they are involved in cocaine trafficking is not the fact that they particularly enjoy cocaine. It is the fact that they are getting hard currency in order to support their revolution. They are willing to have Americans, to have Europeans, to have Central Americans, fall into the evil influence of narcotics in order to support their revolution.

Everybody knows that our Declaration of Independence talks about "inalienable rights." They are rights that cannot be given away. They cannot be taken away because they are given by God. They are for everybody. To deny those rights to those people who are seeking freedom in Central America really is to deny our own Constitution.

Freedom in Nicaragua is really our freedom. You cannot look around the world and say, we have freedom and you do not. It is too bad. There is mutuality and universality in freedom. If we fail in Nicaragua, where are we going to possibly succeed? If freedom is not worth defending in Nicaragua, where is it going to be worth defending?

Our friends and our enemies are waiting for that answer.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentlewoman from Connecticut [Mrs. KENNELLY].

Mrs. KENNELLY. Mr. Chairman, I am adamantly opposed to the President's request for \$14 million in aid to the Contras.

If one picture, Mr. Chairman, is worth a thousand words, then the four pictures that appeared in Newsweek magazine yesterday are worth hours of our days' debate. In these graphic photographs, we see a prisoner forced to dig his own grave. We see the expression on his face as his throat is cut. Then we watch as he is casually buried deep in the jungle. This is what we are talking about today, Mr. Chairman.

There is no excuse any longer for the bland persistence in comparing these executioners to the Founding Fathers, but we have to admit there is also no excuse whatsoever for offering American military aid to them. Our support would further legitimize the Contras. It would justify the citizens of Nicaragua in believing that their well-being and their very lives are of no concern to the Government of the United States, and it would ease the task of the Sandinistas of rallying popular support against a brutal foe backed by a government.

I believe that our real interest in Central America, and I think a lot of us believe that, is the development of a democratic government; but all the money and all the power of the United

States will not let a democracy grow in the scorched soil of a battlefield. Military aid to the Contras is in the worst interests of the United States and I urge my colleagues to oppose it. It is another step down the trail that will end in a war of our own military forces. American can do better, Mr. Chairman, and I believe we can.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DYMALLY].

Mr. DYMALLY. Mr. Chairman, as a Representative of a democratic nation, I must deplore the moral bankruptcy of a policy that demands the terrorizing of a civilian population in the name of freedom and anticommunism. Indeed, the President of the United States is not asking me, a member of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, to support the good intentions of an anti-Communist cause. He is not asking me to support a lasting plan for peace in Central America. He is not even asking me to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the ruling regime in Nicaragua. Instead, he is requesting that I support a policy which calls for the violent overthrow of a government with which we are at peace. As one who believes that with power also comes responsibility, and as someone who believes that the administration has not leveled with us about the strength of its anti-Communist commitment in the Western Hemisphere, I must oppose Mr. Reagan's plan to assist the Nicaraguan Contras.

"Freedom fighters" is the term President Reagan uses to describe the CIA-funded Contra forces fighting in Nicaragua. Referring to them as "our brothers," the President recently said that financial aid to the Contras "is totally consistent with our Nation's history." With this unique interpretation of U.S. history, he continues to urge the American people to fund, equip, and train these fighters. These are the same men who focus on human targets, seeking out doctors, teachers, and agriculture workers for torture and assassination; the same men who focus on economic targets, even when military targets are present in an area, the same men who kidnap and brutalize peasant workers. And perhaps, more significantly to U.S. foreign policymakers, these are the same men whom Adm. Stansfield Turner, former CIA director, admits can never win a war.

The long-term political liabilities of supporting and encouraging these terrorists sadden me. Without question, the Sandinistas have committed their fair share of crimes against humanity. I am equally as saddened over the prospects of Managua exporting its revolution to peaceful neighbors. Nevertheless, I believe that our Government has certain alternatives to the Contras approach. Let us encourage

the Contadora peace process, while at the same time pursue every avenue of peaceful negotiation with Managua. We owe it to ourselves, and to the people of the region, to stimulate a truly peaceful resolution of the Central American problem.

If we are to embark on a dramatic anti-Communist crusade, let us assault the Soviet Union or China. The administration has exaggerated the alleged threat of Nicaragua to the United States, noting the existence of mythical arsenals of incredible destructive power. Let us reason and negotiate again. The end result can be only hemispheric cooperation, and an adherence to our own democratic principles of nonintervention and fair play.

□ 1620

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I now yield 17 minutes to the esteemed chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON].

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution (H.J. Res. 239), a joint resolution to approve the obligation of funds available under Public Law 98-473 for supporting military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.

The issue before Congress is not whether we like the Sandinista government. Most of us have serious problems with that government and its policies. The question before us is: How can we best achieve our common goals of peace, internal reconciliation in Nicaragua, and democracy in the region.

I oppose House Joint Resolution 239 for several reasons:

1. THIS POLICY SHOULD BE REJECTED BECAUSE THERE ARE BETTER ALTERNATIVES TO ACHIEVE OUR OBJECTIVES WHICH SHOULD BE PURSUED FIRST BEFORE ANY RESORT TO THE APPLICATION OF MILITARY FORCE

The President's statement of the problem we confront in Nicaragua is to either fund the Contras or accept an expansive communism in Central America. He suggests that those of us who oppose the funds for the Contras really favor the spread of communism. May I respectfully suggest that the question that divides us is not whether to oppose communism in that area, but how best to do it.

Let me try to state the elements of a better alternative.

In brief, I believe we can move toward a negotiated solution which will protect the American national interest through the application of a vigorous, consistent, and tough diplomacy, conducted with the advice and support of our friends in the area, and backed up by a willingness to apply maximum economic pressure. If Nicaragua tries to destabilize the region, our strategy should include political, diplomatic, and economic sanctions,

which should be used before military options, such as covert actions, are used.

First, the United States clearly does have legitimate security interests in Nicaragua. These interests include:

Prohibition of Soviet bases; reduction, if not the elimination, of Cuban and Soviet influence; removal of foreign troops; and cessation of efforts to promote revolution.

Second, if the threat is as great as the President says, let us deal with it openly and straightforwardly—not by a nonsecret, secret war, or an overt-covert war.

Third, I favor a tough diplomacy. We should act to put international law on our side. We should take our evidence and our case to the OAS, to the Contadora nations, and to the UN.

Our diplomacy should make clear that we can live with a Sandinista government that stops threatening U.S. national interests and moves toward an open political system.

Our diplomacy and our policy should reflect our values and traditions. Mining harbors, rejecting the jurisdiction of the World Court, preparing manuals which suggest approval of assassination, and financing others to fight to protect our national security interests is not the preferred way for the United States to act.

Our diplomacy must recognize the centrality of a regional effort.

Regional security mechanisms, regional organizations, and other Latin American states can be mobilized to bring heavy pressure on the Managua government. Legal, overt containment of Nicaragua is possible with the support of the states in the region through the Contadora process and the OAS.

The Sandinista government took a more flexible stand in 1983, when it agreed to multilateral negotiations through the Contadora process. The pressure to do so was not from the Contras but from Mexico and Cuba. Castro urged the Sandinistas not to become isolated, and that the refusal to negotiate multilaterally was isolating them from the region. Hence, their change in position;

The U.S. commitment to resist communism in Central America must be consistent with the goals of other countries in the region. Those states support the Contadora process, and do not support military intervention in Nicaragua. If the United States does not support and give high priority to the Contadora process, the United States is jeopardizing the single process most likely to bring peace to the region and to form a bulwark against Communist infiltration;

Today the United States is the single largest trading partner with Nicaragua. We buy almost 20 percent of their total exports.

Fourth, I favor an aggressive use of U.S. economic power.

Our policy in the region will be strengthened as we give high priority

not to fighting a war, but to strengthening the economic and political development of the nations of the area;

Our ability to resist communism in the region will hinge not on covert activity, but on our ability and the ability of governments in the region to address the basic problems of social and economic development and participation in the political process;

If regional pressures fail, the United States has several economic and diplomatic measures available to it to isolate Nicaragua, should this prove necessary. We should be prepared to cut trade and investment to Nicaragua and to employ economic sanctions, and to urge our allies to do the same.

These measures include:

Denying Nicaragua World Bank, IMF, and private bank loans. Nicaragua's substantial arrearages can help us get allied cooperation in this regard;

Stopping Nicaraguan airlines from flying to the United States;

Denying visas to Nicaraguan citizens;

Imposing a partial or full economic embargo on trade with Nicaragua in conjunction with our allies;

Breaking diplomatic relations with Nicaragua; and

Strengthening the military and intelligence capabilities of the states in the region.

We all know that there are tough non-military steps we could take against Nicaragua that have not been taken.

Fifth, I do not reject the military option.

If diplomatic, political and economic pressures on the Sandinista government do not work, United States, as opposed to Contra, military action is likely to have a far greater impact on the Sandinista government.

I do not support such military action at this time, but I remember that the Sandinistas were and are deeply concerned, even panicky, about U.S. intervention. If a demonstration of strength is needed, military maneuvers and U.S. seapower are likely to have more of an impact than the covert war.

I recognize that the military option in defense of U.S. interests is sometimes required. I do not claim the United States should never use that option. I say at this point in time we should try harder to resolve the conflicts in the area through political, diplomatic, and economic means. If those means fail, and if the Government of Nicaragua threatens U.S. national interests in the area and it becomes necessary to exercise the military option, let us do so openly, and not ask someone else to fight our battles for us.

2. THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSAL PUTS US ON THE PATH TOWARD MILITARY INTERVENTION

The President has elevated the struggle to change the Sandinista government through military force to one of the highest priorities of his administration. On February 21, President Reagan said that it was U.S. policy to seek to remove the Sandinista government unless it changed its goals and present structure and allowed the Contras into the government. He said "You can say we're trying to oust the Sandinistas by what we're saying."

On April 15, he said "to do nothing in Central America is to give the first Communist stronghold on the North American continent a green light to spread its poison through this free and increasingly democratic hemisphere."

The Secretary of State does not equivocate: Nicaragua is now behind the Iron Curtain.

But, General Paul Gorman, the retiring Commander of the U.S. Southern Command—and a supporter of aid to the Contras—stated in February 1985, that a Contra overthrow of the Sandinista government was not "feasible in the near future" even with U.S. financial assistance, and that such military pressure would take years to produce results. The CIA has consistently arrived at this same conclusion.

So, the President now wants to overthrow the Sandinistas; his top military commander says that the Contras cannot do it. The question, then, is how do you achieve the President's objective.

The President says Nicaragua is vital to U.S. interests and the Sandinistas are a threat to the United States. The U.S. military and the CIA say that what we are now doing will not succeed. The President insists on the removal of the Sandinista government. Clearly, the Sandinistas will not accept that they step aside. With that condition there really is no chance for diplomacy to work.

Thus, the conclusion follows that greater application of U.S. military force is the next option. A close examination of the President's own report confirms this.

The \$14 million in the President's request is as a down payment on deeper U.S. military involvement. As reported in the press, the President anticipates the deployment of from 20,000 to 25,000 Contras in the north and 5,000 to 10,000 Contras in the south of Nicaragua—a total of 35,000 Contras. This new commitment is to enlarge the Contras to a force over twice its present size.

As reported in the press, the President's own report then states: "Direct application of U.S. military force . . . must realistically be recognized as an eventual option, given our stakes in the region, if other policy alternatives fail."

Make no mistake, the \$14 million request is the next step on the slippery slope to further major U.S. intervention in Nicaragua.

3. THIS PROPOSAL REQUESTS MONEY FOR OBJECTIVES THAT ARE NOT CLEAR

Throughout the long involvement of the CIA in Nicaragua, we have seen tactics in search of an objective.

The United States simply has not been able to decide what it wants from the Sandinistas;

Since 1981, various purposes have been advanced for the covert action against Nicaragua;

First, the United States sought to interdict the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador;

Then, to force Nicaragua to turn inward;

Then, to bring Nicaragua to the negotiating table;

Then, to bring pluralism and free elections to Nicaragua;

Then, to oust the Sandinistas.

Today, U.S. policy statements on Nicaragua, especially those by the President, no longer emphasize the external conduct of Nicaragua but the removal of the Sandinistas. The President says we do not advocate the overthrow of the Sandinistas if they "would turn around and *** say uncle." That phraseology is surely tantamount to requiring their removal.

But what does overthrow mean, and how do we propose to achieve this?

The administration wants to use the Contras to apply pressure on the Sandinistas, but that is a tactic—not an objective, not a policy.

Until recently, you could take your choice of administration policy.

Secretary Shultz wrote on February 6 that we do "not seek to destabilize or overthrow the Government of Nicaragua; nor to impose or compel any particular form of government there."

Fred Ikle, the Under Secretary of Defense, has said that our goal is military victory.

On April 15, the President said that "We will do everything we can to win this great struggle."

At the very least, these differing statements by the President and other administration officials suggest a lack of precision in defining U.S. policy goals, confusion about those objectives and a failure to articulate a clear policy objective.

4. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL CONTINUES TO ALLOW THE CIA TO MANAGE THE WAR IN NICARAGUA—AND THE CLEAR RECORD OF THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS IS THAT THE CIA CANNOT CONTROL THIS OPERATION WITH PRECISION

The most spectacular and objectionable CIA excesses of the recent past include:

The mining of Nicaragua's harbors; Air and maritime attacks on Nicaraguan ports and other installations; and

The publication of the CIA manual, which clearly sought an objective that the administration rejected.

The CIA and the United States have become tarred with Contra atrocities and other Contra human rights violations. These acts of misconduct are probably no better and no worse than the conduct of the Sandinistas. The difference is that the U.S. is financing the Contras.

Since we depend on the Contras to carry out our policies, we must also answer for their actions. Their objective to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua has not, throughout most of this operation, been our objective. In recent weeks the President has adopted their objective. The Contras have dictated American policy, at least as much as the United States has dictated their policy.

The United States has always supported the Contadora process, but this weekend Commander Bermudez said "We don't have to respect any Contadora process."

The President now proposes that the CIA have less control over the Contras than in the past. The CIA's role would be to provide money, arms, and intelligence to the Contras, but not involve itself in day-to-day operations, planning, or oversight. The result of the President's proposal will be even greater identification of the United States with Contra activities, but less U.S. control over them.

5. THIS PROPOSAL MAKES IT MORE DIFFICULT TO OBTAIN REGIONAL SUPPORT FOR UNITED STATES POLICIES AND FOR INITIATIVES TO BRING PEACE TO THE REGION

It is inconsistent for the United States both to support the Contadora process and to seek military support for the Contras. Support for the Contras flagrantly violates one of the Contadora's principles that seeks to guarantee "that the territory of one state is not used to conduct acts of aggression against the territory of another state." U.S. policy should make unmistakably clear its support of the Contadora process. Our friends in the area do not support U.S. military intervention in the area, whether direct or through surrogates;

President Betancur of Colombia reinforced this on April 16 when he said that he and other Latin American leaders: "Firmly believe that any foreign support to guerrilla groups, whatever the origin, is clearly in opposition to the prevailing doctrine in Latin America regarding foreign intervention in the internal affairs of our continent."

He also said of the President's plan that tying negotiations to aid for the rebels made it "no longer a peace proposal, but a preparation for war."

U.S. financial assistance to the Contras is a violation of U.S. treaty obligations under article 18 of the OAS Charter, which provides as follows: "No state or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the in-

ternal or external affairs of any other State."

We should note the impact of any decision at this moment to increase military involvement. The Contadora peace negotiations for Central America are close to reaching full agreement, according to President Betancur and others. The United States should, without equivocation, support those negotiations. When we support renewed funding of the Contras for covert war, we undercut the Contadora process;

Because of its efforts to promote the covert war, the United States has also not been consistent in its support for negotiations with Nicaragua. Direct negotiations with Nicaragua should precede any resort to the military option. As the last few years would indicate, the two cannot be dovetailed successfully.

6. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL CONTINUES A CIA POLICY WHICH HAS NOT WORKED

The Contras are simply not in a position to achieve the goals the United States seeks in Nicaragua. They cannot defeat the Sandinista forces.

The Contras have never been able to seize and hold territory in Nicaragua. They operate only in the mountains. They have never developed urban support. They haven't even been able to sustain operations in Nicaragua without supply from the outside. They depend heavily on their sanctuaries in Honduras and Costa Rica, without which they could not continue their fight.

They have never fared well in direct confrontation with Sandinista units of appreciable size.

Three years of U.S. support and \$80 million in U.S. funding has not produced an insurgency capable of sustaining itself among the population of Nicaragua.

7. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL CONTINUES A COUNTERPRODUCTIVE POLICY. THERE ARE BETTER WAYS TO CONTAIN COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA INSTEAD OF THE COVERT WAR

The covert activity has provided the Sandinistas with a convenient external threat which they have used to justify a host of repressive measures against opposition parties, the press, the church, and the people of Nicaragua. They have used this external threat to justify a military buildup, an unpopular draft, and large scale reliance on Cuban, Soviet, and other Eastern block military allies;

The Sandinista government will have no incentive to moderate its position or its behavior internally or externally as long as a covert action continues which seeks its overthrow. No government willingly submits to such military pressure from a foreign source. The covert action only encourages more extreme positions by the Sandinistas;

Attempts by the United States to renew funding for paramilitary operations against the Sandinista government are undermining the consensus that is developing in this country and in this Congress over our policy toward Central America;

The successful ability of the U.S. Government to deny its involvement in covert operations has always been a criterion for their success. We can no longer deny our involvement in the Contra war. The United States has suffered from the propaganda burden of this covert war in Latin America generally, and in Europe and throughout the Third World. A willingness to defend U.S. legitimate national security interests by military actions is not displayed by this war, just as it was not displayed by the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. Ineffective and counterproductive military action is interpreted throughout the world as a sign of weakness, not of strength.

8. THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL CONTINUES A POLICY WHICH AMERICAN PEOPLE DO NOT SUPPORT

By a margin of 70 to 18 percent, Americans oppose the policy of U.S. involvement in attempts to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. This poll is based on a February 1985 Washington Post-ABC news poll and shows a higher level of opposition to the Contra war than recorded in any of the three previous surveys conducted over the last 18 months;

This poll reflects the deep fears of the American people that current policies are leading to U.S. intervention;

There is a growing consensus in the United States in favor of increased levels of economic and security assistance for friendly and democratic states in Central America at the same time there is growing opposition to the Contra war. U.S. policy should not let the Contra war dominate the U.S. agenda in the region. Rather, it should build on the important emerging consensus;

9. CONCLUSIONS

Mr. Chairman, we, as a nation, are surely capable of arriving at a policy toward this small, desperately poor Central American country, and addressing the threat that it represents to us, and our friends, without military intervention.

In my view, we have not tried as hard as we could to use other than military means to achieve regional peace and security.

The fundamental question is whether the United States can rise to the challenge of leading the countries of Central America toward peace and development. We cannot do that by promoting war.

We cannot expect to impose democracy by force. There is a better way to deal with our problems in Nicaragua than by fighting this nasty little war. We cannot make peace by making war;

we cannot preserve peace by destroying it.

I urge you to oppose further military aid to the Contras.

□ 1640

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Florida [Mr. Mica].

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, I take this opportunity with a great deal of personal concern over the direction of our Nation and what history will record our actions to be in these coming moments with regard to Nicaragua. Being from Florida and being raised in a situation where I saw firsthand a situation develop in Cuba that has come to be most difficult, one of the most if not the most difficult situations we deal with on a day-to-day basis in this hemisphere, having gone to high school with young men who went home to fight in Cuba, in that ill-fated Bay of Pigs mission, and have them come back and tell me the reports of what was going on in their country, and seeing the results, I cannot help but urge my colleagues to take a new look at this entire situation and, based on this thought: We Democrats should remember that it was a combined committee of Democrats and Republicans that approved covert aid in Nicaragua, and we approved it at a preliminary level and we approved it at a secondary level and we approved it at a tertiary level. Only until that level got to a point where there was concern did we recall and say maybe we should reconsider. But why did we do it? Why? Because there was a major change, not just in this administration but in the previous administration, in what the Sandinistas were doing and what the tenets of their original revolution were.

Ortega had said publicly,

Costa Rica will be the jewel for our plucking, once we are in place.

Before this administration, as I recall, even came to power, the statement was made around the world that,

We, Nicaragua, will build the largest standing army ever to be seen in this Hemisphere outside of the United States.

These were concerns of Democrats and Republicans. These were concerns of Americans.

Now we do differ, and I do have concerns with some of the actions of the Contras and the politics that go back and forth, but I think we ought to understand that, had we not expressed some sensitivity, where would we be even today? Would there be any willingness on the part of Nicaragua to enter into minor agreements like they did today? Would there be any actions of reciprocity or willingness to deal with the Contadora group?

Recall that I sponsored the Mica amendment 3 years ago on this floor that lost by one vote that said, "Let's all stop, let's all stop at once," and our

side, my side, did not agree with that approach at that time, that maybe we should not do anything.

There were 21 original tenets, and we agree with those—freedom of religion, freedom of the press, a pluralistic system for business, all of these tenets published around the world in documents in colleges and universities and in their own revolution that they would adhere to if they took over. And these were the concerns that Democrats and Republicans addressed when they said yes, we need to do something to swing that Sandinista revolution a little more back to its original cause. But not only did they not move back toward their original cause, not only have they not proceeded as quickly as we had hoped, they simply turned their backs and said that that was not the case at all.

Now, let me just say I did not intend to speak in this debate, because I spent many hours in the last debate last year. But I was reading last night a book that I bought secondhand that deals with the legislative history on diplomacy in the United States. It is an interesting book that kind of ends in the 1970's but goes back to the beginnings of this Nation and takes every major crisis that this country has faced and traces diplomatically what the Congress did to address it. And I flipped through, very late last night, the period 1935 to 1939. Believe me, my colleagues, when I tell you so much of what we are saying here today is so appropriate and so equal to what was said in that period: "Let's not get involved, the problem will go away." Our colleagues were talking about nonintervention policies, policies that in essence would look the other way, but the problem did not go away.

I know time is limited on this debate, but let me just say this: I am personally convinced that, regardless of your party affiliation, if we walk away in any major sense from this today, we will face the problem as Americans very directly very soon. First it will be Floridians and Texans and Californians, but eventually it will be all Americans and probably the outrage that we hear now with regard to this will be an outrage that we should have done something years ago.

So I say we may have to look for other approaches, support the Contadora group, but we do not walk away and leave Nicaraguans who are trying to change the destiny in their own country for surely what will be a situation that will draw us into have to send American personnel, which I oppose.

I would support this action and ask that we think about how we got here, how the Democrats and the Republicans on these committees in the House and the Senate originally agreed that

we should indeed take some actions to stop what is going on with the Sandinista regime.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. WOLPE].

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 239 and in support of the alternative resolution introduced by Mr. BARNES and Mr. HAMILTON. I also want to associate myself with the remarks made a few moments ago by the gentleman from Indiana, the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee.

Let me say at the outset that I am more alarmed with our Central American policies and the divisive impact the debate on this policy is having in our country than I have been with any other issue since the Vietnam war. For those who deride and disregard any comparison between our country's involvement in Southeast Asia and current events in Central America, I ask that you look again. Look at the thousands of American citizens who participated in the march for peace over the weekend, the hundreds who were arrested in front of the White House protesting our Nation's actions in Central America, and all the people who stayed to visit with Members yesterday and share their sense of foreboding and distress at the direction of U.S. policy in the region. Does this not look a bit familiar?

Consider the rhetorical excesses we hear from our President, the distortions and the deceptions, the phony white papers, the same inclination to rely on military solutions when negotiated solutions can be the only lasting answer, the same inability to comprehend the indigenous causes of revolution and to respect the potency of nationalism as an independent political force, the same efforts to blame the critics rather than the flawed policy they criticize.

Very frankly, I have a keen sense of *deja vu*. I see an all-too-familiar pattern emerging, and I fear we are about to make the same mistakes we made in Vietnam. The fact is that there are important lessons to be learned from our experience in that war. While I do not blame those who would like to put Vietnam entirely behind us and close our consideration of that experience in the current debate, I think we need to recognize that there is absolute truth in the statement that those who refuse to learn from history are doomed to repeat it.

We learned in Vietnam that momentum can build behind a policy, no matter how misguided or flawed that policy may be. Mistakes and misjudgments become compounded as policymakers feel compelled to justify and rationalize their original decisions on the grounds of ever-changing objectives. The logic of any means justifying the ends yields a constant escalation

of rhetoric and growing reliance on fabrication to support these falling policies.

My concern about the administration's Central American policy is not with its goals. None of us wants to see the countries of Central America become bases for the projection of Soviet or Cuban military power in our hemisphere. What is at issue, however, is the means by which the President is trying to achieve those goals.

□ 1650

It is perhaps the ultimate irony that this administration's policy which it designed and defends on the grounds that it is preventing the spread of communism in the region, is having precisely the opposite effect. We need to recognize that often what we perceive as strength is viewed by others as beligerence, and we thereby play directly into the hands of Soviet and Cuban propagandists.

I ask my colleagues to consider the disturbing pattern of deception and blatant disregard for congressional intent this administration has displayed in pursuing its agenda in Central America. I am sure that most Members will remember the Washington Post exposé of the fabrications contained in the first white paper released by Secretary of State Alexander Haig 4 years ago, purporting to link the unrest and violence in Central America exclusively to Cuban and Soviet activities in the region. This was followed by the shock of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees who thought that they had authorized a small effort to assist roughly 500 Contras in the interdiction of arms flowing from Nicaragua to El Salvador, and then discovered that the CIA had actually undertaken a far more massive effort to arm and support a combat force in excess of 12,000. Then Members of Congress had to uncover through onsite inspection what our military has undertaken in Honduras, and found to their surprise that the United States had engaged in the development of a permanent military presence in that country. Then came the series of alarming revelations concerning CIA operations including the mining of Nicaraguan harbors—an act so overtly illegal and indefensible that the administration refused to accept the jurisdiction of the World Court when Nicaragua took its complaint to that respected body.

Have we forgotten the horrifying CIA manual, a manual offering explicit instructions for "neutralizing" Sandinista officials and "creating martyrs" for this Contra cause? In the past few weeks we have seen the President fabricating support for his most recent proposal, suggesting, at least by implication, that Latin American statesmen and even the Pope are backing military aid to the Contras. I am

sure that all of us read the communication from the Vatican clarifying the Pope's position on this issue, and the pointed observation of the President of Colombia, Mr. Betancur, that the President's proposal is "no longer a peace plan, but a preparation for war." Mr. Betancur went on to state, "I have not spoken with any Latin American leader who feels differently."

Mr. Chairman, this deception must end. The American people understand that the decisions that have been made by the President in formulating and pursuing his policy in Central America do violence to American principles and traditions, undermine American interests worldwide by alienating our closest friends and allies, and are directly counterproductive in terms of our goals within Central America. Moreover, there is a growing fear within the Congress and throughout the Nation that what we are witnessing is a very dangerous escalation of America's military involvement in Central America and an inexorable march toward war.

What is really startling is how little of our own history we comprehend. Our current intervention in Central America is not without precedent. Few Americans are fully cognizant of that history, but the fact is we have militarily intervened on several occasions in Nicaragua, in Guatemala, and elsewhere in the region.

Tragically, in each of these cases the net result of our intervention produced neither lasting peace nor greater democracy, but only served to align us with those seeking to maintain an unjust and repressive status quo. In fact, our intervention has usually made the situation worse, providing the Soviets and their allies the opportunity to turn the region's revolutionary ferment toward their own purposes. If instead of seeking to maintain the status quo in these countries, we were to use our power to channel the revolutionary aspirations of Latin Americans toward the democratic goals that we espouse, our long-term interests would be far better served.

It is very troubling in this debate that there seems to be a tendency for each side to portray the other in stark terms—all good or all evil. Would we not be better served by open acknowledgment of the imperfections of all sides in the Nicaraguan conflict? One can be totally opposed to the current American efforts to oust the Sandinista government without condoning all that the Sandinistas have done. The fact of the matter is that the Sandinistas have yet to fulfill the democratic promise that was at the core of their revolution. Press freedoms continue to be violated. There are clearly inhibitions placed on political expression. However, this does not mean that American support for the Contras

makes sense or is any way justified. It does mean that nothing whatever is gained when Sandinista excesses are excused away or when we turn a blind eye to abuses of civil liberties in that country.

Likewise, while there are clearly a number of individuals aligned with the Contra forces who have joined or are supporting those efforts because of democratic motives and their sense of betrayal by the Sandinistas, it is a travesty to characterize all of the Contras, as has the President, as valiant patriots akin to the Founding Fathers of our great Nation. That is an insult to our own heritage and a gross misrepresentation that none of us should tolerate.

The fact is that the vast majority of those in command of the Contra military forces are former members of Somoza's despised National Guard. Estimates indicate that some 46 of the 48 positions in the Contra military command structure are in fact held by former Guardsmen. Are these the moral and visionary men President Reagan equates with our George Washington and Thomas Jefferson?

It is widely acknowledged that many others in the Contra forces are there as mercenaries, or soldiers of fortune, lured by the promise of CIA funds. Are we really to believe that the President would place these men alongside the likes of James Madison?

Mr. Chairman, let each of us cast our vote today to say no more deception, no more distortions, no more lies.

In Central America, as around the world, we must begin to understand that when we assume that people are unable to make their own political choices, we reduce them to mere pawns in our struggle with the Soviet Union and create the very distance and alienation we seek to prevent. We do ourselves and these countries a great disservice when we underestimate the power of nationalism and the desire for independence from all outside domination and interference. This failure in our foreign policy has created disaster time and time again in our history.

There is a better way. We must begin today to recognize that if we are to prevent the spread of communism in this region, then we must demonstrate by concrete actions our respect for national sovereignty, and our superior ability to help solve the region's economic, political, and social problems within a democratic framework. For these are political, not military problems and they require political, not military solutions.

In the end, America's greatest strength is our own revolutionary heritage, and our proud tradition of support for the right of all people to be free and self-determining. It is time for America to reclaim its heritage by ending for once and for all our mili-

tary intervention in Central America. I urge my colleagues to oppose this effort to release an additional \$14 million for the Contras and support instead a redirection of our policy in Central America that will make use of the significant economic and political power at our disposal, and will work in concert with the Contadora nations to produce a lasting, negotiated settlement for this troubled region.

I urge my colleagues to support the proposals offered by Congressmen BARNES and HAMILTON. These proposals would provide true humanitarian assistance to real refugees, not to combatants. This would be assured by having the aid channeled through the International Red Cross and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Moreover, these proposals provide direct support for the Contadora process by setting aside \$4 million to implement any regional peace agreement that may be reached as a result of the Contadora initiatives.

There has been a lot of discussion today about the signals we will send in these upcoming votes. Let us vote in support of the Barnes-Hamilton proposals, and say clearly and loudly that the United States is a nation that respects international law. That we are a people who are committed to political and economic solutions to the problems in Central America. This is an approach which makes sense, this is a policy that can work.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WOLPE. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I have heard the statement made repeatedly that there are more Somozistas in the military command of the FDN, the democratic resistance, and I just would tell you that according to the resource paper put out by the State Department to the press and to everybody, that among the military command, former Sandinistas are 43 percent; former national guardsmen 32 percent; and Campesinos 19 percent.

Of the 56 regional and task force commanders in the FDN, 27 were former Sandinistas; 13 were National Guardsmen, none above the rank of lieutenant; and 12 were farmers. So it just is not so. There are more ex-Somozistas with the Sandinista government and there are more ex-Sandinistas with the democratic resistance.

□ 1700

Mr. WOLPE. Mr. Chairman, if I may reclaim my time to respond to the gentleman, the point that I think needs to be understood is that former Somozistas are numbered among the highest ranks of Contra command structure. It is simply improbable, to say the least, that such leaders could command

credibility among the Nicaraguan population.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. WOLPE] has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. WOLPE. I thank the gentleman for yielding this additional time to me.

Mr. Chairman, if I might just conclude that thought. The fact of the matter is, when we lend our own credibility and support to individuals at the command level who are so closely identified with the former dictator Somoza, it is simply politically foolish. It is counterproductive and it plays into the hands of the more radical elements of the Sandinista population.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WOLPE. I would be pleased to yield now to the gentleman from New Mexico.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman is absolutely correct when he refers to the military leadership. I do want to make a point that there is a political leadership within the Contra that has assumed military relationship, military umbrella, Mr. Calero and Mr. Cruz and many others that I would like to respectfully say are, I think, positive forces. They are moderate.

But I think the quote the gentleman made about the make up of the State Department is essentially correct, but so is my colleague who claimed that the leader of the military was.

Mr. WOLPE. I thank the gentleman from New Mexico for his contribution. I was very careful to note in the body of my own statement that the Contras are diverse elements. The military command structure is very clearly identified with the former dictator Somoza. That clearly, I think, is counterproductive in terms of American interests.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair will announce that the time remaining for the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO] is 1 hour and 52 minutes, and the time remaining for the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] is 2 hours and 14 minutes.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. LIVINGSTON].

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, there has been a great deal of criticism about the U.S. role in Central America. I find that remarkable particularly in view of the successes that we have enjoyed in El Salvador over the last 6 years, what with the free elections and the new President, the constituent assembly, and the constitution the Salvadorans now enjoy.

But most particularly, I grieve over the fact that the United States has been blamed for all the ills in Central America when, in fact, it has recently been conceded by even the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] that because of the proximity of Central America; because of the fact that we in Washington are closer to Managua than we are to Los Angeles; because of the importance of the sealanes in the Pacific and in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico, where 50 percent of all our commerce in this Nation flows; because of the potential of immigration into the United States as an outflow from Communist domination, just as the Vietnamese fled from Vietnam when the Communists took over; and because the potential entrenchment of a Marxist regime on our southern border will possibly lead us to deploy troops away from Western Europe into the southern regions.

All of these are substantial reasons to understand why Central America is important to us, and that what happens down there is vital to our future.

But I think that it is more important to understand that we tried the diplomatic process as was espoused by the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON]. We tried to get along with the Sandinista government after they overthrew Somoza. In fact, there was a great deal of assistance that flowed from this country to the Sandinista government in its early stages based on its promises of a pluralistic government, based on their promises of freedom of assembly, church, religion, and so forth. We even came up with \$118 million in U.S. taxpayer funds in direct bilateral aid, and we helped procure \$1.6 billion in multilateral aid from world banks to get them on their feet, to start them on their way toward the democracy that they had promised the world and their people.

But then as time went on, things began to sour; things began to change. We started to realize that there were things that were happening in Nicaragua that did not really conform to their promises that they had made for an open and free society. We discovered that there was oppression, and suppression of religion; that when even the Pope went down to Nicaragua a couple of years ago, he was heckled, and organized mobs disrupted his appearance, and intimidated representatives and leaders of the Catholic Church with greater and greater frequency.

We saw that the one Jewish synagogue in Nicaragua was closed down, seized again by the divine mobs, and expropriated, and that the Jewish families were run out of Nicaragua. The fundamentalist ministers were intimidated, oppressed, harassed, and actually tortured in some instances. I, personally, spoke with a fellow who had his ears cut off. Another fellow I

spoke to was thrown in jail and had his fingernails pulled out.

We noticed that the Sandinistas began to imprison people without cause. They have a prison called El Chipote right in the heart of Managua that is off limits to the press, of course. It is a subterranean prison, and it is alleged by numerous people who have been inside it that it is used for torture and oppression of Nicaraguan citizens.

We saw that the Sandinistas started forced labor camps and began to impress the citizens or the peasantry in the hinterlands of Nicaragua into working in these prisons camps for low pay or no pay at all.

We saw that they started Communist indoctrination schools for the children. And they started arming and training terrorists who began to export revolution to the neighbors.

Just recently, in fact as of April 11th through the 14th of this year, a few days ago, seven Nicaraguan agents were captured inside Honduras and admitted that they were smuggling weapons and assisting recruitment and training of Communist guerrillas in Honduras at the instance of the Nicaraguan Government.

We saw that the Nicaraguan Sandinista government had built the largest army in Central America, with Soviet tanks numbering as many as 300, and Soviet helicopters and armored personnel carriers and rocket launchers, and are threatening to bring in Mig aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. LIVINGSTON] has expired.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 additional minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding this additional time to me.

Mr. Chairman, we saw that they were building an air base in Punta Huete which was bigger than most U.S. bases and capable of handling any Soviet aircraft that flies.

We saw that they began to control supplies and prices and all the markets in the country, that they ran off the entrepreneurs, they seized the businesses, expropriated private property, forcing people out of the country or forcing them to sell their businesses and property at arbitrarily low prices.

They begin to take in representatives of the Soviet bloc, including Soviets, Cubans, East Germans, Bulgarians, North Koreans, Vietnamese, Palestinian Liberation Organization people as well as Qadhafi's Libyans.

They seized and closed the only synagogue in Nicaragua, as I mentioned, and they began a universal draft and forced young boys of 15 of age and older into the army, and armed and equipped the largest armed force in Nicaragua, arming as many as 40,000

armed troops and 70,000 reserves. They took in over \$500 million in Soviet aid and built the most lethal force in Central America. They continue to aver the force is for defense only against the United States, yet Managua has continually served as a base of operations for terrorist movements and other guerrilla activities aimed at their neighbors.

Under their rule, the Nicaraguan economy has deteriorated horribly. Per capita income has declined by half of what it was before they took over. There are shortages everywhere. There are lines for essentials. The supplies are provided by the Eastern bloc, like Bulgarian and Soviet canned goods.

□ 1710

The last thing they need, of course, is a revolutionary force to undermine their hold and their grip on the people of Nicaragua.

But, Mr. Chairman, they are buying time. The Sandinistas of Nicaragua want the United States out. There are many in this body and many in this country who have said that we should get out, but I submit, Mr. Chairman, that if we give them time, they will lock their grip, they will entrench themselves, and we will have another Cuba on our southern borders. If that happens, we will make a great mistake.

The people who espouse that we get out of Nicaragua have said that we should have gotten out of El Salvador 5 years ago, and they were wrong when they said we should have gotten out of El Salvador, and they are wrong about Nicaragua. They said we should not participate in and encourage the free elections, and they were wrong then, and they are wrong now. We held on; we kept up economic support for the Salvadorans; we got the first election in March of 1982 when a constituent assembly was elected; we got a constitution drafted by that constituent assembly; and as a result subsequent elections have been held freely, fairly, and openly, a President now governs the democracy of El Salvador. We were right then, and we're right now.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. LIVINGSTON] has expired.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. LIVINGSTON].

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, El Salvador is not without its problems, but it is trying to struggle, to pull itself up by its bootstraps and come into the 20th century and join the club of the Western civilized nations as one that can govern itself and govern its people freely and openly. But the Nicaraguan Government does not want to join that club. The Nicaraguan Government wants to repress its

people, entrench itself, and spread its ideological revolution.

Mr. Chairman, I hope and I pray that we will not let them do that. I urge this body to support the Contra revolutionary freedom fighters, to restore freedom and democracy to Nicaragua, and to ultimately make sure that we do not have to send our young men, our young American soldiers, into that region because it is not necessary. The \$14 million will help to guarantee that it never becomes necessary.

Mr. Chairman, it is the Sandinistas who are rejecting negotiations and peace in Nicaragua. Recently declassified intelligence makes that crystal clear. Between April 11 and 14, 1985—note that date—seven Nicaraguan agents were captured inside Honduras. They admitted that they were smuggling weapons and assisting with recruitment and training of Communist guerrillas in Honduras. The leader of the seven, Reymundo Muñoz Díaz—an agent of the Nicaraguan General Directorate of State Security—also admitted to three trips beginning in November 1984 when they smuggled AK-47 rifles, M-16 rifles, and handguns for guerrillas in Honduras, who seek the overthrow of that Government.

In short, even as we debate here today, the Sandinistas are talking peace but making war.

These recently declassified documents—and I ask unanimous consent that they be printed in the Record immediately following my remarks—touch on several other points raised by the other side in today's debate: First, the church, and second, whether it is our action that is driving the Sandinistas to do the terrible things they do. The answer, of course, is that we are not causing the Sandinistas to be repressive and violent—they have been committed Marxists from the earliest days of their revolution of 1979.

The proof in the declassified intelligence:

First, July and August 1979, Chief of Prisons Federico Lopez ordered execution of 300 former National Guardsmen. Today Lopez sits in the Sandinista Assembly.

Second, 1979, behind the Santiago Masaya volcano, about 75 former National Guard members were executed—fair game for FSLN activists.

Third, 1980, the FSLN made a political decision—which they carried out—to assassinate private sector leader Jorge Salazar. This was a warning to citizens not to dissent against the government. Even the Cubans tried to talk the Sandinistas out of it, but Tomas Borge and Humberto Ortega—current Sandinista leaders—gave the go ahead to Juan Jose Ubeda of the secret police, and Salazar was murdered by Ubeda personally.

Fourth, the secret police, that is, the Department of the Nicaraguan Gener-

al Directorate of State Security, has conducted intensive and extensive operations to diminish the effectiveness of the traditional Catholic Church in Nicaragua. Including:

In 1980, funneling money through the secret police to buy influence of a parish priest; and

Recruiting people to serve as agents of influence within the church.

I hope my colleagues will review this declassified intelligence material, which I will have at the desk. It shows that while we gave foreign aid to the Sandinistas in 1979 and 1980, and while our colleagues on the other side of the aisle call for nonintervention today, the Sandinistas were and are bent on crushing liberty inside and outside Nicaragua's borders.

SUBJECT: CAPTURE OF SEVEN NICARAGUAN STATE SECURITY AGENTS IN HONDURAS

Text: 1. Seven Nicaraguan support agents for the Honduran Cinchonero guerrilla organization were captured between 11 and 14 April 1985 in southeastern El Pasajito Department, Honduras. According to reports obtained by the Honduran Security Service, the seven acknowledged that their mission was to smuggle weapons from Nicaragua to Cinchonero groups in Olancho Department, Honduras, and to assist with recruitment and training of Cinchonero guerrilla units in Honduras.

2. According to preliminary information available to the Honduran Security Service. One of the seven, Reymundo (Muñoz) Díaz. Described himself as an agent of the Nicaraguan General Directorate of State Security (DGSE). And coordinator of the group of DGSE agents supporting Cinchonero guerrilla units in Honduras. Mundz said that in three trips beginning in November 1984. He and several of his accomplices smuggled six AK-47 rifles, 24 M-16 rifles, several hand guns, 30 uniforms, boots, medicine, and money to the area of Quebrada Arenas Blancas (142 1N-8551W). On the Patuca River in Olancho Department, Honduras. The weapons were transported by mule from Wamblan (1347N-8540W). Nicaragua, hidden in gunny sacks of corn, while the agents passed themselves off as purchasers of grain. In Arenas Blancas, the arms were delivered to Carlos Alberto (Monge). A Honduran national. Who subsequently passed them on to Cinchonero guerrilla units in formation in the area of Las Planchas (possibly 1502N-8639W). Olancho Department.

3. According to the reports available to the Honduran Service, the seven support agents and other accomplices had as a secondary mission the collection of information on locations and dispositions of troops of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FND) in southeastern El Paraiso Department. The reports also indicated that the Cinchonero guerrilla groups which the Nicaraguan State Security agents were supporting have as one of their missions attacking FDN troops concentrations in Honduras. In addition to attacking Honduran targets.

SUBJECT: SANDINISTA HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

Text: Since 1979, various human rights abuses have been committed in Nicaragua by officials of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) and members of the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS). They include the following:

A. During July and August of 1979, Federico (Lopez), then chief of prisons, ordered the executions of about 300 former national guardsmen with the justification that they were the "ears" of Anastasio (Somoza) in Nicaragua. [Source comment: It is believed that Lopez personally carried out many of these killings. Lopez is currently the FSLN's delegate to region IV and represents the fourth region IV in the Sandinista assembly.]

B. Behind the Santiago Masaya Volcano, about 75 former national guard members were executed in 1979 shortly after the overthrow of Somoza. [Source comment: Former national guardsmen were considered fair game by many FSLN activists, and many of them were indiscriminately killed immediately after the fall of Somoza.]

C. In the fall of 1981, an EPS helicopter was attacked by Indian insurgents as it attempted to land in a Miskito village in eastern Nicaragua near the Honduran border. [Source comment: The village may have been Leimus.] Several EPS soldiers were killed and the pilot was wounded. The pilot continued flying the helicopter and got beyond the reach of the hostile fire. Later, EPS soldiers returned to the village and slaughtered about 45 unarmed boys and men of all ages in retaliation for the helicopter incident.

D. In 1983, the Chief of the Ministry of Interior's Special Moises Tlacy Troops in the region IV, First Lt. Victor (Romero), murdered several persons that he suspected of being counterrevolutionaries. [Source comment: Romero was drunk at the time of the murders.] The persons killed were Juan (Obando), Chief of the Nicaraguan Energy Institute (INE) electrical plant in San Miguelito, and a woman leader of the charismatic church and her husband. The victims had their throats slit and were robbed after being killed. Romero and two other persons were tried, convicted and sentenced to serve 17 years for this crime. After serving eight months, however, they were freed by Vice Minister of Interior Luis ((Carrion)), who had been Romero's superior during the revolution. [Source comment: The church leader was survived by three minor children. This incident created a scandal, although it was censored in the local news.]

E. An uprising occurred at Modelo Prison in late 1983, and five persons escaped. Sandinista news accounts said that all five had been killed while trying to escape. At least two of the escaped prisoners, however, were captured alive and beaten in Granada before being taken to Managua. [Source comment: Apparently, the Sandinistas killed the prisoners after recapturing them.]

F. In late 1983 or early 1984, about 30 to 50 commandos of the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) were captured near the Costa Rican border during an operation run by the General Directorate of State Security (DGSE). All of them were later executed by security personnel. Gerardo ((Arce)), brother of FSLN National Directorate Member Bayardo ((Arce)), was at the time the DGSE chief in region IV, and he was in charge of the operation. Some of the captured ARDE personnel were sent to Managua where they were killed. Others were killed in region IV, and their bodies were scattered over a wide area to make it appear that they had been killed in a pitched battle with the EPS. The DGSE blew up some electrical towers in the area to make it appear that the ARDE personnel had been involved in acts of sabotage. Gerardo Arce ordered the execution of the pris-

oners in order to make himself appear to be a cold-blooded individual who was capable of killing.

G. In the northern part of Nicaragua it is common for the EPS to kill prisoners suspected of being counterrevolutionaries.

H. In the DGSE's prison, El Chipote, there are five or six special underground cells where prisoners who are marked for execution are taken. The only individual who has keys to these cells is the chief of the DGSE's Department of Operations.

SUBJECT: OPERATIONS OF THE NICARAGUAN GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF STATE SECURITY ((DGSE)) AGAINST THE TRADITIONAL NICARAGUAN CHURCH

Summary: The Department of the Nicaraguan General Directorate of State Security (DGSE) has conducted intensive and extensive operations to diminish the effectiveness of the traditional church in Nicaragua. These operations have included recruitments of persons to serve as agents of influence within the church to denigrate religious figures before the Nicaraguan people. Attempted control of the San Jeronimo Religious Festival and an intensive and multifaceted operation against Nicaraguan Archbishop Miguel Obando y Bravo.

Text: 1. The Department of the Nicaraguan General Directorate of State Security (DGSE) known by the designation "Department for the struggle against ideological diversionism," is responsible for operations to diminish the effectiveness of organizations considered to be hostile to the Sandinista revolution. These include religious groups and personnel, labor unions, journalists, civic organizations and educational institutions. The section is headed by Eva Maria ((Sanking)) Chang. Known by the DGSE pseudonym "Catalina."

2. The operations against the traditional church in Nicaragua have been intensive and extensive. Aspects of the operations have included recruitments of persons to serve as agents of influence within the church and covert action operations designed to denigrate religious figures before the Nicaraguan people. A specific example of this type of operation is the DGSE attention to the San Jeronimo section of Masaya where the important San Jeronimo Religious Festival is held every year during September and October. At one point during the early 1980's, the DGSE funneled U.S. \$5,000 to San Jeronimo parish priest, Father Anastasio ((Garcia)), to buy chapel bells from Italy. The gift was ostensibly from the Ministry of Interior and was intended to cause the priest to adopt a favorable attitude toward the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). The DGSE also has given other gifts to priests, such as video cassette recorders, to try to obtain their cooperation.

3. An additional element of DGSE's operation in San Jeronimo has been its effort to control physically the annual festival to ensure that it is not used for political purposes against the FSLN.

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF NICARAGUAN BUSINESSMAN JORGE SALAZAR BY THE GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF STATE SECURITY ((DGSE)) ON ORDERS FROM THE SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT ((FSLN)) WHICH WAS OPPOSED BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT

Summary: In the fall of 1980, the National Directorate of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) made a political decision to assassinate private sector leader

Jorge Salazar. Salazar had become one of the most outspoken critics of the FSLN within the private sector. And his murder was intended to serve as a warning that such dissent would not be tolerated. The chief of the Cuban counterintelligence advisory mission unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade the Sandinistas from taking this course of action, and the assignment to kill Salazar was given to Juan Jose Ubeda, Deputy Chief of the General Directorate of State Security (DGSE).

Text: 1. In the fall of 1980, the National Directorate of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) made a political decision to assassinate private sector leader Jorge ((Salazar)). Salazar had become an outspoken critic of the FSLN within the private sector and had been attending meetings with other anti-Sandinista businessmen. These meetings took place in the home of Dora Maria ((Lau)), former consul of Nicaragua in Japan under the government of Anastasio ((Somoza)). (Source comment: Lau was popular with Nicaraguan businessmen because she was a very cultured woman. She enjoyed giving parties, to which she invited private sector leaders. The anti-Sandinista meetings grew out of these parties.) Lau attempted to recruit her nephew, Nestor ((Moncada)) Lau, for the private sector cause, not knowing that he was an assistant to Lenin ((Cerna)), Chief of the General Directorate of State Security (DGSE). (Source comment: Because Moncada always wore a military uniform, Lau assumed that he was a member of the Sandinista Popular Army (EPS).) She told him about the meetings and asked him to seek out members of the EPS who were opposed to the Sandinistas regime and would work with the business leaders. Moncada reported the information to Cerna, who in turn reported it to the FSLN National Directorate.

2. The Directorate decided to send two agents posing as disaffected EPS members with Moncada to the meetings with Salazar and the business leaders. These agents were comandante Alvard ((Baltodano)) Cantarero, then Chief of Combat Preparation for the EPS, and EPS Captain Alejandro ((Guevara)). Baltodano is currently a member of the EPS general staff. He is the son of Cabinet Minister Emilio ((Baltodano)) Pallais. Guevara is currently the representative of the EPS in special zone three. Guevara was replaced during the operation by EPS Captain Salvador ((Bravo)). Because Guevara made a bad impression on private sector leaders due to his low intellectual level and limited education, Bravo committed suicide about two years ago. He was the brother of Sandinista hero, Jorge Sinforoso ((Bravo)). Moncada was in charge of coordinating the operation and reported directly to Cerna, but Baltodano, Guevara, and Bravo also filed their own reports. The DGSE agents told Salazar and the businessmen that a plan was being prepared within the EPS to overthrow the Sandinista Government. The DGSE then drew up the purported plan for the agents to present to the businessmen, who offered to financially back the plot.

3. On 17 November 1980, after the DGSE had accumulated information on the anti-Sandinista activities of Salazar and the businessmen, a high-level meeting was held among FSLN national directorate members and DGSE leaders. Those present at the meeting included: Minister of Interior Thomas ((Borge)); Vice Minister of Interior Luis ((Carrion)); Chief of the DGSE Cerna; Deputy Chief of the DGSE Juan Jose ((Ubeda)); Minister of Defense Humberto

((Ortega)); Chief of Department of Operations Raul ((Cordon)); DGSE Deputy Chief of Security Roger ((Mayorga)); Chief of the Cuban counterintelligence advisory mission Carlos ((Lingote)); and other national directorate members. (Source comment: Cordon is now chief of the penitentiary system within the Ministry of Interior and Mayorga is the DGSE representative in the first region. Carlos Lingote is probably a pseudonym, as all Cuban advisors use pseudonyms.) During the meeting, Ortega stated that a political decision has been made by the directorate to assassinate Salazar as an example to other private sector leaders that such dissent at high levels within the private sector would not be tolerated. (Source comment: Although the DGSE presented an analysis of the case to kill Salazar at the meeting, it was obvious from Ortega's comments that the decision had already been made.) After Ortega's statement, Lingote told the Sandinista leadership that he viewed their decision as a mistake. He said that it would be a grave error that would have political repercussions. Ortega declined to accept the Cuban's advice, saying again that the decision has been made. Lingote then left the meeting to consult with his superiors in Cuba. When he returned, he again tried unsuccessfully to dissuade the Sandinista leadership from enacting their plan to kill Salazar, saying that the Cuban Government did not approve of the plan.

4. At the 17 November meeting, Ubeda was put in charge of the operation to assassinate Salazar. He initially gave Cordon the assignment of eliminating the businessman. But Cordon protested, saying that he could not do it because he was a friend of Salazar's. Because of Cordon's reaction, Ubeda decided to take responsibility for the assassination himself.

5. On 18 November 1980, Moncada called Salazar, saying that he had important information and needed to talk to Salazar privately as soon as possible. Ubeda accompanied Moncada to the meeting site at El Crucero, on the outskirts of Managua, where the former hid himself. Moncada took a duffle bag of M-16 automatic rifles, which he was to plant in Salazar's car to make the latter appear guilty of possession of arms for use in a coup attempt. When Salazar arrived at the meeting site, Moncada placed the weapons in his car, and Salazar began to protest, saying that he could not carry such items in his possession. Moncada then drew his weapon and fired shots into the air to give the impression to any witnesses within ear shot of the incident that a firefight had taken place between the DGSE and Salazar. Ubeda came forward from his hiding place and shot Salazar. Moncada suffered a nervous breakdown as a result of this operation, and has had psychological problems ever since. He worked for the Department for "struggle against organizations and bands" for some time after the Salazar killing. But as a result of his problems, he has been unemployed since late 1984.

SUBJECT: SPECIAL COMMANDO UNIT OF THE NICARAGUAN GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF STATE SECURITY ((DGSE)) TRAINED BY CUBAN SPECIAL FORCES

Text: 1. Within the Nicaraguan General Directorate of State Security (DGSE). There is a special commando unit known as "multiple action groups" (GAM). The GAM were created for the purpose of penetrating task forces, camps, and the high command of the Nicaragua Democratic Force (FDN).

The Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE), and the Misurasata. (Source comment: The GAM have been in existence for about two years. Members of the GAM are known as "combat agents".) The specific missions of the GAM include assassinating anti-sandinista task force commanders and other insurgent leaders. Locating insurgent camps within and outside of Nicaragua. Creating Chads and disorganization within insurgent forces during Sandinista offensives, and collecting intelligence. GAM personnel work both individually and in groups.

In one GAM operation, which took place in about mid-1983, the GAM attempted to kill an insurgent task force commander. They did not succeed in assassinating the commander, but they did kill several members of his staff, as well as his wife.

2. GAM troops are trained by Cuban special troops in the area adjacent to the Santiago Masaya Volcano. Their training camp is located at the end of the access road to the House of Enrique ((Bolanos)) Gayer, President of the Superior Council of Private enterprise. The location, known as Reparto El Razlon, is at km 20 on the Masaya highway. The GAM receive paratroop and special troops infantry training, as well as training in the use of explosives, self-defense, locksmiths' techniques, communications, and ciphers. They also attend a course of the composition and armaments of U.S. troops at the squad, platoon, company, and battalion levels, and they study the offensive and defensive maneuvers of U.S. forces.

3. The Chief of the GAM is First Lieutenant Arnoldo ((Garcia)). The GAM is organizationally part of the DGSE department known as "Periferia," which handles administration and planning. "Periferia" is under the direct authority of DGSE Chief Lenin ((Cerna)).

The freedom fighters are supported by the Nicaraguan people—note the following article in today's New York Times—and it is right for us to support them too.

[From the New York Times, Apr. 23, 1985]

NICARAGUAN REBELS APPEAR READY TO FIGHT ON EVEN IF AID IS CUT OFF

(By James LeMoyné)

SAN SALVADOR, April 22.—Despite serious political and military problems, guerrillas fighting the Nicaraguan Government have achieved a base of popular support, and their war is likely to continue whether or not Congress votes to give them assistance, according to Nicaraguan refugees, rebels and Western diplomats in the region.

Visits to rebel bases and Nicaraguan refugee camps in the last month indicate that the guerrillas are growing in number and that they have been able to pose a significant threat to the Sandinista Government. Their principal support seems to lie in northern Nicaragua, where the level of fighting and the number of exiles fleeing to Honduras appear to indicate that something close to civil war is being waged.

Two Salvadoran guerrilla officials who have spent considerable time in Nicaragua said in separate interviews that they believed the anti-Sandinista rebels were a serious problem. One of the Salvadorans has been involved in organizing the left for over 20 years.

The Salvadorans said they believed the rebels would wage a long war that would not lead to a military victory but would considerably weaken Nicaragua.

WAR WILL GO ON

"I have told the Nicaraguan comrades that they are in a situation like Mozambique with South Africa," one of the Salvadoran leftists said. "The war will go on, and with American economic pressure they can slowly be strangled."

The existence of a degree of popular support for the guerrillas has become clearer in recent months as the rebel forces have swelled, even though American financing has been cut off.

Accounts from Nicaraguan refugees and recent rebel recruits in Honduras gathered in the last month also indicate that the rebels have greater support than is generally realized, principally among the conservative farming communities across northern Nicaragua.

The clearest indication of the rebels' appeal, according to both guerrilla officials and Western diplomats in the region, is that the Sandinistas have felt compelled in the last two months to relocate more than 30,000 peasants sympathetic to the guerrillas to camps in Government-controlled territory.

"The Sandinistas think Reagan created the rebels," said a Nicaraguan exile leader, Arturo Cruz, in an interview in Costa Rica. "They are wrong. The insurgency will continue because citizens of my country are in an armed fight."

Mr. Cruz, a former Nicaraguan Ambassador to Washington, has lobbied for aid to the rebels and called on the Nicaraguan Government to negotiate an end to the conflict.

MILITARY VICTORY SEEMS UNLIKELY

The guerrillas do not appear capable of militarily defeating the Sandinistas and, with their backers concentrated in the rural north, it seems unlikely that they can hope for the sort of broad insurrection that brought the Sandinistas to power in 1979.

What seems more likely is a prolonged, bitter fight in which each side counts on committed backers and Nicaragua remains polarized. The rebels seem capable of inflicting considerable damage on the Nicaraguan economy and of maintaining political pressure on the Government.

Rebel officials say they have made an effort in the last year to wage a small-unit guerrilla war, thereby avoiding heavy casualties. They do not, and probably cannot, control fixed positions inside Nicaragua, but say they are holding real-guard areas in Jinotega and Zelaya Provinces.

PEOPLE FLEEING ACROSS BORDER

A separate indication of the Nicaraguan Government's problem is the rapidly increasing flow of exiles fleeing across Nicaragua's borders to Honduras and Costa Rica. According to a United Nations official in Costa Rica, more than 1,000 Nicaraguan refugees have entered the country in the last two weeks, half as many as officially entered in all of 1984.

Many of the refugees are middle-class students who have fled the draft in Nicaragua and have no desire to fight for the rebels. But hundreds of others are peasants, many of whom can be seen training at the main rebel camp on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border.

The rebel group that appears to be growing stronger is the Nicaraguan Democratic Force. It is principally led by former members of the Nicaraguan National Guard, but its rank and file is a 14,000-man army composed mostly of peasants who express deep grievances against the Sandinista Government.

CRITICISMS OF REBEL SOLDIERS

Rebel soldiers, dozens of whom spoke in interviews with a reporter during a visit to their camp last month, offered a sharply competing and considerably more conservative vision of how Nicaragua should be ruled than the socialist program offered by the Sandinistas. The rebels criticized rationing, membership in the political militia, state control of crops and prices and Government friction with the Roman Catholic Church, all of which they attributed to the Sandinistas.

A measure of the seriousness with which the Nicaraguan Government takes the rebel threat is its expenditure of more than 40 percent of this year's budget on defense. The war dominates Nicaraguan politics and has badly dented the economy, according to Western diplomats in the region and several press reports from Managua.

A key issue that has divided rebel groups is the nature of their leadership, particularly the presence of former National Guard officers in the Nicaraguan Democratic Force. Human rights violations have also been a point of contention within the rebel movement.

Interviews with officials from all major rebel groups indicate that a majority believe that the movement needs new leadership. Mr. Cruz was the person most frequently mentioned as capable of uniting the rebels, but he has so far refused to take a leading role in the armed movement.

Although the rebels themselves say they have been badly hurt militarily by the cutoff in United States aid, Western diplomats who monitor the guerrillas say they still enjoy some advantages. The rebels are able to operate out of secure sanctuaries in Honduras, and they have a veteran combat force that fights on terrain that it knows well. One diplomat in Honduras said the rebels had not waged as wide a campaign of sabotage as they are capable of.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON].

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, many of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have tried to roll all of the forces in Nicaragua into one ball—all bad. They could not be further from the truth. People by the thousands are fleeing the repression of the Communist Sandinista government in Nicaragua, and young men are joining the freedom fighters while fleeing the military repression of the Communist Sandinista military.

My colleagues have said there is nothing to fear from Nicaragua. How about Cuba? How about if and when El Salvador falls? Will there be something to fear then? How about Honduras?

We will not see a direct frontal assault like we saw when Hitler was crossing the Rhine in World War II. What we are going to see are wars of liberation by Communist guerrillas, low-intensity warfare. When will we respond? When are we an island in a sea of Communist States?

One of my other colleagues said that we are driving the Communist Sandinistas into the arms of the Soviets, the

Soviet bloc. How? We gave them \$118 million when they first took power, and they turned immediately to the Soviet Union. We are not pushing them into the Soviet bloc; they are already there. Last year they received 18,000 tons of war materials from the Soviets.

When I was in Nicaragua 2 weeks ago, I talked to church leaders, business leaders, political leaders, and human rights advocates, and all of them, with the exception of the mouthpieces of the Sandinista government, said that if we withdraw support for the Contras, if there is no organized opposition to the Sandinista government, the Communists will solidify their position within that country, the repression will increase, and they will undoubtedly export revolution throughout Central America.

Not only are they working toward that now, but they are teaching the next-generation revolution. My colleague, the gentleman from New Jersey, talked about the educational text they are using, using handgrenades and machineguns to teach addition and multiplication. So they are not planning for just today but for tomorrow and revolution into the future.

We should look at what they have said in the past. We should look at the Communists, not only in Nicaragua but throughout the world, and we should listen to them. I think that is the biggest thing we have ignored today. We have not listened to what the Communists have had to say.

In 1916, Lenin said:

Socialists cannot be opposed to war without ceasing to be socialists. Only after we strike down, firmly conquer and expropriate the bourgeoisie in the entire world, and not only one country, will wars become impossible."

In 1955, Khrushchev said:

We must realize that we cannot coexist eternally * * * one of us must go to the grave. We do not want to go to grave. They do not want to go to their grave either. So what can be done? We must push them to their grave.

In 1958, Khrushchev said:

Our state renders aid to other countries because we communists, Marxist-Leninists, do not remain closed up within our frontiers. We consider the cause of building socialism and communism to be a great international affair and objective.

In 1971, Brezhnev said:

The complete triumph of the socialist cause all over the world is inevitable. And we shall not spare ourselves in the fight for this triumph, for the happiness of the working people!

In 1979, Andropov said:

Marxism-Leninism is the textbook for achieving socialist world revolution and the building of a new society in every country of the world.

In 1975: Castro said:

The revolutionary fighters of Cuba, true to the principle of international solidarity,

facilitated the formation of armed forces and militias in a number of progressive countries, unhesitatingly and decisively supported peoples facing imperialist aggression. They have time and again shed their blood in other lands that have asked for their modest help.

And, of course, Castro said in 1958 that it was a lie that the Cuban Government was Communist-infiltrated. Then in 1961, 2 years later, he said: "I am a Marxist-Leninist and will be one until the day I die."

Then let us get to Nicaragua. In 1981, on August 25, Humberto Ortega said: "Marxism-Leninism is the scientific doctrine that guides our revolution, the instrument of analysis of our vanguard to understand the historical process and to create the revolution. Marxism-Leninism and Sandinismo are insolubly united, and because of our moral strength, our Sandinismo and our doctrine is that of Marxism-Leninism."

And then this is the most telling remark I have read. Tomas Borge in June of 1984 said: "This Revolution goes beyond our borders. Our revolution was always internationalist from the moment Sandino fought in La Segovia."

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON] has expired.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. BURTON].

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Chairman, in 1983, Defense Minister Umberto Ortega said: " * * * the military buildup is not in response to an external threat but is in fulfillment of the historical mission of the Sandinista party."

And in 1983, while being interviewed, Mr. Borge was asked: " * * * will you respond to the * * * remark that Nicaragua is the first domino in Latin America? That since the revolution triumphed here, it will be exported to El Salvador, then Guatemala, then Honduras, then Mexico?"

And Borge said, "That is one historical prophecy of Ronald Reagan's that's absolutely true."

Winston Churchill said 40 years ago, when talking of Hitler, that World War II was an unnecessary war because we could have prevented it if we had listened to Hitler. We can prevent American involvement in Central America with our boys being killed and maimed if we would just listen to what the Communists have to say. It is not Nicaragua that is the real danger to us; it is the failure of the United States of America to do something about Nicaragua that is the real danger.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER].

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution and in support of the Barnes-Hamilton alternative. U.S. foreign policy in Central America is out of control. It is costing the American taxpayers billions of dollars. There is no clear direction of U.S. foreign policy. Its failure is threatening the lives of brave Americans and innocent people in the region. And, finally, it is alienating hundreds of millions of people in Latin America.

No one in this body, to my knowledge, questions the importance of the political stability of the nations in Central America. No one in this body, to my knowledge, is not concerned about the association of the Sandinistas with Communists.

The question before us is, how do we deal with that association with communism?

□ 1720

Friend after friend from Latin America have told us that militarism is no answer. Expert after expert in our country have testified that militarism is not a solution in Central America.

President Alfonsin, a recent recipient of the Democracy Award, said that the problem in Central America is not military. The problem is economic, political and social.

Our friend, Belisario Betancur, President of Colombia, repeated that assessment, that the problem is not military. The problem is one of poverty, malnutrition, social injustice, political corruption and those terrible conditions causing ferment and discontent that explodes into revolution.

I think that the alternative presented by Mr. BARNES and Mr. HAMILTON gives the Contadora process an opportunity to address the real problems, an opportunity to succeed in advancing the principles upon which our own Government is based. This would give democratic capitalism in the region of Central America an opportunity to compete with Marxist Socialism ideologically.

We have seen time and time again throughout the 20th century where a paternalistic militaristic American policy in Latin America produces hatred, resentment and angry cries "Yankee go home." Only when we attempt to address the aspirations of the people of Latin America as we would address the aspirations of our own citizens in this country do we find good neighbors who join us in cooperation to achieve the principles taught by Simon Bolivar, a disciple of Washington and Jefferson. Bolivar was recognized as the liberator of Latin America from foreign domination.

A foreign policy which abandons the principles which our own Government advocates is destined to failure. We

have abandoned our own principles times and time again in dealing with the nations of Central America. It is time that we began to learn from our own revolutionary history, to review our national principles and to follow the light that we offer as hope to other peoples around the world. I believe that democracy can compete ideologically with communism.

Since 1945, communism has demonstrated time and time again that it cannot compete with capitalism, beginning in 1948 with Tito and as recently as 1978 with the People's Republic of China.

Fidel Castro states openly that the United States-China model is his goal for future Cuban-United States relations.

It is time we Americans started reading our own book, started believing our own ideals, practicing what we preach, and adopt those ideals as a guide for U.S. policy in Central America.

Give democracy a chance. Give our ideals a chance. Give the people of Central America the opportunity to enjoy the same freedoms that we claim for ourselves.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR.].

Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. Mr. Chairman, I would imagine that everyone who has listened to all of the testimony and statements here the last few hours has already made up his mind as to what he intends and plans to do. I have myself. I intend to support the President in the position that he is taking today.

I do not question and I do not think anyone does, the motives or the integrity of anyone who has taken a stand at this place, and who has taken a position different from the way I feel. They are sincere, honest people, who are seeking what they think is for the best interests of our country. However, I would like to share with you for just a moment an occurrence that happened a few weeks ago when Congressman SONNY MONTGOMERY and I, and other members of his codel had an opportunity to visit seven countries, Panama, Venezuela, Honduras, Costa Rica, Belize, Ecuador, and El Salvador. We spent a week in those countries. I do not take the position that by going one time and visiting those people that I am an expert on Central America. I do not take that position, but I do want to share with you some information that was given to us that I think should be made a part of this RECORD. This information was presented to us in intelligence briefings. We were told that since Mr. Ortega has been in power that this is the first time that direct shipments have come to his country from the Soviet Union, that prior to his assuming power it

came from circuitous routes for his use and benefit.

We were also told, and this to me is cogent to what we are discussing today, that foreign military advisers in Nicaragua today total 3,770. That these military advisers come from Cuba, Soviet Union, East Germany, Libya, the PLO organization, and North Korea.

Now, I pose this question to my friends. Why are those military advisers in that country? Would anyone take the position that they are there to protect our interests? Would anyone take the position that they are in that country to try to further democracy? Of course not. They are there, in my opinion, to try to do the same thing to that country that they have done to Cuba and that is to make it a satellite of the Soviet Union.

I live in east Texas and I know that some of the fighting there is closer to my hometown than my hometown is to Washington, DC. That in itself gives me great concern.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Texas has expired.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman.

Mr. SAM B. HALL, JR. I am concerned about not voting this \$14 million aid for another reason. I would much rather see those people fight it out down there themselves than to ever have American troops go down into Central America and shed an ounce of blood.

I do not think you can compare it with the Vietnam matter because of the distance involved, if nothing else.

So I would state to my friends to consider why those 3,700 people are there and if you can convince me that they are there for the betterment of the United States of America and for the betterment of democracy and that they are doing things that would be better for my children and grandchildren, I will switch over this minute and lead the fight and vote with you. I do not believe you can show me that.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. GINGRICH].

Mr. GINGRICH. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman.

I want to specifically pick up on the arguments of an earlier speaker, the gentleman from Arkansas, who in a sense was asking what are these votes in Nicaragua really all about.

There are a number of ostrich Democrats who would have us believe that there is no danger from Nicaragua. Some even laugh at the idea.

There are ostrich Democrats who would have us believe there is no communism in Nicaragua.

The ostrich Democrats would have us believe, from an earlier speaker, that it is a "militaristic America" and Ronald Reagan who threatens peace in Central America.

The ostrich Democrats promise us that if only America pulls out, there will be peace.

The ostrich Democrats promise us that if America unilaterally quits, the Nicaraguan Communists will be reasonable.

We have heard the ostrich Democrats before in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Angola, Afghanistan, and Grenada.

Again and again ostrich Democrats promise peace through American weakness. Many human beings died, others were imprisoned, Communist tyrannies were imposed; the Soviet Union became stronger, the United States became weaker.

Have you seen the movie "The Killing Fields"? Cambodians died after ostrich Democrats in this Congress crippled America.

Here are the Grenada documents. Again and again ostrich Democrats promised us that Grenada was not Communist and the Soviet Union was not gaining an ally against the United States.

□ 1730

This book, these actual Communist documents prove beyond any reasonable doubt Leninism exists, the Soviet Union is real, America does have enemies.

Ostrich Democrats deny the lesson of Grenada. Again and again today the ostrich Democrats said there is no proof of Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan Communist efforts to undermine Nicaragua's neighbors.

Let me offer the physical proof of the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan Communist offensive in El Salvador and Honduras. Let me say in advance to my colleagues, these exhibits are all harmless but they have been harmful. These exhibits are authenticated captured weapons from El Salvador. They are on loan from the El Salvadoran Government to the U.S. Defense Department. They have been dismantled. They meet every kind of rule of safety.

This is the stock of an American weapon captured in Vietnam which the Communists captured in El Salvador after it came from North Vietnam to Cuba to Nicaragua, and then to El Salvador.

This is a similar American weapon captured, we know because of the stock numbers. This was left in Vietnam after this Congress cut off aid to South Vietnam. It was then captured by the North Vietnamese, shipped to Cuba, transhipped to Nicaragua, and captured in El Salvador.

This is a particularly interesting little device because the same device, this is a rifle-propelled grenade, this particular device was the same lock number as was found in Grenada where we absolutely knew it was

brought under contract from the Soviet Union to Cuba and then transshipped to Grenada. This was found in El Salvador.

This is a North Vietnamese 82 millimeter mortar sight modified to fit captured American equipment in Vietnam, shipped from North Vietnam, captured in El Salvador after it came through Nicaragua.

This is a Soviet grenade pin found near an electric utility generating station in El Salvador where it was left by the guerrillas after they blew up the station. It came through Nicaragua from the Soviet Union to El Salvador.

Finally, and I will not leave this here, this is a Bulgarian rifle round from the same factory number 10, shipped from Bulgaria to Cuba to Nicaragua, captured in El Salvador.

Now let me say to our friends across the aisle, I am going to leave these weapons sit here on exhibit, and I am going to leave a copy of the Grenada documents on exhibit.

As each ostrich Democrat denies the truth of Leninism and the Soviet military alliance against the United States, have them read Marshall Ogarov in the Grenada papers.

As each ostrich Democrat denies that the Nicaraguan Communists are undermining their neighbors, have them come over and examine these weapons on exhibit. Remember that there are thousands more of captured weapons just like these that we do not have here.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GINGRICH. If I have time.

President Kennedy said in his inaugural address, and I quote from an earlier donkey Democrat: "Let every nation know whether it wishes us well or ill that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and success of liberty. This much we pledge and more."

Ostrich Democrats say, "We shall pay no price, we shall bear no burden, meet no hardship, support few friends to assure the survival of liberty."

Mr. RICHARDSON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GINGRICH. I will be glad to yield.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I thank my colleague.

I wish to remind my colleague, I do not know if he has been here for the whole debate, but I am proud to say that I commend the minority for their bipartisanship in the course of the debate. I also commend my colleagues on the majority.

What the gentleman has just done is destroy this whole bipartisan exercise that I think by a weak media event. This is a responsible debate, and we are all Americans here, not "ostrich" Democrats or conservative Republi-

cans. The gentleman from Georgia is debasing the quality of this debate. We all want to do what is best for this country, and we don't need a media weapons display to make our points.

Mr. GINGRICH. If I may take back my time—

Mr. RICHARDSON. By an act of demagoguery.

Mr. GINGRICH. I take back my time.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Which I regret very much.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, I demand that the words of the gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. RICHARDSON] be taken down.

The CHAIRMAN. The Clerk will report the words.

□ 1733

Mr. GINGRICH. Let me continue, if the gentleman will withdraw.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I withdraw my request.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman withdraws his request. The gentleman from Georgia is recognized.

Mr. GINGRICH. Let me talk about demagoguery for a second and why I talk about ostrich Democrats. This book is actual Communist document, this is not demagoguery. These weapons are actual Communist weapons shipped through Cuba to Nicaragua and El Salvador. That is not demagoguery. And it is your wing of the party which is killing freedom in Central America. It is not Republicans, it is not the decent Democrats. You are darned right, when your end of the party dominates this House, you set the rules, you bring up the resolutions, you cripple freedom, you weaken America, I will talk about ostrich Democrats. When you want to cease doing that I will be very bipartisan.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. RUDD].

Mr. RUDD. Mr. Chairman, I thank my colleagues for yielding. I have been most observant of the debate today because it probably is the most important debate that we will be engaging in anytime in the near future, because it has to do with whether or not we will recognize that we have brothers to the south of us who are looking to us for leadership. There is a lot said today about concern for human rights and outrage, and we have had a lot of that. We had a lot of outrage in the past against the U.S.S.R., the Soviets, for the slaughter that they engaged in in Poland, in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia, in Afghanistan, in Southeast Asia, the horn of Africa and central Africa. We have had outrage against the Soviet Union for the shooting down of innocent people, including a former colleague of ours, on flight 007 of the Korean Air Lines, well remembered.

We have had outrage at what has happened when Fidel Castro took power in Cuba, because we felt that there had been outrage committed and that he was going to repair that, but there was no comment made when he lined up thousands upon thousands of people against the wall and shot them simply because they opposed what he had done and had established a dictatorship there.

We have been outraged at what has happened during the Somoza/Sandinista fight in Cuba, when the Sandinistas, with our help, came to power and established a Communist government there, identified as such by themselves because the Sandinista Party was the Communist Party of Nicaragua before they did take power. We have done nothing to show respect for representative government, outrage—temporarily.

Let me just say that a recent poll taken indicated results from 50,000 people contacted, that 85 percent of the people across the Nation, 85 percent of the people were in favor of aid to the Contras in Nicaragua and in Honduras.

I will tell you that it must have outraged a lot of people, too, when we recognized that the Sandinistas came to power behind the barrel of a gun just as the Fidelistas under Fidel Castro came to power behind the barrel of a gun in Cuba. The freedom fighters who are called the Contras are the remnants of what was presumably set out to be done at the time the Somocistas were overthrown in Nicaragua, and that was to establish not a democracy, necessarily, but some kind of a government which would provide liberty and freedom and respect for the individual in Nicaragua. Regardless of what has been said here today, the information available to me is that the Contras are made up of about 2 percent, 2 percent of the remnants of the National Guard of Nicaragua and 42 percent are former Sandinistas, or people who helped the Sandinistas come to power. That is an established fact, at least according to the information that I have. Let me tell you, along with other colleagues who have indicated travel into that portion of the world during the Easter recess, I was privileged to accompany a codel to 7 countries in Latin America. And, as compared to a year ago, the people throughout the lands south of us have changed their attitudes a great deal. Previously they did respect the United States, they did look to us for leadership, but they would not confess to that or to outright friendship because it was not popular to be too friendly with the colossus of the North.

Today those people openly profess their friendship, openly ask for the leadership of the United States of America and openly state their horror

of the terror that exists in Nicaragua because they know this will come to their lands if they do not get the leadership that we will be able to provide them and if we do not support the Contras.

This is the most important vote for them on Latin America that they are watching today. They are watching it much more closely than we are here in America, because it means if this vote is not taken in favor of the Contras, it means that we will once again, once again leave our friends at the last minute.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. RUDD. I yield to the distinguished gentleman, my friend, from Mississippi.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

Mr. STUMP. I yield an additional 2 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. RUDD].

Mr. RUDD. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi.

Mr. MONTGOMERY. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend the gentleman for what he said, and also to emphasize the point he made about the Contras, that less than 2 percent of the total Contra forces ever served in the Nicaraguan National Guard, served under Somoza, and that 42 percent of the Contra middle grade leadership are men who deserted the Sandinista ranks when the Sandinistas betrayed their promise of democracy and freedom in Nicaragua.

So the Contras, most of them were Sandinistas at one time. I think that point should be clearly made here today.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the gentleman in the well bringing it up.

Mr. RUDD. I appreciate the gentleman's leadership which he provided on a recent trip.

You know, there are a number of us, and this may be of interest to my friend and colleague from Arizona, who supports the Nicaraguan freedom fighters and oppose it by invoking the memories of Vietnam.

We should reread history.

The Tet offensive was a military victory for the United States and the South Vietnamese forces.

When President Nixon ordered the bombing of Hanoi Ho Chi Minh sent his emissaries to the Paris tables to actually talk peace.

Actually, South Vietnam was not destroyed in that case, but was destroyed by the Case-Church amendment which prohibited the use of air power to enforce the provisions of the Paris accords.

Today a large portion of Southeast Asia is dominated by the Communists under the same circumstances we are facing now in Central America and because of the violent genocide there.

Many of the Nicaraguan freedom fighters helped to oust the government of General Somoza, as we stated before, but they now turned coat on it and are trying to establish the freedom that the Sandinistas promised and never produced.

If we fail to support both the freedom fighters in Nicaragua and the duly elected government in El Salvador of Jose Napoleon Duarte, then Cuba and the Sandinistas under the Soviet direction will export communism everywhere throughout Latin America and in Mexico.

Captured Soviet correspondents obtained in Grenada provides us with compelling evidence that Russia is committed to spreading this revolutionary doctrine throughout the region.

There is an old copybook rule that an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. And the freedom fighters are defending the United States and its principles in Nicaragua just as surely as they are fighting for their own freedom and for our freedom.

So if those in control of the House of Representatives forbid further assistance to those freedom fighters in Nicaragua, they should be prepared to take the blame for the inevitable consequences that will result.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. RUDD. I yield to the gentleman from Louisiana.

Mr. LIVINGSTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, people on the other side have made the point that this may be a Gulf of Tonkin resolution. In other words, if we were to approve money for the Contras, that we might have to send troops down there. In fact, this is the reverse, if we do not send money down there, we may have to send troops down there.

Mr. RUDD. The gentleman is right.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

□ 1750

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. DOWNEY].

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. Mr. Chairman, Congress faces an important choice and a test of its will.

The choice is whether we will support a diplomatic resolution of the conflict in Central America and reaffirm our faith in the strength of our diplomacy.

The test of our will involves the issue of maintaining congressional opposition to providing military assistance to the Contra forces who seek the overthrow of the Nicaraguan Government.

1. THE STRENGTH OF OUR DIPLOMACY

In the past year, we have seen leaders of the administration continually question the value of our diplomacy by

emphasizing the need to rely on military force as a solution to our diplomatic problems. Central America has been the particular focus of this approach.

This approach undercuts our diplomacy and ignores the strength of our diplomatic tradition.

Strength of our diplomacy rests on the strength and power of our diplomatic imagination.

The United States emerged as a diplomatic power in the 19th century, at a time when we were not a military force to be reckoned with.

In fact, in Latin America, where we first staked out a diplomatic position through the much misunderstood and manipulated Monroe Doctrine, we had no military force to back us up.

What we did have was a bold diplomatic imagination and a vision on which we have based our Latin American diplomacy ever since.

In all of our diplomatic succession, what stands out is the fact that we have been clear about the nature of our interests and those of others. The Reagan administration, in practice, seems to have lost sight of this. The tragic outcome of our involvement in Lebanon is generally credited to the fact that no one in the administration could agree on the reason for sending in the Marines. If we are to believe the administration, there is a similar lack of clarity with regard to policy toward Nicaragua.

Initially, we supported the Contras in order to stop the influx of arms to El Salvador. When the administration could not provide convincing proof of this, the policy objective shifted.

The next reason for administration support for the Contras was to press Nicaragua to reduce its relations with the Soviet Union and Cuba. When that seemed to have failed, rather than change the policy—support for the Contras—the administration changed the policy goal.

The latest rationale is to keep pressure on Nicaragua to bring them to the negotiating table and to keep them there. The difficulty with this rationale is that quiet negotiations have been going on and it is the administration which has not stayed at the table; in January, we ended the talks which had been progressing at Manzanillo in Mexico.

What, then, should be the goals of our diplomacy?

Unquestionably, the primary goal should be to deny the Soviets an offensive military base in Central America. There must be no missiles in Nicaragua—on that we are all agreed.

We should also be concerned to promote a peaceful, diplomatic, and political solution to the conflict in Central America.

We must also reaffirm the primacy of diplomacy. We should support ac-

tively the Contadora peace process. After all, the Contadora nations are staking quite a bit on their diplomatic skills; our own history shows that a nation does not need to be a military power to make diplomatic history.

Are these goals being served by the administration's proposal to continue aiding the Contras? The answer is no.

Since 1981, the administration has given almost \$100 million to the Contras and what do we have to show for it?

A further hardening of the Sandinista's position.

An increase in the intensity of terrorist attacks on the civilian population of Nicaragua.

A series of embarrassing incidents, including the mining of Nicaraguan harbors and the production of a manual for the Contras which advocated terrorist methods.

Our efforts to consolidate opposition to the Sandinistas on a democratic basis have failed.

The Contras have been unwilling or unable to work together and the primary reason is that the democratic groups opposed to the Sandinistas refuse, for good reason, to follow the lead of the FDN forces—the largest single group and the group that the administration seems closest to.

Everyone else involved with Nicaragua recognizes that the FDN is dominated by former members of Somoza's national guard, who have rarely been known for their commitment to democracy.

The irony of the administration's unwillingness to deal diplomatically with the Sandinistas was pointed out by Theodore Sorenson when he noted the welcome extended to Chadli Benjaddi, the President of Algeria last week. Mr. Sorenson correctly observed that governments change of their own accord, that not all governments born in revolutionary fervor wind up as hard line opponents of the United States. A great deal depends on our willingness to accept them and deal with them.

2. A TEST OF CONGRESSIONAL WILL

We are engaged in a test of congressional will on this matter. Over the past 3 years the House has repeatedly expressed its opposition to the administration's policy with regard to the Contras.

Through the Boland amendment to the fiscal year 1983 appropriations bill, we prohibited the use of funds to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua.

In fiscal year 1984, aid to the Contras was capped at \$24 million and we stipulated that additional funds could not be spent without congressional authorization.

Last year, Congress denied a request for an additional \$21 million for the Contras.

Now, Congress is being asked to approve an additional release of funds for the Contras.

How many times do we have to say no?

We are being offered a compromise that is no compromise at all, a compromise that flies in the face of the experience of the past 3 years. We have been told before that the funds would have a limited use, and we subsequently found out that they were used to mine harbors, produce assassination manuals and support a movement whose true aim was to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government. The essence of the administration's compromise is that the money will be used for humanitarian assistance for 60 days, and then it will revert to military assistance. All that this compromise does is to postpone the day when the money will be squandered in pursuit of a wrongheaded and deadly policy in Central America.

We have been clear in the past about our resolve not to fund the Contras. We must remain resolute while we work actively to promote a just peace in Central America—a peace which will be the most effective way to deny the Soviets a foothold in Central America.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. Would my friend concede, in the interest of historical accuracy, that you were a little slow on Grenada? Would you concede that much?

Mr. DOWNEY of New York. I will not, but I will be happy to have a dialog with the gentleman a little later.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. MONTGOMERY].

Mr. MONTGOMERY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the \$14 million aid request. Mr. Chairman, a group of us from the Armed Services, Veterans' Affairs, and Appropriations Committees visited seven countries in Latin America earlier this month to assess United States, Central, and South American security matters as well as to review the participation of U.S. national guard troops in the Blazing Trails and Ahaus Tara III exercises. We had the opportunity to meet with numerous U.S. diplomatic and military personnel as well as with high-level Latin American military and government leaders—most notably with President José Napoleon Duarte of El Salvador. We encountered a number of recurring security and defense themes on our journey—themes about which there was surprising unanimity of opinion—and I would like to pass along our findings for your consideration. In fact I had

been to Central America 12 months ago and then 2 weeks ago and I could see improvement toward democracy.

First, United States and Latin American officials agree that Cuban and Nicaraguan support of leftist insurgents in El Salvador and elsewhere in the region poses the most serious threat to democracy and stability in Central America. There is no doubt that Cuba and Nicaragua are continuing to export their revolution in terms of providing financial support, military hardware, training, and sanctuary to the violent opponents of democratically elected governments.

Second, United States and Latin American officials agree that the United States must continue to provide significant resources to democratic forces in Central America in order to counteract the effects of Cuban and Nicaraguan influence. President Duarte, in particular emphasized that "if the United States cuts off aid to democratic forces in Central America, the United States will ensure a permanent military imbalance in the region and contribute to the victory of totalitarian forces."

Third, the officials with whom we spoke stressed that Latin America views U.S. approval of the \$14 million humanitarian assistance request to the Nicaraguan Contras as a "litmus test" of the U.S. commitment to the region. They ask why the United States hesitates to actively export its most precious commodity—democracy—when Cuba and Nicaragua do not hesitate to export their Marxism. They ask why the United States hesitates to support Nicaraguans who are willing to risk their lives to restore freedom and democracy to their country in order that American men need not sacrifice their lives some time in the future.

Fourth, United States and Latin America officials emphasized the importance of constructive U.S. pressure on Nicaragua to move the Sandinistas toward moderation. The record shows that the flow of arms from Nicaragua to leftist insurgents in Central America slows when the United States keeps the pressure on through providing assistance to the freedom fighters or through conducting joint military exercises with regional armed forces. We can only encourage the Sandinistas to participate in meaningful negotiations if we hold their feet to the fire with such constructive pressure.

Mr. Chairman, the Contras have reached a critical juncture in their fight to restore democratic freedoms to Nicaragua. Today, there are more Contras in the field than there ever were Sandinistas during the revolution—and the Sandinistas are vulnerable. Now that success is within reach, the United States must not pull the

rug out from under the freedom fighters.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to clarify who the Contras really are. We have heard some Members of Congress argue that the Contras are the same national guardsmen who terrorized the Nicaraguan people under the Somoza regime and that the United States should not support these murderers and torturers. In actuality, less than 2 percent of the total Contra forces ever served in the Nicaraguan National Guard. An even more telling statistic is that 42 percent of all regional commanders are ex-Sandinistas. In other words, 42 percent of the Contra middle-grade leadership are men who deserted the Sandinista ranks when the Sandinistas betrayed their promise of democracy and freedom in Nicaragua.

I say to my colleagues—make no mistake about it—U.S. credibility in Central America is directly at stake in this vote. I urge you to cast a vote for democracy and approve the \$14 million humanitarian assistance request.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. STRATTON].

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, earlier in this debate there was a good deal of discussion about the problem of Nicaragua as a foreign policy matter and as a human rights matter; but I think in the last couple of hours we have come, really, to the basic question. In my judgment, those earlier discussions ignored what the real issue is. It is a question of the national security of the United States. Make no mistake about it; under the Sandinistas Nicaragua has become a military camp. They have by far the largest military force in the Caribbean. They are putting so much money in their own military machine that their own people are short on food and they are short on power, and the Sandinistas, who already have a substantial airport in Managua, are now in the process of building a vast new modern military airport, whose basic objective is clearly to become a base for a Soviet air group. In fact, one individual whom I am not able to identify in this body, and who has never been a strong supporter of the Reagan administration in Nicaragua, said if that happened even he would believe a military attack would be warranted.

Do we really want to see another Cuba in the Western Hemisphere? Remember, Cuba, after all, is only an island. But Nicaragua is part of the main, a part of the continent, and it makes Nicaragua a far greater threat as a Soviet-sponsored military base than Cuba has ever been, even with all of its ballistic missile submarines. Do not let us forget the lessons of Grenada, the vast storehouses of Soviet and Soviet bloc weapons on that island of 111,000 people. Think how many more

Soviet weapons can be stored in Nicaragua warehouses, as the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. GINGRICH] has just demonstrated to us very clearly. Think how many can be distributed to other Caribbean countries.

The distinguished gentleman from New Mexico [Mr. RICHARDSON] said that what we want most in Nicaragua is peace. But we would have to be whistling Dixie to think that the Sandinista government is really interested in peace. Because it is not any more interested in peace than Hitler was interested in peace.

As a matter of fact, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick said the other evening the parallel with Nicaragua is Munich. Neville Chamberlain tried diplomacy, as Mr. ALEXANDER and Mr. DOWNEY suggested that we try diplomacy. Neville Chamberlain tried diplomacy with Hitler, and we all know how he turned out.

As a matter of fact, because Nicaragua is a part of our continent, it is very likely and very possible that the Soviet forces there could even drive north to the Rio Grande.

The Armed Services Committee visited Nicaragua last July, and the people in the U.S. Embassy told us that the real value of the Contras is that they provide the only leverage we have in Nicaragua to force the Sandinistas to change their political policy and to stop their growing military machine.

Some people said that this legislation could create another Vietnam. Absolutely not. The problem in Vietnam was that we were using U.S. troops to pursue our objectives while the Soviets were using their clients, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese Army. But with the Nicaraguan Contras, we have freedom fighters who are willing even eager to carry out our efforts. All that we are being asked to supply with this legislation is some help so that they can carry out those efforts.

If it is OK to aid the Afghanistan freedom fighters; if it is OK to aid the heroes of the Solidarity movement in Poland, if it is OK to provide the help that we gave to the Hungarian freedom fighters back in 1957, what is wrong with helping the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, who seek to eradicate a threat to our security. In fact, if it were not for the money that a struggling United States of America got from the French in our American Revolution our great democratic Nation wouldn't be in existence today thank God.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. KASTENMEIER].

Mr. KASTENMEIER. Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge the House to reject the President's request to resume the financing of military or

paramilitary operations against the Government of Nicaragua.

The President's policy toward the Nicaraguan Government has gone through a number of quick-changes. First, we were told that we had to prevent Nicaragua from providing military assistance to the rebels in El Salvador. Next, our goal became the containment of Communist expansion in Central America. When Congress refused to provide funding for the Nicaraguan Contra forces, Mr. Reagan stripped the camouflage from U.S. support for the Contra forces by declaring his intention to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government if the Sandinista regime didn't cry "uncle." A vote to resume financial aid to the Contras would give congressional approval to the President's desire to continue a war by proxy and to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government.

The Government of Nicaragua, admittedly, does fall short of expectations and I am not going to defend the Sandinista regime in all its actions. But, the people of Nicaragua choose its Government in an election. It is Nicaragua, and not the United States, which is the most clearly threatened nation in the Western Hemisphere. Its harbors have been mined. There are U.S. warships offshore. Large armies are on its borders, and it is fighting against rebel forces. Nicaragua is more threatened than it is threatening.

As for the Contra forces we have been supporting, some do represent groups that would form a government with which we could closely identify. But, there is a substantial number of murderous mercenaries who cannot be called freedom fighters or the moral equivalent of the Founding Fathers. They are nothing more than brutal thugs whose former loyalties are associated with the hated Somoza dictatorship. They would reinstate a reign of terror and a regime that was originally perpetrated by the Somoza family, and a takeover in Managua by the Contras would result in this latter group-seizing control.

The President speaks about being firmly on the side of peace in Central America. Of course, we do not know what the President means by peace since this President is capable of engaging in such pernicious doublethink that he would try to have us believe that going to war would be for the purpose of peace. By supporting insurgents and mercenaries, it can be said that we are already at war with the people of Nicaragua.

Mr. Reagan's indiscreet comments about overthrowing the Nicaraguan Government can only reinforce the suspicion and fear of the United States that runs through the countries of Central America. The President keeps referring to the Marxist-Leninist threat to Central America, but for

many people in that region, the real threat comes from the Yanqui from the north. Since the middle of the 19th century, the United States, time after time, has intervened militarily in Central America, and it is the Americans, not the Soviets, who are feared by many in Central America. The President is now reviving the great fear of Yankee imperialism in its worst form.

Mr. Chairman, the President, by pursuing his policies in Central America, is intervening on the wrong side of history. In Central America, we should be on the side of those popular movements which want to attack the oppressive conditions there, and as long as the poverty, the hunger, the illiteracy, and economic exploitation exist, revolutions will continue with or without foreign intervention.

Nicaragua is a small, poor country that on its own cannot threaten the United States. Rather than exercising its military muscle, the United States should be joining the Contadora nations in seeking a long-term commitment to peace and stability in Central America. Such a policy would be far more effective than sponsoring military adventurism.

Mr. Chairman, the President's remodeled proposal to salvage aid to the Contra forces is one born out of desperation. It is a sham. Does anyone really believe that funds managed by the CIA will be used for humanitarian purposes? It makes no moral, political, intellectual, or strategic sense to fund the Contras. Let us defeat this proposal and get on with the business of finding the means to use American power and influence constructively to obtain peace in Central America.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. MINETA].

Mr. MINETA. Mr. Chairman, I know that everyone here today is committed to democracy and freedom. While some here may disagree, my determined opposition toward U.S. assistance to the Contras, and my efforts to change the failing policies of the United States in Central America, do not contradict my belief that the Sandinista government is failing in some of its commitments to the Nicaraguan people.

So while I am strongly committed to the United States ending its support to the Contras, I am under no illusions about the Sandinistas or the Contras, or for that matter, the Governments of Guatemala, El Salvador, or Costa Rica.

However, my concern today is not with the merits of Sandinista internal policy, but with the lack of wisdom and the illegality of U.S. foreign policy.

I believe the United States is justified in wanting to stop Nicaragua from exporting military equipment and sup-

plies to other parts of Central America. However, I am deeply distressed that our Nation is paying only lip service to diplomatic methods, and instead is putting all its emphasis on a military solution. That approach is not succeeding. Instead, it is adding to the dangerous instability of the region.

Moreover, the hypocrisy of this indirect, supposedly covert operation seriously damages our credibility at a time when we should be demonstrating our moral leadership and our commitment to open, honest, and democratic government.

Mr. Chairman, in discussing U.S. Central American policy, we must face two fundamental facts.

First, we must comprehend the unchanging, grinding, and brutal poverty in this part of the world that most Central Americans face—year after year, decade after decade, generation after generation. While this poverty is an age-old problem, it is our country's shortsightedness in failing to constructively address it that helps perpetuate the intolerable conditions.

The second fact I wish to point out is that over these past decades, the United States has been the agent of peaceful, evolutionary change toward democracy and economic well-being in Central America. Too often the history of the U.S. Central American policy has been a history of military intervention, diplomatic neglect, and economic control.

By failing to give high priority to thoughtful economic development, and by supporting landed families such as the Somozas, we have placed ourselves on the side of oligarchy, and on the side of right wing military dictatorships. We have failed to use our influence and prestige to encourage the growth of democracy.

Against this backdrop, the Reagan administration remains determined to show that it can be tough with governments such as Nicaragua.

When the U.S. Government first began its covert action in Nicaragua, the rationale given by the administration was twofold, namely to prevent the flow of arms from Nicaragua to other Central American states, and in doing so, force the Government of Nicaragua to become so preoccupied with its own internal problems that it would turn inward and ignore the rest of Central America.

The rationale offered for this position was apparent: Nicaragua can do what it wants within its borders, but stay out of other countries. Most would say that on its face, it was, and is, an acceptable policy for the United States to try and prevent the exportation of a Soviet-Cuban backed Marxist revolution to neighboring countries.

However, it was, and is now, an empty rationale and a smokescreen policy. For while the administration purported to follow the policy of con-

tainment, it is now apparent that its true policy from the beginning, was to overthrow the Sandinista government.

And there was Congress, approving the expenditure of significant money to stop the flow of arms, and yet none were ever found. As a member of the Intelligence Committee, I repeatedly asked the CIA and the administration to show me that one round of ammunition, or one pound of high explosives that the so-called arms-interdiction campaign had seized. They did not then, and still have not, produced any.

At the same time, the CIA, contrary to U.S. law, was failing to keep us informed of the extent of its activities.

I learned more from Newsweek than I did from our special briefings. And of course, in the instances of the mining and the manual, the CIA flatly ignored the requirement that it inform the House and the Senate Intelligence Committees of its activities.

In 1984, after Congress limited assistance to the Contras to \$24 million, the administration consciously and intentionally violated that ceiling by what can best be called creative accounting. Cost and expenses that should have been counted against the \$24 million ceiling were charged to other accounts, or swallowed up in the general cost of intelligence or military operations, or under the guise of U.S. military exercises.

To me, however, this cooking of the books is a direct and intentional circumvention of the law, and, along with my esteemed colleague, Mr. ADDABBO, I asked Defense Secretary Weinberger to formally account for all funds spent on the U.S. military exercises last year, and planned expenditures this year.

I remind my colleagues of this administration's record because it is reported that the administration may ask that great humanitarian organization, the Central Intelligence Agency be allowed to distribute humanitarian aid to the Contras. Assuming that ruse is refused, the administration may retreat to the position that an "inter-agency group" be in charge of distributing so-called humanitarian aid.

Mr. Chairman, the administration is telegraphing its punches. They will look for any way to get the money to the Contras. This administration has forfeited the right to be trusted with any money involving the Contras. If we want to give humanitarian aid, let us give it to an international organization that we know will distribute it properly and has the track record to show for it.

You and I know the American public generally does not support this adventure. But it seems that the stronger the public opposition gets, the more determined the administration is to persevere.

I would like to believe we have learned by now that no amount of sophisticated military equipment can win a guerrilla war nor repair an unjust society. Without popular support a repressive and undemocratic government has a very hard time resisting a rebellion.

I do not believe we promote democracy by killing more innocent civilians than the other side. Or by withdrawing from the World Court when our actions are less than legal. Let us use our influence not to win this war but to end it. Let us stop giving only lip-service to the Contadora group of nations trying to work out a regional solution and actively support their efforts. Let us step not toward a wider war, but toward a workable peace. Our country stands for honest and peaceful principles of government; let us demonstrate the power of that belief.

I am not suggesting this is an easy task, but it is a necessary one, both morally and politically—for Central America is a strategic region in our country's security. We will not have the luxury of blundering into an unwinnable ground war there and then withdrawing from the region and then trying to erase the experience from our national consciousness.

As usual we are getting candor mixed with hypocrisy from this administration. It is doing its best to lead us into the quagmire of Central America, where once again there is no light at the end of the tunnel. My friends, this week we are hearing those familiar echoes of the past. There is not much difference between, "Just 14 million more dollars ought to do it," from what we heard some 20 years ago, when another President said, "Just 14,000 more troops ought to be enough." Today we hear too many voices willing to spend American dollars in a war-by-proxy. Where will these voices be when we are spending American lives in an unwinnable undeclared war with little if any objectives, and with little if any support of the American people? What will we answer 20 years from now when people ask us, "How did this happen?"

I urge my colleagues to join with me and reject House Joint Resolution 239, and any other proposal which provides funds for the Contras thru the CIA or any other executive branch agencies.

□ 1800

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. EDWARDS].

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time. Mr. Chairman, nobody in this Chamber has the ability to see the future. Nobody can know for sure what these votes and these words are going to mean to some scholar of the future—or even to our own children.

Nobody knows for sure what sympathies and aspirations lie in the hearts of the Contras, or with Daniel Ortega and the men and women who, with him, govern the actions of Nicaragua.

And so we who cannot see the future have to rely on today and yesterday to guide our words and our actions. We have to determine what we are going to do here today according to the record the Sandinistas have built with their own hands, and according to a reasonable estimate of what they are likely to do in the future.

Nicaragua is a cancer.

In Central and South America, millions of men, women, and children are being brought the blessings of democracy and freedom. Free elections, free press, free speech. Where there was once a sea of oligarchy and oppression, there is now, thanks in large degree to our own actions in this Chamber, a new tide of free government.

In all of Central America, only Nicaragua is not moving toward freedom and democracy. And in all of Central America, only Nicaragua stands as a threat to the freedoms of others.

Do we have a right to move American force into Nicaragua to force that government to adopt a system like the one that has worked so well in the United States? Of course not.

But do we have a right to apply limited pressures on that government to force it to stop its efforts to undermine neighboring democracies and force millions of Central Americans into Sandinista-type governments, without free press, free labor unions, free elections? Do we have a right to protect democracy not in Nicaragua but in Honduras and Costa Rica and El Salvador, where government and civilian leaders almost with one voice plead with us not to abandon them? Yes. We have that right. And we have that obligation.

Vietnam has a lesson for us alright. It taught us never again to commit American troops to foreign battlefields with neither clear purpose nor clear will. No reasonable American would argue that the United States must remain out of Central America no matter what happens. If, one after another, our friends and allies in Central America are overthrown, and the freedoms of their people stolen, and new alliances formed with potential enemies of the United States, then our national survival will insist that any American President—Democrat or Republican, liberal or conservative—step in to prevent the establishment of an enemy base at our feet. How do we prevent that from happening?

We do it by acting now in a timely fashion with a measured response. By applying limited pressure to induce the Sandinista government to stop subsidizing revolutions and murders in neighboring countries.

Mr. Chairman, it is not wrong to try to help democracies remain free. It is wrong to remain neutral between oppression and freedom. It is not wrong to try limited means to prevent the overthrow of free nations. It is wrong to stand by while freedoms are lost and bloody wars are underwritten by men and women who believe in violence, in repression, in murder.

I have no idea whether this aid package will pass or not. I can't see even that far into the future. But I can see this: just as Americans today look back, with the benefit of hindsight, and wonder why we didn't do more, faster, earlier to choke off Hitler before he rained destruction on Europe, or Castro before he began sending Cuban troops to all corners of the world, if we don't do even this little bit—without American troops and at very little expense—to try to force Nicaragua to the peace table, our children will have questions for which we will have no answers.

I support this request for assistance to the Contras, Mr. Chairman; I think conscience demands it.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON].

Mr. SKELTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

Mr. Chairman, this is indeed a very difficult and complex issue which we discuss today. We have heard different points of view, and we have seen some who have painted themselves either into a political corner or into a philosophical corner.

Sometimes, in listening to the debate, I often wonder if those corners had not been painted not based upon the facts. Mr. Chairman, I think what we seek is a reasonable position. I too say that a reasonable position that we take in this body should be based upon the facts, and I would like to report that I was recently in Central America, and I would like to talk of the facts that I found there.

First and foremost I must say that the bright spot in Central America is El Salvador. Democracy is alive; democracy is breathing; it is on first base, and this Congress should be proud of the fact that we have supported the Duarte government in El Salvador.

As bright as the picture is in El Salvador, however, it is just as bleak in Nicaragua. The civil war is increasing and more people are fleeing the authoritarian government and the draft there is unpopular. While internal opposition does exist, a case can be made that it is ineffective. Meanwhile, the economy continues to decline and it reduces the Nicaraguan standard of living.

The civil war and the needs of the draft are increasing problems for the national government there. The Con-

tras have continued their attacks even though U.S. funding has ceased. One Contra leader stated his organization raised \$5 million since the congressional fund cutoff last spring.

□ 1810

An opposition leader estimated 15,000 Nicaraguans have died in the civil war in the last 3 years.

To increase its military force the Sandinistas resorted to a draft last year. This has proven to be very unpopular and has forced many draft age youths to leave the country, others are deserting after induction or failing to register. With over 50 percent of the Nicaraguan population under 21, the draft affects a large percentage of the population.

Internal opposition to the Sandinista government is divided. The major opposition is led by the church which has been very outspoken. The church had called for a national dialog and offered to mediate among the varying factions, but this has not occurred.

In talking to the opposition leaders several key points were made:

There is no doubt this is a Communist government with international leftist support.

The Sandinista government allowed an invasion of arms and advisers—especially from Cuba—that took over the apparatus of government.

Nicaragua is a stepping stone to the domination of other Central American countries.

The government has repressed the political opposition, reducing its size and access to the communications media. The opposition has very little political power.

While the Contras actively create problems for the opposition, it also allows them some flexibility to negotiate with the government.

It is obvious aid in some form to the Contras is needed to show U.S. resolve in the region.

Private enterprise is being taken over by the government.

The educational system is being subverted and children brainwashed by the government.

The government is censoring the media and acquiring a monopoly over what is being broadcast on radio and television.

In the absence of a political dialog, the civil war will continue.

Overall, Mr. Chairman I found a very dark picture in Nicaragua. The Sandinista government continues to repress the people and subvert the revolution. They do not appear willing to enter into a dialog with opposition leaders, even though the opposition continues to grow.

On the other hand, Mr. Chairman, there is a problem with the Contras. Evidence of a strong influence of former Somosistas is there, evidence

that causes one to question their leadership and the harshness with which they attempt to achieve their goals is there. They would not exactly be, as we would term it, Mr. Chairman, in the category of Sunday school boys. It is too bad that we have the narrow choices that we have before us today. I did not favor the rule that established this. In view of the conflicts that we have today, I wish to point out that there is a middle ground.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. SKELTON] has expired.

Mr. AVCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I propose a compromise, whether it be on this floor at a later time or whether it come from the other body. The compromise I offer is as follows:

First, keeping the Boland amendment.

Second, providing \$14 million in humanitarian aid to the Contras to be split evenly or otherwise between the International Red Cross and U.S. Government channels, preferably through AID.

Third, cleaning up the Contras, which means eliminating former Somosistas and developing a positive political program which would include a type of Bill of Rights and humanitarian reforms.

Let me explain in more detail.

First, there is a political requirement for keeping the Boland amendment. Most Americans believe it wrong to be involved in efforts to overthrow a government with which we have diplomatic relations.

Second, by splitting the humanitarian aid request between the International Red Cross and the U.S. Government, the United States would be underscoring its concern for the legitimate needs of refugees who have fled Nicaragua and who are now living in Costa Rica and Honduras. Money for the Contras would be stretched out over 18 months, once again for humanitarian purposes to aid Nicaraguan refugees but tied to efforts to put together a program to clean out former Somosistas and establish a liberal, in the classic sense, democratic program.

And third, I stress the importance of transforming the Contras into a legitimate alternative to the present government. We have to change the perceptions of the American public and international opinion toward the Contras. This means that we have to support Arturo Cruz in the Nicaraguan situation in much the same way we supported Napoleon Duarte in El Salvador.

Just a few years ago the situation in El Salvador was pretty grim—death squads on the right and Communist guerrillas on the left. Democratic liberals in Congress helped change the

situation by strengthening Duarte's hand. President Duarte, a true democrat, was able to convince the military that without a curb in death squad activity the change of continued U.S. aid were slight. Progress has been made in El Salvador against both the extreme left and right.

In the Nicaraguan situation, Arturo Cruz is the same kind of individual as Napoleon Duarte. He fought against Somoza, and was arrested on two different occasions. He also served as a member of the present Sandinista government until he reluctantly came to the conclusion that they had no intention of honoring promises made to the OAS in 1979. He is a respected political leader and a true democrat. He and others like him are the kind of individuals whom we need to support and who deserve our support.

As part of the effort to make the Contras a truly legitimate alternative, they need to put together a positive political program. Such a program should include: an explanation of the proposed economic structure with a detailed account of positions on land reform, market guarantees, business safeguards; a commitment to a pluralistic political system; guarantees ensuring that the military would be controlled; policies concerning taxation, education, freedom of speech, press, and religion. The program should also openly accept gains made by the Sandinistas in health and education. It should reject the Sandinista authoritarian apparatus: neighborhood defense committees, mass control organizations, and ideologically oriented education.

As part of this process toward legitimizing the Contras the effort should be made to open up the movement to international organizations—Red Cross, Amnesty International—church groups, and news media observes in order to secure the kind of international acclaim and support attained by the Sandinistas in 1978-79.

This is how we should proceed.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. SHUMWAY].

Mr. SHUMWAY. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support the resumption of United States assistance to the anti-Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua. The social, economic, and political problems that continue to plague Nicaragua and to promote tragic violence there concern us all, and it is because of that concern that I urge my colleagues to lift their prohibitions on aid to the Contras and allow the United States to once again support those who are fighting for peace and democracy in the region.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened carefully to this debate during the course of the day today and I have some con-

cerns about many of the statements that were made on this floor. I am concerned about what has appeared to be partisan posturing with reference to position in this debate.

I certainly believe in the two-party system and I think there are many topics that we discuss here in the Chamber of the House of Representatives that lend themselves very well to that kind of partisan debate, but the significance of this issue far transcends those partisan loyalties that might otherwise prevail. It was, therefore, very reassuring to me to hear the gentleman from New York a few moments ago, Mr. STRATTON, stand and take a position which obviously is not one held by a majority of the members of his party.

I think as we consider this issue today and this evening, and again tomorrow, we have to be realistic in how we look at it. I think, realistically, as has been said here, the Contras may not be totally attractive. Maybe they do have warts on their skin and on their performance. But I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that if the Contras are deemed to have warts, then the Sandinistas who are presently the leaders in Nicaragua must be deemed to have cancerous lesions. Their shortcomings, their taint, I think, are far greater than anything that we might attribute to the Contras.

I believe if we are going to be realistic about viewing what is there today, we have to see that the only element of that Nicaraguan society actively pursuing the ideals that we as Americans have long cherished and believe in and announce to the world, are the Contras. If it is fair for us to characterize them as a ragtag bunch of undisciplined fighters, perhaps that may be so. But perhaps it may be so because they have not received the kind of assistance that today we are debating. They have not received the kind of training or help from us that might give them a more respectable appearance and skill in what they are trying to accomplish.

Again trying to be realistic about this issue, I think we have to consider fully the alternatives. There is a government now in Nicaragua which I believe closely parallels the Government of Cuba. We have known over the years of experience with the Cuban Government that they have spread their poisoned doctrine and their subversive forces throughout the world. They have caused us great problems in terms of our own international policies and in terms of our own good neighbor relationships.

Again realistically, I think we have to concede the fact that the Sandinista leadership means problems for Nicaragua and the citizens of that country. I believe if we examine that aspect of this issue carefully we must concede that the Nicaraguans will not

be content over a long period of time with the kind of limits that are now imposed, the kinds of lines that must be formed to obtain basic supplies, the kinds of shortages they have encountered, and certainly the suppression of rights that has followed the Sandinista leadership.

Just today, the front page of the Los Angeles Times newspaper had a picture showing a very dimly lighted medical facility somewhere in Nicaragua, showing mothers with their children waiting for medical treatment and saying that the status of medical care in that country has declined. Malaria is now a problem. I am suggesting, realistically again, that the message of the Sandinistas and their kind of leadership is going to spell trouble for those good people in Nicaragua over a longer period of time.

Third, I think there will be problems for Central America. There are some in this Chamber who perhaps may say that the cause of those problems is our own foreign policy. With reference to that, Mr. Chairman, I would simply like to cite a statement which was made back in 1969, a statement of goals which was formulated by the founders of the Sandinista liberation philosophy, Carlos Fonseca and Tomas Borge.

They said in paragraph 14 of that statement, and I quote:

We struggle for a true union of Central American people within one country, beginning with support for national liberation movements in neighboring states.

More recently, Tomas Borge, the Minister of the Interior, said, and again I quote:

This revolution goes beyond our borders. Our revolution was always internationalist from the moment Sandino fought in La Segovia.

I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the root of these problems is not U.S. foreign policy. The Sandinistas were committed to territorial domination and the cause of Marxism-Leninism far before 1979. What we see now is not simply reactionary posturing, but a public display of deep-seated support for Communist ideology.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. SHUMWAY] has expired.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from California.

Mr. SHUMWAY. I thank the gentleman for yielding this additional time to me.

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I would suggest in closing, Mr. Chairman, that if we refuse this small effort to aid those who are fighting to instill freedom in Nicaragua, we are going to see massive discontent on the part of those people, we are going to see a mass exodus of humanity from that country to this country, and we

are going to see the Sandinista-Marxist-Leninist philosophy gain a foothold in Central America.

Mr. Chairman, certainly history will be the judge of our actions, and I hope that that history will not say that a majority of this House had been victimized by deceit and by a shrewd propaganda effort on behalf of the Sandinistas, but that a majority of this House will go on record in support of freedom and liberty for this hemisphere.

Mr. Chairman, I rise today to support the resumption of U.S. assistance to the anti-Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua. The social, economic, and political problems that continue to plague Nicaragua and to promote tragic violence there concern us all. It is because of that concern that I urge my colleagues to lift the prohibitions on aid to the Contras and allow the United States to once again support those fighting for peace and democracy in the region.

No one would deny that we have an interest in encouraging democratic development in Central America; the proximity of these countries to our own compels us to recognize the stake we have in their progress. During the last decade, this progress toward democracy has been impressive—where Costa Rica once stood as the only Central American nation with a democratically elected civilian government, it has now been joined by Panama, Honduras, and El Salvador, and in Guatemala, elections are scheduled for October. Efforts are going forward in these countries to address the problems of economic injustice and arbitrary exercise of power that have historically afflicted their people.

While this movement toward democracy has been notable and steady, it is still fragile and its future is clearly threatened by the persistent militarization occurring in Nicaragua under the Sandinista regime. When the Sandinistas in 1979 led the overthrow of General Somoza and claimed the establishment of a new, democratic government in Nicaragua, we supported their efforts by providing over \$120 million in direct economic assistance, and by helping the new regime to secure \$262 million from multilateral lending institutions. Nevertheless, our hope, and the hope of the Nicaraguan people, was soon betrayed by the Sandinistas as they imposed a new dictatorship governed by the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and upheld with military assistance from the Soviet Union and Cuba.

Today, there is little question that the Sandinistas have betrayed the principles of the Organization of American States to which they pledged adherence in 1979. They have denied Nicaraguans a pluralistic political system, a mixed economy, freedom

of expression, and a fair, responsible judicial system. Evidence of the repression and brutality characteristic of this regime was once again demonstrated in a recent Washington Times article which reported the discovery of a mass grave in Nicaragua containing 50 to 60 bodies believed to have been political prisoners executed by the Sandinista government.

Mr. Chairman, we must be critical of internal policies in any nation that creates horrors such as this, but our concern in the case of Nicaragua is heightened by the grave consequences that these domestic developments hold for the region. The Sandinistas' inward repression has been matched by an outward aggression—indeed, they openly declare their expansionist intentions in statements such as that of Tomas Borge, Nicaragua's Minister of the Interior, who claimed: "This Revolution goes beyond our borders. Our revolution was always internationalist from the moment Sandino fought in La Segovia."

This is not mere rhetoric; Sandinista words have been consistently translated into action: the regime has provided logistical and military assistance to the leftist guerrillas in El Salvador, maintained links with a variety of terrorist organizations including the PLO, and built up an active duty military force that exceeds by five times the size of Somoza's national guard at its peak. Furthermore, the number of Cuban military personnel now in Nicaragua has escalated to 2,500-3,500, a force that is bolstered by thousands more Cuban civilians, at least 200 Soviet and East European military advisers, and about 50 advisers from Libya and the PLO.

Nicaraguan and Cuban-supported subversive activities which seek to destabilize the region and which violate the borders and sovereignty of neighboring countries ultimately threaten our security as much as the security of our southern neighbors. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the United States has an interest and a responsibility to support those countries in the region, such as El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica, which are dedicated to the democratic process and which have requested our assistance in countering the external threat posed by Nicaragua.

There are, of course, a variety of means by which the United States can try to address the clear threat posed by Nicaragua—through support of the negotiations of the Contadora group, through direct negotiations with the Nicaraguan regime as were initiated at Manzanilla last year, through the application of economic pressures, and through support for the democratic resistance movement struggling for change from within. All of these approaches are important and useful and each, including assistance to the anti-

Sandinista rebels, should be available to the President and U.S. policy makers as they craft American relations with Nicaragua. To prohibit the use of funds for support of the rebels would serve to unilaterally restrict our Nation's ability to deal with the threat to peace and stability in Central America. If the United States has a responsibility to support those countries in the region which are threatened by the Sandinista's export of revolution—and I believe it certainly does—then this responsibility should be served through any and all means available.

We should support the Contras not only because this support offers a positive and effective means of pressuring the Sandinista government to moderate its actions. Popular support for the resistance has increased significantly in the past few years as the number of fighters has grown from 2,000-5,000 in 1982 to some 12,000-18,000 in 1984. As their numbers grow, the anti-Sandinistas' ability to pressure the government has reportedly begun to distribute land to individuals, rather than to cooperatives, in response to efforts by the Contras to recruit dissatisfied peasants into their forces. The presence of an active and growing armed resistance has also exerted pressure on the Sandinista government to negotiate with its neighbors, the United States and the Contadora group. While Sandinista concessions in these talks have not yet been satisfactory to meet the concerns of those threatened by Nicaraguan aggression and subversion, without the pressure of the U.S.-supported resistance, the Sandinistas would have little incentive to negotiate at all.

Mr. Chairman, I believe it is critical that the United States resume its support for the anti-Sandinista rebels in their struggle to achieve the same democratic freedom for Nicaraguans that Americans have long enjoyed. They are fighting for goals that we share; we have a responsibility to support them together with those nations in the region dedicated to the democratic process, all of which are threatened by a totalitarian minority. As long as the Sandinista Government continues to restrict the rights of its citizens, civil war will rage and Nicaraguans will flee to the United States and other countries of the region. In the interest of establishing lasting peace and stability on its southern border, the United States must demonstrate its willingness to employ all available policy options, including covert assistance to the rebels.

The resistance forces need our assistance now to combat the Soviet supplied Nicaraguan armed forces—if we deny that support today, we may not have another chance to act on behalf of democracy in Central America. Mr. Chairman, I urge my colleagues to join me in supporting the President's re-

quest for \$14 million to assist the anti-Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. BEDELL].

Mr. BEDELL. Mr. Chairman, as in the past, today's debate centers around what remains the best possible policy alternative by which to achieve the long-term national security interests of the United States in Central America, specifically with respect to U.S. relations with Nicaragua. What are those interests? Clearly, they are twofold. First, to deter and blunt Soviet, Cuban, and Eastern bloc influence in Nicaragua and Central America and, second, to provide a policy path by which the peoples of Central America are not subjected to the tyrannies of either the political left or right. Thus, our long-term national security interests in Central America today remain what they have been in the past—to promote economic development and stability, social reform and the cause of democracy throughout the nations of this strategic basin.

Each of us today must determine whether President Reagan's strategies toward Central America and Nicaragua are fulfilling these objectives. In my view, they are not. Indeed, in my view, if we continue to follow the President's course, we shall ensure the absolute failure of our policy objectives in Central America, as well as create a climate there through which Soviet, Cuban, and Eastern bloc influence will grow rather than recede in Nicaragua, as well as other Central American nations.

Let us examine the success of the President's not-so-secret war against Nicaragua. The Contras control no indigenous territory within Nicaragua, nor do they appear to enjoy the support of any groups within Nicaragua. Indeed, many of their ranks are filled with former Somoza national guardsmen who were so thoroughly despised by the majority of the people that the people of Nicaragua turned to the Sandinistas en masse. The original stated purpose of our support for the Contras—the interdiction of illegal arms shipments from Nicaragua into El Salvador—have been refuted by the Contras themselves as they claim their purpose is the outright overthrow of the Sandinista government in Managua.

The CIA's illegal mining of Nicaraguan ports resulted in the condemnation of the United States at the World Court. We should also recall that in response to this illegal act, both the Soviet Union and our allies—England and France—volunteered to sweep Nicaraguan waters clear of these devices. Thus, the actions of the CIA actually served to enhance Soviet influence and prestige within Nicaragua.

Our stated support for the Contadora peace initiative rings hollow as we reject out of hand any proposal that is offered to enhance the prospects of success of the Contadora initiative and leave both our friends and allies questioning the integrity of the U.S. commitment to this valuable initiative.

It seems to me that the President's policy has been conceived in a vacuum. Its architects have failed to examine the histories of past failures such as the Bay of Pigs where anti-Castro rebels were crushed. It seems to me that the architects of this policy remain convinced that the best solution to the socioeconomic problems confronting Central America rests in the application of military might. I thought we realized the overall ineffectiveness of such policies in both Vietnam and Iran.

In my view, our policy path must serve long-term U.S. national security interests. To do this, I believe we must move away from reliance upon a bankrupt policy that emphasizes a military solution which retains no indigenous support in Nicaragua and toward a policy that recognizes U.S. interests in being a true and honest partner in the Contadora peace process. This alternative policy is best achieved through support of the Hamilton substitute which allows the United States to provide humanitarian assistance under the supervision of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees—not the Contras—while the regional peace efforts of the Contadora group are truly permitted to go forward.

The Hamilton substitute is not an endorsement of the Sandinista regime or its internal practices. The Hamilton substitute does not play into the hands of the Soviet Union, Cuba, or the Eastern bloc. The Hamilton substitute is not a renouncement of U.S. interests in seeing a restoration of the democratic process in Nicaragua. But, the Hamilton substitute is in the best interests of the United States and our hemispheric neighbors in Central America. It spurs the Contadora process and keeps pressure on the Sandinista government through its recognition that our future decisions with respect to Central America will be predicated upon the internal behavior of the Sandinista government. Thus, American interests in promoting economic stability, social reform, and democratic pluralism are preserved, and Soviet, Cuban, and Eastern bloc influence is minimized.

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. McCurdy].

Mr. McCURDY. Mr. Chairman, Americans are confused. On one hand, they hear many critics of President Reagan referring to the Contras as Fascist thugs, and to the Sandinistas

simply as Nationalists with Socialist leanings. On the other hand, we hear the President rhetorically referring to the Contras as the "moral equivalent of our Founding Fathers."

I cannot equate the Sandinistas with misguided Socialists, nor the Contras with Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. Somewhere between these extremes of rhetoric is a policy that is slightly gray, but which advances U.S. interests and can possibly gain public support.

I was disturbed during my recent trip to Nicaragua by evidence of growing Sandinista repression, censorship, and duplicity, and by the escalation of their military forces. Democratic changes are underway, however precariously, throughout Central America, except in Nicaragua. I believe, as I did 2 years ago, that the Sandinista government poses a clear threat to the security of its neighbors and that it must abide by the promises it made to the OAS in 1979.

What we desperately need—what we have needed all along—is a clear-cut, realistic policy.

As the chairman of the Intelligence Committee in the other body, Senator DURENBERGER, has stated, because we have no policy, we appear to be reacting to events, rather than carrying out a strategy with goals by which to measure progress.

Americans are confused by strong administration rhetoric and lack of administration action; by congressional procrastination and debate. They are looking for coherence and a sense of vision. If we oppose the Sandinistas, why do we buy Nicaraguan beef and bananas when Honduras could use our trade? Why do they still enjoy most-favored-nation status? If the regime is illegitimate, and its overthrow a goal of U.S. policy, why do we continue diplomatic relations? If we are serious about meeting the Marxist challenge in Central America, it is time to begin shaping a long-term, affirmative policy, and stop confusing intentions with accomplishments.

We must ask ourselves what is really happening in Central America, what we would like to see happen, and what we can do about it. In the past, we fought change; now, we must decide whether to ignore it or support it. Unfortunately, too many Americans have visited this region with open eyes and closed minds—looking not at what is happening, but only at what is happening that would support their strongly held views.

Both in committee and on this floor, I have voted against covert aid to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua. But having recently returned from the region, I believe more strongly than ever that there is a compelling case for continued American involvement in Central America.

The Sandinista regime is an obstacle to the growth of democracy. It is also a dictatorship that is doomed to fall unless it is kept alive by outside help. There is growing internal opposition to the economic and militaristic policies of the Sandinistas. Nicaraguans are increasingly dissatisfied and frustrated with their Government, but it is equally obvious that the Contras do not have the political persona or identity to advance their cause.

In my opinion, to relieve the outside pressure on the Sandinistas would be a mistake. But the American people must believe that all channels of diplomatic, economic, and political pressure have been exhausted before there can be any support for paramilitary or military options.

The \$14 million that has been the focus of so much debate can have little practical effect. No one who has been there or who looks at the record believes that the Contras can overthrow the Government of Nicaragua, with or without these funds. But this money can be a symbol of bipartisan determination to stand firm for democracy in Central America.

I will vote for the Hamilton substitute. It provides no funds for military or paramilitary operations, although I do not believe these options should be ruled out. It seeks to impose multinational pressures on Nicaragua, including the possibility of trade sanctions, and it supports the regional peace process. I believe the substitute could have gone further. For example, it could have provided a trigger-date and congressional observers to further encourage a cease-fire and peace negotiations. But the substitute as it stands is better than the alternatives.

We can no longer afford to view the problems of Central America in black and white terms. Foreign policy requires military strength; it also requires skillful use of diplomacy and economic tools. The substitute allows for rapid action on any further requests for Contra aid. If no peace agreement is reached by October, we will be able to judge which side is responsible for the lack of progress and act accordingly. I urge its adoption.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. Broyhill].

(By unanimous consent, Mr. Broyhill was allowed to speak out of order.)

ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DEATH OF THE HONORABLE SAM J. ERVIN, JR., OF NORTH CAROLINA

Mr. BROYHILL. Mr. Chairman, it is my sad duty as the senior Member from our State of North Carolina to announce the passing of former Senator Sam Ervin of Morganton, NC.

Sam Ervin, of course, had a long and distinguished career in the Senate and prior to that served one term in this body. He called himself a country

lawyer, but he was anything but that. He was an outstanding expert on the Constitution, second to none.

Funeral plans are incomplete, but the funeral will be held later this week in Morganton, NC. Those who would like more information, please call my office.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. WORTLEY].

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WORTLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. BARTON of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Joint Resolution 239.

First, millions of illegal aliens already cross our border seeking economic opportunity.

Second, Vietnam, Cuba, Berlin Wall show that Communist conquest causes millions to flee.

About 10 percent of the population of Vietnam has fled. About the same percentage of Nicaraguans is already living in Costa Rica, not counting those in Honduras, United States, and elsewhere.

Third, Nicaragua is fast becoming communist.

Sandinista rhetoric, actions, and allies demonstrate that Sandinista goal is a traditional Communist state.

Fourth, Nicaraguan neighbors cannot house influx of refugees.

Their economy won't support it; political traditions do not encourage it.

Fifth, conclusion: If the Communists consolidate their position in Central America, the United States will experience a new, huge wave of illegal immigration.

I submit the following document to substantiate this conclusion:

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: 20 MILLION WITHOUT A COUNTRY

(By Laura Ingraham)

Over 100 million people live between the Rio Grande and Panama. Communist instigated political turmoil coupled with acute economic stagnation continue to plague that region. As a result, millions of refugees and displaced persons will soon make their way to the United States in search of freedom and security. How many people can our country expect? To which cities are they likely to migrate? What impact will this influx have on our society and economy? What is our moral obligation in this grim situation?

The time to face these distressing questions is long overdue. Already since 1970, the number of illegal aliens in the U.S. has risen dramatically—from about 600,000 to between 6 and 12 million. From New York to Miami, Los Angeles to Dallas, city and county governments are already hard-pressed by problems resulting from rapidly expanding communities of illegal Latin American aliens.

Soon literally tens of millions of refugees will be flooding across our borders. A minimum of three or four million people illegally enter our country each year. The Los Angeles county supervisor estimates that between 1.1 and 1.7 million illegal Latin Amer-

icans live there. That figure could increase by 3.2 million if the crisis in Central America is not stopped. Conservative figures for New York City place its illegal population at between 500,000 and 750,000. Soon, 3.4 million more Central Americans may be in New York. Miami may find itself inundated by 1.4 million more refugees, Chicago by another 1.1 million and San Francisco by another 1.9 million (see Appendix). Moral solution must be quickly found.

As the Sandinista regime expands its "revolution without borders" to all of Central America, staggering numbers of refugees will flee to the United States. Both El Salvador and Guatemala have been battling guerrillas trained and armed by Nicaragua and Cuba. Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala are, according to the U.N. High Commissioner of Refugees, the major refugee-generating countries in Central America.

I

As communist revolution seizes Central America, eventually destabilizing even Mexico, how many refugees can we expect in the United States? History shows that Communist takeovers consistently generate large numbers of refugees. After the fall of Cuba and Vietnam an estimated 10 percent of the population fled each country, often at the price of incredible risks and even death.

It is unrealistic, however, to expect only 10 percent of the Central Americans to flee to the United States! It is much easier to get from Guatemala or El Salvador to the United States than from Vietnam. At worst, one has only to walk northward. Many more persons will become "feet people" than become boat people. Now the cultural gap is far less severe for Latin Americans. In Los Angeles, Miami, Washington D.C. and other major urban centers, complete Hispanic communities allow illegal aliens to live and work without even speaking English. Finally, many Mexicans and Central Americans already have friends or relatives living here.

CIA interviews with the Mariel boat people report that at least another 10 percent of the present Cuban population (for a total of 20 percent) would leave if they could. Because it is easier for Central Americans and Mexicans to come here, between 10-20 percent of the population will do so. In fact, more than 10 percent of the Salvadoran population is here already.

Country	Current population	10 percent refugees	15 percent refugees	20 percent refugees
Costa Rica	2,600,000	260,000	390,000	520,000
El Salvador	4,700,000	470,000	705,000	940,000
Guatemala	7,700,000	770,000	1,155,000	1,540,000
Honduras	4,300,000	430,000	645,000	860,000
Nicaragua	2,800,000	280,000	420,000	560,000
Panama	2,000,000	200,000	300,000	400,000
Mexico	75,700,000	7,570,000	11,355,000	15,140,000
Total	99,800,000	9,980,000	14,970,000	19,960,000

Note.—Rounded figures.

We can then expect that between 10 and 20 million refugees and displaced persons will breach our southern border as the turmoil escalates. This almost equals 10 percent of the current U.S. population, or the equivalent to the 10 largest cities in the U.S. Twenty million refugees is 39 times the population of Vermont or 33 times the population of Delaware. It is also three times the combined populations of Alaska, Wyoming, Vermont, Delaware, District of Columbia, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Nevada and New Hampshire.

What impact will these millions of illegal aliens have on the United States? This ques-

tion concerns all Americans because contrary to the casual assumption, most illegal aliens do not stay in the southern United States. In search of anonymity and jobs, new arrivals follow the beaten path to every major urban area. Cities as diverse as Miami, Dallas, Los Angeles, Chicago and New York have extremely high numbers of illegal residents.

It is difficult to measure the distribution of the illegal alien population. Some maintain that illegals hide in areas where they are not likely to be apprehended by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Yet many, including the INS, argue that overall the illegal alien population is distributed in generally the same pattern as the legal alien population. This is because illegal aliens, especially once they bring their immediate families here, tend to become legal aliens.

To predict the illegal alien distribution in 1983, the INS surveyed the legal alien distribution in this country. The totals, printed in the Appendix, showed that in fiscal year 1982, 29.3 percent of all legal aliens (and illegal as well) lived in the western region of the U.S., 20.5 percent in the southern region, 34.8 percent in the eastern region and 15.4 percent in the northern region. The study also broke down the percentages by selected cities in each region. From these it is possible to predict the number of illegal aliens from Central America and Mexico who will migrate to each city.

For example, 17.1 percent of the aliens were living in New York City. So, if 20 percent of the population between the Rio Grande and the Panama Canal become refugees, 3.4 million of them will inundate New York. Los Angeles, with a distribution of 15.8 percent, can expect at least 3.15 million additional refugees, Baltimore another 400,000 and even Portland, Oregon another 140,000.

The one qualification is that for major cities such as Los Angeles, Dallas, Houston, Miami, Washington D.C. and New York, which already have a high ratio of illegal Latin Americans, the figures are quite low. For example, based on current legal alien distribution, if 20 percent of El Salvador's population fled, 27,260 would be expected to arrive in Washington D.C. However, almost 60,000 Salvadorans are estimated to be in the nation's Capital already. Still the figures are valuable as a low-end projection of expected refugees.

II

In the past, people have (both legally and illegally) migrated to the United States from Mexico and Central America for socio-economic reasons. The traditional migrant left his homeland because of poverty, high unemployment, inadequate education and a general lack of opportunities for personal advancement. Today, some, especially Mexican, still come for these reasons.

After decades of socialist policies, Mexico has begun a downward spiral towards a virtual economic collapse. In 1983, inflation was between 80 to 100 percent and the foreign debt approached \$100 billion. Unemployment and underemployment now total 45-50 percent of the labor force; on top of this, Mexico needs to create over 850,000 new jobs every year just to keep pace with its population growth.

Senate experts predict that should the Mexican economy collapse completely, disorder and perhaps civil war are a likely result. This would cause 7-14 million Mexicans to flee over the Rio Grande. Yet, there

are more serious repercussions. Such a situation would provide the opportunity for Cuban-Soviet destabilization and subversion. As the economic crisis worsens monthly, such opportunities are growing.

Already, Cuban-Soviet sponsored revolution has dramatically increased the numbers of refugees heading for the United States. However, many can still find asylum in more stable Central American countries such as Honduras or Costa Rica. The UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR), which oversees all refugee camps within Central America, reports that as of December 1983 over 300,000 refugees had fled to neighboring countries. The Costa Rican government estimates that 200,000 additional undocumented refugees are in Costa Rica. Also, the U.S. Department of State estimates that 400,000 citizens are displaced within El Salvador and between 100,000-500,000 are displaced within Guatemala. The local refugee crisis is so severe that UNHCR assistance in Central America and Mexico has doubled since 1981 from \$12.5 million to \$25 million, 40 percent of which is funded by the United States.

If communist aggression remains unchecked in Central America it will engulf successive refugee campsites and cause an explosion of "feet people" who will walk north to the United States. President Reagan, in his May 9, 1984 speech on Central American policy, stated that concerns about "refugees fleeing communist oppression and seeking entry into our country" are "well founded." He warned that Central America "has become the state for a bold attempt by the Soviet Union, Cuba and Nicaragua to install communism by force throughout the hemisphere... weapons, supplies and funds are shipped from the Soviet bloc to Cuba, from Cuba to Nicaragua, from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran guerrillas." Furthermore, the President noted that the Kissinger Commission report agrees that we could soon be facing "a Communist Central America with additional Communist military bases on the mainland of this hemisphere and Communist subversion spreading southward and northward. This Communist subversion poses the threat that the 100 million people from Panama to the open border on our South could come under the control of pro-Soviet regimes." Twenty million of those people will legally or illegally cross that "open border on our South."

Some newly arrived Salvadorans in this country came to find employment. They are being called economic migrants rather than political refugees. However, their economic problems stem directly from the Marxist guerrilla war now being waged in El Salvador. Never before have we faced such huge numbers of refugee aliens from Central America and their numbers will only continue to swell unless the communist threat that drives them from their homelands is stopped.

III

Of greater concern to many Americans is the economic impact of illegal immigration. In June 1982, the Supreme Court ruled that under equal enforcement of the law and in the absence of alternate Congressional intent, the various states must provide free public schooling for illegal aliens. This, coupled with statistics such as 64 percent of all births at UCLA's hospital are by illegal alien mothers, kindles the fear that illegals represent a great financial burden to Americans.

Defenders of immigration are quick to point out that, surprisingly, taxes paid equal benefits received by illegals. This is true, but is not the whole story. It doesn't take into account the cost of job displacement. Rice University Professor Donald L. Huddle estimates that every ten illegal workers displace six Americans. Once a single firm hires illegals, there is a cost incentive for all its competitors to do likewise. The ripple effect of this practice is clear in key service and construction sectors in the southwest whose employees are almost exclusively illegal aliens.

Displacement also affects all income levels of American workers. It is a major myth that most illegal aliens take only low paying jobs that Americans do not want. The 1982 nationwide apprehension figures by INS investigators, including Border Patrol apprehensions which focus on farms and ranches, reveal that only 11 percent make less than minimum wage; 27 percent were paid \$5.25 or above, and 9 percent were paid \$7.25 or above.

Further, the estimated costs of job displacement are enormous. The Congressional Budget Office reports that each unemployed American costs \$7,000 annually in transfer payments such as unemployment benefits and public assistance. Estimates from the U.S. Department of Labor place overall costs for displaced American workers at \$1,113 billion annually per one million illegal aliens. CIS's December 1983 West Watch cited annual U.S. public costs per one million illegal aliens as follows:

<i>U.S. public costs per million illegal immigrants</i>	
Job displacement.....	\$1,113,000,000
Unemployment.....	181,400,000
Education.....	367,200,000
Health care.....	92,900,000
Welfare.....	130,900,000
Justice and law enforcement—local.....	62,300,000
Justice and law enforcement—Federal.....	29,300,000
Subtotal.....	1,977,000,000
Taxes paid (minus).....	-995,000,000
Total.....	982,000,000

Should we experience massive illegal immigration as high as 20 million people, we would face annual public expenses of almost \$20 billion.

In fact, \$20 billion a year is a conservative projection of illegal alien costs. Currently, taxes paid cover transfer payments received by illegals because many still fit the traditional profile of young, single males in search of temporary employment. These men generally work hard, pay taxes and accept little welfare, education or unemployment benefits. However, as the political situation in Central America becomes increasingly volatile many more women and children are seeking permanent resettlement. Some men send their families to America for safety; others who are already here bring up their extended family instead of returning home to them. This dramatic increase in the number of families crossing our southern border will destroy the tax-benefits balance. Many of these new public costs will have to be borne by state and local governments, as cities with large illegal alien populations have already discovered. Education costs will skyrocket, especially because of the Supreme Court decision requiring all public schools to admit illegal alien children. Special tutoring counseling and bilingual programs are being developed

to facilitate these children's integration into American schools.

Health care costs also are expanding as many of these political refugees arrive with diseases ranging from malnutrition to tuberculosis and internal parasites. Frequent cases of these diseases are found among Nicaraguans in Honduran refugee camps. As more of them flee the highly overcrowded and often dangerous conditions of these camps, we can expect to encounter many more such cases in our public hospitals. As noted above, 64-80 percent of all current births in the Los Angeles public hospitals are to illegal alien mothers. These children are automatically U.S. citizens and upon attaining the age of 21 will be able to petition for their immediate relatives.

Other transfer payments will escalate as well, especially welfare benefits such as food stamps and AFDC (Aid to Families With Dependent Children). Since dependent children born in the U.S. are citizens they are eligible for all welfare programs. In 1980, 17.5 percent of benefits paid by all county operated public assistance programs in Los Angeles went to illegal aliens. This figure can only rise as more "feet people" arrive in the U.S.

With aliens increasingly reluctant to return to their native countries unemployment insurance payments are also growing. An experimental screening of unemployment insurance recipients for March 1982 in Illinois revealed that 51 percent of them were illegal aliens. In another study, 49 percent of the selected alien population in California had received unemployment benefits between 1975 and 1980.

Ironically, should the U.S. Government change its present policy and recognize the growing political nature of immigration from Central America by giving these people legal refugee status, public assistance expenses would soar even higher. Now, some illegal aliens do not apply for public assistance out of fear of being detected and deported. But if the government provides legal status, it also will have to provide huge assistance and resettlement programs.

IV

The current debate over U.S. immigration law reform highlights a critical consideration: illegal immigration must be halted now; the greater the crisis. Although Congress has been slow to realize this, the American public has not. Since 1977, public opposition to immigration has risen dramatically. A March 1977 Gallup poll showed 42 percent of the respondents favored decreased immigration, an increase of 9 percent from a Gallup poll taken twelve years earlier. By August 1981, 65 percent of the public favored decreased immigration in a similarly worded NBC poll. This shows a 23 percent increase in opposition to immigration in only four years.

The INS, like the American public, strongly supports immigration reform through increasing border control. They are dangerously understaffed to stop the current number of illegal crossings, let alone handling dramatic increases. While some improvement is necessary, the number of new officers needed is highly debated. Closing the border is virtually impossible; a fortified southern border manned by 50,000 guards would be necessary to keep everyone out. Yet, currently the Border Patrol normally has 450 men on any given eight-hour shift covering the 1,900 mile long U.S.-Mexican border. Clearly, there is a crying need for increased INS staffing levels.

The spectre of the Mexican-U.S. border bristling with guns raises a terrible moral dilemma for the United States. This country was founded by men and women fleeing governmental oppression of basic religious liberties and ever since has been the promised land for all people suffering economic, civil and religious oppression. Can we now in good conscience close our borders to families seeking the very freedoms which brought our own forebearers here? Internal reform of our immigration law ignores the only permanent and just solution—halting the causes of the massive flow of illegal aliens from Mexico and Central America.

The threat we now face is a direct consequence of our neglect of economics and national security south of the Rio Grande. For over half a century, Mexico has been ruled by the oligarchic PRI, the Institutional Revolutionary Party. Although the PRI represents itself as a "progressive democratic" party, no other party has won the presidency or a majority in Congress in all that time. The PRI's corruption, combined with its socialist economic policy, limits Mexico's ability

to solve many of its pressing problems. Only a commitment to open government and massive reprivatization of the economy will stop the northward flow of refugees from becoming a flood.

Former Costa Rican Foreign Minister Gonzalo Facio has stated "The object of the current communist offensive in Central America is Mexico and its vast oil riches and its geographical proximity to the United States." He could well have added, and the strategically important Caribbean Sea lanes (The April 4, 1984 issue of the White House Digest explains that "nearly half our total exports and imports, representing over two-thirds of our seaborne foreign trade, pass through the vital commercial arteries of the Panama Canal, the Caribbean or the Gulf of Mexico.") A revolutionary pipeline has been built from the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries through Cuba to Panama, Nicaragua and El Salvador, with extensions reaching into Guatemala and Honduras. Economic prosperity will never come to the region until that pipeline is dismantled.

Three to four million Latin Americans come into this country illegally every year. They come seeking the American dream: economic prosperity and political liberty. As long as their own countries are burdened with inefficient state-controlled economics and Marxist guerrilla warfare, that dream will be unrealizable at home. As those problems race unchecked toward a violent climax, we face the real possibility of 20 million people pouring into this country very shortly. Once this great northern trek begins it will be impossible to stop it. The only hope for the 100 million people between the Rio Grande and Panama lies in resolute action of both their and our governments.

(This report was prepared by the Council for Inter-American Security, a non-profit, non-partisan, education and research organization. Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of CIS or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.)

ILLEGAL ALIEN DISTRIBUTION BASED ON 15 PERCENT OF CURRENT POPULATION BECOMING REFUGEES

Legal alien distribution fiscal year 1982	Percent	Mexico 11,355,000	Costa Rica 390,000	El Salvador 705,000	Guatemala 1,155,000	Honduras 645,000	Nicaragua 420,000	Panama 300,000	Total 14,970,000
Western region	29.3	3,327,015	114,270	206,565	338,415	188,985	123,060	87,900	4,386,210
Los Angeles	15.8	1,794,090	61,620	111,390	182,490	101,910	66,360	47,400	2,365,260
San Francisco	9.4	1,067,370	36,660	66,270	108,570	60,630	39,480	28,200	1,407,180
San Diego	1.8	204,390	7,020	12,690	20,790	11,610	7,560	5,400	269,460
Honolulu	1.3	147,615	5,070	9,165	15,015	8,385	5,460	3,900	194,610
Phoenix	1.0	113,550	3,900	7,050	11,550	6,450	4,200	3,000	149,700
Southern region	20.5	2,327,775	79,950	144,525	236,775	132,225	86,100	61,500	3,068,850
Miami	6.8	772,140	26,520	47,940	78,540	43,860	28,560	20,400	1,017,960
Atlanta	3.1	352,005	12,090	21,855	35,805	19,995	13,020	9,300	464,070
Dallas	2.8	317,940	10,920	19,740	32,340	18,060	11,760	8,400	419,160
Houston	2.6	295,230	10,140	18,330	30,030	16,770	10,920	7,800	389,220
New Orleans	2.3	261,165	8,970	16,215	26,565	14,835	9,660	6,900	344,310
San Antonio	1.2	136,260	4,680	8,460	13,860	7,740	5,040	3,600	179,640
El Paso	1.0	113,550	3,900	7,050	11,550	6,450	4,200	3,000	149,700
Hartford	.7	79,485	2,730	4,935	8,085	4,515	2,940	2,100	104,790
Eastern region	34.8	3,951,540	135,720	245,340	401,940	224,460	146,160	104,400	5,209,560
New York City	17.1	1,941,705	66,690	120,555	197,505	110,295	71,820	51,300	2,559,870
Newark	4.0	454,200	15,600	28,200	46,200	25,800	16,800	12,000	596,800
Washington	2.9	329,295	11,310	20,445	33,495	18,705	12,180	8,700	434,130
Boston	2.7	306,585	10,530	19,035	31,185	17,415	11,340	8,100	404,190
Philadelphia	2.5	283,875	9,750	17,625	28,875	16,125	10,500	7,500	374,250
Baltimore	1.7	193,035	6,630	11,985	19,635	10,965	7,140	5,100	254,490
San Juan	1.2	136,260	4,680	8,460	13,860	7,740	5,040	3,600	179,640
Buffalo	1.2	136,260	4,680	8,460	13,860	7,740	5,040	3,600	179,640
Hartford	1.2	136,260	4,680	8,460	13,860	7,740	5,040	3,600	179,640
Portland, ME	.2	22,710	780	1,410	2,310	1,290	840	600	29,940
Northern region	15.4	1,748,670	60,660	108,570	177,870	99,330	64,680	46,200	2,305,380
Chicago	5.4	613,170	21,060	38,070	62,370	34,830	22,680	16,200	808,380
Cleveland	1.6	181,680	6,240	11,280	18,480	10,320	6,720	4,800	239,520
Detroit	1.6	181,680	6,240	11,280	18,480	10,320	6,720	4,800	239,520
Seattle	1.6	181,680	6,240	11,280	18,480	10,320	6,720	4,800	239,520
Denver	1.5	170,325	5,850	10,575	17,325	9,675	6,300	4,500	224,550
Kansas City	1.2	136,260	4,680	8,460	13,860	7,740	5,040	3,600	179,640
St. Paul	.9	102,195	3,510	6,345	10,395	5,805	3,780	2,700	134,730
Portland, OR	.7	79,485	2,730	4,935	8,085	4,515	2,940	2,100	104,790
Omaha	.5	56,775	1,950	3,525	5,775	3,225	2,100	1,500	74,850
Helena	.2	22,710	780	1,410	2,310	1,290	840	600	29,940
Anchorage	.2	22,710	780	1,410	2,310	1,290	840	600	29,940

Note.—Figures are rounded.

ILLEGAL ALIEN DISTRIBUTION BASED ON 20 PERCENT OF CURRENT POPULATION BECOMING REFUGEES

Legal alien distribution fiscal year 1982	Percent	Mexico 15,140,000	Costa Rica 520,000	El Salvador 940,000	Guatemala 1,540,000	Honduras 860,000	Nicaragua 560,000	Panama 400,000	Total 19,980,000
Western Region	29.3	4,436,020	152,360	275,420	451,220	251,980	164,080	117,200	5,848,280
Los Angeles	15.8	2,392,120	82,160	148,520	243,320	135,880	88,480	63,200	3,153,680
San Francisco	9.4	1,423,160	48,880	88,360	144,760	80,840	52,640	37,600	1,876,240
San Diego	1.8	272,520	9,360	16,920	27,720	15,480	10,080	7,200	359,280
Honolulu	1.3	196,820	6,760	12,220	20,020	11,180	7,280	5,200	259,480
Phoenix	1.0	151,400	5,200	9,400	15,400	8,600	5,600	4,000	199,600
Southern Region	20.5	3,103,700	106,600	192,700	315,700	176,300	114,800	82,000	4,091,800
Miami	6.8	1,029,520	35,360	63,920	104,720	58,480	38,080	27,200	1,357,280
Atlanta	3.1	469,340	16,120	29,140	47,740	26,660	17,360	12,400	618,760
Dallas	2.8	423,920	14,560	26,320	43,120	24,080	15,680	11,200	558,880

ILLEGAL ALIEN DISTRIBUTION BASED ON 20 PERCENT OF CURRENT POPULATION BECOMING REFUGEES—Continued

Legal alien distribution fiscal year 1982	Percent	Mexico 15,140,000	Costa Rica 520,000	El Salvador 940,000	Guatemala 1,540,000	Honduras 860,000	Nicaragua 560,000	Panama 400,000	Total 19,980,000
Houston.....	2.6	393,640	13,520	24,440	40,040	22,360	14,560	10,400	518,960
New Orleans.....	2.3	348,220	11,960	21,620	35,420	19,780	12,880	9,200	459,080
San Antonio.....	1.2	181,680	6,240	11,280	18,480	10,320	6,720	4,800	239,520
El Paso.....	1.0	151,400	5,200	9,400	15,400	8,600	5,600	4,000	199,600
Hartford.....	.7	105,980	3,640	6,580	10,780	6,020	3,920	2,800	139,720
Eastern Region.....	34.8	5,268,720	180,960	327,120	535,920	299,280	194,880	139,200	6,946,080
New York City.....	17.1	2,588,940	88,920	160,740	263,340	147,060	95,760	68,400	3,413,160
Newark.....	4.0	605,600	20,800	37,600	61,600	34,400	22,400	16,000	798,400
Washington.....	2.9	439,060	15,080	27,260	44,660	24,940	16,240	11,600	578,840
Boston.....	2.7	408,780	14,040	25,380	41,580	23,220	15,120	10,800	538,920
Philadelphia.....	2.5	378,500	13,000	23,500	38,500	21,500	14,000	10,000	499,000
Baltimore.....	1.7	257,380	8,840	15,980	26,180	14,620	9,520	6,800	339,320
San Juan.....	1.2	181,680	6,240	11,280	18,480	10,320	6,720	4,800	239,520
Buffalo.....	1.2	181,680	6,240	11,280	18,480	10,320	6,720	4,800	239,520
Hartford.....	1.2	181,680	6,240	11,280	18,480	10,320	6,720	4,800	239,520
Portland, ME.....	.2	30,280	1,040	1,880	3,080	1,720	1,120	800	39,920
Northern Region.....	15.4	2,331,560	80,080	144,760	237,160	132,440	86,240	61,600	3,073,840
Chicago.....	5.4	817,560	28,080	50,760	83,160	46,440	30,240	21,600	1,077,840
Cleveland.....	1.6	242,240	8,320	15,040	24,540	13,760	8,960	6,400	319,360
Detroit.....	1.6	242,240	8,320	15,040	24,540	13,760	8,960	6,400	319,360
Seattle.....	1.6	242,240	8,320	15,040	24,540	13,760	8,960	6,400	319,360
Denver.....	1.5	227,100	7,800	14,100	23,100	12,900	8,400	6,000	299,400
Kansas City.....	1.2	181,680	6,240	11,280	18,480	10,320	6,720	4,800	239,520
St. Paul.....	.9	136,260	4,680	8,460	13,860	7,740	5,040	3,600	179,640
Portland, OR.....	.7	105,980	3,640	6,580	10,780	6,020	3,920	2,800	139,720
Omaha.....	.5	75,700	2,600	4,700	7,700	4,300	2,800	2,000	99,800
Helena.....	.2	30,280	1,040	1,880	3,080	1,720	1,120	800	39,920
Anchorage.....	.2	30,280	1,040	1,880	3,080	1,720	1,120	800	39,920

Notes.—Figures are rounded.

Mr. WORTLEY. Mr. Chairman, today's vote on aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters is a vote about the freedom of the Nicaraguan people. If we vote "yes" on aid to the freedom fighters, we will be voting for giving freedom and democracy a chance in Nicaragua. If we vote "no," we will be condemning the people of Nicaragua to the terror and repression that are inherent in Communist states.

Some people may claim this is an overstatement. It is not. It is a statement of fact.

Before going any further, let's clarify some of the terms of this debate. First, "Sandinista" is inaccurately reserved for the ruling regime in Managua, which has perverted and twisted Sandinismo until Sandino himself would not recognize it. Many of the armed opposition, on the other hand, are Sandinistas who have remained true to the goals of Sandino.

The term "Contra" has been used incorrectly to designate the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. "Contra" is short for counterrevolutionaries, but the freedom fighters are not counterrevolutionaries—they are revolutionaries. They are continuing the revolution in which so many of them participated against Somoza. They are still fighting for freedom and democratic pluralism. The goals of the revolution have not changed—the dictatorship they are fighting has.

The Sandinista regime is a self-proclaimed "Marxist-Leninist" regime, yet when some of us talk about communism in Central America, some people start shaking their heads. Marxism-Leninism is communism.

Now let's clear up; just who is involved in the conflict in Nicaragua. Some people seem to have the idea

that this is a conflict between the United States and Nicaragua, an imperialistic view that gives the United States a much larger role than it actually plays. The Nicaraguan conflict is not between the United States and Nicaragua; it is not between the United States and the Soviet Union; it is a conflict between Nicaraguans, some of whom adhere to communism, others to freedom and pluralistic democracy. The Soviet Union has weighed in heavily, both directly and indirectly, on the side of the Marxist-Leninist Sandinista National Liberation Front. The United States has weighed in much less convincingly on the side of the democratic groups.

And what about the nature of the Nicaraguan regime? It has received hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military support from Cuba, the Soviet Union, East-bloc countries, and Libya to build the largest and best equipped army in Central America. It has instituted censorship of the press; it practices religious repression of Catholics, Jews, Moravians, and Evangelicals; it has forcefully relocated whole communities; it does not allow free labor unions; it has more political prisoners than Somoza ever had; it promotes indoctrination rather than education.

I could go on, but I think you get the general idea. And if you think freedom and democracy are a fading dream now, it's nothing compared to what it will be if the Nicaraguan regime is given the chance to consolidate its position and power. The ramifications of such a consolidation for all of Central America, Mexico, and the United States must not be underestimated.

To vote against aid will be voting to consign our Nicaraguan neighbors to communism and the Central American region to subversion and destabilization. The hour is late. The choice is clear. A vote for aid is a vote for freedom.

□ 1830

Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WORTLEY. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. BLILEY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of aid for the freedom fighters.

Mr. Chairman, the question that we are now debating—whether or not to give \$14 million in aid to the democratic freedom fighters in Nicaragua—revolves around two principal points.

The first point is whether this Nation, the United States of America, is going to abandon its history, its values, and its commitment to the expansion of freedom, liberty, and justice in the world. Our Nation was made free by the blood and sweat of our forefathers and by the help of European countries and individuals in our struggle against the foreign domination of Great Britain. Now there is a large and growing force of people in Nicaragua who are trying to bring our principles of liberty and democratic government to that most unfortunate land.

The freedom fighters, their families, and their less vocal supporters only want the opportunity to participate in an honest and open political process to determine the future of Nicaragua and the revolution that brought them so much hope in 1979. That revolution has been subverted and stolen by a relatively small group of dedicated Com-

munists. If the friends of the American Revolution had abandoned us when the going got tough, how do you think America might have turned out? I am thankful that we never had to find out.

If we in this Congress turn our backs on people whose only goal is freedom and the right to chose their own destiny, then I would tell you that we have turned our backs on our morality and our history as a nation and as a people.

The second point to this debate goes beyond support for our principles to our security. We need only look at similar debates in history for this lesson. There were Members of this body who stood right here in this well and warned America that Adolph Hitler was a dangerous madman. Others scoffed and said that Hitler's rearmament program would only put Germany back to its rightful place and that Hitler was just a reformer. America and the West did nothing until after the world had been plunged into the deadliest war in history.

We were warned that Mao-tse-Tung was a ruthless, bloodthirsty Communist who would threaten the world with his fanatical adherence to Marxism. Others scoffed and said that Mao was just an agrarian reformer who would be good for China and the world. America and the West did nothing and had to watch as 60 million Chinese were murdered and starved to death because they lacked "purity of the spirit" in adhering to Mao's Marxism.

There were those who stood here and warned America that Fidel Castro was a Communist revolutionary who would not improve the life of the Cuban people, but that he would threaten America and the world with his adherence to Marxism. Others scoffed at this and said that Castro was "just a popular reformer" who had nothing but the welfare of his people at heart. So America and the West acquiesced to Castro and now there are 20,000 Cuban combat troops in Angola, 5,000 Cuban combat troops in Ethiopia, 10,000 Cubans in Nicaragua. There were 800 Cuban "construction workers" in Grenada who shot Americans in 1983.

There were those who stood here and warned of the Marxism of Augustino Neto in Angola and Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and how they would be a threat to human rights and freedom in those nations if we abandoned the democratic groups seeking to promote freedom and not totalitarianism. Others scoffed at that and said that these were honorable men who wanted pluralism and nonalignment. So America cut off support from UNITA and helped Mr. Mugabe share power in Zimbabwe. Now the Cubans protect what is left to the Marxist government of Angola because UNITA

has survived despite us and is gaining support as it progresses throughout the country. In Zimbabwe there is no pluralism as the Marxists have driven out their opponents and have seized control of the Government and the army.

When I and others stand in this well and warn America that the Sandinista Marxists in Nicaragua desire nothing less than the conquest of Central America there will be those who scoff and say that there is no immediate threat to us and that the Sandinistas are nice people who are being pushed into being bad by America. These naysayers need only open their history books to see the fate of Central America if we do not help our democratic brethren in Nicaragua.

I support freedom, dignity, liberty, and democracy. I will not abandon others who also believe in these things.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. OWENS].

Mr. OWENS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution. I rise to speak against the expenditure of \$14 million of the American taxpayers' money to fund an illegal military intervention to overthrow the legitimate Government of Nicaragua.

Mr. Chairman, I have listened to most of the debate, the very long debate today, and I know that at this point no speaker can hope to add very much or to say very much that is new; however, I think it is important that certain things are reemphasized at this point in the debate.

I think it is important to reemphasize the fact that since we are concerned about the containment of communism or the stopping of the spread of communism in Latin America, we should consider those speakers who have argued again and again that military intervention is the least effective, the least efficient way to contain communism in Latin America and Central America.

Military intervention did not stop communism in Southeast Asia. Several speakers have drawn parallels with the war in Vietnam and I think those parallels were appropriate. I fully agree with those who have said that the lessons of history that were taught by Vietnam should not be forgotten. We lost about 58,000 American lives in Vietnam and many more were mutilated, wounded; many more bear psychological scars as a result of our assumption that the domino theory should govern our actions in Vietnam.

We assumed that if Vietnam fell, all of Southeast Asia would go behind Vietnam and we had to take a stand in Vietnam. History has shown that this was not true.

The New York Times and several other publications in the last 2 weeks pointed out the fact that Southeast

Asia is booming and prosperous at this point. The only governments, the only nations in Southeast Asia that are not prosperous, that are not booming, are the nations of Vietnam and Cambodia, the two areas of conflict, the two areas of violence and military intervention.

The economies are strong in countries that we thought would go under if we lost in Vietnam—and we did lose in Vietnam. And yet the domino theory is not occurring. It appears that the domino theory is acting in reverse in favor of the United States and against the Soviet Union, since not only in Southeast Asia but following the end of the war in Vietnam capitalism has begun to flourish even in the largest Communist nation in the world, the nation of China. China has the largest land mass of communism and the largest number of people under communism, and yet capitalism is flourishing and being applauded in China.

We should learn the lessons of history and understand that if we want to stop communism in Latin America, in South America, and Central America, perhaps we should take a new tack. Perhaps we should weave together some of these more creative and imaginative programs, the peaceful programs that have succeeded.

The Marshall plan succeeded. Why not a Marshall plan for Central America and South America and Latin America? The Peace Corps, although it was only an experiment and quite small in scope, succeeded.

The Alliance for Progress succeeded partially. It only failed because the same forces that are causing problems in Latin America now were intransigent, refused to budge, resisted President Kennedy's attempt to change peacefully the economies of Latin America in favor of giving more to the masses who suffer in Latin America.

The people of Latin America, like the people in the rest of the world, the ordinary people are fed up with ideology. They want food, clothing, shelter. They want educational opportunities for their children. They want decent health care. They are not interested in ideology.

In Poland the people who work in private factories, private enterprises that recently have been introduced in the Communist state of Poland; those people are looking at their paychecks and they like the paychecks they get from private enterprise. I am sure private enterprise in China is not worrying the people who are profiting from that.

All over, ideologies must take a bow to actual performance, especially in this hemisphere in which we claim to have the dominant influence. We have the leadership here. Most of the people in the hemisphere look to us for leadership. Why do we not provide

more aggressive leadership in terms of creative and imaginative programs which will provide that improvement in the quality of life for the numerous people out there who only want decent food, clothing, shelter, health care and an educational opportunity for their children.

We can do this. We can start with the \$14 million by using it in a humanitarian way. Spend it through channels to help all the refugees, refugees anywhere in Central America. Let us let some objective body, like the International Red Cross or the U.N. committee on refugees distribute this \$14 million as a symbolic gesture, a beginning gesture for a new policy in Latin America, a new policy which would be made up of past programs, a tapestry which would be woven from some of the things that have succeeded in the past.

Why not a Marshall plan? Why not more Peace Corps? We can go forward and contain communism and do what is best for all of the people of this hemisphere. We can do it with peaceful initiatives.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. HUTTOL].

Mr. HUTTOL. Mr. Chairman, having previously visited in Central America, as many other Members of this body have, I feel that I should rise in support of the efforts of the Contras to bring about some changes in the repressive Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. What a shame that the revolution which overthrew the dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza took the wrong turn.

I remember very well that in 1979 we tried to assist the fledgling new regime. I remember even more clearly hearing the late chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Clement Zablocki, at the end of a long debate on whether or not we should vote \$75 million to the new government in Nicaragua, say, "It is the least we can do. It's a chance we have to take in trying to bring democracy to this country." I voted for the \$75 million and took a lot of flack for doing so.

Sadly, our attempts to work with the Sandinistas have not been successful. The Sandinista regime turned its back on us—turned its back on freedom—turned its back on a pluralistic form of government and the hopes and aspirations of the revolution. I think there is no argument that the Sandinista government is Marxist-Leninist—that the people are suffering under a Communist regime.

Unfortunately, we do not have the luxury of not being involved in Central America. In view of what the Soviets, Cubans, and others are doing worldwide—in Afghanistan, Poland, Nicaragua, and elsewhere—we must do what we can to prevent the spread of

their type of activity. This is especially true at our doorstep in Latin America.

Because of our involvement and because of our support we are greatly encouraged by the progress that is being made in El Salvador. It is good to see that the people have expressed themselves freely at the ballot box by electing President Duarte, who appears to be making good strides in curbing the death squads and bringing about some reforms to help the plight of his people.

Frankly, one of the great concerns of the people in Florida and other gulf coast States is a further flood of refugees into the United States. If people can live in peace and freedom with hope for the future in their own country, they will not seek to escape to another nation. If we can help to democratize the countries to the south, then we can better maintain jobs here for our own people, and also avoid costly programs in helping refugees to settle here.

The Contras can keep the pressure on Nicaragua, and slow or stop the spread of Sandinista-like regimes to other countries. The Contras can keep the pressure on the Sandinistas to change their way of life—to quit being oppressive to the people and the church—to allow freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Without this kind of pressure, don't expect any changes in what's going on in Nicaragua. Do not expect any lessening of activity by the Soviets and Cubans.

Yes, we should support aid to the Contras. We should not and have no intentions of sending American troops to fight in Central America. Our adversaries have good success in using proxies. Why can't we do the same? Let's help the Contras in keeping the pressure on a very repressive regime in Nicaragua.

□ 1840

Mr. AUCCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from North Dakota [Mr. DORGAN].

Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota. Mr. Chairman, the central issue in the debate on aid to the Contra rebels in Nicaragua is whether the United States seeks peace and democracy through diplomacy or subversion. Put another way, does our policy in Central America use military force as a last resort or as a first resort.

The White House has poured some new wine into its old Central American policy wineskins. It claims that its new peace proposals cinch the argument in favor of aid to the anti-government Contras in Nicaragua. But I have grave doubts.

I welcome any movement by the President away from military aid to the Contras and toward a negotiated end to the conflict in Nicaragua. The Reagan administration apparently

wants a plan which offers \$14 million in nonmilitary aid to the Contras and the option of military aid if peace talks, mediated by the Catholic Church, should fail.

But has the leopard really changed its spots? On its face, the administration calls the aid "humanitarian." But money is fungible: Giving the Contras \$14 million in humanitarian aid assuredly frees up other Contra funds for guns and bullets. And peace talks or not, the Reagan plan still would permit the administration to renew aid to the Contras as part of a reported effort to expand the Contra forces from about 20,000 to 35,000 soldiers. Not surprisingly, the Sandinista government has dismissed the Reagan proposal.

PEACE TALKS: A FIRST RESORT

The chairman of the Select Intelligence Committee, Mr. HAMILTON, and the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, Mr. BARNES have drafted a strong bipartisan alternative that meets three important goals: it uses the good offices of the Organization of American States or the Contadora group to set up peace talks between the Contras and Sandinistas without preconditions. The Contadora nations of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela have already won the respect of both sides and their mediation—not the club of more U.S. Contra aid—is more likely to produce a solution; it definitely bans military aid to the Contras until Congress specifically approves such aid; it reinforces a constructive U.S. role in the area by providing \$10 million to the International Red Cross or the United Nations for aid to any Nicaraguan refugees outside of their homeland.

I don't favor a cut-and-run approach, and I'm no fan of the Sandinistas. I don't want to see Nicaragua in a fixed orbit around the Soviets and Cubans. And, I don't approve of Nicaragua's inept efforts to export arms to Salvadoran rebels or its heavyhanded press censorship.

But the fact is that Contra aid and the mining of Nicaragua's harbors have undercut our national interest instead of advancing it. The Contras are not close to knocking the Sandinistas from power and \$14 million more won't do the job either. Nor has CIA mischief-making won us any new friends south of the border; just the reverse. As a result, the American people have voiced overwhelming opposition to the administration's policy. Without public support, any policy is doomed to fail.

More than anything else, I remain convinced that what we are trying to do in Nicaragua is wrong. Shipping arms to the Contras, who are clearly intent on overthrowing the Nicaraguan Government, violates our own

laws and flaunts our best traditions. It should not be the province of the United States of America to abet the overthrow of a foreign government we don't like. If we don't want the Sandinistas to export unrest and terror, then we can't wink at our sponsorship or subversion.

If we want to stop the reach of Cuba and the Soviet Union in our own backyard, then let us first use the policy tools which work: Food, medicine, and education—not the weapons which too often fail—guns, bribes, and mines. Only as a last resort, let us consider appropriate military options.

Our best bet is exerting strong diplomatic pressure on the Sandinistas through a concerted multinational effort with the Contadora nations. Waging peace, not war, offers the clearest hope for a workable pact in Nicaragua and stronger U.S. ties with all of Latin America. I urge the Administration to take the next step forward and rise in support of the Barnes-Hamilton-Fish bipartisan peace plan.

I include for the record an article by my colleague, Mr. BARNES, which makes a convincing case for a strong U.S. humanitarian and diplomatic role in Central America and an equally sound argument against any direct aid to the Contras.

[From the Washington Post, Apr. 21, 1985]

AN ALTERNATIVE THAT PUTS PRESSURE ON BOTH SIDES

(By Michael D. Barnes)

The objectives of U.S. policy toward Nicaragua should be to enhance the security and stability of Central America by achieving reciprocal and verifiable security arrangements with Nicaragua and by promoting political pluralism and the observance of human rights in Nicaragua.

There is now a consensus in Congress that current policies are not achieving—and hold no real prospect of achieving—these objectives. In recognition of that growing consensus, President Reagan has dropped his proposal that Congress release an additional \$14 million for military aid for the Contras. This week, Congress will consider alternative approaches.

Along with my Democratic colleagues Lee H. Hamilton and James R. Jones, and my Republican colleagues Hamilton Fish Jr., Jim Leach, Ed Zschau and Willis D. Gradison Jr., I have prepared a bipartisan alternative that I believe can, and will, command broad support in Congress and among the American people. Our alternative is designed to support regional peace efforts and give diplomacy a chance to work, while at the same time maintaining pressure on the Sandinistas to change policies that we feel destabilize the region.

The policy set forth in our resolution is to seek peace in Nicaragua and Central America through the Contadora process, which provides an appropriate 21-point framework for achieving U.S. objectives. As part of a regional settlement, it should be U.S. policy to encourage a cease-fire and peace talks among the combatants in Nicaragua.

Our resolution points out that there are disturbing trends in Nicaragua's foreign and domestic policies, including restrictions on

individual and press freedoms, the subordination of government functions to party control, close Soviet-Cuban ties and a military buildup, and efforts by the Sandinistas to export their influence and ideology. There are also serious human rights violations by both the Nicaraguan government and the Contras.

We believe that Congress should monitor events in Nicaragua carefully, and that progress in reversing these trends should be a key element in future congressional decisions with respect to Nicaragua and Central America as a whole. Actions by the Sandinista government and its opponents will weigh heavily in determining those decisions. If progress is made, the United States should consider improving ties with Nicaragua, including expanded trade relations and the provision of technical and economic assistance.

Our alternative continues in effect the existing prohibition on funding for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua until such time as Congress enacts a joint resolution repealing that prohibition. Meanwhile, our resolution provides \$10 million for humanitarian assistance for refugees who are outside of Nicaragua, regardless of whether or not they are associated with the Contras. The assistance could not be used for provisioning combat units. To ensure that the assistance is not misused in that or any other way, we provide that it be channeled through one of the two recognized international relief agencies with experience in the area: the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees or the International Committee of the Red Cross. As a sign of our commitment to the Contadora process, we also provide that \$4 million will be available for the costs of implementing a Contadora agreement.

Our alternative requires the president to continue to report periodically to Congress on the situation in Nicaragua, and it gives the president another opportunity, after the beginning of the new fiscal year on Oct. 1, to request further action by Congress. The resolution would bind Congress to give any such request expedited consideration, just as it is now doing with respect to the president's request for \$14 million in military aid for the Contras.

We believe that this alternative serves U.S. peace and security interests in several important ways. It gives a strong impetus to the Contadora process, which will make an agreement much more likely than if a plan is "made in the U.S.A." It puts pressure on both side in the Nicaraguan conflict to enter into a dialogue leading to reconciliation and an opening of the political system, because after Oct. 1 the president can force Congress to reconsider the situation, and neither side will want to be held responsible for lack of progress. The alternative offers incentives for those on both sides of the conflict who desire such a dialogue and reconciliation to get together. It criticizes both the Sandinistas and their opponents where criticism is due.

Our alternative makes eventual U.S. intervention in Nicaragua less likely. It combines restraint with the engagement of our diplomatic, political and economic resources squarely on behalf of our interests. Equally important, it provides a way out of our own domestic impasse, and the deep divisions that current policy toward Nicaragua have engendered.

SUMMARY OF THE BIPARTISAN ALTERNATIVE
NICARAGUA PROPOSAL OF REPRESENTATIVES
MICHAEL D. BARNES, LEE H. HAMILTON,
JAMES R. JONES, HAMILTON FISH, JR., JIM
LEACH, AND ED ZSCHAU

I. The resolution contains the following findings and declarations:

(1) The United States desires peace in Nicaragua and throughout Central America, and U.S. policy toward Nicaragua should encourage a cease fire and peace negotiations among the combatants as part of a regional settlement through the Contadora process or the OAS.

(2) The Contadora 21 principles provide an appropriate framework for achieving peace and security in the region.

(3) There are disturbing trends in Nicaragua's foreign and domestic policies in the areas of individual and press freedoms, dominance of the party, Soviet/Cuban ties and the military buildup, and efforts to export Sandinista influence and ideology.

(4) Congress will carefully monitor the situation, and progress in curtailment these trends will be a key element in future congressional decisions.

(5) If Congress determines that progress is being made toward peace and democracy in Nicaragua, consideration will be given to initiating economic and development programs in such areas as trade and technical assistance.

(6) In assessing progress, Congress will expect, within the context of a regional settlement, the removal of foreign military advisers from Nicaragua, an end to Sandinista support for insurgencies in the region, restoration of freedoms, and progress in conducting free and fair elections.

II. The resolution continues in effect the prohibition on funding for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua without regard to fiscal year until Congress enacts a joint resolution repealing that prohibition.

III. The resolution provides the following assistance:

(1) \$4 million for expenses arising from the implementation of a Contadora agreement, such as expenses for peacekeeping, verification, and monitoring systems.

(2) \$10 million for humanitarian assistance for refugees who are outside of Nicaragua, regardless of whether they are associated with the Contras. This assistance may be provided only through the International Committee of the Red Cross or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees upon the determination of such organization that the assistance is necessary for humanitarian purposes, and may not be provided for provisioning combat units.

IV. The resolution provides that the President must report to Congress every three months on progress made in achieving the objectives of the resolution and on any expenditure of funds under the resolution, and may, any time after October 1, 1985, request further action by the Congress. Such request would be considered under expedited procedures similar to those being employed for the current request.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the very patient gentleman from California [Mr. DANNEMEYER].

Mr. DANNEMEYER. Mr. Chairman, one of the most puzzling questions about this debate is how two great political parties and their leaders assembled in this chamber can read the evidence and come to diametrically opposed conclusions. I have wrestled

with this question time and again when attempting to resolve how I am going to vote and why it is we have this difference. And the only analysis that makes sense that I have been able to figure out is that essentially we have a different perception on revolutions taking place in the world today and those that have taken place in the past.

□ 1850

There is a line of thought which says that what is going on in Central America is really a revolution. We Americans, at least in North America, are a revolutionary people, we should be on the side of revolution in the world to preserve and advance the cause of social justice, and therefore it is inappropriate for the Government of the United States to be against the revolution going on in Central America.

That has a ring of truth to it but it has a fatal defect in it because all revolutions are not created equal. The American revolution was fought 200 years ago for political, economic, and religious reasons but it had at its foundation a respect for private property, the preservation of private property.

The revolution going on in Central America is ostensibly for purposes of religious, economic, and political freedom but it has achieved none of those things and yet at the same time it is destroying private property.

It takes property from one class of people with a gun and distributes it to another class of people all in the name of pursuing social justice.

That is the difference in perception. When you believe, erroneously as I believe, that the revolution going on in Central America is a continuation of the American Revolution, you can come to the point where you can offer this body something tonight or tomorrow a proposal that is contained in the Barnes-Hamilton plan whereby we can offer assistance, but nonmilitary assistance only.

Now I would like to believe that we can live in the world of today without arms, without strife and without struggle. It would be a wonderful world if that were the case. But for those who believe that is the way of the world is, I feel sorry for them because history does not teach us that.

I reluctantly conclude that the only way to deal with a Marxist government is to tell, very clearly, that if they choose to pursue what they call the war of liberation by internal subversion which is going on in Nicaragua today, that they are going to face a force of arms from some other source to resist that revolution which definitely is not in the interest of those people.

That is why this Member from California has concluded that it is in the interests of this body to support the

President's request and vote in favor of House Joint Resolution 239.

Another question the American taxpayers can ask is why should I be concerned with what is going on in Central America? What difference does it make to me? It is no threat to me.

Well, the evidence is that the Italian members of the Red Brigades, the German adherents to the Baader-Meinhof gang, the Basque ETA separatists, Honduran Cinchoneros, the Peruvian Shining Path militants, the Argentine Montoneros, the Uruguayan Tupamaros, and a host of others have taken up residence in Nicaragua.

My friends, they did not come there just as tourists, they did not come there to work on the airfield that is large enough to receive every aircraft in the Soviet arsenal. They have come there to use Nicaragua as a mounting place for terrorism in Central America and in their view, hopefully, to bring that terrorism to North America.

I think it is appropriate for us to recognize what we are facing in Central America, that it is a revolution that is destructive of private property, that those people mean business in terms of seizing power through the force of a gun and we should commend the people in Nicaragua who are willing to, at this point in our history, maintain a struggle that is our struggle, namely the pursuit of freedom and the protection of private property.

There is a correlation between the current situation in Central America and the Russian revolution in 1917. Seeking political and economic freedom from the oppression of czarist rule, revolutionaries of various stripes joined forces to overthrow the government. Once in power, however, the Bolsheviks stole the revolution from the more moderate Mensheviks. As a result, Russia became a Communist country with no opportunity to develop into a moderate socialist state, a democracy, or some other variation of self-government.

A similar comparison can be made with Cuba. In the late 1950's, Castro successfully stole a people's revolution. While his democratic allies in the fight against the Batista government were occupied in formal institutions like the Council of State and various ministries, Castro and an inner band of trusted guerrillas built and consolidated control over the real instruments of power—the army, the secret police, revolutionary tribunals, and other organizations.

Today in Nicaragua, we again see Communists—the Sandinista directorate—stealing a revolution from the people. The democratic opposition to Somoza established a broad coalition which included the Sandinistas. Cuba provided the Sandinistas with about 500 tons of weapons and other military supplies as well as advisers which

made them an extremely powerful ally for the true democratic opposition.

Due to the non-Communist democratic elements of this broad coalition, many Western governments failed to recognize the real character of the Sandinistas. After this coalition had succeeded in bringing down the Somoza regime, the Sandinistas followed Castro's example: An inner core was formed headed by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), a nine-person directorate. They established a new army, an internal security apparatus, and a variety of controlled organizations like neighborhood defense committees, trade unions, professional groups, and media organs.

By encouraging their democratic allies to participate in the executive branch institutions of the new government, the Sandinistas were able to maintain their credibility and receive substantial (\$1.6 billion) western aid through 1982.

Late in 1979, shortly after the Sandinista victory, a plan was launched to isolate and bring under Sandinista control the various democratic groups, including political parties, labor unions, and the media. The Sandinistas acknowledged that these groups had to be allowed to exist because of international opinion, but they planned to gain control of them from within.

And what of the promises made during the revolution to replace the Somoza dictatorship with new social, political, and economic systems based upon the principles of pluralism, free elections, a mixed economy, and observance of human rights?

Special tribunals, outside the judicial system, were established to try the cases of suspected counterrevolutionaries, thus denying them legal protection afforded by the regular courts.

Using both the powers of government and the capacity for intimidation of Sandinista organizations, the Nicaraguan Government continues to harass opposition political parties, independent labor confederations, the private sector, the Catholic Church, and the independent media.

There is no free press. Censorship of print and electronic media continues. The editors of *La Prensa*, the only independent source of news in Nicaragua, claim that between January and October 1983, the government censored over 50 percent of their stories on current national and international events.

The various Sandinista organizations, particularly the Sandinista defense committees, seek out dissidents and coerce people into participating in Sandinista-sponsored activities.

Through both legal and extra-legal means, the government seized the private property of several prominent citizens; it warned that neutrality in

the struggle against armed opposition forces might be punishable by confiscation.

In December of 1981, the Sandinistas began destroying more than 40 villages of Protestant, English-speaking Indians in northeastern Nicaragua. About 15,000 escaped into Honduras. The remaining Indians were either killed by the FSLN or forcibly relocated to detention camps. The proof of these atrocities is undeniable.

The Cuban and Nicaraguan revolutions demonstrate a historical method of operation for a communist takeover of a revolution:

First, unification of the extreme left;
Second, establishment of a broad coalition, led by the extreme left but including some non-Communist or democratic elements, which makes direct or ambiguous promises of a broad-based government after victory;

Third, use of the broad coalition, systematic propaganda, and political action techniques to obtain non-Communist international support and isolate the target government from Western political and material assistance; and

Fourth, providing Soviet bloc, Cuban, and other anti-Western military support as an incentive for extreme left unity.

The correlation between Communist strategy and events in Central America is obvious. And while there is certainly room for reasonable men to differ on exactly how our Nation should conduct its foreign policy, we should be able to agree on the fundamentals of a system of government which we must oppose:

First, the goal of communism is world domination;

Second, the Communists do not negotiate for purposes of achieving peace unless they are forced to do so by the realization that they cannot profit from further conflict;

Third, communism cannot coexist with capitalism;

Fourth, there are no absolute moral imperatives in Communist philosophy; morality is relative: that which enhances the state is moral; and

Fifth, communism cannot coexist with any religion that acknowledges a being superior to the state.

Sadly, we don't seem to be able to agree on these fundamentals. We maintain that if only we constrain our inordinate fear of communism, if only we would refrain from building this or that weapons system, if only we would negotiate with this or that terrorist/revolutionary force—we could be at peace with the Communists.

This is naive and dangerous thinking. There is no historical basis for this line of reasoning. The Communist definition of peace is not the same as the American definition. Peace talks and negotiations are a tactic to be engaged in only to the extent that they

may further the goal of world domination.

We do our Nation a profound disservice if we fail to realize that Communists have gone to great lengths to understand the American mindset. Not only do they understand how we think, but they are masters at using our compassion, integrity, and sense of justice and fair play against us.

On the matter of this social and moral conscience, many U.S. religious and political groups opposed to assisting the Contras repeatedly point to purported violence and terrorism which the Contras inflict on their own countrymen.

I invite those moral arbiters who seem to show compassion only for the victims of rightwing tyranny—but, oh, perish the thought, never from the left—to examine the record of brutality, deceit, inhumanity, and vicious oppression which the Sandinista regime has accumulated in the past 5 years.

Among the several of my colleagues who have taken an interest in and spoken out on the situation in Nicaragua, my friend Bob LIVINGSTON from Louisiana has given us a truly stark and horrible glimpse into the ghastly atrocities perpetrated by the Sandinistas on those considered to be opponents of the government. His statement reciting the litany of horrors is printed in the April 4 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

In addition, one of the original Sandinista leaders of the 1979 revolt, Arturo Cruz, has recently concluded that the revolution has been betrayed by President Ortega and his ruling junta. Echoing the sentiments of the inter-American Human Rights Commission, he charges that the Sandinistas have consolidated power at the expense of freedom and democratic principles. The Contras have emerged as the only viable internal force which can combat this evil. In his words, "they have gone from being an instrument of U.S. policy to a social movement."

Another facet not to be overlooked is the undeniable connection between the Sandinistas and world terrorism. Scores of leftwing militants have settled in Nicaragua, where they plan their next ventures and plot destruction with the less-than-benign acquiescence of the Sandinista government.

Italian members of the Red Brigades, German adherents to the Baader-Meinhof Gang, Basque ETA separatists, Honduran Cinchoneros, Peruvian Shining Path militants, Argentine Montoneros, Uruguayan Tupamaros, and a host of others inhabit the ranks of these terrorists. And, not insignificantly, the Palestine Liberation Organization, Iran's Khomeini, and Libya's Qadhafi also figure prominently. From their Nicaraguan base, these terrorists export violence to

their respective homelands and throughout the world.

In order to blunt justified criticism of their outrageous policies, the Sandinistas have sought closer ties to the political left here in the United States as well as worldwide. These open-minded liberals are reminded of the excesses of the Samoza regime and are fed the obligatory rhetoric about human rights, sympathy for revolutionary ideals, and compassion for the Earth's downtrodden masses. Aid to counterrevolutionaries like the Contras would be a dastardly exhibition of U.S. imperialism.

One can only wonder what it takes to convince these people that tyranny of the left is no less an evil than that of the right. It is astonishing, distressing, and sickening to see the American left (though not all of it) defend the Sandinistas, perhaps not directly, but certainly by their denying assistance to those who wish to preserve the democratic ideals of the 1979 revolution.

By their words, they represent themselves as world humanitarians. By their actions, they reveal themselves to be no better than the tyrannical despots who enslave peoples and annihilate freedoms.

"Be sober, be vigilant; because your adversary the devil, as a roaring lion, walketh about, seeking whom he may devour."—1 Peter, 5:8

Mr. Chairman, I ask for the adoption of the resolution.

Mr. AUCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. GARCIA].

Mr. GARCIA. Mr. Chairman, I think it is not the question of \$14 million that we are talking about here; \$14 million in today's economy, especially in this administration, will probably be enough to buy a couple of pliers and maybe a few hammers.

The fact of the matter is that we are talking about a difference of basic philosophy in terms of policy in Central America.

For those of us who understand the culture of the people of South America, we can only say to those who stand here today asking us to send money to the Contras so that a Garcia can continue shooting at a Rodriguez, a Rodriguez can continue shooting at a Gonzalez, a Gonzalez can continue shooting at an Ortega. The bottom line to all of this, for those of us who understand, is that for many, many decades the United States has continued to intervene in Central America.

When you go to Nicaragua, what is the first thing they say to you? They talk about the exploitation of the large companies in the twenties and the thirties, who came into Nicaragua.

Today, we go, and what do they talk about? They talk about, once again, intervention.

Look, I do not believe there is a person on this floor who is happy with Daniel Ortega. Those of us who have had opportunity to meet with him to talk with him, we all, I think, agree that the people of Nicaragua could do a heck of a lot better.

But let me say to my colleagues I believe it is absolutely essential that what takes place in Central America be decided by the people of Central America.

We sit in this Chamber and we decide what other countries are going to do with their own country. I believe that it is their country, it is their part of the world and they are entitled to make those decisions whether they are wrong or right.

For those of us who have participated in a shooting war, and I think there are Members on both sides of the aisle who have participated in a shooting war, we know that war is hell and we stand on this floor and we pontificate and talk about who is more macho than the other.

The bottom line is that people are getting killed. The only way we are going to solve the Central American problem is by getting those persons who are truly interested, bringing democracy there, to get together.

Let us say, for example, we send half a billion dollars into Central America tomorrow, especially into Nicaragua and, let us say, that we were able to beat back every Sandinista, that war will continue. The only way we are going to stop that war is having those people and the neighboring countries get together and decide what is best for them.

I think the time has come for this Congress and this country called America to let people decide their own fate.

Please, I think we have had enough of the Garcias and the Rodriguezes shooting and killing each other. We are talking now about a part of the world that has been dominated by, first, oligarchy, and now it has shifted over to the other extreme.

I say to my colleagues, to all of you here, that there is no perfect solution to what is going on in Nicaragua, but I would say to each and every one of you that whatever the solution is it should be decided upon by the people who live in that part of the world.

The President's policy with regard to Nicaragua is an excellent example of the contradiction between morality and perceived strategic interest. The Kissinger Commission on Central America stated that a primary goal of our policy toward the region should be: "To preserve the moral authority of the United States."

Does aiding the Contras contradict this goal? I think so. Certainly the World Court believes so, as do many of our European allies. Even Margaret

Thatcher protested the mining of Managua's harbors last year.

This is not to say that a totalitarian regime in Nicaragua wouldn't threaten our security interests in the region. Perhaps, but the arguments that the Reagan administration has put forth in favor of aiding the Contras are based on the premise that force is the only way to handle the Sandinistas.

Certainly force can be very persuasive, but the Contras, as they are presently constituted, are not a credible bargaining chip.

They are factionalized. Many within their ranks are heirs to the worst excesses of the Somoza regime. Their human rights record reflects this. They may not all be mercenaries, but they are certainly not all freedom fighters. More importantly, they have no chance of taking control of Managua—even with massive amounts of aid.

Without the Contras how do we bring about change in Nicaragua? We start by working through Contadora. We gain nothing by ignoring the Sandinistas. I don't like the Chilean Government, but I would never suggest that we stop talking to Santiago. It is my belief that with patience and the right amount of pressure, Managua—that is the Sandinistas—may be forced to institute changes that are more democratic.

It is important that we understand that even a full scale invasion by the United States will not put an end to the Sandinistas. Yet, such an invasion would succeed in tearing our country apart. That is something none of us can afford.

The President's supporters have said that we should support the Contras so that American troops won't have to go to Nicaragua. That's faulty reasoning. My concern is that by supporting the Contras we will only serve to fan the flames in Nicaragua, in Honduras, in Costa Rica, and finally back at the White House, leading us into an unnecessary conflict that will, in the end, do nothing to help the people of Central America or to protect our security interests.

There is no more telling statement of how devastating an unpopular war can be than a recent picture published in Time magazine showing President Lyndon Johnson leaning over his desk in anguish as he listens to a tape recording from his son-in-law, Chuck Robb, describing the loss of his men in battle in Vietnam. Even our military commanders do not want to see a recurrence of this in Nicaragua or elsewhere in Central America, and there isn't support from the people of this Nation for a war. There doesn't seem to be a great deal of support for even a covert war.

It is my feeling that the people of this Nation would like to see a negotiated end to this conflict, to our prob-

lems with Nicaragua. I believe that the American people are counting on us to come up with a better plan to settle our differences with the Sandinistas, than mining their harbors, and waging war by proxy.

We've got to continue to pressure the Sandinistas diplomatically and economically. There is no argument about that. The argument stems from what our tactics should be. I do not believe for a moment that we will be able to break the backs of the Sandinistas—and that is what the President seems to want—by intimidating them militarily. We can win this conflict peacefully because we are the better Nation, because our system is the better system. It will prevail.

We can't hang the threat of military intervention over the heads of the Sandinistas and expect them to cry uncle. They won't. The President had the right idea on how to handle our problems with the Sandinistas when he sent Ambassador Schkaudman to Manzanillo to talk to the Nicaraguan Deputy Foreign Minister. What the President must do is to continue with this line of thinking without holding out the threat of armed conflict. There can be no effective negotiations if we hold a gun to the head of the Sandinistas.

The President's plan must be defeated so that we can send a clear signal to all the people of the world who truly support democracy that we believe that we can solve our differences through negotiations, that our system will prevail because it is a better system. The nations of Latin America, in particular, are waiting for a sign from us, showing that we will try to settle this with their help off the battlefield and at the negotiating table.

I would like to leave you with a quote from the Kissinger Commission Report on Central America that I believe should serve as a guiding principle in our dealings with Nicaragua and all the nations of the region: "It is a common failing to see other nations as caricatures rather than as portraits, exaggerating one or two characteristics and losing sight of the subtler nuances on which so much of human experience centers as we have studied these nations; we have become sharply aware of how great a mistake it would be to view them in one-dimensional terms. An exceptionally complex interplay of forces has shaped their history and continues to define their identities and affect their destinies."

I'm afraid the President has chosen to look at Nicaragua and its experience with this Nation in one-dimensional terms. He has chosen to ignore the complex interplay of forces shaping the destiny of that nation. It's time he listens to the lessons on history.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BOULTER].

Mr. BOULTER. Mr. Chairman, there he goes again. In the 11th hour—just before the crucial vote we will take today—Comandante Ortega has offered up a "peace" plan that will end civil strife in Nicaragua. Trouble is, it would also spell the beginning of the end for freedom and democracy in Nicaragua.

We were conned by the Sandinistas in 1979, and they're at it again in 1985. When will we learn our lesson. Time and time again—in its eagerness to dispose of an issue—Congress embraces the best case scenario, in which all the people of the world, including our sworn enemies, share common goals, good will and a desire for peace. Well, folks, this happy ending rarely comes about.

What will come about is an increase in instability and terrorism throughout Central America. And very soon afterwards we will witness a flood of refugees into the United States. Indeed, Mr. Chairman, a rising tide lifts all boats. And when we speak of the rising tide of communism in Central America, we can expect a massive exodus that will inevitably crash on our shores and across our borders. I take little comfort in knowing that 10 percent of the Cuban population left Cuba after Castro came to power. Can we afford to open the gates to 10 percent or more of the over 100 million people now living in Central America and Mexico?

If we truly want to see the evolution of a democratic process in Nicaragua, then we must continue to pressure the Sandinista government to recognize a legitimate opposition. This pressure has to be applied through a resumption of aid to the freedom fighters. To give hope to neighboring countries struggling to erect a democratic system of government, U.S. aid is necessary to combat the Sandinista's attempts to export their revolution.

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This is a real danger, which must be understood by the American people. Tomas Borge, the Nicaraguan Interior Minister, was once asked the question: "Will the revolution be exported to El Salvador, then Guatemala, then Honduras, then Mexico?" His response: "That is one historical prophecy of Ronald Reagan's that is absolutely true."

Mr. Chairman, we must not turn our backs on those who constitute the first line of democratic resistance to the Communist aggression in our own back yard. If we fail now, then the Communists will be able to consolidate their gains and continue the exportation

of their revolution with Mexico as their ultimate target.

The Contras are the first line of resistance. We must support the freedom fighters of Nicaragua, and I urge you to vote for House Joint Resolution 239.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California [Mr. FAZIO].

Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the military aid demanded by the President.

The President has requested \$14 million from the American people to wage a war that has not been declared, a war that will be waged by mercenaries and substantially led by former members of the Somoza dictatorship, a war that the American people do not want and will not support.

This is not the first time the President has come to this Congress to ask for help in waging this war. The logic of his first request was to stop the flow of arms to El Salvador. When this was found to be spurious, a new argument for funding the Contras was found; the Sandinistas needed to be pressured by the Contras if they were going to negotiate.

And this too did not work because, much to the consternation of the Reagan administration, the Sandinistas did negotiate and even accepted the treaty worked out by the Contadora nations.

With last year's election safely behind him the President recently unveiled his newest and most revealing rationale. The Sandinistas must surrender or face war.

In other words the President of the United States, during peace time and with diplomatic relations with Nicaragua, was asking the Congress to fund a war whose object was the overthrow of a Western Hemisphere government.

The public outrage at such a short-sighted policy has led the White House public relations team to heights of ingenuity. Now the aid is humanitarian as long as the Sandinistas do as Ronald Reagan dictates. Should they actually wish to have some say in their own country's affairs the so-called humanitarian aid would revert to the President's original purpose, the provision of arms to the Contras.

The administration's intentions are clear despite such novel approaches in dealing fairly with the American people.

The President wants to wage war by proxy.

And who are these proxies the President has called the "moral equal of our Founding Fathers"?

Virtually the entire military apparatus of the Contras, 46 of the top 48 posts, are former members of the infamous national guard of the Somoza regime. It should hardly be mentioned that when they wore the uniform of the national guard these henchmen

were not known as ardent supporters of democracy or human rights. They have committed unspeakable crimes of terror perhaps the most famous of which was the execution of an entire wedding party.

Are these the actions of the moral equivalent George Washington and Thomas Jefferson?

If they are I have read very different history books than the President. As I understand it Washington never committed acts of cruelty and terror, and Jefferson never advocated the use of political assassination. The Contras have much more in common with the Waffen SS troops buried at Bitburg than with those giants buried in Virginia.

We have no illusions about the Sandinistas and their form of government. We do not advocate it for the people of Nicaragua or any of the other nations in Central America. They have not kept faith with their revolution and must reverse their antidemocratic policies if we are to develop a positive future with them.

The irony of the President's policy is that it has not led, nor will it, to a democratic Nicaragua. From the day he has taken office the President has laid siege to the Managua regime. He has mined their harbors, aided terrorists, and intimidated them with countless military exercises on their border. Can anyone really wonder if the Sandinistas do not take this President at his word?

It is time to strike out in a bold new direction—a direction that emphasizes negotiations, that reduces conflict rather than escalates it, that constructs incentives for meaningful peace rather than brandishing threats that propel the Sandinistas down a path no one wants.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. SEIBERLING].

Mr. SEIBERLING. Mr. Chairman, few Americans and, I am sure, no Members of this House, want to see a Communist regime in Nicaragua. Most Americans and, I hope and believe, most Members of this House would, however, not jump straight to the conclusion that we must, therefore, support military force to establish our kind of regime in Nicaragua. That would be a fatal error. We learned that in Vietnam, I think. Yet that is the error that President Reagan seems determined to repeat in Nicaragua.

The same sort of overblown rhetoric, the dire predictions of a "domino effect," the escalation of U.S. military advisers, and, above all, confusion of goals and repeated deception of Congress and the American public—all tell us that this administration has not only failed to learn the lessons of Vietnam, but is bent on going the military route in Nicaragua, regardless of the

objections or desires of the overwhelming majority of the American people.

A recent article by James McCartney of Knight-Ridder Newspapers, printed in the Akron Beacon Journal of April 14, 1985, concludes that in the administration's efforts to popularize military solutions to the problems of Central America, the Administration has simply ignored the lessons of Vietnam. Worse yet, as McCartney puts it, "The political mindset that led the nation down the garden path into the war in Vietnam, where more than 55,000 Americans needlessly died, remains the mindset of many in positions of power to this day."

Influenced by the far rightwing, who dominate this administration, policy is being based on the myth that we might have won the Vietnam war if we had gone all out and used all of our available military power. As McCartney notes, those who hold this revisionist view "still have not learned the central lesson of Vietnam. That lesson was that a great and powerful nation cannot necessarily solve political problems with raw military power." McCartney also notes that it is the military men who have learned the lessons of Vietnam best, as he says, "They know that Vietnam was a mistake and a lost cause and it is they, along with a good many smart Congressmen, who have been providing the brakes on further military involvement in Central America."

Mr. Chairman, it is not too late for the United States to deescalate the tensions in Central America. We should make it clear, and I believe we have made it clear, to the Sandinista government that we will not tolerate any attempt to use force to export Marxist revolution to our allies in the region, nor will we tolerate the establishment of Cuban or Soviet military bases in Nicaragua. If the Sandinistas understand anything, I am sure they understand that. At the same time, we must offer the carrot of economic assistance and the stick of economic sanctions, depending on whether the Sandinista regime is or is not willing to recognize basic human and political rights. Such assistance would, in the end, be far more productive and far less costly than support of the Contras or other forms of military action.

The kind of approach we ought to be following was well expressed recently by Senator SAM NUNN in a speech to the Coalition for a Democratic Majority on April 17. An excerpt from his speech was printed on the editorial page in today's Washington Post and deserves to be quoted again. Senator NUNN said:

The challenge is to move the military option to the back burner while keeping it on the stove and honoring our commitment to the democratic forces in Nicaragua. This means resuming an adequate amount of hu-

manitarian aid both now and for the foreseeable future with no arbitrary termination dates . . .

While resuming humanitarian aid, I suggest that the diplomatic and economic options be moved to the front burner. I agree with President Reagan's call on the Nicaraguan government to accept the recent proposal of the democratic resistance to agree to an immediate cease-fire in place and commencement of a national dialog.

Further, I believe the United States should call on the Nicaraguan government to suspend its state of emergency, thereby lifting press restrictions and allowing for full freedom of association and assembly. If the Sandinistas agree to a cease-fire, open a dialog and suspend the state of emergency, the United States should suspend military maneuvers in Honduras and off Nicaragua's coasts. The United States should call on the Nicaraguan armed opposition to purge from its ranks all those responsible for serious human rights abuses. Congress must be convinced that we are supporting the true democrats, men like Arturo Cruz.

I do not believe this diplomatic approach will work without some form of pressure on the Sandinistas . . . [The President should make every effort to enlist the nations of the region in a coordinated effort to bring maximum economic pressure on the Sandinista government. One option that should be considered immediately is an economic embargo, enlisting our other allies throughout the world to the extent possible.

Mr. Chairman, today we have an opportunity to make a fresh start in Nicaragua. We can do this, first, by rejecting the President's request for \$14 million in aid to the Contras and, second, by adopting the bipartisan Hamilton substitute.

The full text of James McCartney's article from which I have quoted appears elsewhere in the RECORD under my name.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. PANETTA].

Mr. PANETTA. Mr. Chairman, I cannot help but be outraged over the administration's policies in Central America, and I rise today to address the issue.

President Reagan is once again asking this body to approve further funding for the Contra groups that are—and our Government freely acknowledges this fact—attempts to overthrow the elected Government of Nicaragua. Let no one misunderstand this fact: Our Government, the United States of America, is using our tax dollars to deliberately overthrow a foreign government.

This is not, of course, a new policy for the Reagan administration. Since 1981, the Reagan administration has spent between \$70 and \$100 million to help the Contra rebels "destabilize" the Nicaraguan Government and to "neutralize" any opposition. With the direct approval of the present administration, our Central Intelligence Agency has carried out a deliberate policy of providing training, equipment, and logistical support to the

Contras—the so-called freedom fighters. Our CIA has engaged in a massive military buildup in that troubled and unstable region, and has tried in any way it possibly can to intimidate the Sandinista government, including encouraging private groups to fund the Contras.

At first, we were told that the United States had to pursue this covert policy in order to prevent the flow of arms from Nicaragua to the guerrillas in El Salvador. But that excuse just did not hold up, so the administration tried a new tack.

We need the covert war, the administration then claimed, to pressure Nicaragua to reduce its ties to the Soviet Union and Cuba. But we all know that the administration's support of the Contras only pushed the Sandinistas closer to the Soviet Union and Cuba. So, the administration needed a new argument.

Now, President Reagan insists that we support the Contras in order to change the "present structure" of the Nicaraguan Government. It did not take long to realize that the President was admitting that the United States was footing the bill for an overthrow of the Sandinistas.

And what is it, exactly, that we are paying for? President Reagan say we are paying for removal of the "totalitarian communism" practiced by the Sandinistas. He also says that we are paying to prevent the communist menace from moving into America's backyard. But where is our money really going?

To be perfectly frank, our money is supporting and encouraging a group of individuals who use rape, pillaging, kidnaping, torture, and the cold-blooded murder of innocent civilians as common instruments of war. Only recently, the Contra forces massacred a wedding party in Nicaragua—no one in the party was armed, and most of the guests were women. Three months ago, Contra forces kidnaped 18-year-old Tomas Lopez, the son of two religious leaders. His body was found 3 days later; his toes and fingers had been broken, his shoulders had been pierced by bayonets, and acid had been poured in his face. Lopez was a civilian.

Last July, Contra rebels attacked two trucks full of civilians. Seven were killed, including a 3-year-old and pregnant mother. Thirty-five others were injured.

I could stand here for hours recounting the horrible details of countless crimes perpetrated by the Contra rebels—a group of mercenaries our President has compared to our own Fore Fathers—crimes committed by a group financed and trained by the U.S. CIA. Let no one doubt the goal of our President and the methods of

those he supports; we are, in effect, paying for state-supported terrorism.

In an effort to maintain the illusion of having taken the high road, the President has proposed a new peace plan for Nicaragua. Under this plan, \$14 million in previously appropriated funds would be released by Congress to provide humanitarian aid to the Contras. Military aid, under the plan, would be withheld for a period of 60 days during which the Nicaraguan Government has an opportunity to make progress at solving problems that have taken years to develop. But is our Government truly committed to a peaceful settlement in that country, I do not think so.

Despite repeated attempts by the Sandinista government to discuss the Central American situation, the Reagan administration has shown little, if any, interest in such dialog. Only 3 months ago, this administration broke off talks that had been going on since last summer—talks that were aimed at providing a peaceful solution to the trauma engulfing Nicaragua. If the administration was serious about working things out in Nicaragua, then why did our Government pull out of one of the primary forums of dialog?

I do not believe for 1 minute that his administration seeks, or, for that matter, wants a peaceful solution in Nicaragua unless it involves the achievement of its immediate aim—the ousting of the Sandinista regime. Instead, I am convinced that talk of peace proposals is, in effect, a smoke-screen enabling the President to push through aid to the Contras now, and convert that aid to military aid at the end of the 60-day period. We have an opportunity today to prevent that policy from being carried out, by refusing to release any funds for the provisions of aid to Nicaragua.

There has been a great deal of talk in recent days about several compromise packages that would allow aid to go to Nicaraguan refugees, or through agencies other than the CIA. But I have my doubts about whether there is any sure way to prevent money from reaching the Contras short of withholding it completely.

I am convinced that the administration is charting the wrong course in our relations with Nicaragua, and, indeed, much of Central America. And by charting this course of aggression and military assistance, the President is predetermining the outcome. I need not remind any of my colleagues that military solutions breed military responses—and the outcome is bloodshed, and loss of innocent life, and little is accomplished.

Instead, our Government ought to faithfully pursue the course chartered by the Contadora group. These nations, which have acted in the most courageous and honorable manner,

have attempted to provide a forum for meeting political, social, and economic problems with peaceful solutions. Their presentation of the Contadora Act for Peace and Cooperation in Central America provides a framework for peaceful coexistence and democratic development in Central America.

I am firm in my conviction that we ought to promote peace in Nicaragua, and throughout Central America, by supporting the Contadora Peace Initiative. For that reason, earlier in this session I introduced H.R. 1335, which would:

First, provide for direct consultations between the United States and the participants of the Contadora process in order to develop a common policy for promoting peace in Central America. Under this legislation, the United States would work actively to persuade other governments involved in the region to join in observing the conditions for peace established by the Contadora process;

Second, provide for a resumption of direct, bilateral negotiations between the United States and Nicaragua; and

Third, suspend temporarily all U.S. support for, or participation in, military or paramilitary activities in Central America. Under this legislation, there would be a 90-day freeze on military assistance and construction programs, military training exercises, and reconnaissance flights on behalf of other nations.

Having traveled to Central America myself, last autumn, I know that the Contadora group alone cannot solve the vast problems of that region. The United States has a tremendous opportunity to support this process for peace, and put an end to the violence and loss of life that now defines Nicaragua.

The answer to that region's problems does not lie in the allocation of money for military aid, nor does it lie in the perpetuation of falsehoods and smoke-screens which seek to obscure the real issues. The answer, instead, lies in good-faith negotiations and military cease-fire. I, therefore, strongly encourage my colleagues to refuse to provide aid to the Contras in Nicaragua, and to commit themselves to pursuing the peaceful course of the Contadora nations.

There is an old Chinese proverb that says that "a journey of 1,000 miles begins with the first step." That first step is always the hardest, but the Contadora group has already taken it. I implore my colleagues not to cause those steps to falter. Let us instead join the Contadora group, and walk side-by-side with them in the common pursuit of peace.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. BILIRAKIS].

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Mr. Chairman, last week, one of my constituents called

my office to express his strong opposition to any aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters. He stressed his knowledge of the issue, as a political science professor and a Latin affairs scholar, and was quite emphatic in his belief that such a policy was immoral, illegal, and tantamount to supporting terrorists.

Although support among my constituents for President Reagan's Central American policy is running nearly 2 to 1 in favor, I was frustrated by this particular expression of opposition. While I was impressed with my constituent's sincerity, I was quite frankly, shocked at his assessment of U.S. policy in Central America. I felt that the reports he gave credence to told only half of the story, and that he was unaware or chose to ignore so many facts that are essential to a full understanding of the conflict in Nicaragua. So, as I speak today, my colleagues, I am speaking not just to you but to those of my constituents and your constituents who have not recognized the seriousness of the Communist threat in Central America, nor the importance of a strong American response to that threat.

The first area of misunderstanding, as I see it, is the character of the Sandinista regime itself. I honestly don't know why there is any misunderstanding on this point because the facts are quite clear. The Sandinistas openly espouse Marxist-Leninist means and goals. They are closely allied with Cuba and the Soviet Union, who have steadily supplied them with arms, advisers, strategy, and technology since the Sandinistas assumed power in 1979. In fact, there are roughly 10,000 Soviet, Cuban, Eastern bloc, Libyan, and Palestinian forces in Nicaragua, who serve not only as military advisers but as teachers, and Government personnel as well. It is essential that this foreign influence be viewed in the context of the expressed goal of communism, which is quite simply a worldwide communist revolution. Ironically, nearly three-quarters of the M-16 rifles captured from the guerrillas in El Salvador can be traced to American weapons left behind in Vietnam.

Today, Nicaragua's total armed forces exceed 110,000, including some 60,000 active duty troops. This is five times the size of Somoza's national guard and larger than all other armies in Central America combined. Those who want to explain this massive and unprecedented military buildup as a defensive reaction to American meddling are dead wrong, and they must know it. The buildup began immediately when the Sandinistas took power, at a time when the United States was leading the world in providing economic assistance to the new regime. But our \$118 million and our good intentions could not persuade the

Sandinistas to keep their promises to the Organization of American States or to their own people—promises of political pluralism, economic revitalization, human rights, and neutrality. They turned immediately to the Communist bloc and prepared to export their revolution to their neighbors in Central America through the use of force if necessary.

The Sandinistas have given arms, advice, and sanctuary to the Salvadoran rebels, an act of aggression that has not gone unnoticed by the struggling democracies in the region. Those who think the United States is the only country concerned about the spread of communism in Central America have not been listening to our neighbors in Latin America, who are looking to us for assurance that we do care about what happens in our hemisphere. I think it is significant that a Democratic American President who based his foreign policy on the principle of human rights stopped American assistance to Nicaragua when it became apparent that the Sandinistas were abandoning the democratic aspirations of the Nicaraguan people.

And it is precisely this abandonment of democratic ideals and processes that has resulted in the formation and growth of the democratic resistance. The Contras are not former Somocistas terrorizing the Nicaraguan people as some would have us believe. This is the second major area of misunderstanding. While some are indeed former members of Somoza's national guard, many more are former Sandinistas, including some very high ranking Sandinistas, as well as simple workers and peasants. All are disillusioned by the Sandinistas' broken promises. Press censorship, religious persecution, rationing, economic turmoil, restrictions on assembly, political repression, government threats and human rights abuses—these are the totalitarian controls that the Contras are fighting against. They do not specifically desire to overthrow the government. But they are willing to risk their lives to drive their country back toward moderation and democracy.

The third area of misunderstanding stems from the first two. Those who misunderstand the true nature of the Sandinistas and of the freedom fighters who oppose them cannot help but fail to understand American policy in the region. Far from my constituent's claim that supporting the Contras is immoral, I feel strongly that failing to support them is the immoral position for the United States to take. Our refusal to provide aid to those who struggle for freedom against a heavily armed and foreign-supported regime is inconsistent with our own history.

George Will has appropriately pointed out that President Reagan's policy is the Truman doctrine after 38 years of Communist advance. I would make

another comparison as well for the benefit of those who feel the United States is illegally interfering in the internal affairs of another nation. How many German Jews could have been saved if other countries had the courage and foresight to meddle in the internal affairs of Nazi Germany? Let's face it. Sometimes, what goes on behind the borders of another country is our business. And when that country seeks to force its repressive system on its neighbors, who happen to be our neighbors as well, then we are fully justified in supporting those who are willing to risk their lives to preserve freedom and democracy in our hemisphere. Far from moving the United States closer to commitment of American troops, providing aid to the Contras is a way of avoiding such a commitment. History has shown time and time again that aggression must be stopped sooner or later, and that the later we act, the higher the cost.

Americans have developed a tendency in the last 40 years of wanting to bury our heads in the sand. We don't want to make tough foreign policy choices. We don't want to get involved. We take our own freedom and security so much for granted that we look skeptically at claims that they are threatened.

This tendency has been strengthened by what is popularly known as the lessons of Vietnam. But I would propose that we are only learning selective lessons when we fail to read the final chapters of the Vietnam lesson book. In this 10th anniversary year of the fall of South Vietnam, we should also be reminded of what happens when we abandon those who struggle against Communist tyranny. We must assume some of the responsibility for the hundreds of thousands of Southeast Asians who have suffered and died at the hands of one of the world's most repressive regimes, and for the thousands more who have flooded foreign shores as refugees.

Some say we will have another Vietnam if we support the Contras. I think it is much more likely that we will have another Vietnam if we don't support them. The President's plan to keep the pressure on the Sandinistas by assisting the Contras while working for a cease-fire, serious negotiations, and free elections, is a good one.

I urge my colleagues, my constituents, and the American people to have the courage to make the difficult decisions now and to firmly establish the American commitment to supporting those who are fighting for freedom in Nicaragua. They are fighting for our freedom as well.

□ 1910

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. TORRICELLI].

Mr. TORRICELLI. Mr. Chairman, America's policies in Nicaragua have been evaluated many ways. Some have spoken of other options available to our country, some of values, some of America's image in the world. There is another consideration. This policy needs to be evaluated also on its own terms.

Three years after the Contra invasion began, it has yet to liberate its first town, win its first province, or even claim a single military victory.

Four years ago the administration claimed that there were 900 tons a year of Soviet military equipment going to Nicaragua. This year it is 18,000.

Four years ago they spoke of a few Cuban advisers. Now they speak of thousands.

No longer helicopters. Now they warn of planes.

This policy has radicalized the Nicaraguan regime. It has become a pretense for Soviet military involvement. It is, beyond all other failures, a military failure. It needs to be ended tonight so tomorrow we can begin to construct, to build a new policy that will genuinely meet the threats in the region.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. CONYERS].

Mr. CONYERS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this resolution because it reflects a policy based on deceit, misrepresentations, and cover-up; it is a policy which is wrong in the first place, which is not in our long-term interests, and, as such, is ultimately doomed to fail.

The President's oft-stated charge against the Nicaraguan Government is that it is a "totalitarian Marxist dungeon", unconcerned with human rights and bent on militarily subverting the hemisphere. This is a propaganda campaign of the worst kind for it is creating a set of false beliefs that will lead us into a losing policy.

Let us be quite clear about the falsehoods of the President's statements on this matter.

In Nicaragua there are no death squads. In U.S.-supported El Salvador, the right wing death squads have been responsible for the vast majority of the more than 40,000 civilian murders over the past 5 years.

In Nicaragua, the press has occasionally been censored. In El Salvador, opposition journalists have been murdered and their newspapers have been bombed into silence. Until Nicaragua has death squads like those of El Salvador, our claim to be fighting to restoring civil rights in Nicaragua is fatuous.

Nicaragua is not totalitarian. In the internationally monitored elections last November, 80 percent of the population turned out to vote—as compared

to 53 percent in the United States—for seven different political parties who now hold seats in the National Assembly. In Nicaragua these parties were given public financing and free television and radio time but there were, regrettably occasional restrictions. In El Salvador, by contrast, opposition leaders are often tortured and murdered and in its last election, voting was mandatory and the ballots were placed in transparent ballot box and monitored by the El Salvadoran military.

With 60 percent of the Nicaraguan economy in private hands, it is not a Marxist economy, albeit further to the left than our own. But neither God nor the last U.S. election gives us the right to kill our neighbors if they do not copy our economy.

In the past 5 years, the Nicaraguan Government has brought down illiteracy from 55 percent to 13 percent and, by nearly every objective measure of human rights, has demonstrated that it is much more concerned with the welfare of its people than are the governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

The charge that Nicaragua is bent on militarily subverting the region is also without factual basis. After 4 years of spending over \$100 million to fund the Contras for the alleged purpose of interdicting arms, not one single cache of weapons has been interdicted. Furthermore, Nicaragua has agreed through the Contadora process to meet every stated security concern of the administration's including a withdrawal of all foreign military advisers and support if the administration would stop the undeclared war against Nicaragua. Yet, the administration blocked this Contadora process giving no intelligible reason as to why.

Finally, if we ever really have a legitimate security threat, we have the most effective military tool to deal with it: we have control over the seas.

Every premise about the need for a war against Nicaragua is based on lies and deceptions which provide a pretext for imposing the type of government that the administration wants to see in Nicaragua. It is wrong, it won't work and I am tired of the deception, my constituents are tired of the deception and the American people, by at least 70 percent, are tired of the deception.

For over 132 years, we have opposed in Central America every move for social reform. Here again we are trying to impose our kind of government in Nicaragua for dubious reasons. Let us not fool ourselves as to what funding for the Contras really is: it is imperialism. Only now we are doing it by illegally mining harbors, distributing manuals of death and by funding former Somoza national guardsmen who make up 46 of the 48 leadership positions within the Contras.

It is time to stop the rhetoric, cut off the hired army for good, practice what we preach and butt out. It serves our military, economic, and human interests to make friends among our neighbors. A good place to start is to stop attacking them. Better if they say "amigo" than "uncle."

The administration's proposal to resume funding to the Contras epitomizes everything that is wrong with our Nicaraguan policy. The Contras have been a tragedy for the Nicaraguan people, who, according to every independent human rights group, have been systematically brutalized and murdered by the Contras. Moreover, the Contras will not be able to succeed in imposing a different government in Nicaragua, a point which is now conceded even by our own commanders, including General Gorman. Finally, it will backfire in terms of isolating us from the Contadora countries who oppose the Contra funding. It will also confirm in the minds of the Nicaraguan people their beliefs about U.S. imperialism making possibilities for the future friendship between our two peoples less likely.

Until there is a peaceful settlement, any aid will only prolong the murder and mayhem. Once there is a ceasefire and negotiations begin, then we should be dealing with the question of refugee resettlement. First, however, we must stop contributing, directly or indirectly, to the creation of these refugees.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair announces that the time remaining to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. BROOMFIELD] is 58 minutes and the time remaining to the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO] is 53½ minutes.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from New Hampshire [Mr. SMITH].

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Certainly. I would be glad to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to make a couple of comments on speeches that I have heard.

Negotiation. Ambassador Shlaude-man has had nine meetings with the Sandinistas and gets nowhere. He talks himself blue in the face. They will not move. They are intransigent. They continue to refuse to negotiate with their internal opposition, the only people that can settle this problem.

Second, poverty is the enemy, but the gentleman on the other side talk as if they never heard of the Kissinger Commission, which proposed \$8 billion for Central America over a 5-year period. Trying to get that passed is quite a task.

In addition, Honduras is the poorest country in Central America. They do not have a major Communist insurgency. So while poverty is a problem down there, it has not led to a serious Communist insurgency.

And last, I ask my friends, who is going to invest in Central America in an area of guaranteed instability when the Communists take over, as they surely will.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. I thank the gentleman from Arizona for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, I want to lend my voice to those who have already risen in support of aid and also in support of House Joint Resolution 239.

Before I begin to explain why I support the aid, I would like to just for a moment address the issue of public sentiment on the President's Central American policy. If it was solely up to the opponents of the administration's policy, one could not help but be led to believe that there is little or no public support for the President's efforts in Central America. I want to inform my colleagues that in the State of New Hampshire this is not the case. I want to let my colleagues know that the New Hampshire House of Representatives recently voted overwhelmingly in favor of a reduction in support of the President's Central American policy. Indeed, I believe once people become aware of the facts about Central America, they cannot help but agree with the need to stop Communist aggression.

Unfortunately, Central America has been subject to a massive misinformation campaign by the left.

Mr. Chairman, at this point I include in the RECORD the resolution passed by the New Hampshire House, as well as a letter from the Clerk of the New Hampshire House.

The letter and resolution follow:

H.R. 17—STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Whereas, throughout the annals of history, the United States of America, under presidents both republican and democrat, has pursued in the western hemisphere diplomatic and military policies predicated upon preserving maximum national security for our people from real or potential aggressors; now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives:

That the honorable house of representatives of the sovereign state of New Hampshire supports the United States policy of resisting Communist aggression in Central America.

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Concord, March 20, 1985.

HON. RONALD REAGAN,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The House of Representatives, on February 26, 1985 in session convened, adopted House Resolution

Number 17, relative to South America, by a roll call vote of Yeas 289—Nays 111.

Sincerely,

CARL A. PETERSON,
House Clerk.

Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. The threshold question is: Are we willing to accept a Soviet Communist Marxist state in Central America? Are we willing to accept another Cuba in Nicaragua and in Central America? I say we cannot afford to do that.

To not support aid to friendly nations in Central America is to risk national security problems for future generations of Americans and to risk oppression for millions in our neighbors south of the border.

In conclusion, in response to a remark made by my colleague on the other side of the aisle a few minutes ago, talking about the real situation; the real situation in comparison to Vietnam. Along with many of my colleagues here, I spent some time in Vietnam. Let us take a look at what happened in Vietnam after we left. Let us take a look at the oppression that took place afterwards. Read Parade magazine center section in the Sunday edition of the Washington Post. Take a good look at that and find out what communism does and find out who violates human rights, my colleagues.

Let us talk about human rights violations. Let us read. Let us read facts that are not just coming from one source but are coming from many sources. There will be human rights violations all right, and they are going to be on the part of the Communist Sandinistas.

I urge my colleagues to support this resolution.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. AuCoin] an esteemed member of the Subcommittee on Defense.

Mr. AuCOIN. I thank the gentleman for yielding this time to me.

Mr. Chairman, over the past 3 years Congress and the White House have been engaged in an emotional tug-of-war over U.S. policy in Nicaragua. What began as a consensus that U.S. covert aid would be used solely to intercept illegal arms traffic has evolved into a policy of military aid to the 5,000 so-called "Contras" seeking to overthrow the Sandinista government.

Along the way the administration has engaged in a lot of rhetoric. A little negotiation, and some disturbing sideshows such as a walkout at the World Court which I think embarrassed Americans, and the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, which shocked most Americans.

Now, 3 years and some \$80 million worth of forceful "persuasion" later, the Sandinista government shows no signs of crying "uncle." A close look at our policy tells why. The covert war

simply doesn't pose a direct threat to the security of Nicaragua. As Gen. Paul Gorman, former head of United States forces in Central America admitted earlier this year, the Contras, right now, have no hope of overthrowing the Sandinista government. Can the Contras do enough damage to make the Sandinistas see the light as the administration would want it to? According to General Gorman, that would take "years."

Mr. Chairman, there are serious problems with both the structure and the policies of the Sandinista government. We've known that since at least 1980 when President Carter made the decision to suspend U.S. assistance to Nicaragua. But, instead of pursuing a policy of forceful diplomacy, the Republican administration created a mercenary army to make war against the Sandinistas, providing them an excuse to continue their own "State of Emergency"—weakening the judicial system, cracking down on freedom of religion, imposing broad censorship, and silencing free labor groups. That is what happens when a government is under siege.

Instead of a realistic assessment of the Nicaraguan military, we in this country and in this Congress have gotten a lot of scare tactics and innuendo, including the idea that Nicaragua, with virtually no air force or navy, poses a threat to U.S. shipping lanes. We have gotten descriptions of the Contras as modern Thomas Jeffersons and fighters for freedoms. These are people who have killed civilians and even attacked wedding parties in Nicaragua.

□ 1930

And just last week, instead of an innovative new peace plan that we were all promised in the Congress, Congress instead received a report from the administration that calls for a doubling of the Contra forces. Increasing the size and efficiency of the Contras is not going to destroy the Sandinistas or suddenly create American-style democracy and free markets in Nicaragua that all of us would like to see.

By the way, the CIA told me in the Defense Committee just last week that the private sector makes up 60 percent of the economy in Nicaragua. That is something my friends on the other side of the aisle seem to misunderstand in their exaggerations and incendiary comments in this debate tonight.

Instead, what increasing the number of Contras will do is to increase the potential for a clash with neighboring Honduras and widening the conflict and increasing the risk of involvement of the United States military.

Mr. Chairman, a vote against convert aid is not a ticket to the Sandinista fan club. It is a call to end the current stalemate and pursue policies

that have a realistic chance of insuring our interests and the interests of our allies in Central America.

The United States has yet to explore all options for developing a regional peace plan under the auspices of the Contadora group. Instead, we have seen an all-too-familiar pattern of deception of Congress and shifting rationalizations of our policy as the months have unfolded.

The Sandinistas do not rule Nicaragua because the people of that country are committed to Marxism-Leninism. They rule because the Sandinistas were an alternative to a neo-Fascist government led by a man named Somoza.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. AuCoin] has expired.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from Oregon [Mr. AuCoin].

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I have not heard anyone on the Republican side of the aisle criticize Somoza, and it was a neo-Fascist regime that he ran. It was a regime of terror. It was a regime that this country supported simply because he was clever enough to say he was anti-Communist. Well, Hitler was anti-Communist, too, and I think there ought to be a better standard set than simply saying some country must be anti-Communist before that country warrants our aid.

When will our administration and our Republican allies learn about root causes of insurrection? If you want to stop left-wing uprisings, stand up against neo-Fascism first, stand up against Pinochet, against Marcos, against the racists of South Africa, and against the Somozas of the world.

I heard one of my colleagues say that the Democrats are not concerned about communism. That is a cheap smear. It would be more accurate to say tonight that the root problem is that that gentleman who made that statement and his allies are not sufficiently concerned about fascism, which causes the roots of insurrection which all of us deplore.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. AuCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. IRELAND].

Mr. IRELAND. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding me this time.

I want to say, first, that 50 years ago, in 1935, Winston Churchill spoke these words:

Want of foresight, unwillingness to act when action would be simple and effective, lack of clear thinking, confusion until the emergency comes, until self-preservation strikes its jarring gong, these are the features which constitute the endless repetition of history.

With these words, Churchill attempted to warn his countrymen of the impending danger posed by the rearming of Germany and of the urgent need for Great Britain to take action. Churchill was a minority in a nation that desperately wanted peace and blinded itself to the danger of war. The prevailing British attitude permitted a deteriorated military posture and an unfavorable shift in the balance of power that allowed for the rise of Hitler's Germany, as the gentleman before me just said, and led to the very war that all in Britain wanted to avoid.

Churchill's observations on the inability to learn from history are as relevant today as they were in 1935. Just like Britain in that earlier era, I hear from the President's critics in the debate today the same smooth-sounding platitudes that dominated Britain in the 1930's. I see the same inability to come to grips with the unpleasant facts of Soviet aggression and a similar failure to accept reality when it departs from the hopes of our idealism. Too many American leaders, many of them here today, and others in every walk of American life are opting for popular positions, no matter how distant they may be from the real needs of this Nation.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Florida [Mr. IRELAND] has expired.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. SILJANDER].

Mr. SILJANDER. Mr. Chairman, the Sandinista's overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua was originally welcomed by most of the international community with optimistic enthusiasm. The United States, in fact gave the now Sandinista regime over \$130 million grant to sustain the Nicaraguan Government in the first 2 years, including an \$8 million grant to sustain the Nicaraguan Government in the first hours of the revolution. This optimism faded, however, into a cruel nightmare for the Nicaraguan Jews and Christians as well as the neighboring nations of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica. The reason: The Sandinista's selling of their country to radical Marxist elements, most notably, the Cubans and the Palestine Liberation Organization [PLO].

In a recent speech in London, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn stated:

Within the philosophical system of Marx and Lenin and at the heart of their psychology, hatred of God is the principal driving force, more fundamental than all their political and economic pretensions. Militant atheism is not merely incidental or marginal to Communist policy; it is not a side effect, but the Central pivot. To achieve its diabolical ends, Communism needs to control a population devoid of religious and national feeling, and this entails the destruction of faith and nationhood.¹

Nicaraguan leadership by proclaiming itself a revolution without borders and by declaring itself in solidarity with Yasser Arafat in the world revolution and by its harsh persecution of religious groups has set itself up as a model example of Solzhenitsyn's analysis. Most likely because of the Sandinista's link to the PLO, the Jews have been the most thoroughly oppressed religious group in Nicaragua, if not in numbers than certainly in the completeness to which their exile and cultural genocide took place.

The PLO desire to overthrow the Somoza regime had nothing to do with the legitimate revolution of Nicaraguan citizens against the dictatorship. It had historical roots of its own. Just why Nicaragua is of concern to the PLO is best explained in the autobiography of Jerusalem's Mayor Teddy Kollek, entitled "For Jerusalem." He revealed that Nicaragua played a major role in obtaining arms for Israel during the crucial period of its creation in 1948. Kollek met the older General Somoza in Nicaragua to plead Israel's case.

According to Kollek:

Somoza as well as the Nicaraguan foreign minister cooperated because of their strong basic sympathy with our cause. Our agreement included the understanding that Nicaragua would vote for Israel in the United Nations whenever the occasion arose, a point to which they pledged themselves out of genuine conviction.

Prior to the 1979 Sandinista revolution, Nicaragua had consistently supported Israel in the United Nations and was one of the very few nations that voted against the resolution condemning Zionism as racism.²

Clearly, the PLO had a vested interest in overthrowing the Somoza regime in Nicaragua. The results of the alliance between the Sandinistas and the PLO are evident upon Nicaragua society. This paper will examine the PLO-Sandinista link and attempt to demonstrate the existence of the religious persecution in Nicaragua and other Central American countries, particularly against the Jewish community.

ARAB INVOLVEMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

Latin America has always been an important source of support to Israel in the United Nations. In Israel's first 25 years of existence Latin American nations provided more than half of the U.N. votes supportive of Israel. During the 1967 war, Latin America was more supportive of Israel than any other bloc of countries. However, by the seventies their support has weakened as Latin American nations began to split into political factions. Still today, Israel and Arab nations perceive Latin America to be important politically to the survival of Israel.

In a visit to Mexico in 1975, Egypt's Vice Chancellor Gamal Mansour ex-

pressed the importance of Latin American U.N. votes.

For the Arabs, the support of Latin American countries is essential because they hope to obtain a majority for a resolution in the next Assembly of the United Nations . . . recognizing the right of the Palestinians to convert themselves into a political entity; to permit the Arabs to recuperate the territories occupied in the war of 1967 and confirm the principle that no country can acquire territories of another by force.

Gamal Mansour's visit was only one of many such Arab missions in the Arab League campaign to sway Latin America toward a pro-Arab stance. The Latin American governments resisted Arab efforts; however, the 1973 quadrupling of oil prices put new pressures upon their economics and international policies.

The Arabs began to use petrodollars and vitally needed oil to pressure the Latin American nations into the Arab camp. Fouad Naffah, who was the Lebanese Foreign Minister and acting as a representative to the Arab League in 1973, traveled to seven Latin American nations. In his tour, he informed the governments that "no underdeveloped country that backs the just cause of the Arab world will suffer from an energy shortage." In addition to a guaranteed oil supply, Naffah also made promises of Arab investments to strengthen the suffering Latin American economies.

In 1981, Arab representatives met in Tunis and decided to focus on gaining the support of Latin America in an effort to oust the Israelis. In conjunction with this decision:

They decided to unleash an anti-Semitic campaign designed to undermine the status of Jews in Latin America to nullify the political and economic support which the Latin American Jewish communities provide Israel.³

The Palestine Liberation Organization was selected as the primary instrument of the campaign in Latin America:

Arab ambassadors, other high ranking emissaries and representatives of the PLO have been crisscrossing the region in a coordinated, heavily financed effort to secure authorization to establish an official PLO office in every Latin American capital.⁴

The PLO has made limited progress during the past 3 years in its attempt to open offices in Latin American capitals. So far, the PLO has established offices in Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, and Mexico. Brazil and Venezuela were thought to be prime candidates for the PLO; however, they have resisted the heavy Arab economic and political pressures. The main obstacle the PLO faces is the fact that it is an international terrorist network; and to allow the PLO to legitimize themselves in the region by opening an office would endanger the security of Latin American nations and help pro-

mote anti-Semitism in our hemisphere.

CRIMES AGAINST RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The Sandinista government has been responsible for many abuses against the right to freedom of religion in Nicaragua. The Jews, so far, have been the most intensely targeted group for persecution. The government began its campaign of persecution in the quasi-official government newspaper *Nuevo Diario*. On July 15 and 17, 1982, the paper carried articles that were not only anti-Zionist but also anti-Semitic. Jews were blamed for the crucifixion of Christ, using the "myth" of the chosen people to massacre Palestinians, and using financial power to gain political control of the United States. The articles referred also to "Synagogues of Satan," and rehearsed old canards that "world money, the banks and finance are in the hands of descendants of Jews, the eternal protectors of Zion."⁵

Although resident in Nicaragua for more than a century, the Jewish community has always been exceedingly small. The 1972 population of about 200 shrank to about 80 after the earthquake. After the overthrow of Anastasio Somoza in 1979, many Jews fled into exile, along with others close to the regime. Today, there are about 8 to 10 Jews living in Nicaragua, and only a few Jewish-owned firms. These individuals and businesses exist under the suppressive conditions of the Sandinista regime.⁶

The main reason for the departure of Nicaraguan Jews is the manner in which the revolutionary government treated them. Their properties were among the first to be confiscated. Jews who owned factories and stores were ejected from their homes and places of business. Their properties were turned over to Arabs and local workers. Many accusations were made against them without proof. Often, their individual safety was threatened.⁷ The foregoing took place in an environment politically and emotionally charged. Jews were accused of support for the Somoza government and blamed for Israeli assistance to the Somoza government.⁸

The final blow against the Jewish community came when Sandinista supporters scorched the doors of the only synagogue in Managua while worship services were in progress. The Sandinistas then seized the synagogue, destroying all religious items and putting pro-government posters over all religious symbols. The synagogue then became "an elite social club for the children of high-ranking Sandinista officials."⁹ Since then, Jews have tried to regain their property and return to their homes, but the Nicaraguan Government has directed the courts not to act on any request by a Jew seeking to return to Nicaragua.¹⁰

On a number of occasions there have been attacks against religious leaders

which have, at times, become violent. These attacks are not only specifically aimed at the Jewish religion, but also at the Christians, most notably the Catholics and the fundamentalist Moravian Church. The uneasy situation is caused by the fact that most Nicaraguan citizens are professed Catholics. These attacks have been sponsored by so-called divine mobs or confrontation groups of the Sandinista Front for the Liberation of Nicaragua [FSLN].¹¹ Harassment has also been extended to Pope John Paul II who in March of 1982 visited Nicaragua and was subjected to inexcusable abuse. The Pontiff was forced to speak from a platform that had revolutionary billboards as a backdrop. Also during his homily, the Pope was barely audible to the large crowd because the Sandinista government provided him with a poor sound system which could not compete with the shouting of pro-government slogans by the "divine mob."¹²

In addition, the government banned from publication letters from Pope Paul II which criticized the government's effort to create a Marxist "peoples" church.¹³ The leaders of this "peoples" church have insulated the Catholic Church by trying to change the Christian doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary. The offensive reinterpretation depicts Mary, the mother of Jesus, as in fact not the mother of Jesus, but the "Mother of the Revolutionary."¹⁴ The government has also gone so far as to discredit the divinity of Jesus and instead label him "the First Sandinista."¹⁵

The government actively discriminates between those clergy who share its political viewpoints and those who are indifferent or critical.¹⁶ An example of this was seen when the regular church sponsored televising of the Mass was replaced with broadcasts of priests who took a pro-government position.¹⁷

Of the east coast Indians and Creole natives in Nicaragua, 80 percent are members of the Protestant Moravian Church. The government has repeatedly described the Moravian Church as a center of counterrevolutionary sentiment. As a result, the Sandinistas have reportedly burned more than 50 churches, confiscated church property, harassed church leaders, and taken other actions to undermine the traditional role of the church. In addition, government groups had stepped up attacks on Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, and Seventh Day Adventists, accusing the sects of having direct links to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.¹⁸

The anti-semitic curtain that has descended over Nicaragua, and any other place where Sandinista inspired revolutions have spread to, is one of serious repercussions for all Jews. To emphasize, one of the first moves taken

by the Sandinistas government when it took control was to cut off all diplomatic ties to Israel.¹⁹ Obviously, this is consistent with the Sandinistas' stated intention to root "Zionism" out of Central America. In fact, a block of Salvadorans based in Washington, DC, and loyal to the Sandinistas were asked to provide:

... a condemnation of the Zionist state of Israel, because of its participation in maintaining the deplorable conditions under which the Peoples of Palestine, El Salvador and South Africa are forced to live.²⁰

The ideological union between the PLO and the Sandinistas begins to be exposed with this statement of direct anti-Semitic attitudes toward Israel.

THE PLO, THE SANDINISTAS AND THE SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS

On January 12, 1983, Daniel Ortega Saavedra, the commander of the revolution and a member of the FSLN delivered a speech to a special ministerial meeting of the coordinating bureau of the nonaligned Countries on Latin America and the Caribbean. In this speech he labeled Israel's policies towards the Palestinians as being irresponsible and that criminal actions were being taken against "the heroic Palestinian people" by Israel.²¹ As the Palestinians were being praised and exhorted by the Sandinistas, the Jewish citizens of Nicaragua were being essentially expelled from their own country. The Nicaraguan Jews blame the loss of their jobs, homes and businesses along with the general persecution on the presence of the PLO.²²

Late in 1979, 1,000 delegates from Arab and Latin American nations met in Caracas, Venezuela. These delegates formed two organizations. The first is known as the Pan-American Institute of Arab Culture headquartered in Buenos Aires, and the second organization is the Arab-American Information, Publicity, and Communications Center based in Santiago, Chile. One of the basic initiatives of these two organizations is made clear in a communique published by the delegates saying that they would:

... work for the free self-determination of the Palestinians and their right to a homeland ... we consider the PLO the legitimate representative of that people ...²³

Victor Ananias of Chile, president of the federation, was quoted in *Agence France Presse*, October 6, 1979, as stating:

The solution we propose for the Middle East is the disappearance of Israel to make way for a secular, democratic Palestinian state.²⁴

Other delegates were asked whether the PLO was a terrorist organization? Their reply was that the PLO armed activity was "legitimate defense."²⁵

The PLO's involvement in covert operations with the Sandinistas is not a recent occurrence. Active cooperation

between these two revolutionary groups has existed as early as 1969 when Bonito Escobar of the Sandinistas met with three high ranking PLO officials in Mexico City. As a result of this meeting, 50 Sandinistas were sent to training camps at PLO facilities in Tyre, Lebanon. Not only did they accept training, but they fought side by side with the PLO against King Hussein of Jordan in 1970. Patrick Arguello Ryan, a Sandinista trained in the Middle East, was Leila Khased's partner in an abortive attack on an El Al airliner just outside of Amsterdam—Ryan was killed in the attack.²⁶ The ties between the two groups has continued for 15 years without interruption.

As a result of this relationship, not much attention was given when the PLO announced a grant of \$12 million to Nicaragua for economic aid.²⁷ The PLO also has helped the Sandinistas to gain support from other radical Arab countries such as Mu'ammarr Qadhafi's Libya which has given \$100 million under an "agricultural appropriation."²⁸ Qadhafi has in the past aided many other terrorist organizations such as the Montoneros in Argentina and the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta founded in 1974 as the first bridge between Latin America and Cuba. From January 25 to February 1, 1981, Libya sponsored a meeting with the Sandinistas, PLO, Montoneros, the JLR plus two other Marxist groups from Chile—the United Popular Action Movement and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left. The stated reason for the meeting was "... to draw up a unified plan of struggle against all types of fascism and imperialism in America."²⁹

In addition to money, the PLO has been sending massive shipments of armaments to Nicaragua and El Salvador. U.S. News & World Report stated that there had been an interception of a plane load of weapons in Tunis which was sent to the Sandinistas by the PLO.³⁰ Weapons are always in abundance and training is also being provided for leftist forces in Central America.³¹ The PLO cadres who have infiltrated into Nicaragua and El Salvador are providing this training.³² Yasser Arafat has himself admitted that Sandinistas had received training in PLO camps.³³ The PLO stated in 1982 that it was fighting alongside of the Sandinista guerrillas. These were actual PLO troops participating in combat in both El Salvador and Nicaragua.³⁴

According to the Washington Post of July 12, 1979, there were Sandinista fighters training in PLO camps located in Algiers. The activity of the PLO was best summed up by this statement by Jorge Mandi, FSLN spokesman to the Kuwaiti newspaper Al Watan.

He said:

... there is a longstanding blood unity between us and the Palestinian Revolution. Many of the units belonging to the Sandinista movement were at Palestinian Revolutionary bases in Jordan... It is natural that in our war against Somoza we received Palestinian aid for our revolution in various forms.³⁵

These various forms included PLO pilots sent to Nicaragua and PLO "freedom fighters" sent to El Salvador.³⁶ Also a plane load of weapons in route to Nicaragua from the PLO labeled as medical supplies, just as the recent Libyan shipment, was intercepted in Brazil.³⁷ Those are suspected to be just two of many such shipments. In May 1982, the PLO gave a Boeing 707 jet to Nicaragua presumably for the purpose of transporting arms.³⁸ In addition, there is a Belgian Air-Charter Service that is wholly owned by the PLO that is used to transport arms to the insurgents in El Salvador, through Nicaragua.³⁹

Diplomatic relations between the Sandinistas and the PLO started with a similar ideological base and has expanded to their commitments to overthrow governments that are contrary to their vision. In a letter from a group of Salvadorans based in Washington, DC, and loyal to the Sandinistas, they stated, "... Our situation is very much the same as the Palestinian freedom fighters."⁴⁰ Because of the unity between the FSLN and the PLO, Nicaragua cut off diplomatic relations with Israel and granted diplomatic status to the PLO on July 22, 1980. The office representing the PLO was officially opened in Managua with a staff of 70. The PLO's presence in Managua was accepted warmly as evidenced by the hero's welcome Arafat received when he visited Nicaragua on the first anniversary of the Sandinista takeover.⁴¹ In his speech, Arafat praised the "strategic and militant ties between the Sandinista and Palestinian revolutions."⁴²

Tomas Bouge Martinez, the Interior Minister of Nicaragua, stated to Yasser Arafat: "We say to our brother Arafat, that Nicaragua is his land and the PLO cause is the cause of the Sandinistas." In response to this statement of goodwill Arafat replied: "The links between us are not new. Your comrades did not come to our country just to train, but also to fight. Your enemies are our enemies."⁴³ Of course, the enemies of the PLO are the Jews, particularly those living in Israel. To demonstrate the joint efforts of the PLO and the Sandinistas against Israel, a bomb exploded in the Israeli Embassy in San Salvador. The People's Revolutionary Army claimed responsibility and said the bombing was in "solidarity with the Palestinian people."⁴⁴

THE PLO AND MEXICO

In 1975, Mexican President Luis Echeverria met with Yasser Arafat and gave the PLO permission to open

an office in Mexico. The succeeding President of Mexico, Lopez Portillo, reluctantly honored his predecessor's commitment, and allowed the opening of a PLO office. However, the office was limited to a staff of one person without diplomatic status. In cooperation with the Association Mexicana de Amistad con el Pueblo Palestino [AMAPP], the PLO office has used cultural events to spread its message. In addition, the office has recruited exiled leftists and revolutionaries living in Mexico to work for their cause. Examples of the PLO activities in Mexico include anti-Israeli advertisements, publications, and demonstrations attacking "Zionism as Racism."

THE PLO AND COSTA RICA

On May 8, 1982, President Luis Alberto Monge announced an extensive policy of internal security in order to combat the increasing terrorist activity in Costa Rica. In his speech he specifically expressed concern about the PLO and Libyan threat. The National Security Agency [ASN] of Costa Rica confirmed that Libya has been training young Costa Ricans as terrorists. The ASN has also linked Libya to the secret terrorist training camps operating in Costa Rica.

Many citizens of Costa Rica were alarmed with former President Rodrigo Carazo Odio's embrace of the Arab cause. It was reported that the Arabs had offered financial assistance to the President's pet project, the University of Peace, in exchange for permission to open a PLO office. Ambassador Yamuni of Costa Rica increased the controversy when he announced to reporters that the government had officially recognized the PLO. However, Foreign Minister Bernard Nelhaus quickly denied the statement with good reason since Costa Rica has been struggling with high oil prices and terrorist activity.

THE PLO AND PANAMA

The Panamanian-Arab League of Solidarity with the Palestinian People and the PLO [LIGASOPOLP] have been working to gain support among the people of Panama. Carlos Perez Herrera, cousin of the late Gen. Omar Torrijos, was the first Secretary General of LIGASOPOLP. Torrijos was a commander of the Panamanian National Guard and the eminence gris of Panamanian politics. After the death of Torrijos in 1981, there has been a decrease in governmental support for the PLO. However, PLO activity and propaganda directed against the Panamanian Jewish community has been disruptive. LIGASOPOLP will continue to function in Panama with Libya as its main financial sponsor. The Panamanian Government has kept its promise to prevent the opening of an official PLO office, and there are no

indications that they will break this promise.

CONCLUSION

PLO activity in Central America has been increasing, and there are no indications that their involvement will diminish. In 1981, Yasser Arafat, expressing the commitment of the PLO in that region of the world, stated:

We are a great revolution that can never be intimidated. We have connections with all the revolutionary movements throughout the world, in El Salvador, in Nicaragua—and I reiterate Salvador—and elsewhere in the world.⁴⁵

"The way to Jerusalem leads through Managua," was more than just an empty statement made by Yasser Arafat on July 27, 1980. Arafat clearly intends to have Nicaraguan and Salvadoran support in his effort to destroy Israel and establish a Marxist regime.

The PLO, combined with the Soviet and Cuban presence, poses a serious threat to the security of the vulnerable Central American governments. The United States must take into consideration the Soviet-Cuban-PLO dimension, along with the PLO threat to the Jewish community, in order to have an effective American policy which protects our interests as well as Central American democracies and religious freedom.

As anti-Semitism grows in this hemisphere, as was stated last week during the Holocaust memorial, never again.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, "Men Have Forgotten God," *National Review*, July 22, 1983, p. 874.
- ² Belden Bell, "The PLO is at Work Subverting America," *Human Events*, Nov. 25, 1978, p. 990.
- ³ Rabbi Morton M. Rosenthal, "ADL International Report: PLO Activities in Latin America," *New York*, May 1982, p. 3.
- ⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.
- ⁵ Op. cit., "Human Rights: Nicaragua's Human Rights Record," p. 33.
- ⁶ B'nai Brith, 1983.
- ⁷ Op. cit., "Human Rights: Nicaragua's Human Rights Record," p. 32.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 32.
- ⁹ Richard Araujo, "The Sandinista War on Human Rights," *Background*, the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, July 19, 1983, p. 5.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 5.
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- ¹² Humberto Belli, "Heckling the Pope in Sandinista-Land," *the Washington Times*, Apr. 6, 1983, p. 1C.
- ¹³ Op. cit., "Human Rights: Nicaragua's Human Rights Record," p. 28.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- ¹⁵ Patrick J. Buchanan, "Jesus—the First Sandinista," *the Washington Inquirer*, June 10, 1983, vol. III, No. 23, p. 7.
- ¹⁶ Op. cit., "Human Rights: Nicaragua's Human Rights Record," p. 25.
- ¹⁷ Max Singer, "Nicaragua: The Stolen Revolution," publication of the United States Information Agency, 1982.
- ¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 32.
- ¹⁹ *The Jerusalem Post*, "Unholy Alliance," Aug. 14, 1981.
- ²⁰ The bloc of Salvadorans in solidarity with the Revolutionary Popular Bloc, Washington, DC.
- ²¹ Speech by Daniel Ortega Saavedra at the ceremony inaugurating the 5th special ministerial meeting of the coordinating bureau of the movement of Nonaligned Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, Jan. 12, 1983.
- ²² Rabbi Morton M. Rosenthal, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, March 1983.

²³ Jacob Koradloff, "Latin America: The Arab Connection," *the American Jewish Committee*, 1979.

²⁴ *Agence France Presse*, March 1982.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁶ U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 1, 1980.

²⁷ London Daily Telegraph, Dec. 2, 1981.

²⁸ Op. cit., "ADL International Report: PLO Activities in Latin America," pp. 8-9.

²⁹ "Unholy Alliance," *the Jerusalem Post*, Aug. 14, 1981.

³⁰ U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 1, 1980.

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³⁴ Op. cit., "ADL International Report," May 1982, p. 9.

³⁵ Associated Press, Foreign Briefs, Dec. 13, 1979.

³⁶ Al Watan, (Kuwaiti Newspaper), June 7, 1979.

³⁷ News from World Jewish Congress, May 17, 1982.

³⁸ Congressional Record, Hon. Larry McDonald of Georgia, Jan. 27, 1982.

³⁹ The Bloc of Salvadorans.

⁴⁰ U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 1, 1980.

⁴¹ "Report—The PLO and International Terror," Israeli Defense Force paper, March 1981.

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Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentlewoman from Ohio [Ms. OAKAR].

Ms. OAKAR. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding time to me.

Mr. Chairman, the issue we are considering today involves much more than \$14 million. How we spend this money, or whether we spend it at all, will decide how we approach Central America and its problems. When you cut through all of the rhetoric and partisan hyperbole, the issue boils down to a simple choice—peace or war?

Historically, the American people have been peace-loving, but have not shrunk from war when there was no other alternative. As the major power in the Western Hemisphere, we have a wide range of political, economic and cultural resources to shape events in Central America without bankrolling a war. The American people know this instinctively and overwhelmingly oppose any further aid to the Contras. We should heed this grassroots wisdom and develop a policy that goes to our strength, while leaving us with a range of options short of war. Even more than taxes, war should be a last resort; not the first thing you think of.

We must have no illusions about the nature of the Sandinista government. Nor should we ignore our vital interests in the region. We all oppose censorship. We are all offended by Sandinista rudeness to the Pope. We reject arbitrary arrest. We all agree that it is not in our interests for Nicaragua to become firmly fixed along a Soviet-Cuban axis.

By the same token, we should have no illusions about the Contras. Most of their leaders are the same people who were ousted in a popular revolu-

tion. The Contra effort in Nicaragua has been characterized by bloody human rights violations. Most of the victims have been civilians. What is more, top U.S. military officials concede that the Contras lack the strength or popularity to shoot their way to power. Providing this group with military of humanitarian aid will not serve our policy objectives. Instead, approval of the \$14 million to aid the Contras would violate the spirit of F.D.R.'s Good Neighbor policy and bring back the ugly American who drives his Latin American neighbors away from us.

What we seem to have with this administration is \$14 million in search of a policy. Initially, the administration argued that aid to Contras was needed to interdict arms shipments to the rebels in El Salvador. When no evidence could be produced to support that claim, the administration goal became to get the Government of Nicaragua to cry uncle, whatever that means. Even the President agrees, though, that it should not mean we are trying to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua. He knows, just as we all do, that under international law it is illegal to make war or commit acts of war without a declaration of war. Yet by providing the Contras with the means to wage war against a government that we officially and publicly recognize, we would be making war without admitting it openly and officially. The administration acknowledged as much when it refused to defend its policy before the World Court.

What is lacking in the administration approach is a sense of proportion. Forgetting that Nicaragua is a small country of 3 million people with a per capita income of less than \$900, the administration has raised the stakes to try to turn this issue into a showdown between East and West. There has been no convincing evidence, however, of any major aid to the rebels in neighboring El Salvador or anywhere else. Administration claims that Soviet crates contained Soviet Mig fighters turned out to be no more accurate than the claim that the Pope endorses military aid to the Contras. The President's comparison of the Contras to Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton, Franklin, and the other giants of the American Revolution is an offense that would not be worth mentioning were it not for the fact that this is the kind of crude exaggeration that has been the basic justification for the administration's policy.

Let us support a more rational, less hysterical approach. First, let us recognize that we have interests in Central America that are worth promoting and, if necessary, worth defending. Then let us recognize that we have ample resources short of war to pro-

mote a responsible policy in Nicaragua and the rest of Central America.

We should not begrudge \$14 million to promote our interests in Central America. Nicaragua's neighbors who have organized the Contadora process have vital interests at stake that are no less compelling than our own. Since they share borders and cultural affinity with Nicaragua, they are well positioned to promote peace. The International Red Cross has long had a reputation for its humanitarian work. Let us provide the funds to these two entities and begin to chart a new course in Central America. With our enormous resources, we can help to shape a better future for Central America and develop a better approach that serves the interests of our region.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. SHAW].

Mr. SHAW. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Some years ago during the period of time when Somoza was in charge in Nicaragua, I traveled to Nicaragua. Some 3 years ago on a kodel that was headed by the majority leader, JIM WRIGHT, I went back to a Nicaragua that was headed up by the Sandinistas.

I must say that I found a much more oppressive government under the Sandinistas. We found an economy that was in shambles, and we found human rights that were absolutely disregarded.

We even had a situation where army officers stormed into the hotel that we were staying in order to confiscate film that was taken from the hotel window.

You can only find this type of oppression in a Communist-type of government; but yet we found a glimmer of hope. We found it from some of the population statements, such as, "Don't give up on Nicaragua."

I regret to inform my colleagues that was 3 years ago. Since then those who have told us not to give up on Nicaragua have served time in jail, some of them still in jail. Some of them have shown up in south Florida in Miami as refugees.

I would ask the Members of this House to watch the Members from Florida and how they vote on this issue.

We have had personal contact with these people who have been disenfranchised and have lost their country. They are people that their revolution has betrayed and they are coming by the tens of thousands, let there be no doubt about it.

Being an area of the country in south Florida that is the destination for a large part of these people from not only Nicaragua, but from the other countries to which they are exporting their revolution, I say to you, let us look at what has happened in

Nicaragua. We do bear a responsibility for the corrupt regime that has developed there because we gave it much assistance in its beginning and we were largely responsible, it not totally responsible, for Somoza leaving that part of the world.

Our goals were high and I do not fault anyone for that decision, but we were not to know that the corrupt form of government that was to follow and anybody that thinks that we can bring about a correction of that big mistake by simply leaving them alone or giving them aid other than the aid of the rebellious overthrow of that government, does not know history.

We have heard today in great detail as to the goals of communism throughout the world and anybody that cannot read that I would say we have a choice before us this evening. We can do it with Nicaraguans today or later with Americans.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 minute to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. VENTO].

Mr. VENTO. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the administration request before this body.

Mr. Chairman, today this House is debating and deciding whether the cornerstone of our foreign policy in Nicaragua and Central America will be one based on a commitment to negotiation and diplomacy or whether it will be based upon an escalation of military conflict. There can be no doubt that the United States is vitally interested and concerned about the future of Nicaragua and the other nations of Central America. We share a common concern with the people of Central America for the advancement of democratic social and economic reforms which will lead to the establishment of just societies. The real question which we must face today, however, is not one of goals but of the U.S. policy path we follow to achieve these goals.

During the past 4 years, the Reagan administration policy toward Nicaragua has increasingly emphasized conflict and confrontation over negotiation and diplomacy. The President's initial 1985 appropriation request proposed that Congress provide \$14 million in military aid for the Contras seeking to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua. At the 11th hour, however, when it became abundantly clear that there were significant doubts among many Members on both sides of the aisle about the wisdom of the administration's policy, the President announced that he would support a compromise by providing for humanitarian aid; a sharp change of course for one so committed to military action against the Sandinistas.

Originally, the Reagan administration supported and participated in talks with the Sandinistas to discuss democratic political reforms. On another track, the administration gave at

least rhetorical support to the Contadora process which has been and still is the only regional multilateral effort to solve the outstanding issues between the Sandinistas and their political opponents. But somewhere in the course of this process, the administration lost interest and staying power for negotiation and diplomacy. The administration walked out of the Manzanillo talks with the Sandinistas which were occurring in Mexico over 6 months ago and has steadfastly refused to return to the bargaining table. The administration then renounced its support for a proposed agreement worked out by the Contadora nations and Nicaragua because it could not support every element of the proposed settlement. In short, the administration has been willing to lend rhetorical support to the Contadora process which is halfhearted and when some limited progress or agreement was attained, the administration, rather than encouraging continued dialog, discredited and heaped scorn on the participants. The President's policy incorrectly assumes that the United States has veto power over all policy and agreements in Central America. We have not exhausted U.S. diplomatic skills and options. The end result of this bad faith U.S. policy has been to relegate negotiation and diplomacy to the back burner and insure an ever-escalating military confrontation with the Sandinistas by intensive support for the Nicaraguan rebels, the Contras.

Clearly U.S. policy must be such that we are not working in isolation, alone unilaterally as is the case today. We should not seek to superimpose our policy on any Central American nation but rather should be working with other nations in the area and with our Western allies within a multilateral framework. Within the long-standing provisions of treaties and international law, the Contadora initiatives provides a positive basis for such U.S. cooperation.

Did anyone in the Reagan administration seriously doubt that the outstanding political and philosophical differences between the United States and the Nicaraguan Sandinista government would be significant? Did anyone doubt that serious political negotiations with the Sandinistas would be lengthy and would test our resolve to promote democratic reforms? Isn't it the responsibility of this administration to pursue the diplomatic process that promises a peaceful settlement for the people of Nicaragua?

The Reagan policy toward Nicaragua and Central America stems from tunnel vision; a view of history which contends that Marxism is the root of all evil in Nicaragua and Central America. In reality, however, the many political, social, and economic

problems which face this region predate the existence of the Sandinistas and the existence of Marxism. Centuries-old policies which consolidated the control of land and wealth have created a long legacy of injustice and abuse across Central America. Other real enemies which we face and more immediate problems, in Nicaragua and Central America today are disease, hunger, and poverty. These are the elements that destabilize societies and create the political conditions in which repression occurs. We do not serve the needs of the people of Nicaragua or any other nation by pursuing policies which add more fuel to the fire and which foment an escalation of civil war. Previous American administrations recognized this reality. That is why we have a Peace Corps and why we created a Food for Peace Program. That is why we had a Good Neighbor policy under the Roosevelt administration which was designed to help the political and economic development of the nations of Central and South America. These are the bright spots in our historic relationship with the nations of that region which counterbalance our historic unilateral intervention and occupation of the region to serve our other interests.

I urge my colleagues to defeat this resolution and to send the Reagan administration's a message that we must support a peaceful and sensible course in our relations with Nicaragua and all of the nations in Central America. To do otherwise risks a catastrophe for the people of Central America and for our own country.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. GEJDENSON].

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Mr. GEJDENSON. The issue that must be addressed here is what the ramification will be if we accept the President's policy, a policy that began with misrepresentation to this Congress and the American people as simply an opportunity to interdict arms headed for the rebels in El Salvador. Not many Members in this Chamber nor many Members in the other body, or people around this country believe for 1 minute that the administration initially wanted simply to interdict arms. It was clear from the beginning an attempt to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua.

If we take a look at how this process has developed to date we find that our own intelligence agencies, our own military have assessed the situation and have responded with a conclusion that says the President's policy, if continued, will fail. It will fail to overthrow the Nicaraguan Government. It will fail to create the kind of change in Nicaragua that we are seeking.

But it will accomplish certain goals. It will certainly accomplish the goal of

pushing the Nicaraguans deeper and deeper into the Soviet orbit. It will push the Nicaraguans more into the debt of the Cubans.

My parents fled the Soviet Union in 1946. They came to the United States because this country represents a difference. It represented a different standard of behavior than what the Soviets had shown in Eastern Europe when they found client states not following their policy such as when the Soviet Union moved in on Hungary and Czechoslovakia. If there was any sort of divided thought in any of those countries, the Soviets came down hard.

Here we are given an even worse choice. We are put in a position where the President asks us to support a policy that will neither bring change to Nicaragua nor will it bring the Nicaraguan Government and its people closer to America's position in the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEJDENSON. If we examine the options that are put before us by the committee, they take account of realistic alternatives.

Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEJDENSON. Not until I have finished.

They give the Congress and the President an opportunity to attempt to utilize economic pressures, economic pressures that have a far greater opportunity to be successful than the present failed policy.

The 8,000 to 15,000 Contras who now exist on Nicaragua's northern border are not going to bring the Sandinista government down. To the contrary, they will give the Sandinistas the excuse for every failure of their revolution. Each time that a crop does not come in in the planned amount, every time that their society experiences censorship or other forms of Government control, they can easily point to the United States as the cause.

Here a small country in Central America is the focus of the largest military might in the world. It is a great argument to bring back to our own people. We would like to have free press, they can tell them, except for the Americans that are on our northern border. We would like to open up the political process further but the Americans are on the northern border.

It might be worth that kind of cost if there was some chance for success. There is clearly no chance for success. There is only an opportunity to find more violence against Nicaraguan citizens, the kind of horror stories that we have seen before our committee where innocent civilians, mothers and children and grandmothers are tortured and raped by the Contras.

This Congress and the American people cannot afford to continue such a failed policy. It is the same sort of failed assessment that was used in designing the Bay of Pigs, the hope that half the Cuban Army would divert once the rebels had landed at the Bay of Pigs. The hope that the population would create a simultaneous uprising in support of the rebels.

Mr. SHAW. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GEJDENSON. I will not yield.

In talking to people in the region initially, the concept was that the Nicaraguan Army would disintegrate once the Contras began their attack, that we would see a public uprising against the Nicaraguan Government. To the contrary, we are helping to consolidate the Sandinista hold on Nicaragua.

We need to change that policy and we have that opportunity here tonight.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SOLOMON].

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, at this point in the debate, I would like to take a few moments to put the events in Nicaragua in their proper historical perspective. For these past several years, whenever our country's policies in Central America have been debated in Congress, we hear the same continuous refrain: That the United States has overreacted to the actions of the Sandinista leadership in Nicaragua—that the United States does not understand the dynamics of revolutionary change in a developing like country like Nicaragua—that the Sandinistas would see the error of their ways if we would only treat them right.

Mr. Chairman, all of these arguments are variations on the theme of "Blame America First!"—the battle cry of the new isolationists, those who have grown weary of that "long twilight struggle" that President John F. Kennedy summoned us to join.

But I would suggest here today that there is another explanation for the tragic spectacle in Nicaragua that has been wrought by the Sandinistas. I would suggest there is another explanation, an explanation with ample historical precedent and contemporary relevance. This explanation is that the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua was stolen by ideologues and extremists who would rather pay obeisance to a foreign ideology and to the foreign capital that ideology represents—Moscow.

I have been deeply impressed by the statements of prominent Nicaraguans who participated in the revolution, Nicaraguans who sincerely wanted to build a new and democratic society—but whose hopes and dreams have been shattered by the Sandinistas.

Consider, for example, Arturo Cruz, the leader of the democratic opposition in Nicaragua, a former member of the Sandinista military junta, as well as a former ambassador from the Sandinista regime to the United States. Mr. Cruz had this to say 2 years ago:

... dogmatism and adventurism seem to have wiped out the Democratic and pluralistic ideals which, in 1979, united all Nicaraguan advocates of freedom... In April of 1980, after 9 months in government, I was confronted with a difficult decision. I had already become deeply disturbed by the indiscriminate and speedy radicalization of the revolution amid a great deal of confusion and sudden changes.

Mr. Cruz went on to lament that "totalitarian trends are gaining the upper hand in the process of defining Nicaragua's revolution. In the pursuit of a thorough emasculation of the 'establishment,' the radical zealots are prone to exhibit iconoclastic contempt for highly respected people and institutions."

Keep in mind, my colleagues, that these statements were made 2 years ago—and Mr. Cruz is describing events that he observed as an official in the Sandinista regime before the Contras had even taken to the field in opposition to the regime. Only last September, Government-controlled mobs attacked Mr. Cruz's car and resorted to other harassment tactics to intimidate Mr. Cruz and his political supporters.

Before moving on, allow me one more quotation from Mr. Cruz, again describing his experiences in the Sandinista regime before there were Contras opposing it:

... our foreign policy began to show how senseless our goals were. Instead of dedicating all our energy to building the ideal society for which our people had hoped, we were chasing Chimeras abroad... declaring ourselves nonaligned, we were, in fact, leaning to the Socialist bloc. Our actions belied our lipservice to nonalignment; it was difficult to explain our position vis-a-vis the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. No less astonishing was our silence about the heroic struggle of solidarity in Poland.

Let us continue to look at the record of the Sandinistas, the record that regime had compiled before there even were Contras taking up arms. In the days immediately after the Sandinistas seized power in Managua in July 1979, the United States and other countries in the free world moved decisively to supply assistance to Nicaragua. By the end of 1981, more than \$1 billion had been committed by the free world to support Nicaragua. The United States spearheaded this effort, providing more bilateral assistance to the Sandinistas in 1 year than we had provided to the Somoza regime over the previous 10 years. The Inter-American Development Bank provided more funding in 1 year to the Sandinistas than Somoza had received over the previous 20 years.

What did the Sandinistas have to show for all of this?

By the end of 1981, the Sandinistas had managed to amass an external debt equal in size to the debt that was accumulated by the Somoza regime over a period of 40 years.

By the end of 1981, more than 200,000 people—nearly 10 percent of all Nicaraguans—had fled the country.

By the end of 1981, a country that had been running a trade surplus at the time of the revolution was losing \$2.5 million a day.

By the end of 1981, inflation had hit 35 percent and unemployment was at 30 percent in Nicaragua.

By the end of 1981, the public sector in Nicaragua was controlling over 50 percent of the Nicaragua economy, compared to 15 percent at the time of the revolution.

By the end of 1981, agricultural production in Nicaragua had fallen by 50 percent. The country was importing sugar, rice, beans, and corn—staple foods in which Nicaragua was self-sufficient at the time of the revolution.

By the end of 1981, the Sandinistas had sponsored an effort to consolidate the several guerrilla movements in El Salvador under Nicaraguan control. Training agreements with the PLO had also been negotiated.

By the end of 1981, the Sandinistas had suppressed free trade unions in Nicaragua, cracked down on freedom of the press, and were harassing the Catholic Church—an effort, may I say, that reached a climax of sorts when the Pope was publically jeered during staged demonstrations when he visited Nicaragua in 1983.

By the end of 1981, thousands of Miskito Indians had been herded into concentration camps, all in the name of a literacy campaign.

By the end of 1981, the Nicaragua permanent Human Rights Commission was investigating reports of hundreds of disappearances and executions in the country. The commission, which had been founded when Somoza was in power, was subsequently closed under the Sandinistas and its archives were confiscated.

Finally, surprise! surprise! by the end of 1981, Humberto Ortega, Sandinista Minister of Defense and brother of Daniel Ortega, had decided to belabor the obvious when he admitted: "Marxism/Leninism is the scientific doctrine that guides our revolution * * * without Marxism/Leninism, Sandinismo cannot be revolutionary."

No, Mr. Chairman, what we have in Nicaragua is not a case of American policy having failed—it is a case of a revolution having failed; the hopes and dreams of a people being crushed; the leaders of a revolution subverting the very liberties that revolution was intended to establish.

If the Sandinista leadership was content to act as self-conscious parody of the ideals the Nicaraguan people were

fighting for in 1979, that would be bad enough. But when that same leadership surrenders the country's sovereignty to act as a surrogate for foreign powers and to spread the false hope of revolution to neighboring countries, it is the concern of every country in the hemisphere.

Mr. Chairman, the Sandinistas in Nicaragua must stand indicted in the court of world opinion for betraying their own revolution. And true to form, they have resorted to a psychology of crisis, a psychology of ongoing revolution as the only justification for continuing their disgusting regime. Communism always sponsors revolution against everything except communism itself, which is, in fact, the most reactionary model for political and social development ever devised.

If the Sandinistas were fulfilling the hopes their revolution inspired:

There would not be 40 percent of all Nicaraguan males over the age of 18 now in uniform;

There would not be 7,500 Cuban personnel now in Nicaragua to oversee the military buildup and the political repression presently taking place;

There would not be a Nicaraguan armed force significantly larger than any other armed force in Central America—and over four times larger than the armed force maintained by Somoza!

Finally, if the Sandinistas were fulfilling the hopes their revolution inspired, there would not today be more political prisoners in Nicaragua—more prisoners at this moment—than the cumulative total of prisoners for all the years Somoza was in power.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one final observation. In the course of a congressional session, we debate American policy toward many countries: Chile, just yesterday; South Africa, the Philippines, and many others are sure to come. Why is it, Mr. Chairman, that whenever we discuss a country that has not had a grand and glorious left-wing revolution, we always do so in terms that suggest an inevitability, a historical necessity for change that must inexorably come? But, whenever we talk about a Communist state, like Nicaragua, we do so in terms that suggest an acceptance of the present tyranny as a permanent fact of life.

Mr. Chairman, that is precisely what is at stake in this debate. The real issue is whether or not we and our democratic allies in Central America must accept and tolerate the presence of a destabilizing and tyrannical state in our hemisphere, a Communist state whose leadership has sold out to foreign powers in the name of spreading the same perverted revolution throughout the region.

I urge support for the Contras. A figure of \$14 million is a small sum to

spend in defense of our friends in Central America, and, ultimately, in defense of ourselves.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. SWINDALL].

Mr. SWINDALL. Mr. Chairman, in listening carefully to the arguments of those in opposition to H.R. 239, I reached the inescapable conclusion that those opposing H.R. 239 are either intentionally or unintentionally blind to world history, or simply bound and determined to repeat it.

For example, one of the opponents argued that from Vietnam we should certainly learn that our fears of the spread of communism and the validity of the domino theory are unjustified. Yet I would suggest that the lesson to be learned from Vietnam is precisely the opposite.

By the same token, I have heard the argument that rather than seek military aid in this corridor we should work closely with the Sandinistas. I would suggest that history demonstrates that we have already done precisely that.

In July 1979 it was the former administration that actually prevailed upon Somoza to leave and go to Miami, and then in fact, as we all know, 1 year later in Paraguay he was assassinated. But yet in hopes of keeping the Sandinistas from moving to the Marxist-Leninist-Soviet network, we aided them to the tune of \$118 million.

It was only after several years that the Carter administration upon recognizing that the Sandinistas had absolutely no intention of living up to their own promises, made voluntarily in July 1979 to the OAS with respect to free elections, withdrew the aid. And it was in that posture that the current administration inherited the problem. It was in that posture that we saw the liberation army grow from a mere 5,000 to the present force of over 60,000.

Yet the gentlewoman from Ohio pointed out we are talking about a population of a mere 3 million. Why then would we see a standing army of over 60,000?

By the same token, we learned that they have argued for self-determination. My question is what about self-determination in El Salvador. What about those that are seeking to hold their democracy in El Salvador only to find the insurgents being trained in Nicaragua by some 3,000 Cuban-Soviet advisers in the region are seeking to undermine that democracy?

Once again, we must remember that we are talking about Nicaragua a country that has a population of only 3 million. I cannot help but reach the conclusion that those who argue against this in reality are simply sticking their heads into the sand in hopes of ignoring the reality of what the

facts, rather than emotion, demonstrate.

I urge all of those who are concerned about preventing the loss of American lives and the security of this country and our neighbors in Central America to take this opportunity to avoid shedding American blood, to seize upon this opportunity to aid those who share our goal of true self-determination. In this case we are aiding the actual individuals who were a part of that original revolution. Adolfo Calero, for example, was actually one of the ones who before Somoza was deposed held the palace for over 24 hours and yet, again, we hear arguments that these individuals are part of the original Somoza national guard.

Statistics and intelligence tell us if we are concerned about the fact that in reality what we find is less than 2 percent of the 15,000 comprising the Contras are comprised of former Somoza. The leadership is overwhelmingly comprised of the individuals who stood with their colleagues in the Sandinista army in hopes of establishing a true and free democracy.

Finally, I urge consideration of what is at stake regarding the threat of our early warning system which are worth facing—designed on the premise that Central America poses no threat. Additionally, we can ill afford to have reconnaissance flights on our western seaboard similar to those now being flown over our eastern seaboard as a result of the Soviet presence in Cuba. This is especially true in light of the defense facilities positioned in the western United States.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the support of H.R. 239.

□ 2000

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from Kansas [Mr. GLICKMAN].

Mr. GLICKMAN. Mr. Chairman, there are a lot of experts on Central America, I see, as I watch the debate. Since I spent 5 days in El Salvador and Nicaragua I assume that I qualify as an expert as well.

I thought that I might share some of the benefits of my quick visit there. One is that I did vote for military aid to El Salvador and I came back from Nicaragua with a concern about what I saw. I did not see a Cuba but I saw a country where there are a lot of Eastern European military vehicles floating around; I talked to the editor of La Prensa about the press freedom and lack thereof that is going around.

I am concerned about the expansionist tendencies. But I think the situation is complex. I think we have to ask ourselves what are the U.S. goals in this? No. 1, are we trying to overthrow the government directly? Or, two, are we trying to destabilize the regime so they may be overthrown or weakened?

No. 3, are we trying to prevent the Soviet Union and Communist countries from entering the picture? Four, are we trying to prevent the Sandinistas from moving into other countries in Central America? Or, five, are we trying to improve the internal operations of their government?

Now, these are five potential goals. I happen to think that as long as we retain diplomatic relations with the country, which we do, as long as we have an Ambassador in Managua, which we do, as long as we are dealing with them, I do not think that we ought to provide aid to the Contras to overthrow the government or to destabilize the regime so that they would be overthrown. But that does not mean that we are paralyzed, that we cannot act. I am not particularly thrilled with all the language of the Barnes-Hamilton resolution because I am not sure that it speaks clearly to what our goals are in this region. But that is a start.

Other places are a possible trade embargo, a conditional trade embargo against the importation of Nicaraguan goods like beef or bananas or other things in the event that they are involved in these kinds of activities I mentioned.

The Contadora process is one that ought to be encouraged. Warning the Soviets which we did when they were here on their visit, the Politburo and the Supreme Soviet, about the fact that we will not tolerate Soviet military equipment in there; recalling our Ambassador if necessary; or even possibly breaking off diplomatic relations, if necessary. But that is not what is being proposed now.

What is being proposed is providing aid to the Contras to destabilize their government when we have diplomatic relations to this country. I think that is an improper way for us to act as a great power.

I think there is still potential for stabilizing relations between the Nicaraguan Government and the United States. But with covert aid that potential is destroyed. Nicaragua ought to know that if it stops its internal problems that we find so offensive that it might in fact find that it has a lot more to gain from the United States than to lose. It ought to be in their interest to in fact cooperate with us. If they do not, if they engage in these actions, I think we ought to deal with it directly and not indirectly in the form of Contra aid.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 3 minutes to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. HARTNETT].

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. HARTNETT. I yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. HYDE. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I want to make one comment about my good friend Mr. GLICKMAN who spoke so eloquently, as usual, in the well. He talked about how the Ortega government could learn that it had more to gain by cooperating with us than by being hostile to us. That is very true. But I look at Fidel Castro who since 1959 has impoverished his country because he is an ideologue who is wedded to extending and spreading revolution all over the globe. When you get committed, dedicated Marxists they do not care about what is good for their country. All they care about is spreading the faith.

Mr. HARTNETT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reclaim my time and I would like to continue.

Mr. Chairman, and my colleagues, the gentleman who preceded me in the well made reference to experts on Central and South America.

Mr. Chairman, I am anything but an expert. I am 44 years old and I have never been to Nicaragua. I have never shaken the hand of President Ortega. Nor have I ever met any of the benevolent members of his administration. I have never spoken in broken English or in poor Spanish to archbishops, nor have I ever had the pleasure of looking a Nicaraguan in the eye and asking him how he feels about my country and telling him how I feel about his.

But, you know, Mr. Chairman, the eloquence of the speakers on the other side of the aisle who preceded me this evening has been brilliant; their logic and their rationale, Mr. Chairman, I think in some instances is a little lacking. They have tried to equate this to Vietnam and it will be another Vietnam, Mr. Chairman, if our foreign policy and our assistance to the Nicaraguan people are run by some of the left element of the Congress.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have never been to Nicaragua; many of my colleagues have. The thing that concerns me, Mr. Chairman, is that I have made it for 44 years almost now and never had to know, I have a 14-year-old son that if we stand by and do nothing will be down there by the time he is 18, and my daughter, maybe, who is 12. That is my concern; now what is best for Nicaragua, but what is best for the vital security interests of these United States.

We have been somewhat of a force in this hemisphere, Mr. Chairman, because we have had some control over activities in our own hemisphere. That has made for somewhat of a peaceful existence for us and our neighbors in Central America. But if we stand by and do nothing, I am afraid, Mr. Chairman, that we are not going to ever know these United States in the future like we have in the past, nor our own security.

Forty-four years never having ventured to that small country for this

aging, middle-aged Congressman, and some, some chance that my 18-year-old son will be there in a very hostile environment in a short time. I would not trade places with him, Mr. Chairman. I do not think many of the sons of my colleagues would either.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. KOSTMAYER].

Mr. KOSTMAYER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I do not rise tonight to defend the Sandinistas. Along with the gentleman from North Dakota who spoke earlier, I visited that country and returned disillusioned and as disappointed as he. Nor in fact do I rise tonight to criticize our President or his party or their goals in the region for I think we have goals in common as Republicans and Democrats, most importantly as Americans.

But I think this policy is flawed in three ways. First, it cannot work. \$14 million is not enough to do the job. That is why the administration will be requesting for next year double that, \$28 million, and that is why they seek also to double the number of Contras. Nor does the policy have the kind of broad based political support it requires at home in our own country or abroad where our allies feel, and I think rightly so, that we have rejected the Contadora process.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, any effort on the part of our own Government directly or indirectly to overthrow a duly constituted foreign government with which we are not at war and with which we enjoy diplomatic relations, is unseemly.

There is an alternative. The alternative to be offered by the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. BARNES] and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] that alternative, ladies and gentlemen, sends a clear, strong message to President Ortega and his government, a message to end the censorship, a message to end the religious restrictions, a message to reach a political settlement with his neighbors.

Between tonight and the end of this fiscal year we have 5 months to permit the Nicaraguan Government to demonstrate that they have heard the message of Barnes/Hamilton. Tonight the vote we cast is a message to Mr. Ortega to join with us in seizing the historic moment.

I think that we can shift the direction of the tragedy that is unraveling in Central America if we reject the administration's policy and try something different.

This is a risk, but if it fails nothing is lost.

Mr. Chairman, I think that it can succeed.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DREIER].

Mr. DREIER of California. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of H.R. 296.

The one irrefutable fact in this debate is that the high ideals and purpose of the original Nicaraguan revolution have been subverted. That revolution was waged with the pledge that the Somoza dictatorship would be replaced by a society based on political pluralism, civil liberties, a mixed economy, and nonalignment.

Nicaragua today is a far cry from the society promised by the Sandinistas. The elections held last November, for instance, were neither free nor fair. As the inter-American Human Rights Commission had documented, the elections were a sham. Legitimate opposition parties were prevented from freely organizing and campaigning. In the end, the Sandinistas used their absolute control of the state to give themselves an insurmountable electoral advantage—an advantage they have since used to consolidate their power.

There are no freedoms today in Nicaragua. There is no freedom of expression, freedom of movement, freedom of the press. It is no surprise that the early supporters of the Sandinistas now shun the regime. Carlos Andres Perez, for instance, a former president of Venezuela and now Vice Chairman of the Socialist International, publicly declined to attend Daniel Ortega's inauguration, saying that he and others who supported the original revolution felt—and I quote—"cheated" by the current state of affairs in Nicaragua and the lack of electoral freedom.

As a consequence, there exists today in Nicaragua a legitimate, native, and growing opposition to the repressive Sandinista regime. Today we focus on the military aspects of that opposition, but that opposition has a real social basis. You cannot manufacture a revolution; nor can a policy decision here in Washington put 15,000 men in the field. The freedom fighters in the field are backed by a broad, growing social movement—they are not merely instruments of U.S. foreign policy.

The freedom fighters are not demanding political power in their struggle. They are demanding a national dialog and a constitutional solution, and they are asking that we help offset the unfair advantage of Soviet intervention on behalf of the Sandinistas. Is this too much to ask?

Those who respond by saying "no" also say "no" to the leadership of that respected Democratic President, John F. Kennedy. They pervert the words of his inaugural address to read: "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay no price, bear no burden meet no hardship, oppose any friend, support any

foe to assure the survival and success of accommodation."

Let's not let the light of liberty and freedom be extinguished in Nicaragua. Let's help return the original Nicaraguan revolution to the Nicaraguan people—support H.R. 296.

□ 2010

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair announces that the time left of the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] is 33½ minutes and the time of the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO] is 31½ minutes.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona [Mr. STUMP].

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. LEWIS].

Mr. LEWIS of California. Mr. Chairman, and Members, I am reminded of my first exposure to the country; Managua. The tune, if I were Bob MICHEL, would go something like:

Managua, Nicaragua, what a beautiful spot,
There's coffee and bananas and a temperature hot.

Managua, Nicaragua, in our mind's eye a dream vacationland,

A spot in our own hemisphere, a happy people, beautiful tropical sunshine.

When I arrived in the Congress in 1979, the country came to my mind's eye in an entirely different fashion. I found the debate that was raging for this new freshman Congressman to be most disconcerting.

I did not pretend to have a lot of answers and tried to listen. What struck me most was that in the debate that had taken place between 1974 and that time, there had been significant shift in this House, regarding our views about what ought to be a future we can support in Nicaragua.

It was clear that there was growing unrest in our country about Somoza and his regime. It was clear that people were asking serious questions about totalitarian systems that oppress people, that did not allow freedom, that did not allow for a free press, did not allow for private economic opportunity and growth.

The Sandinista movement had gained broad support in this House and broad support at home. In the middle of that first year, with the majority developing here, our Government, then the Carter administration, and the House of Representatives as well, applied pressures to the Organization of American States to have Somoza step aside, and the Sandinistas had won what they described as their revolution.

Now my colleagues, I would ask us to step back and attempt once again to listen. Is that which we see as a Sandinismo today what we were voting about in 1979 or talking about in the years before. Absolutely and clearly it is not.

Member after Member was on the side of the overthrow of Somoza, has

stood and condemned the Sandinista government. Why have they done so? That government came about as a result of a dual-track revolution. One that we were involved in. The other, on the other hand, that the FSLN was involved in, and a few who were very closely tied to Cuba as well as having loyalty to the Soviet Union.

Now Members and my colleagues, it is critical for us to realize that we were arguing for, you voted for, a chance for freedom, for democracy, for free press; and there is none of that at this point.

Any reasonable review would cause us to understand that it is time for us to think again. The church has done that. I commend to you a book entitled, "The Barren Fig Tree," written by a group of Christians who are concerned about the change from what they expected and what they see. The bishops of Central America supported initially the Sandinista. They encouraged their educational programs only to find that those educational programs were undermining a form of education that gave a chance for freedom in that country.

The church began to back off. In the early period, we supported the Sandinista, \$117.2 million in the first 18 months, and then Jimmy Carter was forced to look again, because he found that that other revolution had really gained control; they had strategically placed themselves in a position to take over the revolution, put in place their own. And they are now in the process of attempting to destroy a hope for democracy in the region.

Those who suggest that we are here to talk about the Contras somehow overthrowing the Sandinista just aren't looking at reality. That is not what they are about. They are fighting to see if there is a chance to preserve some time for democracy, to hold in place the chance for this new revolution to grow.

The people who now make up the opposition forces that you call the Contras; those people are Nicaraguans. They represent a broad mix. Some were in the former government, some were supporters of the Sandinistas; some were neither. But a groundswell is taking place, and we must have time for it to succeed.

Mr. Chairman, the issue before us is, are we going to support a Communist Sandinista government, or are we going to vote against that sort of government, and give hope for democracy within our hemisphere.

I fear that if we do not follow the latter path, support democracy, that our hope for democracy in the region is at a loss.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Chairman, here is the frontpage of

today's New York Times. It reads, "Nicaraguan Rebels Appear Ready To Fight On If Aid Is Cut Off." And most assuredly they will, because I hold here a message from the combat front in Nicaragua, from the No. 1 hero of the successful revolution against the dictator Anastasio Somoza.

This letter is from Commandante Zero, Commander Eden Pastora. It is directed mostly to the majority party in the House, but it is surely a message to all of us.

"I will continue our struggle against the Managua regime even if the U.S. Congress stipulates that funds approved will go only to humanitarian aid for refugees and not the rebel groups." "If Congress does that, I will be very sorry, that they don't want to help those of us who are fighting; sorry that they don't want to give military aid to those of us who are fighting with weapons in our hands for the liberty of our people against a dictatorial government of the extreme left. We will continue to fight with or without the aid of the Congress, because it is the revolutionary duty of the Sandino who have no commitment to the Congress or the administration. If the administration proposes humanitarian aid instead of military aid, well then, the administration will know how to settle its differences with Nicaragua. We know how to settle our differences here inside Nicaragua."

With or without the U.S. aid, we will continue to fight, just as we did against Somoza. If it is necessary to fight for another 20 years, then we will fight for another 20 years!

□ 2020

"We do want Democrats to help those of us with weapons in our hands for freedom of the press, just like the U.S. Democrats have. So that the press, Army, party and government will not be one and the same. Those of us who are fighting international communism with the union of treason want a democratic system like the U.S. Democrats have; and we ask them not to conduct U.S. politics at the expense of our people's suffering."

"The Democrat and Republican Parties should settle their differences in the United States and should not create obstacles for those who want to help us in the struggle against the Russians and the Cubans who have invaded us." Signed, Eden Pastora.

"Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we will pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to ensure the success and the survival of liberty."

Those stirring words are from the magnificent inaugural speech by the youngest elected President ever to raise his hand and swear to defend our Constitution. Those words were

spoken 25 years ago on the steps of this great Capitol. Young President John F. Kennedy went on to say that "the trumpet summons us again, it is a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle . . ."

There have passed since the January 1961 day a brutal 24 years and 4 months. In that magnificent speech, President Kennedy let the whole world know that the twilight struggle of which he spoke was to be against disease, and we have a better record in that fight than any country in the history of the world; against poverty it is the United States that works hardest in trying to stop the Communist aggravated famine in Ethiopia.

Yes, he spoke out that we would have to fight for as long as we could see into the in this twilight struggle, against the curse of war. But he also said that the twilight struggle was against tyranny. And it is against the tyranny in Managua that I rise today to support my President's foreign policy.

Now, two magnificent things have happened in this House chamber today. One, no one trashed El Salvador, and two, we have had almost 10 hours of excellent, high quality debate. The tone was set by the Honorable EDWARD P. BOLAND of Massachusetts, and with rare exceptions it has been fought on a very high level. It has not at all resembled the debates in the National Assembly in Managua which, when it adjourned right before Easter, had members cursing at one another while other members stormed off the Assembly floor in outrage. The pain of that Assembly, because of Sandinista oppression is truly a mirror reflection of the final spasms of Kershensky's Duma in 1917 Leningrad before that free legislature was snuffed out, never again to meet in free discourse and debate as we so fortunately have been able to do here in our Capital for over 196 years.

Exactly 14 years ago this very day, April 23, 1971, I witnessed the most disgusting, the most obnoxious—

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] has expired.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DORNAN of California. I witnessed in April of 1971 the most disgraceful conduct of U.S. Members of Congress that I could ever have imagined on the west front of this Capitol. On that sunny day, while this distinguished gentleman from Arizona Mr. McCAIN was still rotting in a Hanoi dungeon but thanking his lucky stars that most of his torture was behind him due to the heroic Son Tay raid attempted rescue, I saw a Communist flag of North Vietnam, larger than this beautiful Old Glory behind our Speaker, draped over one of the

front marble railings, behind the railing a speakers podium. And speaking over the Communist flag was a Senator from Indiana, no longer here, thank God, a New York Congresswoman no longer here, thank God. And two more U.S. Senators working the crowd. I grabbed that massive flag and I tore it to shreds. Then the mob, the 1971 "turbas divinas", had their way with me for a while. However, very weak street fighters those pro-Hanoi fools.

Yes, we have come a long way in just 14 years. We have debated in this Congress with almost no one paying lip-service to Communists. I repeat, the success of El Salvador is brilliantly glowing by its near absence in our deliberations. I made my eighth trip down there on Palm Sunday, and I witnessed a fiesta of free religion and free politics. The people's appreciation and enjoyment of the electoral process and love of their liberty was a joy to behold. I was deeply honored to be an official observer of that fourth free election in just over 2 years.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] has expired.

Mr. STUMP. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1 additional minute to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DORNAN of California. The absence of discussion of El Salvador in our debate today, its relegation to the back burner with an attendant absence of hot, burning rhetoric about no democracy in El Salvador shows that President Reagan has had a magnificent foreign policy achievement in that Central American nation. The Hondurans also yearn to be our friends, and in both of those countries Mr. VIN WEBER of Minnesota and heard those people say, including President Duarte on his election victory night, that the reason that those two countries are relatively stable now is because other mothers' sons are dying for them fighting for liberty with the resistance forces in Managua.

VIN WEBER and I visited a Contra field hospital in Honduras. It was a very rudimentary shed, clean but very rough. It was located somewhere between Tegucigalpa and the Honduran border. It brought tears to our eyes to see these campesino peasant fighters cheer when Mr. WEBER told them that Ronald Reagan would not desert them. They knew they were fighting for a worthy cause and they told us so in clear uncomplicated terms. My heart is with them.

"Those who wait on the Lord renew their strength and shall mount up on wings like eagles; they shall run and not be weary; they shall walk and not faint." So with these fighters for freedom.

I know that these brave men and women will fight on with our aid or without it. I want us to be with them.

Mr. Chairman, at this point I wish to call to the attention of this body the attached letter and resolution which has come to me from the Hungarian Freedom Fighters' Association. This resolution calls on the Congress to honor the President's request for assistance and to help the Freedom Fighters of Nicaragua to join the ranks of other valiant men and women who have fought against Communist tyranny. The Hungarian Freedom Fighters' Association, of which I am proudly an honorary member, accurately calls attention to the implications around the world of our vote here tonight. How often have we failed to count the cost in diminished influence in recent years, when we tossed off our concerns as if they mattered not a farthing. The people of Hungary, whose cousins here have provided us a strong reminder in this resolution, know that it does matter.

I place this statement in the RECORD, and urge my colleagues to heed its admonition.

COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF HUNGARIAN ORGANIZATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA,

Rockville, MD, April 21, 1985.

HON. ROBERT DORNAN,
House of Representatives
Washington, DC

DEAR CONGRESSMAN DORNAN: The Hungarian Freedom Fighters' Federation unanimously passed a resolution on the issue of aid to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters. This resolution was endorsed by the Coordinating Committee of Hungarian Organizations in North America. Copies of the resolution were sent to more than 60 members of Congress in the hope that it will be considered by them before they cast their vote on this issue.

We respectfully request you—as one of the honorary members of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters' Federation—to insert the resolution and our Committee's endorsing letter in the Congressional Record on Monday, April 22, 1985, so that all members of Congress can take note of it.

Respectfully yours,

ISTVAN B. GEREBEN.

HUNGARIAN FREEDOM
FIGHTER'S FEDERATION,
Rockville, MD.

RESOLUTION ON AID TO NICARAGUAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS

(Unanimously adopted by the Executive Committee of the Hungarian Freedom Fighters' Federation at its semi-annual meeting held in Washington, DC on April 13, 1985)

Since World War II the United States encountered numerous opportunities to influence the course of history to stop the advancement of tyranny. Few of these opportunities were exploited. In most cases gullibility, apathy, expedience, ignorance, well intentioned naivete resulted in disastrous consequences for America. Of these cases the most painful for us, Americans of Hungarian descent, was the political and diplomatic paralysis which characterized the United States during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. Fear of war resulted in appeasement of the oppressors of Hungary and a

greater danger of war today. Since then we learned that fear was baseless and a more principled stand could have resulted in a situation in Hungary which would have brought more freedom for the Hungarians and greater security for the world. Similar mistakes chilled the Prague Spring and U.S. "pragmatism" resulted in the abandonment of Solidarity in Poland, withdrawal from Asia paved the road to the genocide of the Cambodians, marginal support for the Afghan Freedom Fighters prevents the decisive outcome of the struggle for a free Afghanistan.

Now the United States is at a critical point of history again. The eyes of the world are on Washington again. Today we confront Marxist tyranny in our own hemisphere. The Soviet inspired reign of terror, with an appetite to consume our neighbors, is knocking on our southern border.

Our President recognized the futility of continuous moral surrender. He supports those, who have the capability and the desire to fight for their own people's freedom. We—who fought alone and learned the cost of abandonment—urge the members of Congress to stand with the President and give him the resources to financially help the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters.

It is not only Nicaragua's fate at stake. The people of Europe, Asia, and Africa living under the yoke of Soviet tyranny will draw far reaching conclusions as the consequence of America's attitude towards the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters. The people of the Third World are watching also, and will be influenced as well.

As citizens of our adopted country, the United States, we feel obliged to warn against the follies which have so often put the United States in the position of denying effective help to those who fight for the very principles upon which this country was built.

The Hungarian Freedom Fighters' Federation therefore supports the President's efforts on behalf of the Freedom Fighters of Nicaragua and urges all members of Congress to vote for the aid presently under consideration by the Congress of the United States.

Washington, D.C. 13 May 1983.

Hungarian Freedom Fighters' Federation

Dr. ANDRAS POGANY,

President.

This resolution is endorsed by the Coordinating Committee of Hungarian Organizations.

ISTVAN B. GEREBEN,

Executive Secretary.

Mr. Chairman, I also include for the RECORD, two of the finest articles on Nicaraguan oppression this month. They are by the brothers Bob and Sam Leiken, published in the New Republic.

NICARAGUA'S UNTOLD STORIES

(By Robert S. Leiken)

The 72-year-old senora lives in a solid stone house constructed by the Sandinista government. Her son, German Pomares, was a founder of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (F.S.L.N.) who perished leading the final offensive against Somoza in 1979. Set off by a well-kept garden from the shacks of the cotton field workers of El Viejo, Mrs. Pomares's home appears comfortable. But inside, the mother of the nationally revered martyr sleeps on a cot covered with rags, and she hobbles through bare, unfurnished rooms. She lives on a pension equivalent to \$10 a month. She has

made four trips to the local hospital, but has yet to succeed in getting a doctor's appointment. Three times she has requested an audience with Comandante Tomas Borge, now the sole surviving founder of the F.S.L.N. Each time, her son's old comrade has refused to receive her.

For one who has sympathized with the Sandinistas, it is painful to look into the house they are building, but it is unwise not to. I spent ten days in Nicaragua in August, accompanied by my brother, a trade unionist from Boston. It was my sixth visit since the revolution, and my longest since 1981. I have testified in Congress against aid to the *contras* and have supported (and continue to support) negotiations to end the civil war in El Salvador. Yet each succeeding trip to Nicaragua drains my initial reservoir of sympathy for the Sandinistas. Last year I wrote in my introduction to a book treated by the press as the "Democratic alternative to the Kissinger Report" that the Sandinistas' "failure to preserve the revolutionary alliance with the middle class and small producers as well as sectarian political and cultural policies [had] polarized the country, led to disinvestment, falling productivity and wages, labor discontent, and an agrarian crisis." This visit convinced me that the situation is far worse than I had thought, and disabused me of some of the remaining myths about the Sandinista revolution.

Everywhere we went we confronted the disparity between these myths and the unpleasant truth. The Sandinistas blame Nicaragua's economic crisis on the *contras* war and U.S. economic sanctions. Yet the standard of living in Nicaragua was deteriorating well before the U.S. backed *contras* turned to economic sabotage in the spring of 1983. A December 1981 internal staff memorandum of the International Monetary Fund found that real wages had fallen 71 percent since July 1979. They have continued to decline in succeeding years. And even with the U.S. "economic boycott," over 25 percent of Nicaragua's exports still go to the United States, not much less than under Somoza. Nicaragua can no longer sell sugar at subsidized prices to the United States, but what it has lost in this market it has sold to Iran at prices above those of the world market. The war and U.S. sanctions have compounded a mess created by the Sandinistas themselves.

Nicaraguans themselves do not seem to accept Sandinista claims that *Yanqui* aggression is responsible for the general scarcity of consumer goods. Peasants are obligated to sell their goods to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and contend that its prices are too low to enable them to make ends meet. A large portion of the peasantry is now producing only for its own consumption, and the resulting shortages have dramatically driven up prices. The marketplace, once the bustling center of Nicaraguan life, is now a daunting experience for buyers and sellers alike. As shoppers make the rounds looking for rice, beans, milk, toilet paper, soap, or light bulbs, the shopkeepers' constant reply is "No hay." (There isn't any). For anyone unable to afford the inflated prices or without the foreign exchange to shop at the new foreign currency stores, Eastern European-style queuing is now routine.

One of the most depressing aspects of our trip was to hear from so many that their lives are worse today than they were at the time of Somoza. Before the revolution Nicaraguans ate well by Central American standards. Thanks to the country's fertile soil

and its small population, even poor Nicaraguans were accustomed to beef and chicken. Now consumer goods available to the masses in other Central American countries are no longer obtainable. Barefoot children are hardly uncommon in the region, but I had never seen so many completely naked. As we encountered them, their distended stomachs displaying the telltale signs of malnutrition, Nicaraguans would bitterly recall the government slogan, "*Los niños son los mima-dos de la revolucion*" ("Children are the spoiled ones of the revolution").

The shortage of basic necessities is also breeding pervasive corruption. When we asked a rural storekeeper why he was able to sell Coca-Cola while many restaurants in Managua were not, he said that he had obtained the soft drink with a bribe. We later met Ramiro, a Coca-Cola deliveryman in Leon and a former member of the F.S.L.N., hitchhiking home from the city of Chinandega. He was returning from his five-hour weekly excursion after work to procure the three bottles of milk his children need. The milk cost him 150 cordobas, 30 percent of his weekly wages. (The official exchange rate is 28 cordobas to the dollar; the real, or black market, exchange rate is 250 to 1.) To get the money, he told us, he accepts bribes from some of his customers for extra cases of Coke. "This system is corrupting me against my will," he said.

Ramiro's desperate measures hardly merit censure. But others, especially high-ranking Sandinistas, are turning big profits from the scarcity. Members of a leather workers cooperative in Masaya told us that they are officially allotted 10,000 meters of leather a month; they receive between 5,000 and 7,000 meters. The cooperatives' Sandinista directors sell the remainder in Managua's Eastern Market and pocket the money. It is now a general practice for coordinators of the neighborhood Sandinista Defense Committees (C.D.S.) to sell part of the provisions allotted to them by the government on the private market. The people are then informed that provisions have run out.

In the village of El Transito, two hours northwest of Managua, most of the people belonged to the C.D.S. at the outset of the revolution. Now there is but one member, the coordinator, formerly the village's leading *Somocista*. (The transformation of *Somocistas* into Sandinistas and of Sandinistas into oppositionists is very common. In every town we visited we were told that former Somoza officials are now running C.D.S.s.) The coordinator enriches himself by selling C.D.S. foodstuffs and supplies in the Eastern Market. As we passed his house, we were able to peer through the window and see him standing there in his dark glasses, isolated and reviled.

The life-styles of the new rich contrast vividly with that of the rest of the country, and with official rhetoric. A Sandinista nomenclature has emerged. Party members shop at hard-currency stores, dine at luxury restaurants restricted to party officials, and vacation in the mansions of the Somoza dynasty, labeled "protocol houses." Vans pull up daily at government and party offices, to deliver ham, lobster, and other delicacies unavailable elsewhere. In a private state dining room, I ate a sumptuous meal with a comandante at a long table, attended by five servants. The image of the protruding stomachs of the "spoiled ones of the revolution" intruded while we consumed our lemon meringue pie.

Intellectuals and former officials claim that decadence is endemic in upper govern-

ment and party echelons. A former Sandinista diplomat recounted tales of high jinks and extravagance by Sandinista officials on foreign junkets, and women state employees complained of the same sexual harassment and blackmail that is common elsewhere in Central America. The swinging Sandinista leadership cynically presents an image of revolutionary asceticism to the outside world while being addicted to the very vices that it routinely denounces in "degenerate bourgeois society."

The widespread corruption from the lowest to the highest levels of government makes it hard for Nicaraguans to accept the notion that their problems originate from abroad, or that they should endure further sacrifices "to confront the imperialist enemy." A jobless worker in the Indian town of Monimbo complained, "The C.D.S. insists that we unscrew the street lights to conserve energy in the fight against imperialism. People are falling in holes while the Sandinistas get rich on our misery. What are their sacrifices?"

Those Sandinistas who have refused to be corrupted recognize that their dreams have turned into a nightmare. One government official, a good friend, told me, "We have given birth to a freak. But we must keep him alive." Yet what is to be done when the freak becomes a menace to its people and neighbors? There is a general impression among those in the United States properly aghast at the C.I.A. mining of ports and U.S. support for the professional torturers among the *contras* that the Sandinistas are the victims, not the victimizers. Inside Nicaragua, however, the image is reversed.

The word Nicaraguans employ the most frequently to describe the Sandinista government is *engano* (hoax or trick). In the city of Chinandega, we talked with transport workers from an opposition union who on their own time and with their union dues had painted road signs to make the city safer for driving. The Sandinista government took credit for the improvement. The national literacy campaign is one of the most vaunted achievements of the revolution, praised even by many of the government's critics. Yet two "graduates" of the literacy program in a peasant village told us they could not read their diplomas. We couldn't find one student from the campaign there or in the neighboring village who had learned to read. The campaign did somewhat better in the larger cities such as León, where, we were told, some had learned to read in follow-up courses. But most had forgotten the little they had learned, and at best could now only sign their name for election registration.

The most outrageous *engano* occurred during Pope John Paul II's visit to Managua in March 1983. According to Sandinista accounts, the Pope's mass had been "spontaneously" interrupted by the crowd, offended by the Pope's failure to heed the request of mourning mothers who wanted him to pray for their sons killed in the battle against the *contras*. Two former government officials, who are still Sandinista supporters, told us a different story. They had been appalled at the interruptions made by cadre from the Sandinista women's organization, furnished with microphones and loudspeakers. After the Pope left, the crowd departed in disgust and the Sandinista leadership was left awkwardly standing on the platform. The two officials, depressed by the spectacle, retired to a bar located next to the offices of the F.S.L.N. radio station. They overheard a group of Sandinista radio employees at an

adjoining table bragging about how they had played pre-recorded tapes of crowds chanting Sandinista slogans into the sound system.

The Sandinistas *engano* has been most successful among the resident foreign press. Journalists familiar with the atrocities of the right-wing tyrannies of Central America wish to believe, quite understandably, that the Sandinistas present an alternative. In today's Nicaragua it is easy to confuse desire with reality. The resident press also frequently merges with the larger population of "internationalists," a term which embraces all those foreigners expressing solidarity with the Sandinistas, from Bulgarian and Cuban apparatchiks to idealistic North Americans and West Europeans. It is the general feeling among Nicaraguans that the foreign press in Managua strongly sympathizes with the government, and that it is dangerous to speak openly with them. Disaffected Sandinista intellectuals, friends of friends, who poured their hearts out to me in Managua were afraid to meet with reporters from the U.S. press. We spoke with a resident of Monimbo, where a spontaneous insurrection had ignited the revolution against Somoza in February 1978. We had spent an evening together a year before with a mutual friend, yet initially he was still distrustful. He told us that the revolution had produced "many advances for the people"; two hours later, he was saying, "Monimbo appears to be sleeping, the way it was during the time of Somoza, but the people are united. One day soon they will stand up again."

One of the most common means of sustaining the myth of popular support is the Sandinistas' use of the rationing system as a lever. In numerous villages and cities, we learned that ration cards are confiscated for nonattendance at Sandinista meetings. In Masaya we were told that before one of the "Face-the-People" meetings (in which commanders meet with local residents) the ration cards of the members of cooperatives were collected; their return was made conditional on attendance. At one such meeting in Chinandega, Ortega branded talk of inflation "a counterrevolutionary plot." A pound of beans could still be purchased for five cordobas, he claimed. A man in the audience stood up and shouted, "Commandante, here's ten cordobas. Please get me a pound of beans." According to his neighbors, he was imprisoned later that day.

Although Nicaraguans still for the most part bow to government pressure, they do so sullenly and without conviction. We witnessed two Sandinista demonstrations, one in Masaya and the other in Chinandega, two historically pro-Sandinista cities. The Chinandega rally, held at 10 on a Wednesday morning, celebrated the fifth anniversary of the literacy campaign. It was attended entirely by students obligated to go by school authorities. As they marched through the streets chanting slogans distributed to them on small pieces of paper by their Sandinista instructors, pedestrians did not so much as turn their heads. None of the presumably grateful, presumably literate, people came to greet the comandante sent from Managua.

In Masaya the demonstration did not even benefit from student participation. As we approached the gathering in the fading afternoon, a large group of students stood on the steps of the Catholic school. They had refused to join the demonstration because the Sandinistas had removed several of their Catholic teachers. The small group

of demonstrators had glazed looks in their eyes as the last speeches wound down. I asked a *campesino* in attendance whether any of the comandantes had come. He answered, "I don't know. I slept through it."

The Nicaraguan populace has been saturated with Sandinista bombast which issues from radio, television, newspapers, local and national political meetings, and block committees, and which is propagated in the schools, the factories, and the cooperatives. The people resist in different ways: with the indifference and boredom we saw in Chinandega and Masaya; with a resurgence in religious feelings which has filled churches and Catholic schools; with suspiciousness and bitter humor.

Jokes and wisecracks against the Sandinistas are proliferating. The two pro-Sandinista newspapers, *Barricada* and *Nuevo Diario*, are referred to as *Burricada* (as in bore) and *Nuevo Diabolo*. The F.S.L.N. is "the Somocista National Liberation Front." "Why do people prefer *Tona* [one of the two Nicaraguan beers]? Because the other, *La Victoria*, is bitter." Suspicions of the government are so deep that families of the war dead no longer believe that the government coffins shipped back from the front contain the bodies of their sons. (The coffins are sealed as a matter of policy.) People believe, improbably, that the coffins hold rocks or banana tree trunks. In Monimbo we were told that when a family and friends tried to open a coffin with a hammer and chisel, they were carried off by the police.

Nor is popular discontent restricted to these forms of passive resistance. Sympathy with the *contras* is becoming more open and more pervasive. I was stunned to hear peasants refer to the *contras* as *Los Muchachos*, "the boys—the admiring term used to describe the Sandinistas when they were battling the National Guard. It was apparent that many Nicaraguans are listening to the 'Fifteenth of September,' the *contra* radio station. It must be noted, however, that the *contras* do not operate in the areas we visited, and sympathy toward them may well be proportionate to absence of direct contact.

Draft resistance has become a mass movement in Nicaragua. The government passed legislation last September under which Nicaraguan men between the ages of 16 and 40 can be drafted for two years. When we were in Nicaragua, four hundred women gathered outside the draft board in La Paz Centro, a trading town thirty-five miles northwest of Managua, to protest forced recruitment of their sons. The demonstration was the latest in a string of anti-draft demonstrations in cities and towns throughout Nicaragua. *New York Times* correspondent Stephen Kinzer, one of the few resident reporters to sniff out the *engano* of Sandinista policies, reported on June 26 that "draft evasion is widespread," and found that high school attendance in six major provincial capitals had declined by as much as 40 percent. A student in León said that his high school class of forty-five had fallen to fourteen during the past year. Honduran researchers say Nicaraguan draft evaders pay 25,000 cordobas to be transported across the border, part of the money going to Nicaraguan Army officials in bribes. The demand is so great that border smugglers are now requiring groups no smaller than five. Draft resistance strikes a powerful blow at the myth of widespread popular support for the government. Young people have historically been the mainstay of Sandinista support.

Perhaps the most illuminating political event in the five years of Sandinista rule was a rally held for opposition presidential candidate Arturo Cruz in Chinandega on August 5. On that Sunday morning, Sandinista chicane, censored domestic and lackadaisical international press coverage, and the growing vigor of the opposition converged.

Chinandega, a city of approximately 60,000, was historically the heart of Sandinista organizing efforts and support. These efforts radiated out to the surrounding cotton and sugar fields, to the country's two largest sugar refineries nearby, to the stevedores at Corinto, Nicaragua's largest port, and down to León, another center of anti-Somoza resistance. One would have expected that here the opposition would be weakest, the government strongest.

The Chinandega demonstration was the last series of six held in support of Cruz. Each rally had been larger than the last. The organizers were denied access to Sandinista-controlled TV stations. They were able to place an ad on the one local non-Sandinista radio station, but they relied chiefly on two vehicles with loudspeakers, and on word-of-mouth. Two days before the rally three "angels," as members of the state security are commonly known, called on the organizers of the demonstration and accused them of being CIA agents. The *turbas divinas*, "divine mobs" of Sandinista supporters, circled their houses at night beating sticks against cans and chanting until the small hours of the morning. (Somoza's version of the *turbas*—the *Nicolasa*—used to employ the very same method against the opposition.) Meanwhile, Sandinista newspapers and television branded the opposition as consisting of *contras* and agents of American imperialism, and announced that further "aggressions" by them would not be permitted. Local authorities implied that the demonstration would be declared illegal. The day before the rally, Daniel Ortega, the head of the Sandinista government and the Sandinista presidential candidate, spoke to two hundred youths in El Viejo, a village three miles away. El Viejo's residents later claimed that the youths had been incited against the demonstration's leaders.

Fearing an attack by the *turbas*, organizers did not put up the banners or placards until early on the morning of the demonstration. But as they were working, fifty *turbas* burst into the soccer field, tearing down the banners and dispersing the organizers. They returned later during the day to try to repair the damage.

We spoke with two organizers—middle-class, professional women who had belonged to the F.S.L.N. before the revolution. (According to one, "the F.S.L.N. says that the opposition is Somocista. But most of the old Somocistas are working with the government. The opposition has remained the same. It is the F.S.L.N. that has changed.") They told us that after the *turbas'* nighttime serenading, they went to complain to the offices of the party representative, the chief of police, and the chief of state security, and to the Sandinistas. They were assured that the *turbas* would be controlled and that the demonstration would not be obstructed. After the early-morning attack, the two women went to the house of the local party leader. The door was open, and they entered. In the next room they heard the *turbas* informing him of the success of their mission.

There is no question that many who wished to go to the Cruz rally stayed at

home. On the day of the rally, local authorities impeded traffic from outlying areas into Chinandega. As Cruz marched through the city, many people opened their doors, gave him the "V" for victory sign, and then ducked back into their homes to avoid the ever-present eyes of the C.D.S. One woman said she did not go to the demonstration because she lived too close to the Sandinista youth office. She told of others who received threatening phone calls. Two weeks after the demonstration, a gas station attendant in Managua told us he had gone to the rally and that three friends who had accompanied him were in jail.

As might be expected, estimates of the turnout vary. Opposition figures soared as high as 20,000; local newsmen said 7,000. Given Sandinista efforts to reduce attendance, even 7,000 seems an impressive number, especially since three months before, the F.S.L.N. only managed to get 2,500 to Chinandega for the country's principal May Day rally. NBC taped the entire Cruz demonstration. Should this tape ever be shown publicly, experts will be able to make an accurate judgment about the number of demonstrators. When I viewed the tape it was evident that these thousands of demonstrators were hardly "bourgeoisie," as the Sandinistas claimed. They were overwhelmingly workers, peasants, and young people. I learned later that workers had hired their own trucks to come from the San Antonio Refinery and from the port of Corinto. They chanted slogans like "*El frente y Somoza son la misma cosa*." ("The Sandinistas and Somoza are the same thing.")

When Cruz began to speak, dozens of *turbas* armed with sticks, stones, and machetes surrounded the field. They came in on what appeared to be army trucks chanting, "Power to the people." They proceeded to break the windows and puncture the tires of demonstrators' cars. The police seemed to make no serious effort to restrain them. When the *turbas* attacked the demonstrators themselves, opposition youths dispersed, only to return wielding their own sticks and stones. Out numbered, the *turbas* were routed.

The almost complete absence of foreign and domestic press coverage enabled Sandinista officials to characterize the demonstration their own way. We encountered a Sandinista official drunk at midday on the streets of El Viejo. He told us that the demonstration had taken place at the private home of a bourgeoisie and was attended only by a handful of plutocrats. In Managua, the Sandinistas told us that there had been several hundred demonstrators. The following day the Nicaraguan press carried no mention of the events except for one photograph in the official newspaper *Barriada* which purported to show the *turbas* attacked by "fascist" demonstrators. *La Prensa* had devoted several articles and photographs to the demonstration and the clashes, but these were all censored, and the paper did not appear. This was the very day that Daniel Ortega had announced the lifting of press censorship.

The demonstrations for Cruz's candidacy tested the popular mood and the prospects for "the first free elections in Nicaragua," as the Sandinistas' slogan puts it. Among the conditions that Cruz and his supporters have laid down as indispensable for participation are guarantees of freedom of movement, assembly, and equal access to the press and television; sufficient time to campaign; international observers; and, most im-

portantly, guarantees that if he won the election he would be allowed to take office. What happened at Chinandega strongly suggests that neither a genuine election nor a genuine campaign can take place.

Chinandega also exposed the Sandinistas' electoral stratagem. Their decision to hold elections in November was based on a rudimentary political calculation. They judged that the external legitimacy provided by elections would more than compensate for their internal cost. They knew that power does not often change hands in Central America through elections. Somoza's elections had proven that, and the Sandinistas are in a far better position to control elections than Somoza ever was.

Yet their calculations were wrong on two counts. First, they failed to account for the Nicaraguan people. High-level Sandinista officials to whom I have spoken seem to live, along with their international supporters, in a dream world. They deem that the "anti-imperialist sentiments" of the Nicaraguan people allow them to bear any sacrifice even when their "anti-imperialist" leaders bear none. They receive favorable reports from lower-level cadre whose jobs depend on the perception of success. The Sandinistas knew that after five years of enforced political paralysis, the opposition was poorly organized, divided, and amateurish. The spontaneous popular reception for Cruz took them by surprise. Second, they failed to recognize the degree to which they have alienated progressive opinion in Latin America and Western Europe. Cruz's recent highly successful trip to Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Colombia, and his support from European Social Democrats like Spanish Socialist Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, has confounded the F.S.L.N.'s electoral plans.

Thus the Sandinistas find themselves in a quandary. Will they back down and permit Cruz to run under reasonable conditions, or will they go ahead with a discredited election? Thus far at least, the Sandinistas seem unwilling to pay the price of submitting their rule to a popular test. One Sandinista official, whom I have always considered a moderate, told me privately that they would prefer a U.S. intervention because it would "vastly accelerate the Latin American revolution against U.S. imperialism." He told me that the Nicaraguan Army would immediately invade Honduras and Costa Rica and be greeted as "liberators" by the people.

One can only hope that cooler Sandinista heads will prevail. Authentic elections may be the last chance to avert full-scale civil war. If democratic channels cannot be opened, the civilian opposition will be forced to link up with the armed opposition—which is exactly what happened in the 1970s in El Salvador after fraudulent elections. The United States, which has a monstrous record in Nicaragua, can do something to help. What is needed now most urgently is a bipartisan effort in support of authentic elections in Nicaragua.

As we pulled out of Managua in the fading light of a Sunday afternoon, we found ourselves directly behind an army convoy made up of about twenty vehicles. But unlike the army convoys I have seen in El Salvador, Honduras, and elsewhere, it would not permit traffic to pass. A large vehicle with a blinking light occupied the left lane, forcing vehicles coming toward us off the road. A soldier with a machine gun was poised on the rear truck. It took us four hours to cover the fifty miles to León. It was a grueling microcosm of Nicaragua today: the Sandinistas in the "vanguard" preventing the

normal flow of traffic, whether out of real fear, paranoia, or bullying. Behind them the rest of the population followed, inconvenienced, irritated, and enduring another pointless "sacrifice" for the Sandinistas' militarism. Our convenience was only four hours: the Nicaraguan people experience this twenty-four hours a day. Their patience has worn thin.

LABOR UNDER SIEGE

In the last several years, a number of union friends of mine have returned from Sandinista-sponsored tours of Nicaragua with enthusiastic reports of the achievements of the revolution. I visited Nicaragua myself this summer, meeting with members of both the official Sandinista labor federation and the independent unions. I didn't expect to discover a workers' paradise in this underdeveloped and crisis-ridden region, or to see workers running the factories. But I did hope to find signs of progress toward empowering the workers and peasants. Instead, I saw a labor movement battling a "Socialist" government which resists worker demands with tactics ranging from state-controlled unions to spurious arrests and violent goon squads.

In the 1970s labor was united against the Somoza regime, and workers expected that it would remain united to rebuild the country in the aftermath of Somoza's fall. But after assuming power, the Sandinistas sought a large measure of control over the workers by enrolling all Nicaraguan unions in the Central Sandinista de Trabajadores (C.S.T.). In 1980 the C.S.T. joined the World Federation of Trade Unions, headquartered in Prague. "The F.S.L.N. wanted to impose a central union, not build one," one opposition labor leader told me.

When centralizing efforts failed, the Sandinistas used state power to penalize unions unwilling to affiliate with them, to organize disruptive factions, and ultimately to jail opposition union leaders. I was told of death threats, beatings, police raids on union headquarters, military conscription of union dissidents, and blacklisting. Opposition leaders are now reluctant to use the recently restored right to strike for fear of being charged with "economic sabotage" and "abetting imperialism."

I talked with truckers from the port city of Corinto who had voted to disaffiliate their local from C.S.T. and to join the independent C.U.S., which is associated with the A.F.L.-C.I.O. through the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Soon thereafter, the local's office was attacked by police and *turbas*. Later some had their drivers' licenses revoked, and a half-dozen union leaders were jailed. In another incident a leader of the other independent union, the C.T.N., said he had been beaten and his nose broken by *turbas* at the Managua airport in full view of military and civil police.

The Sandinistas have also alienated workers in their own unions, which has led to increasing numbers of wildcat strikes. Several years ago, when the Sandinistas nationalized the German Pomares sugar works, they ousted the independent union. Then, to ensure a docile new leadership, they stacked the vote by trucking in illiterate cane cutters. This summer workers at the refinery defied their leaders; they struck after the union allowed management to cut back worker access to the company store's superior goods and low prices.

While we were in Managua there was a wildcat sit-in at the government-owned Victoria Brewery. Truck drivers there earn

3,000 cordobas a month. Rents average 1,000 a month, and a pair of pants costs 1,000. One deliveryman told me, "We've had the same salaries for the last five years and now hunger has made us explode." The Victoria workers knew that to return to work without a contract can spell defeat. Forced to go back on the job, they effected a slowdown as a way to sustain their leverage.

The official F.S.L.N. newspaper, *Barriada*, carried a single article on the Victoria "Labor dispute." It quoted Sandinista union leaders as saying that they offered "full support to the workers," but also said that they were urging them to return to work immediately. In contrast, *La Prensa* carried a front-page picture of 200 Coca-Cola drivers parading their trucks in solidarity with the Victoria workers. I was able to confirm *La Prensa's* report that solidarity brigades were sent by the competing brewery Tona, La Milca fruit punch, Pepsi-Cola, and Standard Steel. Several of these unions also have announced impending strikes.

The dissident labor leaders I met were plainspoken, accustomed to dealing with concrete facts. The C.S.T. official I spoke with talked grandly about how the Sandinistas reorganized Nicaragua's tiny, undeveloped labor unions "by industrial branch." Yet he was at a loss to explain why they had abolished the Nicaraguan equivalent of the U.S. National Labor Relations Board (*Tribunales de Trabajo*).

He often contradicted what the workers had told me. The workers at the San Antonio sugar refinery said that they launched a wildcat strike last February to uphold a wage agreement reached between workers and management. According to the workers, the labor minister, backed by the C.S.T. leadership, disallowed the labor contract because its wages exceeded government guidelines. The C.S.T. official claimed that the labor had rejected the contract because its wages were too low, and even credited the C.S.T. with leading the strike to raise wages. He went on to dismiss the Victoria wildcaters as "backward" and "disobedient." He saw his role not as a representative of the workers, but as their "intermediary" with the employer.

Numerous dissident union leaders described their situation as closely resembling that of the Solidarity movement. One leader, comparing Nicaragua to Poland, told me: "We are both small countries and have suffered many invasions. We both experience long lines and scarcity while many of our products are shipped off to the Soviet bloc. We are Catholic countries with close ties between the unions and the church. We live under regimes where citizens can be jailed at will. And both governments brand independent unions' anti-Socialist agents of imperialism." Listening, I found myself wishing that some of my fellow union activists had come with me to Nicaragua. They would have been as shocked and disappointed at the repressiveness of this "government of workers and peasants" as I was.

SAM LEIKEN.

(Sam Leiken, who has spent the last decade as a machinist and labor activist, is studying at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.)

Mr. AUCCOIN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 1½ minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. YATRON].

Mr. YATRON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the administration covert plan and for the Hamilton substitute.

Mr. Chairman, the Hamilton substitute legitimizes our efforts to support the political aspirations of those genuinely committed to democracy in Nicaragua. This initiative prevents the United States from continuing an armed struggle which simply is not working.

I share the administration's objective with respect to preventing the establishment of a Soviet satellite in Central America. But covert aid for military purposes has not and will not achieve that objective.

Covert military assistance has not interdicted the flow of arms from Nicaragua to the armed insurgents in El Salvador. Covert aid has not terminated Cuban armed shipments to Nicaragua.

What covert aid has done is to contribute to further bloodshed and repression. Covert military assistance has not induced the Sandinistas to fulfill their promises to the Nicaraguan people. In fact, just the opposite has happened. The Sandinistas have used the threat of the Contras as a convenient mechanism to perpetuate further repression. While I do not doubt that certain elements within the Contras are committed to democracy, the evidence clearly shows that many of the insurgents have committed atrocities against innocent civilians.

A vote for the Hamilton substitute does not represent an abandonment of the Nicaraguan people in their struggle to achieve democracy and human rights. This measure coupled with our existing security policy and military presence throughout Central America represents a credible alternative to what has been a misguided policy.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge our colleagues to vote against the administration's proposal and for the Hamilton substitute.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT. Mr. Chairman, I rise to indicate my support for funding for the Nicaraguan "freedom fighters" in battling the Sandinista government. My support for this effort is based, for the most part, on two points:

First, no U.S. troops should ever fight and die in Central America; and,

Second, a hostile Marxist/Communist government should not be permitted to follow on its self-professed aim of destabilizing legitimate governments throughout the region—ultimately threatening U.S. security.

First of all, some express doubt that the Sandinistas are exporting revolution to other countries in the region. A 1983 Washington Post article said:

The Sandinistas say openly they provide moral support and "office space" to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Nicaraguan Commander Bayardo Arce, in charge of relations with other revolutionary movements, said in an interview last year (1982) that the Sandinistas had shown the Salvadoran rebels the clandestine connections and networks they used to get arms for their own insurrection.

In addition to training, the Nicaraguans give Salvadoran guerrillas money, weapons, logistics, intelligence, communications, and sanctuary. According to State and Defense Department officials, some 6,000 to 7,000 rifles and machineguns were delivered to the Salvadorans by Nicaragua. In addition, the FMLN, the Salvadoran guerrillas, have two command centers in Nicaragua, and the FMLN high command lives in Managua.

In the 1969 FSLN—Sandinista—declaration of goals, quoted in David Nolan, the Ideology of the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Revolution, it was stated, "We will 'struggle for a true union of the Central American peoples within one country,' beginning with support for national liberation movements in neighboring states."

Add to this the fact that if we cut off aid to the democratic forces in Central America, we will be ensuring a permanent military imbalance in the region and only contribute to the victory of totalitarian forces. Consider that over 40,000 metric tons of military hardware were delivered to Nicaragua during the first 4 years of the Sandinista government by Soviet-bloc countries. In spite of considerable U.S. support in the first years—\$117 million in direct economic aid and \$500 million in loans to help the Government get on its feet—the Sandinistas continued a huge military buildup—an army of regulars and irregulars totaling 111,000 men, more than 3 times as large as any other army in the region. Tell me this is a purely defensive force.

Arguments that we haven't given the Sandinistas a fair chance simply don't hold water. The aid we gave the Sandinistas was more than the aid we had given the Somoza government in the previous 20 years combined. The opposition has presented the Sandinista government with at least five separate proposals for starting a peace dialog since February of last year. Our Government has been involved in at least three separate offers for negotiations with the Sandinistas, as well, since 1981. In addition, U.S. special envoy Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman held nine separate meetings with the Nicaraguans between June and December of 1984.

The Sandinistas, however, refuse to negotiate with the opposition, even though their supporters claim that the democratically elected Government of El Salvador should negotiate with its armed opposition.

Until the Sandinistas show a sincere willingness to cease support for forces hostile to other governments in the region, the United States must be concerned with stemming the flow of Nicaraguan arms to the rebels in El Salvador.

According to article 51 of the United Nations Charter, countries have the

right to individual and collective defense. Given Nicaragua's subversion of El Salvador, "the United States is entitled to respond with whatever action is necessary and proportional in order to create and sustain an effective defense. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter and Article 3 of the Rio Treaty, and Articles 21, 22, 27 and 28 of the OAS (Organization American States) Charter, make it clear that such actions in response to an armed attack are permissible * * * . "Under article 3 of the Rio Treaty, such a defensive response is obligatory. This obligation is virtually identical to the same obligation of the United States under article 5 of the NATO treaty * * * ."

"Such assistance, whether it" were to "consist of U.S. * * * forces," or "whether it * * * takes the form of aid to the * * * freedom fighters "is lawful under article 51 of the U.N. Charter and article 3 of the OAS Charter," according to Law Prof. John Norton Moore, of the University of Virginia, who served as Ambassador to the Law of the Sea Treaty talks.

From 1977 to 1979, those who supported the Sandinista revolution manned the heights on "human rights," "international law," and negotiated settlements, but those same individuals have failed to demand the same standards of the current rulers in Managua. Many of those defending Nicaragua's sovereignty under international law today were demanding that we violate that sovereignty in 1977-79.

This is not the only inconsistency in the human rights debate. Many are attacking alleged atrocities committed by the Contras. Have we forgotten that more than 200,000 people fled Nicaragua during 1979-81? During the first year of their rule, the Sandinistas executed 7,884 people, according to the Nicaragua Committee of Jurists. Since 1979, 20 radio news programs have stopped broadcasting. Only one radio news program is not FSLN-controlled, but even it is heavily censored. Both TV stations and two of three major newspapers are controlled by the Sandinistas. The only independent newspaper, La Prensa, has had 50-80 percent of its published information censored. In 1982, the Government claimed a "right to detain and jail persons indefinitely without having proved that they committed a crime. The right to habeas corpus is suspended. Under the decree, strikes continue to be banned, no collective contracts may be signed, and no trade union demonstrations or public meetings are allowed." This information is courtesy the AFL-CIO Free Trade Union News.

The Nicaraguan Permanent Commission on Human Rights, which frequently criticized the Somoza regime—now in exile—has documented mass graves, unexplained deaths, widespread use of torture, illegal arrests, and jailings.

Some have charged that the Contras we are aiding are nothing more than disgruntled Somozistas. However, primary opposition leaders like Arturo Cruz, Adolfo Calero, and Eden Pastora also opposed the Somoza regime. Most have spent time in jail during the Somoza regime as a result. Though present Contra ranks remain about one-third former guardsmen, one-third of them are former Sandinistas, and one-third are recruits which had not previously been aligned with either group.

What has taken place since the United States first began support for the freedom fighters? The location of Contra forces between Honduras and the Nicaraguan border has served to deny the Sandinistas the most direct line of shipments of weapons to the guerrillas in El Salvador. The Contras have, in fact, attacked a number of staging and shipping areas, not only capturing weapons intended for El Salvador—incidentally, the source of some of these weapons?—73 percent of the captured guerrilla M-16's were traceable to American weapons left behind in Southeast Asia—but denying Salvadoran guerrillas use of those areas in the future. Key, however, is that success of Contra operations in these areas has forced the Nicaraguan Government to divert their attention from El Salvador to its own defense. Thus, a number of weapons which may have eventually been sent to El Salvador have remained in Nicaragua for use in anti-Contra operations.

Some have argued that Contra activities have prompted the Sandinista government to become more repressive, rather than encouraging more freedoms. Yet, the evidence is pointing to an increase in Sandinista willingness to negotiate and be responsive to international concerns.

As a good faith effort, the President has called upon the Contras to extend their April 20 deadline for a ceasefire until June 1, in order to allow them to enter into negotiations with the Sandinista government with the Catholic Church. This proposal has been well received by the Contra leadership and leaders in Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Colombia, even though it has been rejected by the Sandinista government.

If we don't face this responsibility today, we will have to commit far greater resources to the promised expansion of hostile forces in the future. Through all of the debate and discussion, there has been no sincere promise of a cessation of expansionist policies on the part of Nicaragua, or for that matter, on the part of Cuba or the Soviets.

When will we meet this responsibility if we do not meet it now? Of the narrow choice of policy options available to us, we could pursue:

A policy of containment, by aiding the other countries in the region. This means physically providing a great deal more military hardware to Honduras, El Salvador, and possibly Costa Rica—with a questionable chance of success; or

A policy of seeking, through pressure, to modify Sandinista behavior while helping to strengthen the political, economic and military capabilities of the countries directly threatened; or

Use of U.S. military force.

I certainly don't want to support the last option and the thought of the first option is not heartening, but promises many long years of involvement.

This is a vital strategic choice for the future of U.S. security and the future of the people of Central America to freely govern themselves.

● Mr. WIRTH. Mr. Chairman, today we must decide once more whether or not to financially assist the Nicaraguan Contras. We must decide, despite the fact that the Congress and the American people have repeatedly opposed American involvement in what is essentially an undeclared war on the Nicaraguan Government with which we have full diplomatic relations. We must decide, despite the fact that the American people overwhelmingly favor a diplomatic solution to the deeply rooted social and economic conflicts erupting in Central America.

The preference for a diplomatic course of action and the American people's opposition to war against Nicaragua is so clear that the administration has chosen to disguise its proposed funds for the Contras as "humanitarian aid."

But let's take a closer look at House Joint Resolution 239 which, if approved, would release the aid to the Contras. The resolution would permit the transfer of \$14 million in fiscal year 1985 funds to the Contras for "supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua." The Contras' use of these funds are in no way limited by the resolution. And the funds will be given directly to the Contras, and not disbursed through an intermediary, such as the International Red Cross, which could monitor the use of this aid.

How can we be sure that this aid will be used for humanitarian purposes, as the administration alleges? If House Joint Resolution 239 is approved, we must rely on the administration's word of honor that the Contras will purchase food, medicines, and other basic, nonmilitary necessities, rather than armaments and other tools of war. We must rely on the word of an administration that has authorized, without the knowledge of the Congress, the CIA mining of Nicaragua's key ports and the creation and distribution of manuals that advocate low-level terrorism

and the assassination of local Nicaraguan officials. We must rely on the administration's word that it will provide only humanitarian aid to the Contras, in spite of its declaration that it will continue to pressure the Sandinistas until they cry "uncle."

Mr. Chairman, the administration's record on aid to the Contras clearly contradicts its assertion that any aid to the rebels will not be for military purposes. Moreover, the Contras are not the type of military force to take any aid and turn it into food, clothing, and other humanitarian aid for the population in the areas under their control.

Reports from nonpartisan human rights groups such as Americas Watch document abuse after abuse of the Nicaraguan civilian population by the Contras. These abuses include the torture, mutilation, and murder of civilians and prisoners of war, even those that have been removed from combat because of wounds they have suffered. Are we to entrust our humanitarian aid to rebels that do not even recognize the most basic human rights of noncombatants?

And are we to deliver this aid to the rebel forces' leaders, many of whom are former national guardsmen under the dictatorial and repressive Somoza regime? Many of my colleagues will point out that less than 2 percent of the Contras are made up of former guardsmen, and that the bulk of the rebel fighting forces are peasants disaffected with the Sandinista regime. I do not doubt the validity of this fact, nor that it is an important signal of the unsatisfactory way in which the Sandinistas are governing Nicaragua. But this statistic conceals the important point that former guardsmen make up the large majority of the Contra leadership. For example, of the 48 positions in the rebel command of the chief Contra force, the Fuerzas Democráticas Nicaraguenses, 46 are held by former guardsmen. I find it hard to believe that these officers, so dedicated to upholding the corrupt and unjust Somoza regime, will provide Nicaragua with the democratic government which all of us so ardently desire. In short, the Contras' brutality and their links to the Somoza past demonstrate that these rebels are by no means comparable to our Founding Fathers. Mr. Speaker, we should continue to heed the American people's demand for a halt to further funding or convert assistance to the Contras.

The elimination of funding for the Contras should not imply that we support the Sandinista regime, as it is presently constituted and operates. I share my colleagues' concern about the increasingly repressive tendencies of the Sandinistas. But the roots of these tendencies are unclear to us. The Sandinistas are operating under a siege mentality. They have had to con-

front not only the Contra forces, but also one of the world's largest military powers, which has conducted large-scale military operations near the Nicaraguan-Honduran border, which has mined its harbors, and which has instructed Nicaraguans in the methods of terrorism and sabotage. It is important that we distinguish between Sandinista repression stemming from Marxist-Leninist dictates and repression as a response to external hostilities.

But we cannot make this distinction without diplomacy, without open communication between the United States and Nicaragua. The Contadora countries—Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, and Colombia—have offered their good offices to mediate and resolve the conflict in Nicaragua. But the administration has not availed itself of this opportunity. For example, when the Sandinistas accepted a draft Contadora treaty which held the potential for removing all external forces from the region and guaranteeing the principle of nonintervention on a regional basis, the United States immediately dismissed this move as propaganda and failed to further explore the possibilities of a negotiated peace.

Diplomacy will enable us to determine the sincerity of the Sandinistas in achieving a plural, democratic government that will not intervene in the affairs of its neighbors. And diplomacy is what the Barnes-Hamilton substitute offers this troubled region. It would terminate all funding for the Contras and for CIA covert operations against that country, and would provide funding for humanitarian assistance to Nicaraguan refugees, to be administered by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Accordingly, we can evaluate the Sandinistas' claims that its restrictions on civil rights and its increasingly militarized society are the product of war, and not ideology.

At the same time, the Barnes-Hamilton substitute promotes a U.S. policy toward Nicaragua that encourages a negotiated regional settlement under the auspices of the Contadora countries and the Organization of American States. The substitute also provides \$4 million toward the implementation of any agreement reached under the Contadora process.

It should be noted that this substitute does not foreclose the use of pressure on Nicaragua—the United States and its hemispheric allies can invoke trade sanctions against Nicaragua if it fails to remove foreign military advisers or restore civil liberties and press freedoms. Moreover, the President is permitted to request new aid for the Contras after October 1. Any requests would be handled in an expedited fashion, and could be evaluated in

light of Sandinista responses to the termination of Contra funding and renewed diplomatic initiatives by America and the Contadora countries.

Because of the Barnes-Hamilton substitute's balance between diplomacy and pressure, because of its emphasis on multilateralism, and because of its provision for future sanctions, it has drawn widespread and bipartisan support. I urge my colleagues to support this important amendment, and steer our country away from our present militarily based approach to Nicaragua, which has produced nothing but terror, bloodshed, and oppression, and can promise nothing more. Let's give diplomacy a chance where violence has failed—vote for the Barnes-Hamilton substitute. ●

● Mr. MATSUI. Mr. Chairman, the administration's proposal on Nicaraguan aid represents a deliberate attempt to mislead Congress and the American people on its intentions in the region. It is an insidious effort, Mr. Speaker, and it is time that we bare the administration's head on this issue.

The administration says the \$14 million in aid will go to pay for food, medicine, and other humanitarian items for Nicaraguan Contras. But the administration's record toward Nicaragua completely and irrefutably belie any peaceful intentions. Its policy always has been one of unreasoned and open confrontation, and it is a policy that has failed and failed miserably. Indeed, it is no surprise that the President's proposal allows these funds to be used for military purposes at the end of 60 days.

Mr. Chairman, I oppose the repressive and antidemocratic nature of the Sandinista government. But the administration policies, continue to backfire, galvanizing the Nicaraguan people against the United States and causing resentment toward the United States throughout the area. It is time, Mr. Speaker, that this administration work within the Contadora process, and begin addressing the crisis of poverty and economic hardship in the entire Central America region. ●

● Mr. LIPINSKI. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of this resolution for two principal reasons. First, it is in the best interest of the United States to prevent another Russian beachhead in North America. There is no doubt in my mind that the Sandinista regime is Communist. When they and others in Nicaragua overthrew Somoza, primarily because we finally stopped supporting his dictatorial and oppressive regime, we gave them \$20 million in aid. The Carter administration stopped another \$75 million in aid when it became apparent they were moving toward becoming a totalitarian form of government and enlisting the aid and assistance of Russia, Cuba, and other Communist countries. I also

have no doubt that if the Contra pressure is allowed to wither and die for lack of military aid, the Sandanistas will consolidate their power and with the aid of Russia, Cuba, and other Communist countries spread their Communist ideology into other Central American nations.

This brings me to my second and more important point in support for this resolution. I firmly believe the Sandinistas, with the support of Russian, Cuban, and other Communist countries, will spread their revolution to other Central American countries. And sometime in the next 3 or 4 years, this Communist revolution so very near our border will become a clear and present danger to our security. And the American people and their Government representatives will have this clear and present danger crystallize in their minds and galvanize their resolve to stop and remove this danger from our hemisphere. However, by that time, our only option will be to send American troops to Central America. This can be prevented if we aid the Nicaraguans fighting for democracy and freedom against the Communist Sandinistas. Today, I believe, we vote to stop totalitarian communism in Central America with willing, dedicated Nicaraguans or risk stopping it in the future with Americans—it is our choice. ●

● Mr. BUSTAMANTE. Mr. Chairman, I wish to contribute a short note to the debate on the obligation of funds to the people of Nicaragua and against the Government of Nicaragua. For some time, I have been concerned that sending \$14 million in aid to the Contras—or to the freedom fighters—will not accomplish much in the way of contributing to the prospects for peace in the region of Central America.

After meeting with President Reagan today and with President Duarte of El Salvador a week ago, I believe that we must seek the capitulation of the Ortega government through reform in Nicaragua. The Sandinistas have shown no inclination to respond to anything short of a threat of force. But a threat of force alone contributes only to prolonging the status quo in Central America—and the status quo amounts to war, declared and undeclared, with the prospect for escalation implied in each congressional action.

In any context, with or without superpowers, with or without the Monroe Doctrine and the Alliance for Progress, our aim in Congress has been to support our allies in a given region and to hope for the peaceful establishment of democratic governments. In this connection, I wish to express my hope that we will consult with other Central American governments, particularly with our neighbor Mexico, as we anticipate building a bipartisan policy toward Central Amer-

ica which is something more than a quick fix. We cannot, then, give up on the idea of dialog with the Ortega government, even though we may mistrust its ambitions. Nor can we tolerate the positioning of a foreign base in Nicaragua that would endanger the interests of democracies in this hemisphere. But, we must allow for a period of testing—perhaps as long as 5 to 6 months—in the interest of seeing whether or not the Sandinistas live up to their word. To date, their record in telling the truth has not been a good one. But we cannot ignore the prospects for peace in the region, and we must not convince ourselves that \$14 million buys peace of mind in Central America. ●

● Mr. DANIEL. Mr. Chairman, let us stop for a minute and reconsider what it is that we are debating today. In 1979, the Sandinistas came to power in Nicaragua on the promise that totalitarian rule in that country was finished. And on the promise that there would be elections, genuine nonalignment, and respect for the sovereignty of their neighbors, the Sandinistas garnered enough international support to prevail.

We believed them, Mr. Chairman, as did the Organization of American States. We believed them to the tune of \$117 million in direct aid through mid-1981, aid that provided more money per Nicaraguan citizen than in any other country in the world. And because the Sandinista leadership still included internationally-respected Nicaraguan patriots in those days, we continued to deal with the Sandinistas in good faith long after their actions began to belie their words. This continued as they built in all of the repressive mechanisms of the Marxist Police State. Kangaroo courts, Mr. Chairman. Secret police informers down to the block level in each neighborhood or village. The perversion of the literacy campaign which made their educational system a mockery and a political propaganda tool.

We continued out of hope and misplaced trust well into 1982—and what did it get us? What did it get for the American States unlucky enough to be the neighbors of the new Sandinista regime? What it got us was an army in Central America, configured not for defense but for offensive warfare, of 119,000 men, over half of whom are on active duty. It got us tanks, and armored personnel carriers, and artillery and rocket launchers, and the MI-24 hind hunter-killer helicopter used by the Soviets to terrorize Afghanistan. In short, Mr. Chairman, while we and our American neighbors were telling ourselves that these were the growing pains of a latent democracy in Nicaragua, what was actually happening was the growth of a deadly malignancy. There are no moderate elements, men

of good will, left as part of the Sandinista regime. They've all been forced out, Mr. Chairman, as healthy tissue is displaced by deadly cancer cells. And the analogy is the same for Nicaragua's American neighbors. The Sandinista malignancy is insinuating Marxist revolution and subversion throughout the region. The Sandinistas are proud of that, Mr. Chairman. Over and over, we have been treated to their slogan: "The Sandinista revolution knows no national boundaries. Ours is not a national revolution." They are exporting guns and revolution to their neighbors, Mr. Chairman, and more recently, illicit narcotics to the United States to help them get the hard currency to pay for revolution.

Ambassador Motley has said that the Nicaraguans do not come to the negotiating table because they admire it as a piece of furniture; they come to the negotiating table only because of the Contras. And if we are not going to provide the aid necessary for the Contras to keep military pressure on the Sandinistas, then we must convert that aid to a form which will permit the organization of an effective, legitimate political opposition internationally recognized as a counterweight to the Sandinistas. It must be an opposition which represents the true ideals of the original Nicaraguan revolution, and not the subsequent theft and perversion of that revolution by the Sandinista police state. We cannot vote today for a measure that will turn tens of thousands of freedom-loving Nicaraguans into stateless refugees, into an equivalent of the boat people of the 1970's. We cannot vote for a measure which will permanently extinguish the desire to be free on the part of the people of Nicaragua.

If we do not fashion a solution which combines effective aid to a legitimate opposition, and effective moral, political, and economic sanctions to the Sandinistas if they fail to represent the legitimate aspirations of the Nicaraguan people, then we have not only failed our American neighbors, but we have failed our constituents.

I have grandchildren, Mr. Chairman, who are coming of age to be riflemen—infantry soldiers—and who may well end up as soldiers if we ignore the malignancy in Central America. We can talk, and posture, and fail to act until we and our neighbors run out of time, or we can do something effective there today. We have a choice. And we may not have that luxury too much longer.

In supporting the Sandinistas, I hope that no one is doing so under the illusion that it is a legitimate political party. They gain power by deceit and rule by force. Communism is not political; it is an international conspiracy, and its purpose is to rob people of their freedom and their liberty.

In 1947, President Harry Truman crafted the doctrine which bore his name, setting forth the goal of containment of communism which was then attempting, through subversion, to overthrow the Government of Greece. Fifteen years later, when the Soviet Union attempted to install missiles in Cuba, President Kennedy successfully pressed for their removal so close to our shores.

What is needed now—what is desperately needed—is a reinstatement of these two positions: That we will resist communism where it is found, and that we will employ the means available when Soviet weapons are found so close to our borders.

Thank you.●

● Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 239, to approve the obligation of funds available under Public Law 98-473 for supporting military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.

I also rise urging support of the amendment in the nature of a substitute which will be offered later by our distinguished colleague Congressman LEE HAMILTON.

On four previous occasions, this body has opposed, with reason, the administration's effort to impose a military solution on the people of Nicaragua. On four previous occasions this body has voted to cut off assistance to the Contras, who seek the violent overthrow of the established Government of Nicaragua.

In doing so the House of Representatives exercised considerable wisdom, restraining a policy that has escalated violence in the Central American region, strengthened militarism and reaction, and worked against the forces of democracy and pluralism, serving to isolate our Government from many of our friends in that region and the world.

What is needed is an alternative that prevents the disbursement of funds to the Contras, works toward a nonviolent resolution of the Central American conflict, and meets the basic human needs of refugees.

We will have an alternative before us that offers such a possibility after we again defeat the latest proposal of support for the Contras. This alternative comes to us through the resolution offered by our distinguished colleague Congressman MICHAEL BARNES, as it will be presented to us for debate and consideration as an amendment in the nature of a substitute offered by our valued colleague Congressman LEE HAMILTON. This substitute would provide \$4 million for the implementation of a peaceful resolution in conformity with the 21 Contadora Principles if such an agreement is arrived at. Additionally, this substitute would provide \$10 million in humanitarian assistance for refugees outside of Nicaragua, regardless of whether they are associat-

ed with the Contras. Quite importantly, this \$10 million would be allocated through the International Committee for the Red Cross or the United Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees. The substitute prohibits the use of any of these funds for supplying combat units of any type and most importantly, continues indefinitely the present prohibition on funding for military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, unless and until Congress enacts a joint resolution repealing this prohibition.

This measure also contains a number of policy recommendations encouraging a cease-fire and peace negotiations within a regional context and under the Contadora framework.

I urge my colleagues to reject House Joint Resolution 239, and any other proposal that would provide assistance to the Contras by U.S. Government agencies, and urge their support of the alternative offered in the Barnes resolution/Hamilton substitute.●

● Mr. DI GUARDI. Mr. Chairman, as a freshman, I gave my word to look closely at both sides of this issue and not come to a hasty decision on the matter. After reviewing the facts, however, I believe that the proper course of action is clear.

Tonight, I will be casting my vote in favor of aid to the Contras. I will do so because I view the current Sandinista Government as a direct threat to the national security of the United States.

The proximity of Nicaragua to the United States and the vital Caribbean seaways, not to mention the Panama Canal, presents a clear and present danger to the political and economic stability of the region.

When we look at Central America today, we see President Duarte of El Salvador negotiating with the Communist opposition in his country. Meanwhile, Nicaragua and Cuba continue to ship offensive arms to the very people with whom Mr. Duarte is negotiating. Why is it not justifiable for the Sandinistas also to engage in negotiations with the opposition movement in Nicaragua?

The President is seeking to engage the Sandinistas in talks aimed at removing all Soviet, Cuban, PLO, and Eastern bloc advisers in Nicaragua. Many of my colleagues who are against the President's plan say the root cause of the problems in Nicaragua are ignorance, poverty, and disease. I could not agree more—but it is quite clear to me that the Sandinistas are using the human misery in their country to attain the legitimacy of their regime that they could not attain by holding free elections.

I believe that the inherent military pressure associated with keeping the Contra forces alive is a useful diplomatic tool in getting the Sandinistas back to the bargaining table. When

will the United States draw the line? It wasn't Cuba. If not Nicaragua, where?

It is self evident that the Sandinistas are biding their time by using the Contadora process, and yes, the Western media as a smokescreen—a smoke-screen for consolidating their power, and ultimately the Soviets political and military power.

I am voting for military aid because I would rather attempt to cure a cold now than arrest pneumonia later. By acting to aid the Contras, we will prevent the possible need for greater involvement later. We are being asked to provide aid to people who are willing to fight for their own freedom and self determination.●

● Mr. LEHMAN of California. Mr. Chairman, today the House begins deliberations on whether or not to release \$14 million in military aid to the Contras in Nicaragua.

Today we can help decide whether the conflict between the Contras and Sandinistas continues, or whether the United States takes a more constructive role in seeking a negotiated peace in the region.

Today we can take a step closer to achieving the goal of political and economic stability in Nicaragua by sending a signal to those countries participating in the Contadora peace process, that this government does not want to contribute to the continuing military escalation in the region and that we would like to make a positive contribution to the Contadora process.

Our covert military involvement in Nicaragua so far has been a violation of international law, morally reprehensible, and contrary to the best interests of the United States in this hemisphere.

I agree with the administration that we should support democratic changes and institutions in Nicaragua, just as we should support democratic changes in Chile and South Africa. However, I disagree on the means of achieving those democratic goals.

The alternative to a foreign policy which emphasizes military might is one which achieves peace through negotiations—negotiations with the Sandinista Government and its neighbors.

I urge my colleagues to resist the administration's public relations campaign and oppose the continuation of funding for the Contras.●

● Mr. MAVROULES. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the resolution before us today that would make available \$14 million in military aid to the rebels in Nicaragua. No matter how it comes, military aid to the Contras in Nicaragua is unacceptable policy for the United States.

The administration has cried wolf on this issue too many times. I would like to ask this administration, "Where is the evidence to support your arguments?"

First, the administration sounded the alarm when it suspected that the Soviet Union was shipping Mig-21 aircraft to Central America. But, the administration has no evidence that those crates ever left the Soviet docks. Where are these Mig-21 aircraft?

Then, last year, the administration accused the Sandinistas of exporting large quantities of arms into El Salvador. But, the administration has yet to come to Congress with evidence to support this claim. Where are those shipments of arms?

And, this year, to defend this very resolution, the administration claimed the aid would be used as bargaining leverage in negotiations between the Contras and the Sandinistas. But, where are the negotiations?

And, more recently, the administration claims it has the support of Costa Rica and Colombia. But, where are those words of support from President Monge and President Betancur?

Finally, the administration claims that only one-third of the Contra command structure is former Somoza National Guardsmen. The Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus not only claims that 46 out of 48 Contra leaders are Somoza heirs, but also names them. Where are the names that support the administration's claims?

There are just too many inconsistencies in the administration's Central American policy.

All Americans want to see an end to the violence in Central America and the restoration of stability in the region. We want to be able to offer the people of Central America an alternative to totalitarian and dictatorial leadership, as well as an alternative to further military conflict. Basic liberties and human rights only mean something if they can be exercised in peace.

The Contra war against the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua does not contribute to stability in Central America. It contributes to neither peace nor democracy.

A vote against this resolution is not a vote for communism. It is a vote against a military solution to the problems in Central America. It is a vote that rejects the administration's military priorities.

Later on, we will have an opportunity to offer the people of Nicaragua and Central America a peaceful alternative. A constructive policy in Central America means support for the Contadora process. And economic development aid that will solve the indigenous economic problems in Central America that lead to political instability.

I urge my colleagues to oppose this resolution.

Thank you.●

● Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Chairman, it is time that the United States stopped trying to singlehanded-

ly change the Government in Nicaragua through military intervention. We have learned from past experiences in Vietnam and elsewhere that this is not often a successful policy, and is one which requires tremendous American resources: a tremendous amount of money and an unacceptable loss of lives.

Aid to the Contras has been one of the most debated policies in Congress. We have thoroughly discussed the ill effects of our current policies, the "perceived" Communist threat of the Sandinista government to the United States, as well as the need for some form of pressure on the Sandinista government to improve its human rights record and to limit its power to extend revolution to other countries.

What we have learned from this debate is that the situation is not as black and white as the President portrays it. We have seen further that the President's military aid to the Contras has proved to be neither a popular, nor a very effective policy.

We have seen that military aid to the Contras has not accomplished our goals. Nor can we realistically expect a limited amount of military aid to be instrumental in the overthrow of the Sandinista government. Even if this somewhat dubious goal were achieved, what guarantee would we have that the new regime would be more democratic, that it would be more consistent with American interests, or even that it would hold the support of the Nicaraguan people?

Revolution is not new to Central America, nor will it go away through military force. The problems leading to political instability in Nicaragua, as well as in all of Central America, results mainly from poor living conditions. The area is plagued by unemployment, inflation, poverty, hunger, illiteracy, disease, and declining growth and investment. In order to find long-term solutions to regional and local unrest, we must address these sources of political instability as well.

Our military pressure on the Sandinistas, by supporting the Contras, simply justifies the militarization of Nicaragua and the oppressive measures taken by the Sandinista regime. The threat of the "Imperialistic Yankee" from the north gives the Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega a colossal enemy to rally his forces against, and helps him to generate popular support.

In addition, our unilateral military approach hurts U.S. credibility in the international community, especially when the legality of our policy is at best, questionable. Our policy of supporting the terrorist activities of the Contras underscores the international perception of the United States as an aggressive bully pursuing its own in-

terests rather than that of a nation pursuing peaceful world coexistence.

Mr. Chairman, instead of continuing the battle over an unacceptable policy, I feel it is time to develop a better approach. President Reagan maintains that we must overthrow the Sandinista government because it is a threat to its neighbors in Central America. But the United States can no longer play the role of the big brother to all countries. Battling our own huge Federal deficit, we do not have the economic resources to undertake such a protective role on our own, nor do we have the ability to individually impose our will upon others.

If the Sandinista government is indeed considered a threat by neighboring countries in Central America, then it is the Central American community which should put pressure on Nicaragua, not just the United States.

If there is not support and participation by the countries which we are claiming to protect, then we are not acting like the big brother the United States prides herself on being, we are acting like the local big bully. This unilateral military dominated approach simply undermines the U.S. position in Nicaragua.

Mr. Chairman, it is time that the United States stop trying to solve the world's problems on her own and begin to recognize the ability and the clout that lies in international cooperation. In Central America, we should be encouraging multilateral approaches to resolving conflicts. A multilateral approach would promote world support and engender an international consensus.

We can begin by supporting and adhering to international agreements such as the OAS. This includes following the provisions in this agreement ourselves.

We can support the efforts of the Contadora group, which is made up of the countries which are supposedly threatened.

We can require that any efforts to influence the actions of Nicaragua be supported and participated in by the Central American countries whose security is ostensibly threatened. If the decision is made that military intervention is warranted, then that should be made by the neighboring countries as a whole, and participated in by these countries.

There are several forms of "peer" pressure Central American countries can place on Nicaragua. These measures would include both "carrot and stick" approaches involving diplomatic, trade, and technology transfer, and border-related incentives and disincentives.

Mr. Chairman, the United States need not be out on a limb by herself in Nicaragua. I appeal to my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to vote against and put aside the question of

military aid, which has lost the support of the majority of the American people.

I am not asking us to turn our backs on Nicaragua. Instead, I am calling upon all Americans to look deeper into the dynamics of the Central American region, and to look for a more acceptable and effective U.S. policy. I am calling upon the United States to work with the countries in Central America and to support a multilateral approach to Nicaragua.

Finally, I ask that we learn from our failed policies in Nicaragua. I ask that we reassess our policy not only toward Nicaragua, but toward less developed countries [LDC's] in general. Military containment of communism simply has not worked in Third World countries. The problem which we are confronted with in Nicaragua today will be present in other countries tomorrow. We must develop a more intelligence, comprehensive approach in coping with insurgencies in LDC's. Countries in Central America, Africa, and the Middle East lack economic, political, and social infrastructures and institutions necessary for political stability. To improve United States and world security, we must explore alternatives which address the causes of instability as well as holds the support of the international community.

Mr. Chairman, Nicaragua is a good place to start.

● Mr. FORD of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Joint Resolution 247, a resolution which would provide both humanitarian aid and strong support for regional peace negotiations in Central America.

The policy set forth in this resolution is to seek peace in Nicaragua and Central America through the Contadora process, while preventing the administration from continuing its covert war against Nicaragua through the Contras. This alternative lends support to regional peace efforts and gives diplomacy a chance to work while maintaining pressure on the Sandinistas to change policies that have destabilized the region.

Unlike House Joint Resolution 239, the Barnes resolution provides absolutely no funds for the Contras. Even the administration has admitted that there would be no effective controls on how the Contras used the funds, even if the President pledged that the funds would only be used for humanitarian purposes. Therefore, instead of funding the Contras and their war against Nicaragua, this resolution would place the United States on the side of the Contadora group of nations that have been working for 3 years toward a peaceful solution of the conflicts in Central America.

House Joint Resolution 247 would provide \$10 million for refugee assistance in Central America, to be distributed only by the Red Cross or the

United Nations refugee agency. This ensures that the Contras will not receive aid and prevents the distribution of aid by the Central Intelligence Agency, which has actively aided the Contras for years.

The Barnes resolution would also apply pressure to the Sandinista government by explicitly stating that future congressional decisions on aid to the Contras, and in foreign aid to Nicaragua, will take into account the behavior of the Sandinistas. This approach makes clear congressional concern about the Sandinistas' excessively close links to Cuba and the Soviet Union, their violations of human rights and their attempts to abet unrest in the region.

President Reagan asserts that his plan of action must be followed to stem the spread of communism on our continent. I agree with him and the rest of the Nation that to sit back on our heels and watch Central America subverted to Communist influence would be a grave error in American foreign policy. However, aiding the Contras to attack Nicaragua is no way to assure political stability in the region.

Mr. Chairman, I strongly believe that if the administration was really interested in a peaceful settlement of its difference with Nicaragua, it would not be seeking funding for more war against that government, but would be supporting the efforts of the Contadora group which has produced several draft treaties on ending conflict in Central America.

I urge my colleagues to support the Barnes resolution, an alternative which serves U.S. peace and security interests in the region, and promotes political pluralism and the observance of human rights in Nicaragua.

● Mr. CROCKETT. Mr. Chairman, once again we are faced with an ultimatum from President Reagan—bow to his will and send \$14 million in aid to the Contras, our so-called brothers in Nicaragua, or we will contribute, Mr. Reagan says, to Nicaragua's becoming a Communist terrorist arsenal.

Once again we are asked to deny what we hear and see and read about the atrocities committed by these brothers of ours against civilians in Nicaragua; we are asked to ignore the serious efforts by the Contadora nations to bring a true peace to the region; and we are asked to forget the history lesson taught by Vietnam—that there is no way the CIA or the American military will get just a little involved in the affairs of another nation.

Members of this body are well aware of our involvement in Nicaragua, and how the United States has continually interfered in that nation's government. For more than a century, we have involved ourselves politically,

economically and militarily in the governing of that small nation.

Yet today we are asked to forget that history, and to continue along the path of imperialism by seeking to again impose our will on the Nicaraguan people and make their government "cry uncle."

In his attempts to convince Congress to go along with this plan, President Reagan has apparently decided that sleight-of-hand and mirrors will confuse the issues. First Congress was told that support for the Contras was necessary to intercept the flow of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador. We soon found out that, in fact, no such flow existed, and that the Salvadoran rebels were getting arms from the very army they were fighting. Next Congress was told that the Contras were made up solely of disaffected peasants and farmers, and that they were led by former Sandinistas. We soon found out, in fact, the military leadership of the Contras was dominated by former Somoza national guardsmen. Congress was also told that the Contras were "the moral equivalent of our Founding Fathers," and that they were committed to democracy and human rights. We soon found out that, in fact, the Contras were terrorists, who attacked civilian populations and read CIA manuals that preach the art of assassination.

Now, in the last-ditch effort to garner support for his policy, the President has put forward the argument that the \$14 million is a "bargaining chip" that the Contras must have to force the Nicaraguan Government to come to the peace table. If the Sandinistas will only accede within 60 days, the argument goes, to those talks, the \$14 million will be used for the humanitarian purposes of food and health care. If they do not bargain with the terrorists, our aid can and will be used by the Contras for military purposes.

Despite these smokescreens of our real purposes in Nicaragua, it is clear that the intention of the Reagan administration is nothing short of toppling the Nicaraguan Government and replacing it with one more amenable to an imperialistic rightwing philosophy.

President Reagan says that he is concerned about the well-being of the Nicaraguan people, whom he claims are brutally repressed by the Sandinista government. Daniel Ortega, the democratically elected President of Nicaragua, has said publicly that if Mr. Reagan really wanted a restoration of political and civil rights and an end to the present state of emergency he need only stop the war. Clearly, human rights would be best served if resources now used to defend the country against terrorist attack could be made available for health care, education, and agriculture. It would seem

that if Mr. Reagan were sincere about his concern for the Nicaraguan people, he would stop the aggression, and offer genuine support for the Contadora peace process.

The President has proposed a deal that gives the appearance of a commitment toward peaceful negotiations. In reality, the so-called peace proposal is a sleight of hand that would allow the administration to continue its doomed policy. What the administration does not want people to realize is that their humanitarian aid would allow the Contras to use all the money they now receive from private sources in the United States strictly for military purchases. In effect, nothing is changed, and the Contras can continue their destructive activities. The Sandinistas understood this, and were thus inclined to reject the administration's proposal, as we should.

Congress must hand the administration a new agenda in Nicaragua—one that precludes violence and aggression, and delivers a chance for peace. Let us take a lead in helping the Nicaraguan people build a life for themselves, unencumbered by the perpetual threat of an invasion. Let us work with other countries of the region, as they have asked, to begin demilitarizing the region. Let us return with a clear conscience to the framework of international law. And let us use our creativity to explore more peaceful alternatives to the present policy. ●

● Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, it was my honor to recently travel to Nicaragua as part of a group sponsored by the Commission on United States-Central American Relations.

The Commission on United States-Central American Relations is a non-governmental organization dedicated to improving the climate of the hemispheric relations by employing alternative U.S. policies in Central America. This commission has issued a statement concerning the Contra aid vote and its belief that the Contra Program imperils U.S. national security interests by undermining democratic institutions throughout Central America, especially in Honduras, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua.

I believe that it would be very beneficial for all of my colleagues to review this issue statement prior to casting their vote today. Thank you.

COMMISSION STATEMENT OPPOSING AID TO THE CONTRAS

Since its inception in 1982, the Commission on U.S.-Central American Relations, an association of citizens concerned about the direction of U.S. policy in Central America, has been deeply disturbed by the role of our government in financing, directing and otherwise aiding the guerrilla army (or "contras") fighting to overthrow the Nicaraguan government.

In April of 1983 the Commission sponsored a fact-finding delegation to Honduras and Nicaragua to investigate U.S. covert activities in the region. This group consisted

of experienced and objective observers, including two current members of Congress, Reps. Berkley Bedell and Robert Torricelli. The Reagan administration was then describing the covert operation as an effort to interdict arms allegedly being supplied by the government of Nicaragua to the Salvadoran insurgents.

In a public statement released upon their return to the United States, this group concluded that "there is no doubt that our government is deeply involved in covert activities aimed at overthrowing the government of Nicaragua" and that "no convincing evidence was presented to us that significant men or materials were being sent by the Nicaraguan government to El Salvador or other countries in the area." This latter judgement was corroborated by the U.S. Embassy in Managua.

Since then the secret war against Nicaragua has grown in scope. The Reagan administration's justification for its continued support has grown increasingly broad, leading to a seemingly open-ended commitment to aid the contra army in the overthrow of Nicaragua's government. In response to a series of alarming revelations concerning CIA operations in Honduras and Nicaragua (mining of harbors, the CIA manual, contra atrocities against civilians), Congress has increasingly asserted its authority to terminate what Rep. Hamilton has termed an illegal, immoral and ineffective program.

We join with the majority of the American people and Members of Congress in condemning all U.S. efforts designed to aid the overthrow of Nicaragua's government. These actions violate the will of Congress and constitute a direct violation of Article 18 of the OAS Charter to which our nation is solemnly committed. The U.S. government's attempts to avoid Nicaragua's complaint in the International Court of Justice serve only to flout our government's violations of international law before the court of world opinion.

But above and beyond the legal aspects of this issue, we deplore these actions because they violate the moral principles of the American people. We are not a nation that condones the murder and torture of innocent civilians, which have become a common feature of the contra war that our taxes are financing. Recent press accounts provide chilling evidence that the contra war is exacting an extremely high toll in lives and suffering among the people of Nicaragua.

Further, we strongly believe that this intervention does not serve the cause of building democracy and increasing economic well-being for the people of Central America, which are the stated goals of U.S. policy. Our intervention:

Is not geared toward achieving its stated purposes of interdicting arms or pressuring the Nicaraguan government to further liberalize its internal political process.

Encourages the Nicaraguan government's reliance on Soviet Bloc economic and military assistance.

Alienates the Nicaraguan population, the majority of whom bitterly oppose our support for the contras and resent the hardships imposed by our policies.

Confirms the concerns of our Latin American allies that the U.S. is returning to its historical pattern of unilateral intervention in the internal affairs of Latin America and Caribbean nations.

Extends and regionalizes the Central American conflict by fomenting confrontation between Nicaragua and her neighbors,

which have been used as forward bases from which the contra army launches attacks.

Inflames the regional conflict by extending superpower confrontation into Central America.

Threatens the future of democracy in Honduras by strengthening military and extra-legal means of policy execution, thereby undermining democratic institutions.

Imperils Costa Rica's traditional neutrality as the Reagan administration seeks to enlist that country in the destabilization of Nicaragua.

The Commission on U.S.-Central American Relations reiterates its strong support for the use of diplomatic means to resolve regional conflicts in Central America. We regret that our government has suspended bilateral talks with the Nicaraguan government, which held the potential of reducing tensions and obtaining verifiable security guarantees of mutual interest for both nations.

The contra program is fundamentally incompatible with the long term national interests of our government and those of our allies in Latin America. We thus urge the Congress to reject a resumption of contra aid, and to exercise its oversight responsibilities to assure an end to all forms of U.S. funding for the contras, whether overt, covert, direct or indirect through third parties.

PARTIAL LIST OF SIGNERS*

Harold Berry, president, Berry Enterprises.

Dick Clark, former U.S. Senator, Iowa.

Frances Tarlton Farenthold, attorney.
Edward Feighan, U.S. Representative, Ohio.

Floyd K. Haskell, former U.S. Senator, Colorado.

Mary King, executive director, Young Ideas, Inc.

John McCarthy, Auxiliary Bishop, Diocese of Galveston-Houston.

Rt. Rev. H. Coleman McGehee Jr., Episcopal Bishop of Michigan.

Arthur Schlesinger Jr., City University of New York.

Wayne Smith, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

Donald Stone, Carnegie-Mellon University.

Paul H. Strega, Association of Evangelical Lutheran Churches.

Robert Torricelli, U.S. Representative, New Jersey.

Robert E. White, former Ambassador to El Salvador.

Rev. William Wipfler, National Council of the Churches of Christ.

Lt. Col. John Buchanan, USMC, ret.

John De Mars, National Education Association.

Mike Farrell, actor and writer.

Dr. Richard Feinberg, economist and author.

Terry Karl, Harvard University, Center for International Affairs.

Sr. Barbara Kraemer, vice president, School Sisters of St. Francis.

Cynthia McClintock, George Washington University.

Augustus Nasmith Jr., National Academy of Sciences.

Jack Sheinkman, Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union.

Don Stillman, Union Auto Workers.

I.F. Stone, journalist.

Marge Tabankin, former director, VISTA.

John Tunney, former U.S. Senator, California.

Murat Williams, former Ambassador to El Salvador.

*Organization listed for identification purposes only.

● Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Chairman, I am baffled and disturbed by the debate over providing aid to the Contras in Nicaragua. I am baffled because the word humanitarian, thrown into this equation by an administration bent on passing some kind of aid to the Contras, has succeeded in shifting our focus dramatically; and I am disturbed most of all because if we accept the concept of humanitarian assistance to the Contras—whether for 60 days or for 1 year, we give the President his victory—albeit watered down some—on the policy in Nicaragua. This should not be.

The central question is whether or not the United States should be supporting the Contra forces with aid. I think not. And, from what I have seen and heard over the past several weeks, I think most of my colleagues in this body think not. Is our support for the Contras any less real if we call the funds humanitarian? Of course not. Humanitarian aid is support money that has traditionally gone to feed, clothe, and sometimes house or provide medical supplies for a people in need. When we provide food, clothing and medical supplies to armies, it is called military support, not humanitarian aid. To borrow from Gertrude Stein, aid to the Contras is aid to the Contras is aid to the Contras.

If the President is committed to peace in Nicaragua, and not simply to the removal of the Sandinistas, why has he consistently rejected the Contadora initiatives? Time and again, we offer rhetorical support of that process, yet continue to fund those who seek a military solution. Why have we rejected the World Court's jurisdiction when we are the torchbearers of justice? Why have we actively mined harbors and taught terrorist tactics when we decry those actions by others around the world? Mr. Speaker, I believe the administration cannot support a real peace initiative in Nicaragua because its bottom line is not peace and self-determination. This administration wants an end to the Sandinista government, and it will change the wrapping on that package as often as is necessary to achieve that goal.

But it is simply not enough to change the wrapping. The question of U.S. support for the Contras has been and remains a fundamental choice of how best to move toward peace in that country. Let us at least be clear on that point: No matter how one feels toward the Sandinistas, no matter how strongly one feels about communism—and I share my colleagues' abhorrence of that oppressive system—our goal in Nicaragua is peace for the people of that country, and the freedom to enjoy it. Overthrowing the Sandinistas is not a plan for peace.

This administration has never put forward a peace plan for the people of

Nicaragua. They have simply advocated a more and more sophisticated and costly and deadly war. We have not destroyed communism in Nicaragua; we have helped to destroy a struggling economy, we have helped destroy innocent lives, and we are on the verge of destroying those people's faith in the United States as the moral kingpin of the world.

It is our responsibility here in Congress, as the Representatives of an overwhelming number of Americans who have been flooding our offices with pleas not to continue any support of the Contras, to forge an alternative that does stand up for peace, that does throw the full weight of our democratic principles into action, that does send the signal to the people of Nicaragua that we support their quest for freedom. And what is the most promising vehicle for peace? Clearly, it is the Contadora process.

The Contadora nations, without significant backing from the United States—in fact with considerable negative reaction from us—have continued to try to address the major problems in the region, forging a peace initiative which calls for a loosening of the restrictive policies of the Sandinistas, a withdrawal of foreign advisers, and a ban on military aid to rebel groups in other countries. Right now, the Contadora nations are trying to iron out the specifics of how to implement such moves fairly—concerns raised again by our administration.

Mr. President, I appeal to you to support the peaceful, democratic process that is the Contadora initiative. I challenge you to risk a trial of that program in place of your military campaign. The money that Congress is debating can be put to good use, but let us stop this charade of promoting democracy by funding terror. In Honduras, 20,000 Nicaraguan refugees live in squalid camps, desperate for food, for medicine, and for shelter. These are the refugees that President Reagan himself called "the innocents of the war—people without politics, people who * * * are both innocents and victims." We can help these people who have been forced from their country. And while we help them, we can help forge the foundations for peace in Nicaragua by providing the means to implement a peace. Mr. Chairman, that is a humanitarian proposal, and one that we can all support.

Tonight we have the opportunity to act as defenders of freedom. Tonight we have the opportunity to stand up for the American ideal of self-determination. Tonight we have the opportunity not only to stop what is so painfully wrong, but to take action finally on a program that is strategically, legally, and morally correct. As a still relatively new Member of this body, I retain the hope that we have the

strength and commitment to our ideals and our constituents to deliver an unequivocal "no" to an untenable military posture in Nicaragua. Let us start today to create a future for the people of Nicaragua, rather than destroying their past. We have the tools; I desperately hope that we also have the courage to use them wisely. ●

● Mr. LOWERY of California. Mr. Chairman, on this day, Congress will decide what form, if any, aid to the democratic opposition in Nicaragua will take. This issue, more than any other in recent years, has garnered national and international attention amidst an unparalleled propaganda blitz of charge and countercharge.

At this time it is appropriate for the Congress to ask itself a simple question: Does the United States have any obligation to oppressed people suffering from a regime that denies them the basic freedoms and liberties that we Americans enjoy? Do we owe anything to individuals subjected to intransigent and oppressive regimes?

Some argue that we do have an obligation and that it extends the world over, regardless of where the subjected peoples reside. Others maintain that our Nation's responsibilities end at our borders—that activities outside this country are matters beyond our jurisdiction. Most of us, however, recognize that when our national security is at stake, the United States must move boldly to promote democracy and protect our vital interests.

Certain facts regarding the Sandinista rise to power provide insights as to the nature of their government. Prior to the ousting of Somoza, the Sandinistas and the other rebel forces pledged to the Organization of American States that Nicaragua would become a democratic and nonaligned government that supported open elections and a free press. On July 22, 1979, 3 days after the revolution, the first American shipment of food arrived in Nicaragua. During the first 18 months of the new government, the United States gave some \$118 million in bilateral economic help, \$24 million in emergency food, medical and reconstruction assistance, and endorsed \$262 million in loans from multilateral lending institutions. This aid was advanced to help the fledgling government in Nicaragua attain a stable economy so fundamental to an orderly shift to a democratic and free society. Unfortunately, the Sandinista government reversed course to the radical left, ignoring their previous promises, while building a military force unmatched in the region.

In just over 5 years, the Sandinistas have realized an active duty force of approximately 62,000 persons, and a total force—including reserves and militia—that exceeds 119,000. The tank and armored personnel carrier inventory numbers 340; moreover, the addi-

tion of a radar air defense system and the Mi-24/HIND D, one of the world's most sophisticated attack helicopters, has further increased the military capability of the Sandinistas. It would be ludicrous to believe that this capability was achieved without Cuban and Soviet backing.

This unilateral military buildup has been totally out of proportion to the capabilities of Nicaragua's neighbors or to any possible foreign threat. In tanks and armored vehicles, Nicaragua surpasses all other countries of Central America combined. Costa Rica has no army per se, and relies on an essentially constabulary Civil Guard of 8,000. Honduras has a military of about 18,000—less than one-third the size of the Sandinistas' active duty forces. Clearly, the Sandinistas' buildup is consistent with any possible defensive needs of a country in that region, and it represents a powerful offensive threat to Nicaragua's neighbors.

Internally, the Sandinistas have taken steps to repress human rights and institute a police state. Both TV stations and two of three major newspapers are controlled by the Sandinistas. La Prensa, the only independent newspaper, still faces a high degree of censorship. In April 1984, the Nicaraguan bishops called for peace and national reconciliation. The Sandinistas responded by labeling the pastoral message the work of the CIA, arresting Father Pena for so-called counter-revolutionary activities, and then expelling 10 priests for allegedly violating Nicaraguan law.

Coinciding with this rise in repression has been an increase in opposition fighters seeking to direct Nicaragua toward democracy. Disillusioned by the succession of events, many opponents of General Somoza and supporters of the revolution have left the Sandinista government. The freedom fighters, or Contras, now number 15,000 and among them are former Sandinista junta members Alfonso Robelo, Arturo Cruz, and Eden Pastora.

Mr. Chairman, virtually every objective observer and my colleagues on both sides of the aisle recognize the unsavory nature of the Sandinista government. The President's proposal offers Nicaragua a credible chance for peace and self-determination while maintaining some form of pressure on the Sandinistas. The immediate precursor of the President's proposal was the Nicaraguan bishops' acceptance on March 22 of the mediation role proposed in the March 1 announcement by the internal and external democratic opposition. The opposition's call for church-sponsored dialog and a cease-fire was characterized as fair and promising by a wide spectrum of observers. The Sandinistas rejected the entire idea. Now President Reagan is

asking them to reconsider and has asked us to help provide the incentive for success.

Let me remind my colleagues that the \$14 million in aid is for humanitarian purposes and prohibits these funds from being used to purchase military or paramilitary materials as long as the cease-fire continues—presently designed to last until June 1, 1985.

This proposal is entirely fair and reasonable. The Sandinistas protest the war and here is an offer to stop it. How must they pay? Only by joining a process that points to the original goals of their own revolution. Think of it: An offer by the opposition to put down arms and to start about achieving the Sandinista's own early promises is dismissed as a hostile conspiracy. The hostility is clearly being instigated by the oppressive Sandinistas.

As Adolfo Calero stated so lucidly:

We Nicaraguans see the main issue as internal—a struggle by Nicaraguans for self-determination, democracy and social justice. It is a struggle against other Nicaraguans and foreigners who * * * have imposed a tyranny on their fellow citizens with the help of the Soviet Union * * *. We ask only for enough help so that we can have a reasonable, even chance in our fight for freedom.

As Members of Congress, and indeed, as American citizens, we do have a responsibility to oppressed peoples; especially to those in neighboring countries; especially to those in a country with direct access to the vital Caribbean shipping lanes; and especially to those subjected to a Soviet and Cuban supported regime openly hostile to the United States. I urge my colleagues to support the President's proposal and vote "yes" on House Joint Resolution 239. ●

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The CHAIRMAN. Evidently a quorum is not present.

Members will record their presence by electronic device.

The call was taken by electronic device.

The following Members responded to their names:

[Roll No. 63]

Ackerman	Bentley	Burton (CA)
Addabbo	Bereuter	Burton (IN)
Akaka	Berman	Bustamante
Alexander	Biaggi	Callahan
Anderson	Billakis	Campbell
Andrews	Bliley	Carney
Annunzio	Boehlert	Carper
Anthony	Boland	Carr
Applegate	Boner (TN)	Chandler
Armed	Bonior (MI)	Chapple
Atkins	Borski	Cheney
AuCoin	Boucher	Clay
Barnard	Boulter	Clinger
Barnes	Boxer	Coats
Bartlett	Breaux	Cobey
Barton	Broomfield	Coble
Bateman	Brown (CA)	Coleman (TX)
Bates	Brown (CO)	Collins
Bedell	Broyhill	Combest
Bellenson	Bruce	Conce
Bennett	Bryant	Conyers

Cooper	Jacobs	Pickle
Coughlin	Jenkins	Porter
Courter	Johnson	Price
Craig	Jones (NC)	Quillen
Crane	Jones (OK)	Rahall
Dannemeyer	Jones (TN)	Rangel
Darden	Kanjorski	Ray
Daschle	Kaptur	Regula
Daub	Kasich	Reld
Davis	Kastenmeier	Richardson
de la Garza	Kemp	Ridge
DeLay	Kennelly	Rinaldo
Dellums	Kildee	Ritter
Derrick	Kiecicka	Robinson
DeWine	Kolbe	Roe
Dickinson	Kolter	Roemer
DioGuardi	Kostmayer	Rogers
Dixon	Kramer	Rose
Donnelly	Lagomarsino	Rostenkowski
Dorgan (ND)	Lantos	Roth
Dornan (CA)	Leath (TX)	Roukema
Dowdy	Lehman (CA)	Rowland (CT)
Downey	Lehman (FL)	Rowland (GA)
Dreier	Levin (MI)	Roybal
Duncan	Levine (CA)	Rudd
Durbin	Lewis (CA)	Russo
Dymally	Lewis (FL)	Savage
Dyson	Lightfoot	Saxton
Early	Lipinski	Schaefer
Eckart (OH)	Livingston	Schneider
Edgar	Lloyd	Schroeder
Edwards (CA)	Loeffler	Schuetz
Edwards (OK)	Long	Schulze
Emerson	Lott	Schumer
English	Lowery (CA)	Sensenbrenner
Erdreich	Lowry (WA)	Sharp
Evans (IA)	Lujan	Shaw
Evans (IL)	Luken	Shelby
Fawell	Lundine	Shumway
Feighan	Mack	Sikorski
Fiedler	MacKay	Siljander
Felds	Madigan	Sisisky
Fish	Manton	Skeen
Flippo	Markey	Skelton
Florio	Marlenee	Slatery
Foglietta	Martin (IL)	Slaughter
Foley	Martin (NY)	Smith (FL)
Ford (TN)	Martinez	Smith (IA)
Fowler	Matsui	Smith (NE)
Frank	Mavroules	Smith (NH)
Franklin	Mazzoli	Smith (NJ)
Frenzel	McCain	Smith, Denny
Gallo	McCollum	Smith, Robert
Gejdenson	McCurdy	Snowe
Gekas	McDade	Snyder
Gephardt	McEwen	Solomon
Gibbons	McGrath	Spence
Gingrich	McHugh	Spratt
Glickman	McKernan	St Germain
Gonzalez	McMillan	Staggers
Gordon	Meyers	Stallings
Gradison	Mica	Stangeland
Gray (IL)	Michel	Stenholm
Green	Mikulski	Stokes
Gregg	Miller (CA)	Strang
Grotberg	Miller (OH)	Stratton
Guarini	Miller (WA)	Studds
Gunderson	Mineta	Stump
Hall (OH)	Mitchell	Sundquist
Hall, Ralph	Moakley	Sweeney
Hall, Sam	Mollinari	Swift
Hamilton	Mollohan	Swindall
Hammerschmidt	Monson	Synar
Hansen	Montgomery	Tallon
Hartnett	Moore	Tauke
Hatcher	Moorhead	Tauzin
Hawkins	Morrison (WA)	Taylor
Hayes	Mrazek	Thomas (CA)
Hefner	Murphy	Thomas (GA)
Heftel	Murtha	Torres
Hendon	Myers	Torricelli
Henry	Natcher	Towns
Hertel	Nielson	Traficant
Hiler	Nowak	Traxler
Hillis	O'Brien	Valentine
Holt	Oakar	Vento
Hopkins	Oberstar	Visclosky
Horton	Obey	Volkmer
Howard	Olin	Vucanovich
Hoyer	Owens	Walker
Hubbard	Packard	Watkins
Huckaby	Parris	Weber
Hughes	Pease	Weiss
Hunter	Penny	Wheat
Hyde	Perkins	Whitehurst
Ireland	Petri	Whitley

□ 2040

The CHAIRMAN. Three hundred sixty-three Members have answered to their names, a quorum is present, and the Committee will resume its business.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO].

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. LEACH].

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, 136 years ago, a first-term Congressman stood up in this Chamber and suggested the United States had become enmeshed in a war in Latin America—a war that had in his judgment been “unnecessarily and unconstitutionally commenced” by an American President.

That Congressman was Abraham Lincoln. He didn't win many elections in his life—partly because he was so uncompromising on issues where morality and legality intertwined.

As a Member of Congress I recognize that in foreign affairs the benefit of the doubt should be given to the President; as a Republican I believe it should be given to the leader of my party. But the issue before us today should not primarily be considered in a partisan context; nor as reflective simply of philosophical differences between Members of this body and the Executive. Fundamentally, the issue at stake is the constitutional process and the role of law, domestic as well as international.

Today, Congress faces an awkward and largely unprecedented dilemma. In the case of Vietnam, Congress abdicated to executive discretion both in the appropriations process and in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution. But in the case of Nicaragua, Congress passed a resolution, which with Presidential signature became the law of the land, specifically proscribing U.S. efforts to overthrow that government.

Now Congress is faced with the problem of responsibility. Once the executive, against congressional will, has armed and equipped rebel forces to inflict chaos in Nicaragua, is Congress obligated to continue assisting them? If it refuses, will it validly be accused of undercutting the word of the President and leaving courageous freedom fighters in an indefensible breach?

It is the view of this Member that our intervention in Nicaragua lacks a constitutional imprimatur because it lacks legislative sanction. Nevertheless, we have an American responsibility for events that our Government has precipitated.

What then should be done? In the first instance, it is imperative not to allow the decisionmaking process

within the executive to force congressional complicity with dubious policy. Congress should not be railroaded by events. Neither can Congress deny responsibility for the effects of executive actions. A fine line must be walked between refusing to endorse the single-minded policy of one branch of government and the collective responsibility we must all assume for U.S.-initiated policies.

Under the circumstances it would seem that the most reasonable and compassionate approach is for Congress to authorize a significant upgrading of humanitarian assistance to all refugees in the region, regardless of the side they may have chosen in the conflict, and to funnel this assistance through the International Committee of the Red Cross and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees to ensure that such assistance is not provided in such a way as to assist military units preparing for armed struggle.

The debate this evening pits those who seek to have the United States identified with interventionist policies against those who would prefer a more pristine legal neutrality. In this regard, it is my belief that every Member of this body, whether or not supportive of the notion that covert action against Nicaragua may be efficacious, should be morally incensed that the law of the land which we ourselves crafted and the law of nations as reflected in treaties and covenants to which our country is party have been so cavalierly disregarded.

Not only has U.S.-supported covert action against Nicaragua strayed beyond the bounds of U.S. law—the Boland amendment—it has struck a damaging blow to world order. International law, we are obligated to recall, explicitly prohibits the overt or covert destabilization of existing governments of whatever political stripe. Article 2.4 of the United Nations Charter states that:

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . .

In 1970, the U.N. General Assembly adopted by consensus the “Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” That declaration includes in its authoritative elaboration of the general principles contained in the U.N. Charter the following:

... No State shall organize, assist, foment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another State, or interfere in civil strife in another State.

Article 18 of the Charter of the Organization of American States [OAS] likewise states:

No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.

Not only does it prohibit such intervention by use of armed force, but by—

... Any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the States or against its political, economic, and cultural elements.

The United States is a party to both of these international treaties.

Supporters of the administration's position respond to charges that U.S.-backed covert operations violate international law by arguing that these operations are undertaken for the ultimate purpose of self-defense. While there is little room for doubt that the governments of Nicaragua and Cuba are aiding the insurgents in El Salvador in their quest to overthrow the Government of that country, any right to self-defense belongs logically to the Government of El Salvador. For the United States to act in the place of El Salvador in the exercise of any right of self-defense, if such an act of becoming an alter ego in itself would be consistent with international law and the exercise of natural sovereign rights, would probably have to be at the specific and formalized request of the Government of El Salvador, and the United States could not undertake that right to any greater degree than El Salvador could. That nation would not necessarily have the right to organize and train troops in Honduras and then assist them in Nicaragua, directly or indirectly, to disrupt that political system solely as a rectifying action to prevent arms from reaching insurgents within its own borders. Under the circumstances, that kind of response might well be considered a disproportional response. It would itself probably be classified as an unlawful act.

If we were to accept the administration's thesis that our covert actions are justified by Nicaragua's support for the guerrillas in El Salvador, will we then be forced to accept, under the same rationale, future administration actions to destabilize the Cuban and/or Soviet Government for their part in aiding those rebels?

If proponents of the covert action are not arguing some vaguely defined principle of individual self-defense where the United States is concerned, but are arguing instead the principle of collective self-defense, does that right include the right to commit the prohibited acts cited earlier under the U.N. and OAS Charters? Further, if the right to collective self-defense is being asserted, why have the procedures under the Rio Treaty and the U.N. Charter not been followed?

It is important for those who would raise the argument of the principle of individual or collective self-defense

under international law to review the conditions set forth in international law which are to be a guide to the exercise of that right. One of the most often cited legal references authorizing acts of self-defense is article 51 of the U.N. Charter which states that:

Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . .

However, the remainder of article 51, which many fail to cite in full, adds.

... until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

Article 51 goes on to mandate:

Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council . . .

If, as some argue, the covert operations against Nicaragua are legal under this article, then the remaining obligations under that article ought to be equally honored and the covert action reported to the Security Council. This has not occurred. In fact, it is Nicaragua, not the United States, which proposes Security Council intervention in this issue.

Under the OAS Charter, there are similar rights and obligations. Article 21 states that:

The American States bind themselves in their international relations not to have recourse to the use of force, except in the case of self-defense . . .

Articles 23 and 24 further mandate that all disputes arising between states in this hemisphere are to be submitted to peaceful procedures including direct negotiation, good offices, mediation, investigation and conciliation, judicial settlement, arbitration, and other means. In the event of an act of aggression committed against a state of the OAS, it is to be considered an act against all members. Such acts, it is important to note, are not limited to "armed attack" but may include any act of aggression short of armed attack, extracontinental conflicts, conflicts between two or more American states, or "any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America."

In the event a state is confronted with such aggression, a number of steps are to be taken under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 [Rio Treaty], to which the United States is a party. First, article 3 of the Rio Treaty provides that in instances of armed attack against a treaty party, all other parties may determine the measures they will take at the request of the victim to fulfill their obligation to "assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations."

Furthermore, the Organ of Consultation, consisting of the Foreign Ministers of the states party to the treaty, is to meet immediately to examine the measures which have already been taken and to agree upon collective measures to be taken.

To date, Nicaragua has not yet undertaken a direct, armed attack on any of its neighbors although the capacity and opportunity to do so are certainly obvious. Were it to engage in such an action, however, any state which is the victim of that attack could call on other parties to the treaty, including the United States, to respond to that action and the Organ of Consultation could be convened immediately to determine what collective measures would be taken. Short of a direct armed attack, however, provisions in both the Rio Treaty and OAS Charter recognize that there may be other forms of aggression which may violate the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of another state and thus endanger the peace of this hemisphere. In such cases, article 6 of the Rio Treaty states that:

... The Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately in order to agree on the measures which must be taken in case of aggression to assist the victim of the aggression or . . . the measures which should be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.

If two or more American states are engaged in conflict, the parties to the Rio Treaty are to call upon the countries involved to cease hostilities and restore matters to the status quo ante bellum. In addition, the parties to the Rio Treaty may take other measures necessary to reach a peaceful resolution of the dispute. Whether a state accepts such peaceful measures is critical in identifying who the aggressor is and in applying the agreed upon measures.

Article 8 of the Rio Treaty outlines the measures which the Organ of Consultation may decide to take under the treaty. Those actions include:

... Recall of chiefs of diplomatic missions; breaking of diplomatic relations; breaking of consular relations; partial or complete interruption of economic relations or of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, telephonic, and radiotelephonic or radio telegraphic communications; and use of armed force.

If it is the informed judgment of the United States Government that the actions of the Nicaraguan Government pose a threat to the peace and security of this hemisphere and endanger the sovereignty and independence of neighboring states, we have a legal obligation to abide by our treaty commitments to take such matters before other parties to the OAS Charter and the 1947 Rio Treaty. The United States is not justified under

any reasonable interpretation of contemporary international law to conduct a covert war to topple a government with which it maintains formal diplomatic relations. The principle of tit-for-tatism—that is, our illegal acts are justified by similar illegal acts of others—by which the administration is operating is neither good government nor a legally sanctioned rationalization for political behavior. In fact, article 14 of the OAS Charter explicitly warns against such behavior:

The right of each State to protect itself and to live its own life does not authorize it to commit unjust acts against another State.

The policy of symmetry—tit-for-tatism—thus has the effect not only of lowering us into the gutter of our enemies but of driving a stake right into the heart of international law.

Article 60 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties has been cited by some as providing a legal remedy authorizing reciprocal approaches to international law. Yet clearly this extraordinary article was designed to be a shield and not a sword. It does not provide an excuse for the commission of a mutual breach of international law or condone an action which would otherwise be in violation of any treaty. The so-called wronged party is still bound by its treaty commitments to other treaty parties as well as to the international community.

If, as publicly reported, the new legal rationale for U.S. involvement in Nicaragua is not merely to interdict arms but to pressure and disrupt that Government, then in effect the United States is violating the same international legal principles that we assert we seek to uphold. Our attempt, directly or indirectly, to affect a change in the political elements within Nicaragua would be tantamount to an unlawful intervention in that nation. Two violations of law do not make a legal right.

We all recognize that in international politics there are often imperfect alternatives, involving "no win" options. This could not be truer of the situation with which we are confronted today. But the key issue before this body is not whether a particular policy is effective, which is in serious doubt, but whether this body will demand of the executive branch an accounting for its actions under the laws of the United States which it has a constitutional duty to faithfully execute. No branch of government is above the law.

Congress is faced today with difficult choices under difficult circumstances. However, it would appear wiser to err on the side of respect for the rule of law rather than on the side of those who may pay lip service to democracy but whose actions demonstrate a willingness to flaunt the law and to finance anarchy in foreign

countries. Congress simply should not give the administration license to compound errors already made.

In this regard, administration logic has an ominously familiar ring. A phenomenon which might be described as a "domino theory of decisionmaking" confronts us today as it did not long ago in another war half a world away. One bad decision had been followed by still others, leading this Nation down the long tunnel of a counterproductive foreign entanglement. Under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, the commitment of a small number of troops in Vietnam and the failed policies which followed led progressively to the commitment of greater numbers of troops and still other policies which failed to progressively greater degrees. We have an opportunity today to ensure against a repetition of that experience in Central America and to reverse the direction of U.S. policy in that region before it is too late.

While analogies to Vietnam are necessarily facile, there is one new dimension to American policy which is to some extent more ominous than that which applied to Indochina. This relates to recent administration efforts to privatize the conflict in Central America.

As a Republican, I feel compelled to note that the tradition of my party is one of constitutionalism, of law and order, of playing carefully by the rules, of not devolving too much authority to the Executive. Thus it is particularly upsetting to find a Republican administration appearing to encourage private citizens to involve themselves in the conflict in Nicaragua in violation of all traditional governmental norms of behavior.

Under vastly different geopolitical circumstances, Congress in 1794 passed the Neutrality Act to ensure that U.S. citizens did not engage in private actions abroad which could rebound to jeopardize general national security. The times may have changed, but the principle is still valid today. Citizens still carry with them an obligation not to, by their private acts, craft a foreign policy for an entire nation.

The Neutrality Act reflects the democratic premise that the United States should engage in warfare only with congressional approval. Presidential use of covert private armies undermines a view of warfare that was incorporated into the Constitution: War should be public rather than private; jointly sanctioned by the Executive and the legislature. Private actions that involve armed intervention undermine the democratic decisionmaking processes protected both by the Constitution and the Neutrality Act.

Respect for the law is at the heart of both our national tradition and the fluid contract between the Executive

and legislative branches on foreign policy. But today private citizens, frustrated with the struggle between their elected representatives over Central American policy, have decided to take the law, and foreign policy, into their own hands. They have become international vigilantes, provisioners of posses accountable to no government. In so doing, they have become the international counterparts to New York's infamous subway celebrity, though the stakes for our national security are potentially much higher.

Apart from reflecting these important democratic and constitutional values, the Neutrality Act also reflects a crucial international norm. Despite the increase in violations, the prevention of covert military interventions remains an important part of the principle of territorial integrity affirmed by the United Nations and in numerous treaties to which the United States is a party. The duty of one nation to prohibit the initiation of hostile expeditions by persons within its territory against another nation has become an accepted principle of international law. It should not be thrown lightly to the winds.

The difficulty of the lack of state control over private expeditions is as clear today as it was in the 1800's. The Bay of Pigs operation demonstrated that exile groups are extremely difficult to control. Similarly, as in the Nicaraguan situation where a regional peacekeeping negotiation is underway under the leadership of the Contadora group, the use of private armies makes attempts to terminate hostilities extremely problematic. Troops under Presidential command, as was the case in Vietnam, are clearly preferable to private armies precisely because they are state led and politically accountable.

For decades there has been debate about whether the United States should play the role of policeman for the world, with some arguing that it is a chore for which we lack either a legal imprimatur or adequate resources to undertake. But a new dimension to this debate is implicit in the administration's privatization of the war in Latin America. The administration seems to be suggesting that not only will we play the role of world policeman, but rather than enforcing the law, the interventionist cops American citizens are encouraged to support are themselves above the law.

From a policy perspective, the administration is today in the ironic position of standing foursquarely in El Salvador against forces which are armed and financed from abroad who would shoot their way into power. In Nicaragua, on the other hand, it is standing with such forces; American citizens, following the precedent of

their Government, have become financiers of anarchy.

In embracing these tit-for-tat policies, we have lowered ourselves into the gutter with the violence-prone revolutionaries we so loudly condemn and in the process have undercut the moral imprimatur upon which U.S. policy in the region must be based. Subversion to halt subversion, terrorism to stop terrorism, is of dubious legal or moral validity. As profoundly, this state-sponsored terrorism appears not only to be counterproductive in the region, but of such a nature to spark a general breakdown in international order. The conduct of foreign affairs is always controversial, but seldom have both our ideals and our actions been so thoroughly at odds.

The history of the 20th century demonstrates that viable and deeply rooted indigenous democratic institutions cannot be easily built by outside military intervention. The historical analogies offered by the sorry debacle at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 and the CIA overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954 indicate both the likelihood of failure as well as the long-term counterproductive effects of any short-term successes. The era of great power interventionism in Central America policy may not have been entirely eclipsed on the clock of history, but practical considerations of national self-interest would seem to argue against continued U.S. support for the Contras in their secret war.

It is difficult to comprehend what practical benefit the administration believes it will gain by identifying with the ex-Somocistas who just 4 short years ago lost a massively popular revolution. It is not difficult to anticipate, however, the likely price the United States will pay in the future for such an association with allies of a despised dictator. The energies of nationalism, which too many confuse exclusively with the zeal of Marxism, are easily mobilized to the advantage of the Sandinista regime. Portraying the insurgents as agents of Yankee imperialism serves to consolidate the undeserved and unwarranted power of a few. It helps vindicate repressive internal policies and pro-Soviet and pro-Cuban external ones. Just as the Bay of Pigs operation helped consolidate Castro's brand of socialism, so Contra efforts, despite the courage implied, are likely in the final measure to prove counterproductive.

There is an apocryphal story that dated back to the Kennedy administration that deserves attention today. The story has it that in the Israeli Knesset a member suggested that Israel's economic policies could be righted simply by declaring war on the United States. After 2 days of conflict, he conjectured, the white flag could be raised and Israel would immediately become entitled to massive foreign aid. In re-

buttal, a colleague then inquired: What if we win?

The point of the story is that even if one presumes a Contra victory—which few strategic analysts suggest is likely—the aftereffects would almost certainly include a continued bloody civil war and the transformation of a small pacific country into a violence-ridden republic. What moral right do we have to impose such a future on the people of Nicaragua and potentially as well on her neighboring states? Can we be confident that the objectives we and so many concerned citizens of Nicaragua wish to achieve are not more likely to be obtained under conditions of peace rather than war?

As a visitor to the Nicaraguan border 2 years ago, I can attest to the effect which the paramilitary operations are having on innocent civilians, victimized by the violence spawned by the military mobilization of the Contras. Priests in the region tell visitors of the kidnappings and frequent killings. The inescapable and ugly reality is that the poverty-stricken masses of rural Nicaragua are being treated as pawns in an East-West conflict they hardly understand. If, as the administration argues, it is not supporting the violent overthrow of the Sandinista government, one can only conclude that much of the violence this Congress is financing is violence without a purpose. The United States has become a rebel without a cause.

The most fundamental issues of world politics are, in the first instance, how we contain and constrain weapons of mass destruction and, in the second, how we can best advance the rule of law. To refuse to submit disputes to the World Court and abide by arbitration decisions of that body is to deny our heritage.

It is difficult not to conclude that our foreign policy is becoming increasingly, elitist, if not authoritarian. A bipartisan foreign policy can only be established with bi-institutional sanction. On trial in this country at this time is not only a particular policy but the Constitution itself.

Two and a half millennia ago in a chronicle of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides recorded how the Athenian assembly voted to send by ship a force to conquer the island of Melos whose people declared they wanted to remain neutral in the great struggle of the Greek age. The day after the fleet was ordered to sail, the assembly reconsidered and a vessel was ordered to convey new orders of restraint. Melos received a reprieve.

Thirty years later the same issue was revisited. This time the order was not reconsidered and Athenian forces landed on Melos, killing the males and enslaving the females of the island.

Thucydides' account was intended to portray the flowering and then the decay of Athenian democracy. Today

America stands as the Athens of our time; the Soviet Union, an ideologically more rigid Sparta. The question we must ask ourselves, as our democratic forefathers did 2,500 years ago, is whether it is possible to respect the right of a small country to self-determination even if it implies living with a government in our region which articulates a philosophy repugnant to our own?

It would be the hope of this Member that in a world far more complex than that confronted by pre-nuclear and pre-gunpowder Athenians that our ships will be recalled, that Periclean democracy can be revisited in these halls in this century.

What this country lacks at this time is not just a sense of the importance of law, of playing by the rules of the game, but a sense of history. Nicaragua, after all, is less strategically consequential to the United States than Melos was to Athens. The Constitution is more important than the President; the rule of law more valuable than any short-term military victory that might be achieved in a small Central American republic.

A constitutional crisis has been precipitated. Let's resolve it in a manner consistent with our heritage and support humanitarian rather than military aid in the region.

□ 2050

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. JONES].

Mr. JONES of Oklahoma. Mr. Chairman, this issue of Nicaragua is so difficult because there are no clear-cut solutions. I became involved in this issue for two reasons. No. 1, I truly believe that our major foreign policy opportunities and threats in the near future lie in Mexico and in Central America.

No. 2, 3 weeks ago I headed a delegation of U.S. observers looking at the election in El Salvador. In that country, democratic institutions are in fact growing. They are actually beginning to work and to take hold. Our policies in Nicaragua are not that clear cut. When we returned from El Salvador, I thought about this week's debate and the option was that we would either spend \$14 million in military assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras or we would do nothing and walk away. Neither one of those options were acceptable to me.

For myself and a number of other moderates in both parties, we felt a middle course was in order. That is when we set about under the leadership of the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. HAMILTON] and the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. BARNES] to work out a middle-course alternative, an alternative that denied military assistance for the rest of this fiscal year, an alternative that primarily gave hu-

manitarian assistance, administered through the Red Cross and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

We had two goals in mind. No. 1, to have an immediate cease-fire as quickly as possible.

No. 2, to get all the warring factions to reenter a dialog and to get them back to a conference table. To achieve those twin goals, we felt it was necessary to have a series of incentives and disincentives and to set forth some measurement so that the Congress and the President could let the American people know whether progress was being made toward peace and democracy.

I have had some experience in another administration in trying to build support for policies using a military option, that in Vietnam. One thing is certain. They cannot be successful. A military option cannot be successful without the support of the American people and the American people do not support the military use of pressure in Nicaragua today. So we have to let the American people know how progress and if progress is being made.

The incentives are that Congress will revisit this question under the Hamilton alternative and if progress is being made toward peace and toward democracy in Nicaragua, we will consider as additional assistance, economic assistance to build that country, agricultural assistance, technical assistance, Peace Corps, and the like and if progress is not made the President will report in the new fiscal year to the Congress on the same fast-track procedure that we are dealing with today and this whole question of aid will be revisited.

Now, let there be no mistake. We do not support, we flatly oppose the Sandinista government's repression of freedoms, its military ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union, and its export of war to its neighbors.

In the Hamilton alternative, these measurements of progress away from these things we oppose and toward peace and democracy are clearly set forth so that when we visit this question again we will be able to determine with some accuracy whether or not the incentives or the disincentives ought to be used.

Lastly, our colleague in the other body, the senior Senator from Georgia, made a speech in which he said we must change our policy toward Nicaragua. We must change, make a change that will move diplomatic pressure for peace to the front burner and move military pressure to the back burner, but keep both on the stove. That essentially is what we are attempting to do through this middle course, to give diplomatic pressure an opportunity to work toward peace, toward lasting friendship between the people of Nicaragua and the United States.

□ 2100

I believe we have a great opportunity there and we can be successful if the United States will present a set of policies that are viewed in Nicaragua and throughout Central America as a promoter of peace and not a purveyor of war.

I urge support for the Hamilton alternative.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair announces to the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABO] that he has 20 minutes left and the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] has 21½ minutes left.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, at this time it is my pleasure to yield 7 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Arizona [Mr. McCAIN].

Mr. PARRIS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCAIN. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. PARRIS. Mr. Chairman, 23 years ago President Kennedy felt so strongly about the threat of Soviet military intrusion in the Western Hemisphere that he took this Nation to the very brink of war. President Kennedy blockaded Cuba, and turned away Soviet ships carrying missiles to a Cuban base just 90 miles from the Florida coast.

I applauded that action then, and today I rise to ask this Congress to support President Reagan's strong position to again guard against an invidious Soviet presence in Nicaragua.

The National Bipartisan Commission on Central America clearly showed us that Cuba and the Soviet Union are exploiting the economic and social injustices which have faced this region for decades. This is the same type of collaboration which brought Marxists to power in Angola in 1975, and to Ethiopia in 1977.

The Sandinista's successful opposition to Somoza focused on repression of the press, lack of fair elections, the repression and murder of political opponents, and the political uses of the Nicaraguan Army. As we now approach the sixth anniversary of the Sandinista takeover of Nicaragua, the opponents of the Sandinista dictatorship focus their complaints on the same repressions that the Sandinistas pledged to resolve by their overthrow of Somoza.

In 1979 the Sandinistas were praised for liberating the Nicaraguan people from a repressive regime, but during the last 6 years we have watched the Sandinistas systematically reject the ideology which brought them their original populist support. Censorship of the press, imprisonment, and murder of political opponents, an unprecedented buildup of the Sandinista army, and the meaningless elections held last year prove that the Sandinistas are rapidly gaining totalitarian control over the people of Nicaragua.

The Soviet Union has given the Sandinista army one-half a billion dollars in military hardware in the last 5 years to support this repressive regime. Today we are being asked to release \$14 million in aid already appropriated for the Contras.

I submit that this is a ridiculously low price to pay to close the Soviet door to the Western Hemisphere which was propped open by the Sandinistas in 1979. It is therefore my intention to support this resolution which is clearly beneficial to the national defense of this Nation and therefore consistent with our best interests.

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, four times today during debate which I have observed most of the day, a good and honorable military officer, General Gorman, was quoted by those who were opposing the resolution before us by stating that he said that \$14 million would not have an impact on events in Nicaragua. We received a phone call from General Gorman. He greatly resents that distortion of his remarks and he says, and I quote:

Adequately supporting the Nicaraguan resistance forces can indeed bring pressure to achieve changes for democracy that they seek. Without U.S. support the freedom movement in Nicaragua is doomed.

That is the full quote that I just received from Mr. Gorman. I think he and the rest of us would appreciate very much him not being quoted out of context in the course of this debate.

I am also very interested to hear the continuous lessons from Vietnam and Indochina that are usually quoted from this side. Though I do not agree with those lessons as they have been enunciated, I also feel that is well to view our activities and the vote we are about to take in light of those lessons.

One relevant lesson to this debate is that in the final analysis the people must wage their own war, must gain their own freedom and must be willing to fight to preserve that freedom. There is no better example of that than what has taken place in El Salvador. Under the leadership of Jose Napoleon Duarte the people of El Salvador, with our help, have installed a pluralistic and indeed free society.

Tonight and tomorrow we will decide whether to aid another group of people who are willing to undertake this struggle. Indeed, we are making a decision critical to the existence of the democratic forces within Nicaragua. Make no mistake about it, this decision will have an impact well beyond the boundaries of Nicaragua.

We are being watched by all of Central America and the Caribbean. We are being watched in Thailand and Pakistan and Japan and West Germany, and most of all we are being watched in Moscow and in Havana.

Many of my colleagues have asked why should we involve ourselves in

Nicaragua. They ask why do we fear an impoverished nation with an economy near collapse.

I believe they ask the wrong question. The question should be why not act to further the cause of freedom. The longer we delay the higher the cost.

Those who oppose personal freedoms, those who support the supremacy of the state over the individual, will only gain in strength and influence.

Last week in the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee hearings on Nicaragua I heard a number of individuals state that seriously we must give the Sandinistas more time, time to reform their behavior, time to fulfill the promises they made to the OAS and to their own people. And if the Sandinistas fail to reform, we can then contemplate serious actions against them.

There were two courses of action that I heard. One, trade embargo and economic sanctions. There is no time in history where trade embargoes and economic sanctions as instruments of foreign policy have been successfully used.

The other one, and greatly more alarming to me, by certain people who are much more liberal than I am, was that we can always impose a naval blockade such as we imposed on Cuba in 1962.

A showdown on the high seas between the Soviet Navy and our own naval forces is a degree of brinkmanship which I do not want and I do not believe anyone in this body seeks. That, my friends, is a policy that we cannot follow and we cannot reach that point.

If we do not provide the aid to the democratic forces that we are considering tonight, we are going to be faced with two situations: a Hobson's choice which I think is untenable. One, a Cuba on the mainland of Central America, which we will have to, of course, accommodate for all of the problems and the challenges that that provides us; or the direct involvement of U.S. military troops.

I do not like either option. I do not believe we should have to face those conditions.

While some of my colleagues agree with my statements, they do not find the so-called Contras worthy of our support. They decry the human rights situation, they talk of the instability that the Contras create in the neighboring countries.

While these are valid concerns, I am troubled by certain questions. Do we really believe that the end of the democratic forces within Nicaragua and the consolidation of the Marxist Sandinista regime will improve the human rights situation? Do we really believe that the end of the Contras will result in more stability and less insurgency in El Salvador, Honduras, or

Costa Rica? What evidence exists in the annals of history to support an affirmative answer to those questions?

Here I believe our experience in Indochina is illuminating. Many claim if we only end our military aid to the region and its corrupt governments, the result would be peace and a prosperous future.

One and one-half million Vietnamese have fled, 3 million Cambodians never had the chance to flee, and the suffering goes on. To these people, talk of human rights is nothing but a cruel joke.

Finally, there are still others in Congress who believe that the Contras deserve a form of assistance but it should be channeled through some international group known for its benevolence or opposition to force such as the Hamilton amendment.

Whatever the noble intention of these proposals, the result is the same. The democratic forces will eventually cease to exist. They will become the boat people of Central America, fleeing to other countries including the United States seeking refuge. They will lose their ability to effect any positive change. Their hopes of a pluralistic society, freedom of the press and religion, will become nothing more than a distant vision.

Mr. Chairman, I find it very regrettable that this issue has become so highly partisan, that opposition to the President's Central American policy has become a litmus test for many Members of this body. For many reasons, the American people turned their backs on Vietnam, and those who were responsible for our failure were not held accountable. This time the American people will not be able to turn their backs on American policy failure. The blame will rest with those whose action causes failure.

In the last analysis we must all live with the decisions we make and our failure to properly influence events. However, it is our children who will endure the consequences of these actions.

I urge this body to support a policy which will sustain pressure on both the Sandinistas and the Contras, call for a cease-fire, mediation, the remaining of President Ortega in place, and bring this unhappy tragedy and unhappy chapter to a rapid and peaceful solution.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. Fish].

Mr. FISH. Mr. Chairman, in the years I have served in the Congress, rarely have I encountered an issue which so divides us. In recent months, we all have had the opportunity to meet with leaders of the military and political opposition to the Sandinistas, Nicaraguan businessmen and exiles, as well as Sandinista leaders. We have had ample opportunity to be briefed

by our State Department and intelligence sources. The American people are also divided. On one hand are those who view current policy as inconsistent with our traditions and our mission of encouraging a more just and stable world. On the other hand are those who view our support for the Contras as a necessary countermove to Soviet and Cuban infiltration into Central America.

Mr. Chairman, essentially the Congress, by resolution at the conclusion of this debate, will express American policy in Central America, and particularly toward Nicaragua. The elements of such a policy expression, I submit: First, recognizes reality; second, advances U.S. self-interest in the stability and security of the region; and third, promotes Democratic institutions and self-determination for the peoples of the countries in Central America.

The reality of the present regime in Nicaragua is that it is repressive internally and supports insurgency against the legitimate Government of El Salvador. The reality is that the Sandinistas have made a mockery of the promise of the revolution of 1979 and are perceived by their neighbors as a force of subversion, and even military threat.

United States self-interest is in regional stability and security, advancing a cease-fire and peace negotiations, nurturing democratic institutions, ending human rights violations, and the departure of foreign military advisers and of international terrorists.

Promoting self-determination cannot be achieved by suppression of individual liberties, suppression of political expression, suppression of freedom of worship, and suppression of the independence of the media. Self-determination is promoted by the free expression of political views. To achieve this, our support for the political resistance to the Sandinistas should not be doubted.

Mr. Chairman, the issue before the Congress is not these policy goals, for they reflect American values and tradition. They are within our legitimate interest and in accordance with principles of international law. Rather, at issue is the means to achieve these objectives.

I submit these policy goals are embodied in the Hamilton or bipartisan alternative.

To date, the means to implement this policy has been to finance and support military operations by those opposing the Sandinistas. If justified on the basis of arms interdiction, it has failed. If justified by a reduction in Soviet and Cuban influence or a military buildup in Nicaragua, it has failed. It has also placed the United States in the uncharacteristic and unfortunate posture of violating interna-

tional law. It clearly is in violation of our treaty obligations, and I fear, diminishes our claim to leadership of the free world.

The bipartisan alternative offers another route. It seeks to encourage a cease-fire and negotiations. It squarely puts the Congress in support of the Contadora process as an appropriate framework for achieving peace and security in the region. What are some of the components of this framework?

They are the observance of the principles of international law that regulates relations among States. A few of these are the right of free determination of a people, nonintervention, a peaceful settlement of controversies, respect for territorial integrity, pluralism, the observance and encouragement of human rights, and the proscription of terrorism and subversion. These principles parallel the self-interest of the United States. The moneys allocated for expenses arising from implementation of an agreement based on Contadora principles include peacekeeping, verification and monitoring systems.

The bipartisan alternative, in clear terms, spells out the objectives of our policy goals in Nicaragua: First the removal of foreign military advisers; second the end of Sandinista support for insurgencies; third the restoration of individual liberties, political expression, freedom of worship, and independence of the media; and fourth, progress toward a pluralistic democratic system.

Our alternative calls on the Sandinistas to shape up. It calls on the United States through appropriate organizations to seek to maintain multilateral pressure on Nicaragua to address our concerns. It states clearly our disposition to support sanctions adopted by such organizations.

Appropriately, this resolution for the Congress itself to monitor the behavior of all combatants. It makes clear that in 5 months we expect to see our concerns addressed. It affirms congressional readiness to wield sanctions: economic, diplomatic, political—yes, even military—if Managua fails during this period to enter a negotiating process and make progress toward these goals.

There should be no doubt but that the legitimate security interests of the United States will not permit foreign military bases in Central America, the presence of foreign military advisers, nor the exportation of the means or philosophy of an antidemocratic revolution.

The President's reports required by this resolution will describe actions by the Sandinistas and by groups opposing that government by armed force, which have contributed to or hindered efforts toward peace and democratic institutions. There are many options available to the United States—a par-

tial or full economic embargo, seeking the cooperation of multilateral organizations to reduce or deny aid or credit, and a break in diplomatic relations.

It is significant that the second alternative to be offered this body calls for a trade embargo. This certainly is our most important economic option as the United States is Nicaragua's largest trading partner. The bipartisan alternative, however, goes further, much further. It leaves our options open. Our response can be flexible, allowing Congress to decide at a later date what degree of severity is warranted.

If it is determined by the Congress that progress toward peace and the development of democratic institutions in Nicaragua is being made, the resolution embraces the traditional American role of a willing neighbor and valuable friend.

Mr. Chairman, I urge the acceptance of this policy alternative as a means by which we can implement a policy most consistent with our Nation's values and traditions.

□ 2110

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 6 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana [Mr. ROEMER].

Mr. ROEMER. I thank the chairman.

Mr. Chairman, listening to the debate today, I would say that many in America are frozen in a world growing smaller, and more dangerous, and demanding action, we are frozen somewhere between Cuba and Vietnam. In Cuba, we were shocked by the turnabout of Castro and frightened by the might of the Soviet Union and we asked ourselves the question: Did we do enough? In Vietnam, we were pained to the core by the death and defeat and we asked ourselves did we do too much? Between the extremes of too little and too much we need a plan to plant democracy on the barren soils of inexperience and on the rocky shores of Third World poverty.

Frankly, I am tired of the temptation of having to embrace dictatorships on the right because they are anti-Communist dictatorships of the left; so I voted against Chile yesterday. But is there nothing in between? For it is in the in between that we will cultivate democracy and it will not be easy. It is in between that there are no easy answers, no blacks, no whites, just grays, and browns, and more gray. No easy answer.

For example, one Member today rose and said that we have no right to interfere in the affairs of another country. Yet this same Member supports strong measures of economic sanctions against the racist Government of South Africa. Different, he will say; but it is the same. No easy answers.

Another Member rose and said that he could not support the Contras because they were thugs, Somoza's men in Contra gear. Now some are, but not in the main. In the main is it not true. The vast majority of the Contra leaders fought on the side of the Sandinistas against Somoza and were then betrayed. Oh, they are warriors and they are not perfect but talk with the Suma and the Roma Indians, and talk with the Miskitos, and talk with Steadman Fagoth, and compare their dreams with the realities of the Sandinistas and see who comes closest to our dreams of middle-ground freedom. The Contras do. No easy answers but we must choose. We cannot be 100-percent certain but we must stand somewhere or not stand at all.

On this issue I stand with the President. As long as he continues to pressure the Sandinistas to stop exporting revolution to their neighbors, as long as he continues to pressure the Sandinistas to eliminate offensive military weapons, to pressure the Sandinistas to begin a meaningful dialog with the freedom fighters about power sharing. In my opinion the best way of maximizing the pressure is a combination of military and economic aid for the Contras coupled with economic sanctions on Nicaragua.

I feel that we should stand with the freedom fighters in their war until the Sandinistas agree that they will talk to the Contras in peace.

Unfortunately, the combination of military and economic package is not to be voted on. Instead we have three relatively weak propositions of which we must take the best.

On the first vote, minimum military assistance to the Contras, it is a moot point. It is dead. The President buried it days ago.

The only reason, in my opinion, that we will make the first vote is to embarrass the President. My party, the party, which, during the Lebanon fiasco, said that in foreign policy matters partisan politics stops at the water's edge; my party, of which I am usually proud, in my opinion will take a cheap, gratuitous, unnecessary, partisan, counterproductive slap at the President.

I stand with the President when he is right.

On this issue the President is imperfect in his approach, but closer to the truth than his critics.

You know, I disagreed with the President about Lebanon. The marines were the target, not policemen; they were sitting ducks, not eagles. We brought them home.

I disagree with the President on his South African policy. Economic pressure on South Africa, a nation that treats human beings like animals, is long overdue. I disagree with the President on the price of reconcilia-

tion with West Germany. My God, even inadvertent recognition of SS honor is too high a price to pay.

But I stand with him in his pressure on the Sandinistas.

On the first vote I will not slap the President. I will stand with him.

□ 2120

The vote on Hamilton is an interesting one, because the resolution does nothing. It huffs, it puffs, but nothing happens.

We pay people to leave Nicaragua, we threaten pressure—oh, we are tough—finally, it is the ultimate copout. On the battlefield of freedom it is the old "check's in the mail speech."

Finally, we will vote for Michel. Not perfect, not enough, but at least it gives flexibility to the President's methodology, \$14 million in aid to the Contras, and keeps pressure on the Sandinistas.

We could do much more. We should do no less. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair announces that the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO] has 14 minutes remaining; the gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] has 8½ minutes remaining.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABBO].

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. BARNES].

Mr. BARNES. Mr. Chairman, I think my colleagues on the Committee on Foreign Affairs on both sides of the aisle would agree that many of us have been trying over the last couple of years to find bipartisan answers to the crisis that our hemisphere confronts in Central America.

One of my frustrations tonight—really, it is sort of a sense of sadness tonight, is that we continued to be struck with this issue on which we struggle still to find an answer around which we can develop a consensus.

On a lot of other issues, we have been coming together in ways that might not have been thought possible even 1 year or 18 months ago. The election of President Duarte in Salvador; now the fact that the Christian Democrats have 34 seats in the 60-seat assembly in Salvador I think makes it much more possible for us to find a bipartisan approach to U.S. policy with respect to El Salvador.

We did not see it last night on the vote on Chile, but I think even on Chile, there has been some movement in the administration that some of us who have been very critical of the administration's approach to Chile can support.

On a whole range of issues in our hemisphere, we have been able to find much more of a bipartisan policy than ever would have been thought possible even 12, 18 months ago.

But on this one issue of U.S. support for the groups fighting to overthrow the Government of Nicaragua, we have not been able, as yet, to find a bipartisan approach.

It was in that spirit, I think a very sincere spirit, a sincere desire to try to find a bipartisan approach to what is a very difficult and important issue, that Chairman HAMILTON of the Intelligence Committee, Chairman JONES, a number of Members on the other side of the aisle; Mr. FISH, Mr. ZSCHAU, Mr. LEACH, Mr. GRADISON, and I sat down and tried to come out with a different approach; one that is not a compromise so much as a different approach, one that we hope could bring together Members from both sides of the aisle in support of a policy that could unite the American people.

Why did we feel that the current policy is not one that is likely to achieve the goals that we all have? Well, one thing, we looked at what our Latin neighbors, the people who have most at stake in this, were telling us.

When President Reagan unveiled his initiative a couple weeks ago, it was said that the leadership of the Contadora nations supported his initiative.

Well, then we learned that the Government of Mexico does not support it. In fact, the President of Mexico issued a statement saying specifically he could not endorse the President's proposal.

We learned that the Government of Venezuela does not support it. The Government of Venezuela was forced to issue statements indicating they did not support it.

We learned that the Government of Panama does not support it. The President of Panama said he believes that the President's approach is in violation of international law. And we learned that the Government of Colombia does not support it; the President of Colombia who had been cited as a supporter of the President's initiative said it is not a peace proposal; it is a preparation for war.

We were told that His Holiness, the Pope, supports the President's initiative and supports all of his efforts in Central America and the Vatican had to take the rather unusual step of issuing a formal statement repudiating that and saying that that is not the case.

We were told that the President of Costa Rica, President Monge, supports President Reagan's initiative, and I have just received a letter from the Embassy of Costa Rica, including a statement issued by President Monge of Costa Rica just 5 days ago, in San Jose, Costa Rica, in which he said in response to the question: Would you support an action in which those \$14 million were to be given to the insurgents for war purposes in Nicaragua?

President Monge of Costa Rica responded:

No, I could not support such an action contrary in nature to the neutrality of Costa Rica. I could not support this type of aid to the insurgents.

Well, why is it, why is it that the President of Colombia, the President of Costa Rica, the President of Venezuela, the President of Panama, why is it that these Democrats in our own hemisphere do not support this approach?

Is it because as we have been told all day, that they want to see the consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in Nicaragua? Is it because they want to see communism spread throughout our hemisphere?

Of course not. These are Democrats who are just as concerned as anybody in this body; maybe more, because they are closer to it than we are, about what might be happening in Nicaragua, and they are not blind to what is happening in Nicaragua. They know that is happening in Nicaragua. They have been there more than any of us. They are closer to it than any of us.

Why is it that they are opposed to what we are being asked to vote for tonight? Which is \$14 million in military assistance to the Contras fighting in Nicaragua.

They will argue, as President Betancur did when he was here just a couple of weeks ago and he met with members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, they will argue as the President of Argentina did when he stood at that microphone and spoke to a joint session of the Congress just 3 or 4 weeks ago, they will argue that there is a better way to deal with the challenge that we all recognize is there.

If they were here tonight, if the democratically elected presidents of the democracies of Latin America were standing here in the well tonight, they would plead with all of us to vote against this military approach, and they would plead with us to give their effort an opportunity to work.

They say—and they have said it to many of us in this room, they say that when the United States holds a gun against the head of the Sandinistas and says "Cry uncle or we'll shoot," there is no better way to assure that the Sandinistas will not do what we all want them to do.

They say, allow us the opportunity; that is the Contadora nations, allow us the opportunity to bring pressures from the Latin neighbors on Nicaragua to achieve these goals.

That is the argument they make to us. Tonight, at this very moment, there are more than 100 Latin American diplomats working on the Contadora effort to try to find peaceful answers in Central America, and to try to bring pluralism and democracy to all of the countries of Central America.

What we who are opposed to this military approach now are saying is,

why not give them some time to see if this thing can play out and work? They say it can. President Betancur told us he is very optimistic about the Contadora process succeeding in achieving the goals that we all want.

□ 2130

Well, you can say, "I do not think it will work, I think it is better for us to engage in a military intervention in Nicaragua despite the fact that we all recognize the problems with that."

Well, that option is not going to go away. That option is going to be there 3 months from now, 6 months from now, a year from now. The United States gives up none of its alternatives if it gives peace an opportunity to work as our neighbors are asking us to do.

It seems to me it is a very simple choice tonight. Do we vote to continue a program which our neighbors tell us is counterproductive, will not achieve the goal we want, in fact will make it almost impossible to achieve, given the historical context in which it happens? if you were a Nicaraguan and you were being told you have got to change your form of government or the United States is going to change it for you, given what your nation has been through—the United States has intervened in Nicaragua, as I understand it, 12 times, historically—given what your nation has been through, and given what you went through to overthrow the United States-imposed Somoza dictatorship, I do not think there is a stronger argument you could hear for maintaining what you are doing and refusing to change.

So let us take the opportunity that we have tonight to do what we are being asked to do by our friends, the Democratic friends in Latin America, and that is, let us give them a chance to make their initiative work. It is a Latin initiative. And if ultimately it is necessary to take military force—and that is not ruled out, that option is always there, it is there under the Rio Treaty, it is there under the charter of the OAS—if ultimately it is necessary to use military force, ladies and gentlemen, would it not be better if it is not the gringos who do it, would it not be better if it is a choice that is made by the Latin Americans themselves to deal with the problem that they recognize? they recognize it as surely as anyone here today who has given these eloquent speeches denouncing communism. Let us give our friends, our Democratic friends, an opportunity to do the job they are trying to do.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, today we have heard the pros and cons of the President's policies in search of peace, stability, and democracy in Central America.

Now the choice is clear: Are we going to support the forces for freedom in

Nicaragua through humanitarian aid, or are we through our action, or inaction, going to let the professed Marxist-Leninist leadership of Nicaragua prevail with all that means to its long suffering people and to our own legitimate interests in the area.

President Reagan has presented a solid peace proposal. He has also promised not to use the appropriated \$14 million for arms. To those who have raised the specter of U.S. troops in Nicaragua, let me say that the President has given assurances that this legislation will not be used to justify the use of U.S. Armed Forces. In plain English this legislation is no back door for sending troops there.

The legislation before us is in the national interest of our country. We must choose whether to support the President in his efforts to stop Soviet encroachment by proxy in our hemisphere. If we fail this test, the world will know we are not serious in our support of freedom. I urge a vote on this resolution for freedom in Central America.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York is recognized for 4 minutes.

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Chairman, we have indeed had a lengthy and arduous debate today, in the great tradition of this great deliberative body. We have now come to that time to vote. The question is simple on the vote tonight. It is not a complicated question. We have received and again I will read the letter of transmittal from the President accompanying his classified report submitted to Congress. It reads as follows:

Pursuant to provisions of title VIII, section 8066 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985 (Public Law 98-473, enacted October 12, 1984; 98 Stat. 1935), I herewith transmit a classified report on U.S. support for the democratic resistance movement in Nicaragua. On the basis of this report, I have determined that assistance for military or paramilitary operations now prohibited by Section 8066A of that Act is necessary.

The resolution we will be voting on tonight, very shortly, is House Joint Resolution 239 introduced by the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL], which again says:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves the obligation and expenditure of funds available for fiscal year 1985 for supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.

There is not one word in the classified report submitted by the President or the resolution on humanitarian aid. That is a Gulf of Tonkin resolution. It provides military aid pure and simple.

If the President wants to use funds for humanitarian aid, he cannot use these funds. These funds are ear-

marked for military purposes and he has asked for release of these funds for military purposes. If he wants these funds to be used for humanitarian aid, after the Congress votes down House Joint Resolution 239 tonight, he can send a letter in support of Bob MICHEL's resolution, if he wishes, which talks about humanitarian aid. A letter from the President, a press release from the President, a discussion by the President on humanitarian aid is not law. This resolution is law. House Joint Resolution 239 which you will be asked to vote on very shortly, that is law. And if you vote for House Joint Resolution 239, you will be voting to give the President \$14 million for one purpose and one purpose alone, and that is for additional military aid, the foot in the door for future increases of military aid to Nicaragua.

It is simple. Tomorrow you can vote on humanitarian aid, whether it be the Hamilton resolution or whether it be the Bob Michel resolution. That will cover humanitarian assistance. Tonight the resolution before you is simple and clear cut. As I have pointed out to you, it provides for paramilitary or military aid as requested by the President.

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ADDABBO. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. BIAGGI. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman for yielding. I wish to associate myself with the gentleman's remarks and support his position most vigorously, and I rise in opposition to House Joint Resolution 239 to release \$14 million in previously appropriated funds for use "to support directly or indirectly military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua." This position is consistent with earlier votes I have cast on this subject, and it also demonstrates my belief that the release of these funds at this time could have ominous consequences in the future.

We find ourselves in the unenviable position of having to, in effect, choose between the lesser of two evils. The first evil is the Sandinista government—a government of deceit. The second is increased support on the part of the United States for the Contras, and the potential it has for involving us more deeply than ever in the conflict. I contend that the second evil has far graver consequences for our Nation and its people. No one can quarrel with the premise that efforts must be undertaken to bring peace to Central America. It is also hard to disagree with the premise that we must work to put pressure on the Sandinistas to engage in a good faith diplomatic process aimed at a promotion of self-determination in Nicaragua. As I see it, Mr. Chairman, the issue before us today is what is the distinction be-

tween pressure and involvement? I contend it is a very fine but distinct line which must be respected and honored. Providing aid for the purposes espoused in this resolution would violate that line and transform it into a dangerous blur that can only confuse the people of Nicaragua and provoke fears among people in this Nation.

The Congress has long held the position I take today, and I suspect will vote later today to reaffirm that position. We are opposed to providing that aid which can be converted for military or paramilitary use. We have had amendments after amendments, almost since our involvement in Nicaragua commenced earlier this decade, spelling out that this was not aid to be used to plunge us into a conflict. I voted as recently as last fall to bar the release of any U.S. funds to Nicaragua until the President certified need.

Our problem is compounded by the simple but powerful observation made this week in the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report that "the Reagan administration has never made clear its long-term policies toward Nicaragua."

We were told initially that our aid was needed to help interdict a flow of arms crossing into Nicaragua from Honduras. Then we began to see the dramatic unraveling of our supposed "covert" operations through bungled maneuvers such as the unsuccessful mining of Nicaraguan harbors. Then came reports in late 1982 and early 1983 that the guerrillas, or Contras, had as their main objective the overthrow of the Sandinista regime. Then, in April 1983, the President restated our goal as being the prevention of the flow of arms. Then, in 1984, the President charges that the Sandinistas went back on their word and we would continue to support the Contras. Finally, in February 1985, the President stated as his goal the "removal" of the Nicaraguan Government.

This confusion in policy statements has caused great apprehension here and throughout Central America. Passage of this resolution can only serve to prolong this confusion and clearly plunge us far deeper than we should ever be in Nicaragua.

The challenge before us is this: If we are to spend \$14 million in Nicaragua, can't we spend it in a productive and humane fashion. I contend we can and we must. There is an urgent need for humanitarian assistance in Nicaragua—there is compelling human need. There is an equally urgent need for new incentive to regain the diplomatic momentum in Central America.

If it is pressure we wish to exert on the Sandinistas then let us continue our support, but let us not in any way allow it to be converted into military purposes. Let us abandon the theory that the solution here can only be a military one. This would make us

sound like the British and their position relative to Northern Ireland. But never let us accept the yielding of Nicaragua into the Communist camp. Let us pursue the diplomatic route with our full strength and let it produce the desired result of a political solution featuring self-determination for all the people of Nicaragua. Militarism will beget militarism and we will find ourselves pitched in a new superpower conflict that will only result in fear and apprehension—for the entire world.

I urge the rejection of this resolution because its approach is flawed and dangerous. Let us look for another way for the United States to involve itself in the struggle for peace in Nicaragua and all of Central America.

Mr. ADDABO. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to inquire of the gentleman from New York [Mr. ADDABO] how many speakers he has left.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York, Mr. ADDABO, has no time remaining. The gentleman from Michigan [Mr. BROOMFIELD] has 6½ minutes remaining.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, to conclude the debate, I yield the balance of our time to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL], the distinguished minority leader.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Illinois [Mr. MICHEL] is recognized for 6½ minutes.

Mr. MICHEL. Mr. Chairman, after almost 10 hours of intense debate, the fundamental facts remain the same.

In 1979, a small clique of Communists stole a revolution from the Nicaraguan people.

These Communists immediately began to install the apparatus of a totalitarian state. Even while we were sending them over \$100 million in aid they were engaged in systematic abuse of human rights.

Today this same clique holds power through the barrel of a gun. If they get to the point of consolidating their takeover at home they will surely spread their poison throughout the region.

They have received aid from Cuba the Soviet Union the PLO and other totalitarian nations and groups.

The democratic forces of Nicaragua who oppose the Communists have pledged themselves to the democratic principles of the San Jose Declaration. It could be for all practical purposes the Magna Carta of the Nicaraguan people.

The choice we face is between the San Jose declaration on one hand and the consolidation of Communist power on the other.

Every other argument is irrelevant. The Sandinista force has 62,000 active duty personnel a total force of 119,000 including reserves and militia.

This Sandinista force has Soviet MI-24 hind attack helicopters. It has 150 tanks, 200 other armored vehicles, and some 300 to 400 surface to air missiles. The Sandinistas have nearly completed a runway long enough to service any aircraft in the Soviet or Cuban inventory.

We are told this arsenal is a response to our aid to the democratic forces.

Why, that is a reversal of the law of cause and effect. It is because the Sandinistas have turned Nicaragua into an armed camp that we aid the democratic forces not the other way around.

When Harry Truman asked for aid to stop the Communists from taking over Greece, almost 40 years ago, he was told that the democratic forces in Greece were corrupt and didn't deserve our aid. We heard the same myth today.

But Truman was stubborn. And Greece was saved.

We are told that if only we'd stop aiding the democratic forces, the Sandinistas wouldn't be driven into the hands of the Soviet Union and they wouldn't abuse human rights.

But the Sandinistas always have been ideologically committed to the international cause of the Soviet Union. They imposed a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship before the Contras ever existed.

And do you know why? Because such a dictatorship is an article of faith with them. They have faith in communism. Oh, that we had such faith in democracy.

Let me conclude by saying:

There are voices that matter in this debate who haven't had a chance to be heard, today.

They are the voices of the victims of totalitarianism now in the past, all over the world.

Voices from Cuba, from Afghanistan from eastern Europe. Voices from the Gulag. Voices from the Nazi death camps. Voices from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Voices crying out: "Remember our fate."

If we abandon the democratic forces in Nicaragua they will join the long, tragic, forced march toward the grave that marks the fate of all freedom lovers under totalitarian domination.

□ 2140

I regret that maybe there is sufficient time to read a copy of the President's letter that was addressed to two of our colleagues in the other body earlier today before that resolution was adopted by a 53-to-46 vote. It incorporates the same language as embodied in the language that we have before us today.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would advise the gentleman that it is a breach of order to refer to a particular vote in the other body.

Mr. MICHEL. I understand, Mr. Chairman.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington.

Hon. ROBERT DOLE,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.

DEAR SENATOR DOLE: I announced on April 4 a proposal to promote peace in Central America by fostering a dialogue between the Government of Nicaragua and the democratic resistance, accompanied by a ceasefire in the conflict between them. My proposal was intended, in the words of the Contadora Document of Objectives agreed to by Nicaragua and its neighbors, "to promote national reconciliation efforts . . . with a view to fostering participation in democratic political processes in accordance with the law."

Since April 4, I have had the benefit of many fruitful discussions with Latin American leaders and with members of the Congress. I have been encouraged by these discussions, which have shown that a broad consensus exists on the need for reconciliation in Nicaragua, based on democratic principles, as an essential aspect of achieving peace in Central America.

Today the Senate will vote on a resolution, S.J. Res. 106, the text of which is required by a law enacted last October. That text purports to release appropriated funds and free the Executive Branch from restrictions against the support of military or paramilitary action in Nicaragua. However, my intentions are founded on a different approach. Accordingly, I want to make clear to the Senate, as it approaches this important vote, how I will proceed in pursuit of peace if S.J. Res. 106 is enacted.

First, I will provide assistance to the democratic resistance only for food, medicine, clothing, and other assistance for their survival and well-being—and not for arms, ammunition, and weapons of war. Second, I will not use more than the \$14 million already appropriated during the current fiscal year for such assistance. No other U.S. Government funds would be spent for such material assistance to the armed democratic resistance. I will personally establish thorough procedures for the detailed management and accountability of the program in order to assure that these limitations on both the nature and amount of U.S. assistance are scrupulously observed.

I recognize the importance some Senators have attached to bilateral talks between the United States and Nicaragua and the establishment of a ceasefire. I have considered these views and believe that such steps could help to promote the internal reconciliation called for by Contadora and endorsed by so many Latin American leaders.

Therefore, I intend to resume bilateral talks with the Government of Nicaragua and will instruct our representatives in those talks to press for a ceasefire as well as a church-mediated dialogue between the contending Nicaraguan factions. I must emphasize, however, that such bilateral talks must be in support of the Contadora process and the internal dialogue and cannot become a substitute for these efforts to achieve a comprehensive, verifiable agreement among all the nations of Central America. Also, as I said on April 4, peace negotiations must not become a cover for deception and delay. If the Sandinista government shows bad faith by seeking to gain unilateral advantage, for example, through a further arms buildup during a ceasefire or intransigence in negotiations, I would feel

obligated to respond accordingly in our diplomatic efforts and would not expect the democratic resistance to continue to observe a ceasefire which was unfairly working to their disadvantage.

I will report to the Congress no later than September 1, 1985, on the progress made in achieving a verifiable peace and reconciliation in Nicaragua based on democratic principles. Such report shall also include an accounting for the funds obligated or expended under this joint resolution and may include such recommendations as I deem appropriate with respect to Nicaragua. I shall expect any recommendations for additional legislation for further assistance or sanctions to receive expedited handling.

While economic sanctions are unlikely by themselves to create sufficient pressure to change Nicaragua's behavior, the Sandinistas should not benefit from their present access to the U.S. market while continuing their intransigence on issues affecting our national security. The Administration will favorably consider economic sanctions against the Government of Nicaragua and will undertake multilateral consultations with other Central American states in this regard.

The U.S. condemns atrocities by either side in the strongest possible terms. We will use our assistance to help ensure against wrongful acts by those who seek our help and we will urge them to take steps to investigate allegations of such acts and take appropriate actions against those found to be guilty.

The United States now stands at a moment of judgment. Experience has shown that a policy of support for democracy, economic opportunity, and security will best serve the people of Central America and the national interests of the United States. If we show consistency of purpose, if we are firm in our conviction that the promising developments over the past year in El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala also show the way for a better future for Nicaragua, then over time we can help the democratic center prevail over tyrants of the left or the right. But if we abandon democracy in Nicaragua, if we tolerate the consolidation of a surrogate state in Central America, responsive to Cuba and the Soviet Union, we will see the progress that has been achieved begin to unravel under the strain of continuing conflict, attempt at subversion, and loss of confidence in our support.

There can be a more democratic, more prosperous and more peaceful Central America. I am prepared to devote my energies toward that end. But, I also need the support of the Congress. I hope that you will give me your support today.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN.

And so, as you vote, I ask you to listen. Listen to the voices of those who learned too late what totalitarians can do. Listen to those voices of the doomed innocents and then cast a vote in support of our President who wants so desperately to do the right thing down there.

I urge the Members to support the resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. All time for general debate has expired.

The text of House Joint Resolution 239 is as follows:

H.J. Res. 239

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves the obligation and expenditure of funds available for fiscal year 1985 for supporting, directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua.

The CHAIRMAN. Pursuant to Public Law 98-473, the Committee rises.

Accordingly the Committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. REID, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Committee, having had under consideration the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 239) to approve the obligation of funds available under Public Law 98-473 for supporting military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, had directed him to report the joint resolution back to the House.

The SPEAKER. Pursuant to Public Law 98-473, the question is on the passage of the joint resolution.

The question was taken; and the Speaker announced that the yeas appeared to have it.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Speaker, on that I demand the yeas and nays.

The yeas and nays were ordered.

The vote was taken by electronic device, and there were yeas 180, yeas 248, not voting 5, as follows:

[Roll No. 64]

YEAS—180

Archer	Erdreich	Mack
Armey	Fasell	Marlenee
Barnard	Fiedler	Martin (NY)
Bartlett	Fields	McCain
Barton	Flippo	McCandless
Bateman	Franklin	McCollum
Bentley	Gallo	McEwen
Bevill	Gekas	McGrath
Billrakis	Gibbons	McMillan
Billiey	Gingrich	Mica
Boulter	Grothberg	Michel
Breaux	Hall, Ralph	Miller (OH)
Broomfield	Hall, Sam	Miller (WA)
Brown (CO)	Hammerschmidt	Mollinari
Broyhill	Hansen	Monson
Burton (IN)	Hartnett	Montgomery
Callahan	Hatcher	Moore
Campbell	Hendon	Moorhead
Carney	Henry	Murtha
Chappell	Hiler	Myers
Chapple	Hillis	Nelson
Cheney	Holt	Nichols
Coats	Hubbard	Nielson
Cobey	Huckaby	O'Brien
Coble	Hunter	Ortiz
Coleman (MO)	Hutto	Oxley
Combest	Hyde	Packard
Coughlin	Ireland	Parris
Courter	Jenkins	Pashayan
Craig	Kasich	Pepper
Crane	Kemp	Petri
Dannemeyer	Kindness	Porter
Darden	Kramer	Pursell
Daub	Lagomarsino	Quillen
DeLay	Latta	Ray
DeWine	Leath (TX)	Ritter
Dickinson	Lent	Roberts
DioGuardi	Lewis (CA)	Roemer
Dorman (CA)	Lewis (FL)	Rogers
Dowdy	Lightfoot	Roth
Dreier	Lipinski	Rowland (GA)
Duncan	Livingston	Rudd
Dyson	Loeffler	Saxton
Eckert (NY)	Lott	Schaefer
Edwards (OK)	Lowery (CA)	Schuetz
Emerson	Lujan	Schulze
English	Lungren	Sensenbrenner

Shaw
Shelby
Shumway
Shuster
Siljander
Sisisky
Skeen
Slaughter
Smith (FL)
Smith (NH)
Smith (NJ)
Smith, Denny
Snyder

Solomon
Spence
Stangeland
Stenholm
Strang
Stratton
Stump
Sundquist
Sweeney
Swindall
Tallon
Tausin
Taylor

Thomas (CA)
Thomas (GA)
Vucanovich
Walker
Weber
Whitehurst
Whittaker
Wilson
Wortley
Wyllie
Young (AK)
Young (FL)

Badham
Byron

NOT VOTING—5

Daniel
Rodino

Vander Jagt

□ 2200

The Clerk announced the following pair:

On this vote:

Mr. Badham for, with Mr. Rodino against.

So the joint resolution was not passed.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

GENERAL LEAVE

Mr. ADDABBO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks on the joint resolution (H.J. Res. 239) to approved the obligation of funds available under Public Law 98-473 for supporting military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua, and that I may be permitted to include certain tables and extraneous material.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection.

FURTHER MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE

A further message from the Senate by Mr. Sparrow, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed a concurrent resolution of the following title, in which the concurrence of the House is requested:

S. Con Res. 37. Concurrent resolution providing for acceptance of a statue of Jeanette Rankin presented by the State of Montana for placement in National Statuary Hall, and for other purposes.

REMOVAL OF NAME OF MEMBER AS COSPONSOR OF H.R. 1402

Mr. KOLTER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that my name be removed from the list of cosponsors of the bill, H.R. 1402.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE SPEAKER

The SPEAKER. The Chair desires to make the following announcement.

Following the 5-minute special orders, Members who had been granted permission to address the House for special orders on the calendar day of Tuesday, April 23, will be recognized after the remaining special orders for the legislative day of Monday, April 22. Except for those Members who had been granted a special order for both days, only the first such special order will be called.

INTRODUCING A PRIVATE BILL FOR THE RELIEF OF STANISLAV LEVCHENKO

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. YOUNG] is recognized for 5 minutes.

● Mr. YOUNG of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I have introduced today a private bill for Stanislav Levchenko, a defector who has given U.S. intelligence agencies critical information concerning the activities of the KGB and the identities of KGB agents. Mr. Levchenko's information and his assistance to U.S. intelligence agencies has contributed immeasurably to the security of the United States. Despite this outstanding contribution to our national security, Mr. Levchenko has been hampered in his efforts to become a full-fledged American citizen. The bill I have introduced would rectify this situation. Mr. Levchenko's activities show that he clearly deserves to become a citizen of the United States.

The bill is identical to H.R. 6354 which I introduced in the 98th Congress. Because of the press of time, it was not possible to consider the bill in the closing days of that Congress.

Mr. Levchenko is a 43-year-old former KGB major who was assigned from 1975 to 1979 to the Soviet Mission in Tokyo under cover as a journalist for the Soviet magazine New Times. In October 1979 he walked into a U.S. Army installation in Tokyo and requested political asylum in the United States. He defected for ideological reasons: an intense disillusionment with the Soviet system and a strong desire to fight that system. Since his defection, he has been completely cooperative in sharing with the U.S. Government all of his knowledge on the KGB, particularly in the field of Soviet covert action, or what the Soviets call active measures.

One example of this cooperation is his testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, in July 1982, in which he presented a detailed explanation of Soviet active measures and answered numerous questions from the members of the committee. The committee subsequently published these hearings, providing the Congress and the American people with a unique document outlining in detail—from a former KGB specialist's personal experience and knowledge—Soviet active measures objectives and techniques.

Of critical importance to U.S. counterintelligence efforts, Mr. Levchenko has also provided the identities of KGB staff officers and KGB foreign agents, including some in high foreign government positions and the foreign media. He has discussed the KGB's use of agents of influence, and the overall KGB methods of operating, in-

NAYS—248

Ackerman
Addabbo
Akaka
Alexander
Anderson
Andrews
Annunzio
Anthony
Applegate
Aspin
Atkins
AuCoin
Barnes
Bates
Bedell
Bellenson
Bennett
Bereuter
Berman
Blaggi
Boehlert
Boggs
Boland
Boner (TN)
Bonior (MI)
Bonker
Borski
Bosco
Boucher
Boxer
Brooks
Brown (CA)
Bruce
Bryant
Burton (CA)
Bustamante
Carpenter
Carr
Chandler
Clay
Clinger
Coelho
Coleman (TX)
Collins
Conte
Conyers
Cooper
Coyne
Crockett
Daschle
Davis
de la Garza
Dellums
Derrick
Dicks
Dingell
Dixon
Donnelly
Dorgan (ND)
Downey
Durbin
Dwyer
Dymally
Early
Eckart (OH)
Edgar
Edwards (CA)
Evans (IA)
Evans (IL)
Fawell
Fazio
Feighan
Fish
Florio
Foglietta
Foley
Ford (MI)
Ford (TN)
Fowler
Frank
Frenzel
Frost
Fuqua

Garcia
Gaydos
Gejdenson
Gephardt
Gilman
Glickman
Gonzalez
Goodling
Gordon
Gradison
Gray (IL)
Gray (PA)
Green
Gregg
Guarini
Gunderson
Hall (OH)
Hamilton
Hawkins
Hayes
Hefner
Heftel
Hertel
Hopkins
Horton
Howard
Hoyer
Hughes
Jacobs
Jeffords
Johnson
Jones (NC)
Jones (OK)
Jones (TN)
Kanjorski
Kaptur
Kastenmeier
Kennelly
Kildee
Kleczka
Kolbe
Kolter
Kostmayer
LaFalce
Lantos
Leach (IA)
Lehman (CA)
Lehman (FL)
Leland
Levin (MI)
Levine (CA)
Lloyd
Long
Lowry (WA)
Luken
Lundine
MacKay
Madigan
Manton
Markey
Martin (IL)
Martinez
Matsui
Mavroules
Mazzoli
McCurdy
McDade
McHugh
McKernan
McKinney
Meyers
Mikulski
Miller (CA)
Mineta
Mitchell
Moakley
Mollohan
Moody
Morrison (CT)
Morrison (WA)
Mrazek
Murphy
Natcher

Neal
Nowak
Oakar
Oberstar
Obey
Olin
Owens
Panetta
Pease
Penny
Perkins
Pickle
Price
Rahall
Rangel
Regula
Reid
Richardson
Ridge
Rinaldo
Robinson
Roe
Rose
Rostenkowski
Roukema
Rowland (CT)
Roybal
Russo
Sabo
Savage
Scheuer
Schneider
Schroeder
Schumer
Seiberling
Sharp
Sikorski
Skelton
Slattery
Smith (IA)
Smith (NE)
Smith, Robert
Snowe
Solarz
Spratt
St Germain
Staggers
Stallings
Stark
Stokes
Studds
Swift
Synar
Tauke
Torres
Torricelli
Towns
Traffant
Traxler
Udall
Valentine
Vento
Visclosky
Volkmer
Walgren
Watkins
Waxman
Weaver
Weiss
Wheat
Whitley
Whitten
Williams
Wirth
Wise
Wolpe
Wright
Wyden
Yates
Yatron
Young (MO)
Zschau

cluding KGB field procedures and mission training.

In addition, Mr. Levchenko has, as an independent consultant, given advice on how to counter hostile Soviet actions. For example, he has met with members of the National Security Council, the U.S. Information Agency, the State Department, the FBI, and other U.S. agencies. He has also spoken at the Army War College, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Government's special Technology Transfer Group.

A Soviet military tribunal tried Mr. Levchenko in absentia and sentenced him to death. Despite this threat to his life, he has continued to speak out in press and television interviews and in writing, exposing, and explaining Soviet espionage and deception practices. For example, in recent months he has cooperated closely in the writing and publication of a major new book on the KGB and another book on Soviet "Disinformation." His press interviews continue to be published in this country, in many West European countries and in the Far East, as he seeks to make a broad audience aware of Soviet realities. He also continues to consult and lecture to governmental and research groups studying Soviet intentions and activities.

Mr. Levchenko's efforts have made a great contribution to U.S. national security. The director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who has primary responsibility for countering Soviet espionage in the United States, issued a formal FBI commendation to Mr. Levchenko in 1982 for his unique contribution to the security of the United States.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. Levchenko deserves the gratitude of the American people for what he has done to ensure their security. Mr. Levchenko helped U.S. intelligence because he believed in America and American principles of freedom and democracy. The least we can do is help him to qualify to become a citizen of this country. The bill I have introduced will do so. The bill modifies the applicability to Mr. Levchenko of some technical provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act concerning residency and past membership in a proscribed organization. Mr. Levchenko still will be required to meet all the other requirements for naturalization.

I urge my colleagues to support this bill, which will enable the man who has contributed so much to the American people, to become one of the American people. ●

□ 2210

SPECIAL ORDERS

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Arkansas [Mr. ALEXANDER], is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ALEXANDER. Mr. Speaker, last night my colleagues on the Republican side of the aisle took a series of special orders to express or to restate, rather, their position on the McIntyre-McCloskey race in Indiana. While we Democrats on this side of the aisle have various opinions concerning that race, and while many of us have reserved judgment on the final outcome of that race pending the filing of the report which is forthcoming, and while many of us would disagree with the tactics employed by our colleagues to restate their position, we nonetheless vigorously support their right to state that position.

I would like to publicly thank those Members of the Congress who stayed here during the wee hours last night on the Democratic side, sitting patiently, listening to the arguments which we have heard before.

So I publicly acknowledge the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. PERKINS], the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. GRAY], the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. KANJORSKI], the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. DURBIN], the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. BRUCE], the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. SIKORSKI], the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. TORRICELLI], the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. FRANK], the gentleman from Washington [Mr. FOLEY], the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. ECKART], the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. SYNAR], the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. WATKINS], and the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. EARLY], together with loyal staff assistants, Steve Skardon, John Mack, and Barbara Rourke, and a number of other doormen, clerks, police, and security guards who sat here during the night in order to assure that our colleagues have the right to say those things that they wish to say.

Donn Anderson, in the cloakroom on our side, Barry Sullivan, Tim Friedman, Butler Bernard, Joe Hettich, David Pinkowitz, Brent Maynard, Christopher Davis, Mike Hollenbeck, Fred Gortler, Henry Arrett, Gary Hever, Harold Caviness, Les Davis, Ed Frazier, Charlie Hoag, Tim Donohoe, and Bob Gordon.

To these hardy souls we are grateful. We are also grateful to the following additional employees:

EMPLOYEES OF CLERK OF THE HOUSE WHO WORKED DURING SPECIAL ORDERS ON APRIL 22, 1985

Immediate office: Tom Ladd.
Legislative operations: Robert Berry, James Bromwell, Mary (Meg) Goetz, Jack Gregory, Kevin Hanrahan, John Jenkins, John Overstreet, Maxine Snowden, and Lee Thomas.

Official reporters: Jon Alexander, Russ Greenwood, Charles Gustafson, Susan Hanback, Dan Hawkins, Chris Hell, Florence Leahy, Heather Mapes, Bill Pennekamp, Brad Roe, George Russell, Mary Stahl, Tony Tartaro,

Gay Topper, John Ulmer, and Edward White.

Recording studio: Mike Allen, Linda Barrow, Pat Bailey, Don Berger, Bill Clarke, Bill Collins, Dave Cox, Alex Cusati, Gary Denick, Tom Edwards, Dick Fordham, John Foster, Randle Harris, Rick Hughes, Steve Johnson, Steve Mathis, Howard Musser, Marjorie O'Brien, Dan Popp, Dan Stiles, Patricia Trimbath, and Cris Walker.

Office of the Parliamentarian: Bill Brown, Charles Johnson, Peter Robinson, Thomas Duncan, Dallas Dendy, and Muftiah Koach.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Florida [Mr. NELSON] is recognized for 5 minutes.

● Mr. NELSON of Florida. Mr. Speaker, due to official business in my congressional district, I was unable to be present Monday afternoon, April 22, 1985, for rollcall vote Nos. 60 and 61, and on Tuesday morning, April 23, 1985, for rollcall vote No. 62.

Had I been present, I would have voted "aye" on House Resolution 125, condemning the Government of the Soviet Union for the murder of Maj. Arthur D. Nicholson, Jr.

Had I been present, I would have voted "nay" on House Concurrent Resolution 52, as amended, calling for the restoration of democracy in Chile.

Had I been present, I would have voted "aye" on House Resolution 136, providing a rule for consideration of House Joint Resolution 239. ●

ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. RODINO] is recognized for 5 minutes.

● Mr. RODINO. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing legislation to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to facilitate the often time-consuming and frustrating process of acquiring U.S. citizenship by allowing for administrative naturalization.

For those immigrants adopting this country, U.S. citizenship is a priceless possession. In return, our country is enriched with their contributions and each nationality and heritage is woven into a rich tapestry of American society.

The avenue toward U.S. citizenship as it exists today is a cumbersome one for those who want to enjoy the rights of this great land, the right to practice religion freely, the right to participate in a democratic form of government, the right of free expression, and the inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. In order to accommodate the increasing numbers

of persons who seek citizenship and provide a more effective means to obtain naturalization, I have introduced a bill to bring the entire naturalization process within the Department of Justice.

The legislation vests authority for naturalization in the Attorney General whose designated representatives would carry out the functions of what is currently a judicial process by allowing immigration judges to conduct ceremonies for naturalizing citizens of the United States. This bill simply streamlines the process by which persons become citizens and does not alter existing statutes with respect to the prerequisites for obtaining citizenship.

The Naturalization Amendments of 1985 first directs that the sole procedure for naturalization shall be through the Attorney General. Second, it allows judges designated by the Attorney General to conduct naturalization ceremonies. These most important provisions change existing law by consolidating under the Attorney General what is currently a two-step process engaged in by both the executive branch and the judicial branch. This means a qualified applicant for naturalization must simply submit an application for naturalization on to the Immigration and Naturalization Service and it will be on one track through the final swearing of allegiance ceremony consecrating the ultimate act of gaining citizenship.

Third, the bill retains significant elements of the judicial system in order to retain the dignity and decorum generally associated with the citizenship ceremony. It requires ceremonies be conducted in "open session" and that the Attorney General designate certain days for final hearing on citizenship cases. It also retains a certain period of residence in the State for purposes of filing an application for naturalization.

Fourth, the bill provides for a de novo hearing at the district court on denied applications for naturalization.

The time has arrived, I believe, to relieve the applicant for naturalization from some of the onerous paperwork requirements currently on our statute books. The courts now conducting naturalization ceremonies already have heavy dockets in other areas and the backlogs of those awaiting naturalization frequently causes tremendous inconvenience to the applicants. In many cases, delays result in denial of employment opportunities, travel plans, and, most importantly, exercise of their right to vote. The progress currently being made by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in reducing their backlogs in the naturalization area has been encouraging and demonstrates the priority attached to this area by the Service. I believe my bill will complement this effort.

Additionally, immigration judges—who will become the designated ceremonial agents under my bill—have demonstrated a high caliber of professionalism and I am confident that they will look upon their proposed duties with enthusiasm.

I believe this step to be a timely one in view of the impending 100th anniversary of the Statue of Liberty and I would urge this positive step on behalf of the new immigrants who have contributed volumes of history to this new land. ●

THE ELECTION IN INDIANA'S EIGHTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WALKER] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, let me begin as the gentleman from Arkansas a few moments ago to thank the staff of the House and the staff of the minority and majority side who spent time with us here last evening as we discussed matters that we regarded as important to this body. And we felt strongly that there were issues that needed to have the attention drawn to them that the all night session last night we thought did. And the staffs I think performed nobly. We appreciate their hard work and know that they work on behalf of the whole House, and we are very grateful for their indulgence of the kind of activities that we Members engage in.

Mr. Speaker, I think that it is also important to recognize that we are sincere in attempting to address issues that we regard as extremely important on the minority side; namely, the issue of the seating of Mr. McIntyre in the Eighth District of Indiana, and I am somewhat disappointed that some of the reactions from your side of the aisle has been rather questionable in terms of content.

For instance, members of the Speaker's staff were quoted in a newspaper article as trying to trash the process of the special orders here indicating that there was a report of the Clerk of the House talking about how much money these particular special orders cost, and they were talking about staff salaries and talking about the amounts of money that it cost for printing in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.

I make the point simply because I called the Clerk of the House today myself. The Clerk of the House informs me that no such report exists, that it is in fact a distortion to suggest that such a report has ever been done. When I asked for that report to be given to me, to lay this out, I was told by the Clerk that it does not exist, that the staff salaries that are quoted around here in such reports are in fact a total misnomer because the people

who are indicated in those reports are in fact people who are salaried, are not on hourly pay. So it costs no more money to have them here for special orders than it would any other time. And that the entire idea that we could assign costs to this kind of a thing are in fact a distortion, except in one instance, and that is that the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, of course, is an item of some cost in order to print.

However, it is less money to print the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for the Members who are speaking here on the floor than the Members who refuse to come out and participate on the House floor where they will be challenged on what they say, and instead use special order time to dump large pages of documents into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD without ever having said anything on the House floor with regard to the subject matters that they are addressing. So that is where the real abuse is taking place in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. That is where the real cost is, and I am surprised that the majority never seems to raise that, because some past counts of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD show the majority is far more abusive of pages in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD than any Members of the minority.

I just want to make that clear because I think there is a conscious attempt on the part of the majority to try to trash the process of special orders, and it seems to me that this is an important forum for many of us to have a chance to make points that we do think are important.

Mr. DURBIN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DURBIN. So that I understand the point the gentleman is making, first let me preface this by saying in order to preserve your right and the right of any Member to speak on the floor of the House, I do not believe that the question should be raised as to cost. I believe that it is important that we have this opportunity.

Mr. WALKER. I agree with the gentleman.

Mr. DURBIN. But the gentleman is not suggesting we can go all night long in this Chamber with all of the staff present, the lights burning, the television running, without some additional cost to the taxpayers, is he?

Mr. WALKER. I would say to the gentleman that it is very minimal because the lights that burn might be a little bit of an additional cost, and television cameras, but the staff salaries, the largest single component, the so-called claim of the Clerk's report, it is \$6,000 in the article today, that in fact is a total distortion. The Clerk has never issued such a report. The Clerk tells me, unless the Clerk is lying to this Member, and I talked to

him personally, I am told that the people who are listed in that report are in fact salaried personnel.

Mr. DURBIN. Would the gentleman yield further?

Mr. WALKER. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DURBIN. When I felt at midnight last night, after having had the opportunity to preside, I saw a rather substantial number of security officers, as one might expect when the House is in session. And it is my understanding that the way they work is on an hourly basis. They are not salaried employees.

Would the gentleman concede that there might be some employees who have to stay because some Members would have to have their special orders go on through the night?

Mr. WALKER. I asked specifically about that, and it may well be there would be a few police that would be involved in that. I would say to the gentleman, however, that the Clerk informs me that some of the police officers would in fact receive their regular pay because they would simply be working their regular number of hours and would be here anyhow.

□ 2220

And that there are a minimum number of security people required when the House is in session. So I am simply saying to the gentleman that it is in fact a total distortion to suggest, as some staff on your side of the aisle have suggested, that somehow special orders are costing the taxpayers large amounts of money per hour. The Clerk has issued no such report. The Clerk told me that today. There is no such report.

I would be glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DURBIN. I might just conclude by thanking the gentleman for yielding and suggesting again that I will continue to defend his right and the right of any Member to use a special order even if I disagree with the content of the special order. It is an important element in this House.

But I think we all must concede that you cannot have a special order running all through the night without incurring some additional expense to the taxpayers of the United States.

Mr. WALKER. The gentleman is absolutely right. There is some minimal additional expense to the House. But I would say to the gentleman that to do as the majority side has done now on several occasions, to suggest that the processes of this House that the minority uses are in fact costing the taxpayers money and so therefore the minority is doing something irresponsible by using the processes of the House, I appreciate the gentleman's words, that some of these things are important and ought to be continued and that the cost to the taxpayers is certainly

something which is budgeted as a part of the House proceedings, and it is at best a minimal expense involved in this. It is not even a few thousand.

I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. FAZIO. I appreciate the gentleman yielding.

I guess we probably have both said that freedom is not free. So obviously there are some costs involved here. But license can be costly. I guess my thought is there are times when we ought to be weighing the relative benefits of taking the time that we do take here on the floor with no dispute from most of the parties at issue here. We understand the right that the gentleman has. But it does cost money. There are people who work here who would not have to work here. It is not just a matter of salary.

Mr. WALKER. I would say to the gentleman the only point I am making is that those people are salaried, they are on annual salaries. It is not costing the House additional money for those people to be here.

Mr. FAZIO. Let me say that the law enforcement personnel are not really in a position to simply accept salary. This is a matter of overtime for most of our policemen.

Mr. WALKER. My understanding of the matter, and the gentleman is more expert in these matters than I am, but my understanding is that the security contingent is in fact here whether we are here or not at night, and there may be a few additional people, but it would be a question as to whether or not they are working more hours than they would otherwise work as to whether or not they get overtime pay.

Mr. FAZIO. There are people here, we agree, who would not have to be here if we were not keeping the House in session all night.

Mr. WALKER. And most of those are salaried people who we do not have to pay additional amounts to.

I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma.

Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma. First of all, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and let me say, first of all, that I have been in this body for 9 years, and I can tell you that if the leadership of this House would get to some sort of rational scheduling process so that we did not waste long hours in this Chamber doing nothing and then try to go into the late hours of the night, in the last minutes, trying to rush something through, we would save far more money than has been spent on all of these special orders.

I would also say that when we are talking about an issue of such transcendent importance as the seating of a Member of Congress and going through a procedure that has so violated the Constitution of this country, it does not make any sense to stand here and protest that a Member of Congress should not be able to debate

and bring forth the issues about the seating of a Member and the violation of the Constitution because we are having to pay overtime to security. That seems to me to be getting things totally backward.

Mr. Speaker, I commend the gentleman for the time he has taken to bring to this House and to the public this important matter.

Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman. I do want to make the point that another little bit of research that we went ahead and did was how much it cost for us to have the pro forma sessions which are scheduled by the leadership regularly around here. In fact, the pro forma sessions cost more money than any amount of money that has been spent as a cost to the taxpayers through special orders done by the minority side. Now that is the majority scheduling, and they do not seem to worry too much about the fact that their pro forma sessions are costly. You know, maybe that is as it is, the House rules require us to have pro forma sessions, too. But let us just understand that the cost goes both ways.

I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. FAZIO. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I did not bring this issue up, but I did want to engage in some dialog on it.

Clearly, the gentleman would not be protesting as much as he is if he were not somewhat concerned about the costs that do occur.

Mr. WALKER. Let me say to the gentleman, the reason why this gentleman brings it up is consistently every time we have had, and there have been only two of them in my time in the House, one of these long special orders we have had somebody from your side of the aisle quoted in the newspaper saying that it is irresponsible to hold this because of the cost to the taxpayer and what they do is they quote the Clerk of the House.

The only point this gentleman is making is that is a lie. The Clerk does not have such a report. I just thought that it was important to put on the record the fact that no such report exists and that to continue to use that is to distort the entire process.

I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. FAZIO. I thank the gentleman for yielding further.

I am sure we can document what the costs are, and I am sure that the gentleman and others on his side will calculate that those costs are worth absorbing, given the other weighty issues at stake. It is always a relative judgment as to whether the exercise of your rights are worth the cost. You happen in this case to think it is. I just think the issue should be clear for the

public to decide so we can put in the *Record* the costs that will occur as a result of these late night sessions, which I grant your side's right to engage in. But I do think you have to be willing to own up to the costs and the public has to know about it.

Mr. WALKER. I hope the gentleman will come forth with that kind of report, because every time this has come up I have requested a copy of the report.

At one point the majority leader was out there on the floor brandishing a sheet of paper that purported to talk about the cost to the taxpayer of doing certain things. I was told in that colloquy that that came from the Clerk. I called the Clerk's office and said since that Member had it couldn't this Member get a copy? I was told there was no such report that exists.

We never prepared such a report.

If the gentleman wants to prepare that report and give us the breakdown, I would sure love to see it, because I do not think that you can come up with anything that comes anywhere close to the kinds of figures that the gentleman's side of the aisle has been brandishing around here as purporting to be costs to the taxpayers.

Mr. FAZIO. I will see if we can clarify this matter. I just hope that the gentleman will accept the fact that there will be costs. The gentleman can toss them off as the price we have to pay for democracy, but I think that price should be known to the public.

Mr. WALKER. Well, I thank the gentleman. One thing that has amused me over the years is we even have people around here who do not like to come over to the floor and vote. They have put a cost on coming to the floor and voting on matters. You know, I really do think we have got to the point where the majority side simply does not want anybody doing anything on the House floor because they prefer to do things in the back room, and that somehow does not cost us anything.

I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. SWINDALL. I would like to make a point that has nothing to do with what the gentleman was speaking about. But as I was walking over here to cast my vote tonight on the aid to the Contras bill, what was already a level of outrage with regard to what is going on in the Eighth District of Indiana, soared to even greater heights of outrage as my gaze focused on a poster that I had seen many times, but I guess the words never really struck me as they did on this occasion. They said, "Count all the ballots; McCloskey wins."

The reason I became so outraged, as I saw that, is before coming to this august body I was a trial attorney and on occasion I tried criminal cases, and any time I was a trying a criminal case

I always tried to go back and find documentary evidence that in some way showed the frame or bent of mind of the criminal before he was actually apprehended, because there you somehow find what was really going on with respect to their intent.

With that in mind, I noticed that it said, "Count all the ballots; McCloskey wins."

Then it occurred to me that was printed long before the recount, which was supposedly an objective recount, where numbers of individuals defended that they were going to go into it objectively, and whoever won, won. Well, I submit to actually print a document before the recount is over that states, "Count all the ballots, McCloskey wins," is a very revealing fact, because it tells us that before all of the ballots were counted, this step was already contemplated to the point that they knew who would win.

□ 2230

Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman, and the problem of course is the fact that, having paraded that sign around for some time, then they decided at the last time not to count all the ballots, which is the angle that ends up being extremely unfair.

Mr. SWINDALL. If the gentleman will yield further, that is the other point, because that just stuck out even that much more, because it says, count all the ballots. As did a number of my colleagues this morning.

Mr. WALKER. I noticed that a lot of those signs have come down since we got the final result, because they know doggone well that there were at least 32 ballots that they did not count, including those of our servicemen.

Mr. SWINDALL. If the gentleman will continue to yield? Would you say that perhaps the evidence is being hidden?

Mr. WALKER. I think that might be an analysis that would stand scrutiny.

Mr. DURBIN. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I would be glad to yield to the gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. DURBIN. First let me say to my new colleague from Georgia [Mr. SWINDALL] that the use of the words "theft of the election" I think is an excessive term, but it has become a fashionable term on the floor of the House. If everyone who used that term had their words taken down, we would have done nothing else over the last 48 hours but take words down, and I will not ask for that.

I would like to comment, if I might, if the gentleman would refer to the war of the posters and look at his own party's posters, long before the recount was taken, your poster claims, "Seat McIntyre, He Won."

Again, if there was a conclusion as to what the result might be, we are all hopeful as to the result and in fact we

now have the result, and Mr. McCloskey is the winner by four votes.

Mr. WALKER. I think that our poster was a statement of fact, however. We had a certified winner from the State. Just as he came to this body with a certification from his State that he won his election, so did Mr. McIntyre come with a certification that he had won his election.

He was in fact the winner. That is the reason why we thought he should be seated. Under all precedents of the House of Representatives, he should have been seated. He was not seated because there was an arbitrary decision made to not seat him and to go through this charade of a process of declaring someone else a winner who could not win an election on his own in Indiana, but could only win by having the House of Representatives count.

The House of Representatives then went through a process where they did not count all the ballots; they counted some of the ballots. They continued to count up until that time when McCloskey took the lead, and then they stopped counting.

That is the process that we regard as unfair, a process that I think is very revealing based upon your posters which stated, if you count all the ballots, McCloskey wins, and then refuse to count all of the ballots.

I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from Idaho.

Mr. CRAIG. I appreciate the gentleman yielding to me.

Mr. Speaker, on January 3, I stood on this floor and admonished my colleagues on this side not to vote against the duly elected and certified Congressman from the Second District of Idaho, because the delegation from Indiana was going to attempt to hold him from his certification as the Members on this side of the aisle held Mr. McIntyre from his certification.

I took the floor that day to argue the point that although there was still a question in the race in the Second District of Idaho, and although the incumbent, who had been defeated, had filed some protests because of some irregularities alleged in certain precincts in the Second District of Idaho, that it was not a question of a recount; there were no irregularities in the count in Indiana. In fact, the incumbent had not filed a protest, and there was a recount underway.

I said, and I believed it then and I believe it now, that the gentleman from Idaho should be seated until there was some evidence that irregularities could be proven that might change the election outcome.

Because that gentleman, Mr. RICHARD STALLINGS, had a valid certificate of election from the secretary of state of the State of Idaho, as did our colleague, Mr. McIntyre.

I took the floor that day and asked the members of the Indiana delegation not to use the congressman from the Second District of Idaho, just elected, as an example in protest. I believe I was right then and I think I am right now in saying that was the thing that should have been done because that was the constitutional and responsible act of this House.

So there were some limited protest votes, but the movement was backed off from. I made only one mistake that day, and that mistake was to believe that this body would attempt, through a fair and just constitutional process, to determine who was elected or who was not elected.

The bottom line was and is still remaining, that there is a gentleman from the Eighth District of Indiana who holds a certificate of election, but he has been denied by the majority of this House, through an absolute display of arrogance and power that they can in fact un-elect and re-elect as they decide. Not as the citizens of the Eighth District of Indiana decided; not as the citizens of the Second District of Idaho decided, and therefore by their act ask the secretary of state to so certify.

I can only apologize to the citizens of the Eighth District of Indiana that the arrogance of power is so massive in this House today that they will deny those voters, as they almost attempted to deny in Idaho, the right of the duly-certified individual to serve in this body.

I am disappointed. I thought we were a constitutional body, but I do recognize that power by the majority can and does and has overridden the Constitution of this great country.

Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman for his remarks.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. Speaker, I was standing on the floor when I heard your statement, and I would like the gentleman to define what is minimal, if I may. Do you have an opinion?

Mr. WALKER. Well, I do not really know—I assume the gentleman is talking about the cost. I simply reflected the fact that the salaries of the employees around here that are being included in the cost estimates given to us by the majority side, whoever is peddling that story around here, which is a false story, is not true because the salaries are paid annually whether or not the people are here or not. Just as the salaries for my staff are paid whether they work 12 hours a day or 18 hours a day.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. WALKER. Sure.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Now, I happened to spend most of the good evening last

night with my friends from the other side. We had a rather heavily involved conversation, and I was impressed that it had to be costing us something.

Since I heard your comment, at my request, I asked the Sergeant at Arms to give me a cost per hour of the extra police protection for having kept the House of Representatives in session.

I think you will agree, on that question that you were discussing yesterday, we at least were in session an additional 14 hours. Would you agree to that?

Mr. WALKER. I have no idea.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Well, the Sergeant at Arms informs me that the minimal cost for the services of the police force alone are \$1,500 an hour. That is \$20,000 for police protection alone.

Mr. WALKER. Well, I thank the gentleman for his observation—

Mr. KANJORSKI. Mr. WALKER, in my book and in my district in Pennsylvania—I do not know about yours—that is enough to employ one man for an entire year and raise a family, and that is not minimal.

Mr. WALKER. Well, I thank the gentleman, and it is a great deal of money. Of course, the gentleman realizes that we have security around this body whether we are here or not, and I would be somewhat suspicious of those figures since no one is able to document that kind of thing.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. WALKER. I did not yield to the gentleman.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Is there a reason now we cannot have a byplay?

Mr. WALKER. I am simply trying to make my point, and I will be very glad to yield.

Mr. KANJORSKI. I ask the gentleman to yield. We have the Sergeant at Arms in the Chamber.

Mr. WALKER. The Sergeant at Arms. I talked earlier today to the Clerk, and I will say to the gentleman, the point is a peripheral point, because I am simply making a point that what we saw in the paper today—

Mr. KANJORSKI. Is now peripheral, is that correct?

□ 2240

Mr. WALKER. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is marked by his rudeness, and the only point that I would say to the gentleman is that the reflection I made earlier was that in a newspaper article there was a claim that the Clerk of the House has issued such a report. No such report exists. That report is a lie. If the gentleman wants to in any way refute that, I would suggest that he talk to the Clerk of the House.

I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. GINGRICH. I just want to say that I think the gentleman from

Pennsylvania is, frankly, getting drawn into a quicksand that is not relevant.

Mr. WALKER. The gentleman is absolutely correct.

Mr. GINGRICH. Let me say unequivocally to the gentleman from Pennsylvania that if he wants to make a case about the Speaker's major trips, which are vastly more expensive, if you want to take on a number of things that are done in this place that are very expensive, then we will take you seriously. But the fact is that among many of your colleagues during the 1950's and the 1960's, all-night sessions in the other body, which were involving issues of the Constitution and of civil rights, were heroic, they were noble, they were useful.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GINGRICH. No. Let me finish my statement.

Mr. KANJORSKI. You know, it is interesting, you are constantly asking us to listen.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, could we have regular order?

Mr. GINGRICH. I would be glad to yield in just a second.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Will the gentlemen please maintain decorum?

Mr. WALKER. I think we ought to forgive the gentleman from Pennsylvania. He may be somewhat inexperienced and not familiar with the rules of the House. But it seems to me that at the very least he ought to respect the courtesies of the House as they relate. I have been good enough to yield to the gentleman. I will again. But I think the gentleman ought to try to respect the courtesies of the House.

I would be very glad to yield to the gentleman from Georgia.

Mr. GINGRICH. I would just like to finish what I was saying.

It is fascinating to have people come down here who are willing to spend virtually any amount of money on virtually any domestic idea that drifts through, to have people come down here who spend billions of dollars randomly, whenever they have a project, who proudly announce back home hundreds of thousands of dollars, millions of dollars, who are perfectly happy to have massive amounts of overseas travel, who have staffs around this building and offices around this building in their party's keep, which are an enormous cost, and then they rush down, suddenly, because we are speaking and they talk as though they were fiscal conservatives. It is a wonderful mockery, I think it is a beautiful act, it is a nice thing for them to do, but let us put it all in perspective.

Mr. KANJORSKI. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I think it is important to understand that we have had a few votes around here about bringing down the cost of this place by reducing the number of staff around here and doing that. Invariably, the majority party votes absolutely against those reductions in staff and the kinds of things that would save big money.

Mr. McCANDLESS. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I would be glad to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. McCANDLESS. I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

I have listened very intently to my colleagues about the cost of operating this House, and having come from the private sector and also from local government, I have become very conscious of what it costs to operate anything, including this House of Representatives. And I must say, in all candidness, what we are talking about here is like a grain of sand on a beach compared to the cost of operating this House.

For example, here is the whip notice of the activities of the House of Representatives for this week: On Monday there were three suspension items. That is it. On Tuesday, self-explanatory. Tomorrow the House meets at noon. We may or may not take up what is the authorization of the State Department, but that is subject to a rule. Thursday is a pro forma session. The House meets at 11 a.m. in plain English, that means nothing will happen. The House is recessed on Friday.

Now, could any kind of a business anywhere in the United States function with that kind of a calendar with the overhead that this House has, whether it meets or not? And I think the object and the answer is absolutely no.

Now, a little personal note: I happen to represent a district from the west coast which has a considerable cost of travel. The changes made on the spur of the moment, without any apparent reason, of day after day, week after week, month after month, of this House of Representatives' program costs the Federal Government a bundle of money in changing reservations to get back to the district to meet the obligations of not only this Member but I am sure many other Members of this House because there evidently is not thoughtfulness enough to understand that every hour that this House is operating there is a cost.

To me, what happened last night is a basic constitutional issue and demonstrates the need to speak out for something that obviously is out of order.

Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman. I just want to make the point that in the matter that we are discussing, the Eighth District race, the

Democrats had no hesitancy whatsoever of paying two people for one job during the period of time that they were taking time in order to change the election result in Indiana. That particular cost to the taxpayer, paying those two people for one job, comes to more money than even under the rather questionable figures of the gentleman from Pennsylvania the cost to debate in the House last night.

Mr. FAZIO. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I would be glad to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. FAZIO. I would just like to make several points, and then I will leave the floor so the gentlemen can continue their internal discussions about their view of what happened in Indiana.

The last 6 years the legislative branch budget has been held down to a far greater degree than any budget of the executive branch.

Mr. WALKER. But it still has increased.

Mr. FAZIO. And we have still made progress on a yearly basis on eliminating personnel. We have had in the last 2 years declines in the number of employees in the legislative branch, net. We have been doing our job to set an example. I think we have done it in a bipartisan way. I simply wanted the record to show that we have had some success, and I think we will continue to have it this year. We are making every effort we can to make reductions not in the rate of increase but absolute reductions in the legislative branch once again. That would be the third consecutive year.

So I would hope that as the gentlemen defend their positions in terms of the time that was taken—and it is one that can be defended, from their perspective—that they would not play fast and loose with the facts as they relate to the spending that is taking place in the legislative branch.

We are now in a far different mode than we were 10 or 20 years ago. The gentleman from Georgia can cite history, but the fact is that today we are making progress on this, and I think we are doing it in a cooperative spirit, one that should not be trashed by the kind of late-night histrionics that occasionally impact us here.

Mr. WALKER. Well, I thank the gentleman. I would simply say to the gentleman that the point being that there evidently are some costs that are involved that the people from his side of the aisle get up here and posture against all the time when they happen to affect the minority. Our point is that many of the costs of running this body are involved with the fact that our committees around here are overstuffed, we have far too many subcommittees, we have a whole raft of staff around here that many of us

think could be cut back and that we think there are ways of saving big bucks, and all the time what we hear is that the minority should not be allowed to debate, that would really save the money.

Mr. SUNDQUIST. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I will be glad to the yield to the gentleman from Tennessee.

Mr. SUNDQUIST. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania for pointing out that the information that has been floated erroneously is not accurate.

Mr. WALKER. It is a lie, I would say to the gentleman.

Mr. SUNDQUIST. I think he said it was a lie. That the fixed expenses, if you would, of this body, continue, with the exception of some items. But I would like to pose a question to the gentleman from Pennsylvania: Is not the real question here—and perhaps the other side of the aisle should be focusing on that—what is the cost to the system, what is the cost to the system when the minority is trampled? What is the cost to the system when the State of Indiana is trampled in terms of certification of a candidate? What is the cost to the system when people lose faith in the system, this House of Representatives has to have two people being paid, as you said.

Mr. WALKER. Both are on the payroll.

Mr. SUNDQUIST. Which is far in excess of any additional electricity or a few security patrolmen.

Would the gentleman care to comment on the cost to the system?

Mr. WALKER. That brings it back to the real issue, which of course is the issue that the gentlemen on that side of the aisle do not want to discuss, because they do realize that, despite all of their rhetoric, despite all of their rhetoric of counting the ballots, they have refused to do that, that they stopped counting; and so, therefore, they send up smokescreens all the time.

When we get out on the floor and discuss the real facts, make our points very clearly to the American people, they then raise peripheral issues in order to try to divert the attention away from the real facts. They are spending their time talking about all kinds of matters in order to divert attention away from the real facts of the matter here and the real cost of this body, the real costs to our constitutional system if in fact they are allowed to pervert the Constitution in a way that they have moved thus far in the State of Indiana.

Mr. SUNDQUIST. I thank the gentleman. If he would continue to yield, I wonder where the Members are who

were talking about the few dollars of police protection.

Mr. WALKER. Oh, they do not want to talk about this issue.

Mr. SUNDQUIST. If they could address the question of the cost to the constitutional process.

Mr. WALKER. Well, they all voted to pay two people for the seat in Indiana at the same time. They all voted in that direction, and they do not want to get out here and discuss that matter because they are on record as having voted that way, which cost the taxpayers far more than anything the minority has done thus far. So they are not about to come out and discuss that issue. The gentleman I think is kind of deluding himself if he thinks that they are really willing to discuss real issues out here on the floor. They want to take their time on issues of nonimportance.

Mr. SUNDQUIST. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. WALKER. I would be very glad to yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. HUNTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I absolutely cannot believe my ears. This, majority leaders of the House, is not National Orange Juice Week that we are talking about, it is not National Transcription Week, it is not any of a number of somewhat perhaps nonmeritorious subject that we get up and talk about at great lengths at cost to the taxpayer. This is a matter of seating a Member of this body who is certified by a State as having won an election twice. And I have seen no Members on the other side of the aisle, on the Democrat side, get up and make any type of a substantive defense of the Democrat majority refusing to count the last 29 ballots in this race, those same unmarked ballots, the absentee ballots, that had been counted up to that point, until the Democrat contender got four votes away or basically pulled ahead of the pack by four votes, and then they said, "We don't want to count the ballots any longer," and then they stopped counting.

□ 2250

Let me tell you something: You had over 60 Members of the Republican conference in this special order that took place all night. These people left their families, they left their homes, they left other business engagements, they did a lot of sacrificing to be out here to talk about something that was very important to them and that is democracy in this United States. It is basic fairness in seating Members of Congress.

Let me tell you also that it was not simply conservatives, it was not simply liberals, it was a cross-section of all the Republican conference. Republicans are outraged; a lot of Democrats are outraged, my friends, and a lot of

people in Indiana and across the Nation are outraged. Because it means that the Democrat majority for the first time, "You really do not have to get 50 percent of the vote to win a congressional seat, you guys come close out there and we will see what we can do."

Let me tell you something else for the gentleman that got up and said, "Well, it looks like we won by four votes." I got news for you: I predicted 4 weeks ago that you would win by a couple of votes. Some people in my District said what are you talking about; the Republicans are some 400 votes ahead? I said when the Democrat task force gets finished analyzing and controlling which votes will be counted, they will not be some 400 and some votes ahead; the Democrat will have won and the Republican will have lost.

They said, "My gosh, that is a cynical view." I said I am sorry. There were very few betting people in America when that 2-to-1 task force took off for Indiana who were willing to bet that the Republican would come out the winner, and it looks like they were right.

Let us say something else about propriety and the appearance of impropriety. One of the best points that was made last night, and I hope Members listen because this was not a filibuster where some Member of the other body gets up and reads a phone book so he can claim some time. There were very articulate statements made. The one gentleman, Mr. COUGHLIN from Pennsylvania, made one of the best comments and best statements about this body I have ever heard. He said, you know this body runs on comity, and comity means respect. It means respect for the minority. And he said essentially that task force should have bent over backward to accommodate the Republicans. They should have bent over backward to be fair. How can any Democrat stand up there and say how can you be made Republicans? When they counted those ballots, they counted those absentee ballots until they pulled four votes ahead, and then they said, "Now we think perhaps that the State of Indiana was right, and we are going to stop counting the ballots and we are not going to count those last 29 ballots."

How could they have expected any other reaction except outrage from the Republican side, from our leadership right on down. That starts with Mr. MICHEL and goes right through the ranks. Everybody was outraged; liberals in the Republican Party; conservatives in the Republican Party. In fact, I saw some conservatives stand here last night and wince a little bit when some of our more moderate Members got up and really explained very graphically what they think about this outrage that occurred.

I think every Member saw a number of them this morning, a number of people who are very, very concerned about civil liberties in this country, and about the right to representation. I would like to ask something else about cost: How about the 100 days-plus of cost that the citizens of Indiana experienced in not having a Representative? How about that cost? What is the cost to democracy? Well, I will tell you something: If you go over to the Soviet Union, you are not going to have many all-night sessions; you are not going to have many sessions at all.

If they are saying essentially other forms of government can run more effectively than those in which Members get up and speak their mind on subjects, they are probably right.

Mr. WALKER. Let us understand: Dictatorships tend to be very efficient. They are not very nice to live under, as we know on the minority side, because what we are hearing from the Democrats around here is they like efficiency. So when we do something like this, it is not very efficient, and so they do not particularly like that. It just happens to be democratic, however.

So what we have is a contrast here between democracy and dictatorship. It gets played out all the time in this body and on this floor, and I think that we have seen a few more examples of it here this evening.

I yield to the gentleman from Utah.

Mr. MONSON. I thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, all this talk about cost has really outraged me even more. We have had a cost going on for the last 3 months that we did not even have to have and that is the recount process, period. We never needed to do that because we had a certified winner. We never needed to go through this process at all. We never needed to worry about whether we were going to pay two salaries. This was all immaterial because we knew who the winner was.

Then we go through all this process and what have we been left with? We have been left with a situation where they have counted spoiled ballots. Ballots that no one would count under normal circumstances because we know that they were spoiled and they were set aside and someone was given a new ballot because they had asked for a new ballot because they had spoiled the first one. They have counted some of those, and then the real abuse, when they get to the end, it takes them all but 32 votes before their man can pull ahead, and then they quit counting because all of a sudden they have a lead.

We do not know those last 32 votes would go, but we know that they were not counted, and until those are counted, and until you can eliminate

all those spoiled that should never have been counted, giving us in some precincts more people voting than signed the register, I do not see how we have learned a thing from this. We have just extended the period more; created more uncertainty; lack of credibility in the voter's minds, and we have committed one of the biggest outrages this House has ever committed.

Mr. WALKER. The gentleman makes a very good point. I wonder if some of those Democratic staff people who seem to have these figures instantaneously at their fingertips for the majority side has some figures as to how much that task force has cost us and all this recounting they have done. Getting the GAO and doing all this. I wonder if they have that kind of figure. I doubt it; I doubt they have it at their fingertips. I imagine they will try to bury that somewhere because they are not going to want to know, they are not going to want the American public to know just how much it cost in taxpayers' money to steal this election.

I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DREIER of California. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, it seems sadly ironic that today, as we are faced with the vote on \$14 million in assistance for those who are fighting for freedom and free and fair elections in Nicaragua, that we are faced with this kind of dispute here.

I was just talking to my good friend from California [Mr. HUNTER] about this quandary, and I wonder if he might have any comments on a comparison he could see between this dispute which exists, because we know very well that in 1979 there was a promise made by the Sandinista regime that we would in fact see free and fair elections.

I wonder if my friend from California sees my comparison in this.

Mr. WALKER. I would be glad to yield to the gentleman from California, and the gentleman from California knows that the gentleman from Virginia has been waiting too.

Mr. HUNTER. I would simply say I think in that letter that the Sandinistas sent the OSA promising free and fair elections, they were not referring to the Indiana Eighth; I think that is obvious.

Mr. DREIER of California. They had no idea at that point that the dispute would exist, I am sure.

Mr. HUNTER. That is right.

Mr. DREIER of California. I thank the gentleman very much.

Mr. WALKER. I thank the gentleman and I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. WOLF. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I really do not think the cost is very significant. Obviously, we are dealing with principle. If I were the Speaker of the House, frankly, I would let most of the staff go home on almost all these special orders. I think we keep too many of the staff people around. I think those who have families ought to be able to go home.

Mr. WALKER. I agree with the gentleman.

Mr. DREIER of California. Shall we take a vote?

Mr. WOLF. Well, we could take a vote tonight.

On the question of what I think should be done, I think something like this really helps to tear the House apart. I know, obviously, what I would favor would be that Rick McIntyre ought to be seated.

I want to again read something that I referred to again today. It was an editorial in today's Washington Post, and it is significant because the Washington Post is an independent newspaper. It is here within Washington, DC; within the Beltway. It responded immediately after the task force made their recommendation.

This is what the Washington Post said:

The controversy now rapidly coming to a conclusion in the House over who actually won last November in the Eighth District of Indiana inevitably raises one question: Can it ever be determined with certainty who won such a close election? The proceedings before the 3-Member Task Force, which has concluded two-to-one that Democrat Frank McCloskey beat Republican Richard McIntyre by 4 votes suggests that the answer to this question is no.

That means no, it will never be a certainty. It will always be in the minds of everyone. Frankly, I know it will be in the minds of the Members on the other side. It will be in their minds as to whether or not they actually robbed Rick McIntyre of his seat.

Members know how hard it is to run for Congress. I had to run 3 times before I got elected I was defeated in 1976 and 1978, and I did not get here until 1980.

□ 2300

Do you know the hurt, the pain, and the agony when somebody is defeated, particularly in a situation whereby they think they are going to be seated and then they are not seated, and back and forth? Frankly, I would feel the same way. My heart would go to McCloskey if he were in that same situation. I mean it just is not fair. So I think no one in this Chamber will ever know for sure.

The editorial goes on to say: "The House, embroiled in an ear-splitting dispute over the outcome"—and it is ear-splitting—"should in fact declare the seat vacant and let Indiana hold another election."

It concludes by saying: "But when the margin is so close"—as this is, four

votes—"doubts inevitably remain"—as I said before, we will always wonder; I think we will wonder who should have been seated and ask, did we do the right thing?—"and the candidate who is declared the winner will hold the office, so far as some of his colleagues and constituents are concerned, under a cloud."

I think, quite frankly, if we do not hold a special election, you will see McIntyre or McCloskey walking around and you will sort of whisper and say, "Hey! I wonder if he really won that election. I wonder, do you think he won that, or did we do the right thing?" You will always wonder. Whether it be McCloskey or McIntyre, as they walk down the corridor of the Capitol, people will say, "There's the guy who won by four votes, and it really didn't count." There will always be this cloud.

The Post goes on to say, and I agree completely: "In these circumstances the by no means unusual or cumbersome remedy of a special election is in order."

Now, I think we ought to seat Rick McIntyre, but certainly I would appeal—and I know we are going to have an opportunity to vote on this next week—to Members, and Members will say, "What is the fairest thing we could do?"

First, I think it is fair to have a special election. Second, if you care, not only about that Indiana Eighth District but care about the traditions of the House and you care about whether or not this body will be torn apart—because, frankly, the Members on my side of the aisle are really angry about this, and I am not sure what is going to be done, but frankly something will be done—I think in order to keep peace and show fairness, the best thing we could do for Rick McIntyre, for Frank McCloskey, and for the Congress is to hold a special election and allow the people of the Eighth District of Indiana to make a decision as to who should sit in this body and forever remove that cloud.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman, and I think the gentleman will agree with me that the one thing that is not fair in this process is the seating of Frank McCloskey when the only way he could win the election is when his buddies in the House did the count. That we know is not fair. There may be other options that would be fair but that we know is not.

Mr. WOLF. I agree.

Mr. WALKER. That is precisely why the minority feels so strongly and so deeply that that process cannot go forward without the minority's reacting in a vehement fashion.

Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. BOEHLERT. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding, and I want to compliment him for the outstanding effort he has underway here.

I would like to identify myself with the remarks of my predecessor, the distinguished gentleman from Virginia.

There is an ironic twist to this, because I have heard some Members from the other side criticizing the Member in the well for this special order and for the minimal cost of that special order. It just so happens that I have before me on my desk a copy of the Congressional Quarterly for March 30 and there is a story entitled, "House Votes Increase in Committee Funding." The story says, and I quote exactly:

At the same time many of its members are advocating freezing federal spending programs, the House voted to authorize more money for its own committees March 26.

Now, we are not talking about nickels and dimes because the resolution authorized \$48 million for investigative costs of these House committees.

Mr. WALKER. Will the gentleman repeat that figure?

Mr. BOEHLERT. It is \$48 million for investigative costs. And that is only the half of it. It is estimated that we will spend \$86 million on committees in the House of Representatives during this year when so many people are talking about costs.

Mr. WALKER. Was that \$86 million?

Mr. BOEHLERT. That is precisely right. The gentleman is exactly right.

And the interesting twist to this is that some of the Members who were so critical of the gentleman in the well for taking this special order and for giving the minority one of its rare opportunities to speak its will, to address the American people and let them know the seriousness of the matter we are discussing, these very Members, I noticed as I looked back at the scorecard, voted for this.

Mr. WALKER. They voted for \$86 million?

Mr. BOEHLERT. Well, they voted for only \$48 million in this increment. It is an incremental thing. The House takes very good care of itself, as the gentleman well knows.

I would commend the gentleman in the well. I checked him on this, and he voted no on that resolution.

Mr. WALKER. Thank goodness.

Mr. BOEHLERT. I want the gentleman to know that I also voted no, and a good number of us did because we were concerned about this excessive spending.

But the fact of that matter is that these special orders, I think, are extremely important. They give those of us who are in the minority an opportunity to discuss at some length with reason, with cogent arguments, very important issues like the issue of the

race in the Eighth District of Indiana, and I would like to commend the gentleman for what he is doing in this special order.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman very much.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I am glad to yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I thank my friend, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, for yielding.

I would like to point out that I voted with the gentleman in the well last week on a cost-saving measure relative to the NASA Program.

Mr. WALKER. I appreciate that. I noticed that. You and a number of your colleagues voted that way, and we very much appreciate that. We saved a few million bucks there.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. The gentleman is absolutely right.

Mr. Speaker, I only came to the well because I thought there was a nice statement made by our friend, the gentleman from Virginia, who read the first paragraph of the Washington Post editorial, and I was hoping that we would read the second paragraph of the Washington Post editorial, which says this:

We reach this conclusion not because we think the Task Force acted unfairly or negligently. On the contrary, it seems clear that it counted the votes it believed were cast with great accuracy and that it reached its conclusions as to which votes were cast on principles that can readily be defended as impartial and fair. We don't agree with Republicans who are describing the Task Force's proceedings as a "rape."

That was the next paragraph of the Post editorial.

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. It is his time.

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, if I might reclaim my time and then yield to the gentleman from Virginia, I would simply say to the gentleman that I have a feeling that the editorial was written or I know it was written before the task force met today or before the House Administration Committee met today, where the official counter for the task force did in fact admit there were ballots that he would have counted that the task force did not count. I wonder if the Post, upon hearing the words of the official counter, will in fact be as confident of the second paragraph that the gentleman read.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. I have no idea. I just wanted to read the second paragraph.

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I yield to the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. WOLF. I never used the word that the gentleman made the com-

ment on, and if the gentleman checks the RECORD, he will find I never used that word about the task force.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. What word? I am sorry. I did not use a word.

Mr. WOLF. The editorial goes on to say, if the gentleman wants to read the very next paragraph:

But at the same time, to decide which votes should be counted, the Task Force had to make exceedingly fine judgments about which, inevitably, fair-minded people might reasonably disagree. By a 2-1 bipartisan vote, for example, the Task Force decided to count absentee ballots that were not notarized and were sent by county clerks to precincts. But by a 2-1 partisan vote, the Task Force decided not to count unnotarized absentee ballots that were retained by county clerks.

Then it ends, as I made the comment before—and the point I was trying to make is for a special election—and it says: "In these circumstances the by no means unusual or cumbersome remedy of a special election is in order."

The point I was trying to make is—and I know the gentleman is a fair-minded person, too—darn, you know you want to do the right thing by both of these people, and reasonably it will make a difference with different counties involved and everything else, but a special election would turn it back to the people of the Eighth District of Indiana and let them make a decision. I think that is fair, and that is the point I was trying to make.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. I agree. I just wanted to get the rest of the editorial in.

Would the gentleman agree that a description of the task force's proceedings as a "rape" might not be a fair description, as a fair-minded person?

Mr. WALKER. Yes. The gentleman from Colorado, I think, expressed our sentiments. We think that might be a little mild.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. You think that might be a little mild?

Frankly speaking, I watched the debate last night, and I, frankly, do not know what went on in the task force and I for one am very interested in finding the technicalities.

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. Just a second. It is his time.

Mr. WALKER. I continue to yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. I watched it last night. I do not know the technicalities of this question, and I am very interested in finding out the answers to the technicalities of this question. If I think technically the vote was misconstrued, I will vote that way. I do not know the technicalities, and I want to hear them. But there were descriptions last night that were absolutely out of order with the decorum of this House.

□ 2310

Mr. WALKER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I hope the gentleman understands that one of the reasons that is taking place is because there is a very, very strong feeling on our side of the aisle. I am not certain that many of the Members on that side of the aisle understand the depth of concern about this issue. It is a concern with an issue that we feel is fundamental to the minority; that if in fact this process is allowed to go forward conducted in the way it has been conducted thus far, that it runs the risk of perhaps disenfranchising much of the minority over a period of time.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. WALKER. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. One of the things I was noticing last night, I happen to be chairman of a small subcommittee. I am proud to be chairman of the small subcommittee. I have an outstanding ranking minority member by the name of JACK FIELDS from Texas. Last night it was consistently said all the time about suppressing the rights of the minority.

Now, I feel pretty confident, to tell you the truth, that the subcommittee that I happen to have the privilege of chairing, that I do not think the minority would say that.

The first bill that will come to this floor out of that subcommittee is the bill sponsored by the excellent ranking minority member, JACK FIELDS from Texas. That is the first bill we acted upon.

I mean, there were descriptions last night saying things we do in the majority that were absolutely inaccurate.

Mr. WALKER. Let me yield to the gentleman from California and then I will get to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. HUNTER. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Since the gentleman listened to the debate last night—

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. Three hours is all.

Mr. HUNTER. Let me just ask the gentleman this. The point of our argument was this. It was that they counted unnotarized absentee ballots that had been distributed to the precincts, which actually was an improper move under the task force analysis; but when Mr. McCloskey got four votes ahead and they had some 29 unnotarized absentee ballots with real people's names on them and real people's addresses on them, the task force says, "Even though there were notarized statements or there were sworn statements from the county clerks that they had secured those ballots, nobody messed with them," they said, "We don't want to count the last 29 ballots."

Now, my question to the gentleman, and he has asked some fair questions

of us, would the gentleman have counted the last 29 ballots?

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. It depends on what the certification was. I do not have the information, I do not.

Frankly, if a person was not very close within this task force situation, I, frankly, do not know how we would have the information. I know that the chairman of the task force makes an argument on those 29 ballots. I have not heard that. I think we are going to have a chance to hear that tomorrow. I want to hear that argument. I have heard the argument the gentleman said. I want to hear that other argument.

Mr. HUNTER. I would ask the gentleman to make that analysis when it comes forth, to look at the facts and come back and tell us he would have counted all the ballots.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. I say to my friend from California, I will absolutely do that. I want to have a chance to see all the facts. I have not.

Mr. WALKER. I hope the point is made in the gentleman's caucus tomorrow that the official counter hired by the House at some expense did in fact tell the task force and tell the House Administration Committee today that he would have counted the ballots. That is something that is getting lost in this whole process.

We are dealing in very fine technicalities, but the person that we hired, who supposedly was to tell us how this election should have been conducted, said today on the record, it is on tape of him saying that he would have counted the ballots. It was a task force decision not to count the ballots.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield further?

Mr. WALKER. I will yield to the gentleman.

Mr. LOWRY of Washington. I will complete on this and then I will sit and listen some more.

I will make sure I ask that question tomorrow, I say to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

I also want to say that I did not raise the point on the cost of this special order.

I also want to say, the gentleman forgot about that special order. There was a special order here 2 or 3 years ago on behalf of the nuclear weapons freeze. It really was on behalf of the nuclear weapons freeze, but it was the whole nuclear arms race that went all night. I participated in that. I was part of the organizer of that and I thought that was a very good thing to do.

I am not a person that thinks that having a special order on an important issue is wrong. I think it is right; but I do believe that we all have a responsibility to deal with fairness to the facts and try to get as much information as we can.

Mr. WALKER. Well, I thank the gentleman. I think the gentleman makes an excellent point.

The thing is about the special orders is that they do provide an opportunity to discuss in depth a lot of issues. The loss of that by nitpicking, as has been going on, I think would be a tremendous disservice to the House of Representatives and a tremendous disservice to the future of debate of serious issues in the House of Representatives because as the gentleman well knows, even though he is from the majority, there are some issues that sometimes cannot get scheduled for legislative debate and the only way we can deal with those important national issues is to bring them to the floor under procedures such as this. I know the gentleman has done that and I think it is extremely important that in the House we do it.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. McCANDLESS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that my special order may be taken out of sequence at this time.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection.

THE OUTRAGE OF THE INDIANA EIGHTH TASK FORCE

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. McCANDLESS] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. McCANDLESS. Mr. Speaker, I have a number of people who are interested in participating in that part of the program that I have. I yield first to the gentleman from Colorado [Mr. BROWN] who has been very patient. I am sure he has something of substance to contribute.

Mr. BROWN of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman.

I wonder if I might ask some questions of our colleague, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, regarding this matter, if he would be willing to respond.

I appreciate the gentleman from Pennsylvania being willing to respond to the issue.

As I have listened to the debate on this issue over last night and the preceding weeks, there have been a number of key points that I am not sure have been spelled out clearly in the press.

First of all, if I understand the case correctly, this election was certified and then a recount was taken and it was recertified, that the Democratic candidate had some concerns about the rules that were followed in counting the ballots.

Let me ask the gentleman from Pennsylvania if the procedure that Indiana used was challenged in court.

Mr. WALKER. It is my understanding that a case could have been brought under the Federal Contested Elections Act if in fact there was a

valid court case, but the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. McCloskey, who it seems to me has the burden of proof on him because he was not certified and Mr. McIntyre was, never brought a suit under the Federal Contested Elections Act.

Mr. BROWN of Colorado. Let me see if I understand this correctly. The House is questioning the validity of the Indiana State laws as to whether or not they are proper and constitutional and yet the loser in that election, the Democratic candidate, chose not to contest those Indiana laws in the courts of this country.

Mr. WALKER. Well, if the gentleman will yield, I would say to the gentleman that that is correct, and not only that, but when we got to the question of whether or not Indiana laws had resulted in fraud, the task force itself reported, the gentleman from California [Mr. PANETTA] reported to the task force that they found absolutely no evidence of any kind of fraud within the process, so that in fact we were not dealing with a situation as was described to us on opening day where an election was held under questionable circumstances.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, would the gentleman hold this off for 1 second and yield to me?

Mr. McCANDLESS. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Would the other two gentleman from California on the floor please take the microphones? This is very important. There is one open at the Democratic leadership desk.

Mr. McCANDLESS. Are we going to call this the "California connection"?

Mr. DORNAN of California. I wanted to point out to the gentleman from California that the gentleman from California [Mr. McCANDLESS] is now a historical figure. During the gentleman's special order we have now set a House record for the longest continuous session in 197 years and I think that it is a proud moment for the State of California that all of us are here protecting the Constitution under the tutelage of the two distinguished gentlemen whose fascinating conversation I so historically interrupted.

I would just like to say that the questioning and probing of this gentleman and all of us is going to continue to elucidate the facts tonight.

Mr. DREIER of California. Mr. Speaker, will be gentleman yield?

Mr. McCANDLESS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. DREIER of California. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding.

It is quite apparent that more than 150 years of precedent has been set by the decision that was made by this House in not seating a representative

from any district, not only the Eighth District.

We all know that precedent indicated that a Member should have been seated and then if there was a question that had taken place as to whether or not that Member had been duly elected, he should have stepped aside.

So while the gentleman says that precedent has been set as far as the length of this special order, it is tragic that the precedent was set in not providing a half million people of the Eighth District of Indiana an opportunity to have a representative in the most important deliberative body in the world.

I thank my friend for yielding.

Mr. McCANDLESS. Mr. Speaker, I thank my two colleagues from California.

I would like to reiterate that it is not with the desire or gladness that we break the record, but it was with the need to express ourselves on a subject that goes far beyond the time that was involved.

I yield again to my colleague, the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. BROWN of Colorado. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman from California.

I have just two other questions for the gentleman from Pennsylvania, if he would be so kind to respond.

□ 2420

We had established that the Democratic candidate who lost the election in Indiana did not object or contest the validity of the Indiana laws in the courts of this country.

Let me ask the House of Representatives. Did the Democratic majority who have thus far set aside the laws of the State of Indiana, can the gentleman tell me the laws that they have set aside, what their purpose was?

Mr. WALKER. I would say to the gentleman that I am not familiar in enough detail with the specifics of the task force to know exactly what they set aside.

In adopting their rules, however, they did set aside certain of the procedures in the State of Indiana that I would interpret as being the guards against fraud.

Mr. BROWN of Colorado. In other words, the laws that were set aside here were ones that were meant to protect the ballot box against fraud and provide proper authentication and so on?

Mr. WALKER. That would be my interpretation for the reasons for those laws. And most of the ones set aside were in fact in that category.

Mr. BROWN of Colorado. Do I understand also, were the laws of Indiana set aside by the Democratic majority, do those laws conflict with Federal laws in this area? Is there a Federal statute that outlaws those? Does the Voting Rights Act outlaw the Indiana law?

Mr. WALKER. No. The only thing I

would say to the gentleman is that the Federal Contested Elections Act was set up in order to resolve such disputes and that if in fact you believe that the laws of your State have somehow disenfranchised voters, or in some way impacted adversely upon your election, you can take those kinds of contests to the Federal Courts, to the Federal Contested Elections Act. That was the whole reason for putting it into place, and it is passing strange that the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. McCloskey never sought to use that remedy as a part of the case that he made.

Mr. BROWN of Colorado. Let me just review the facts if I understand them. If I have misstated them I hope Members of the House will correct me.

But first of all, if I understand correctly, the Democratic candidate did not choose to contest the Indiana laws in court. No challenge was brought to that certification of the Republican candidate in the courts of this country.

Second, those laws were meant to protect the validity of the ballot box and protect the integrity of the process.

Third, the House has chosen to set aside those laws even though they do not conflict with the Federal standards and the Federal statutes that are on the books.

I just would observe one thing. I think it is terribly important that this body, when it makes its final decision, answer the question of why in breaking the rules and setting up new rules they were not applied consistently.

One last thing from the gentleman from California, if I might be permitted just a few seconds more. I would like to observe with regard to the cost of this body, I think it is very appropriate we begin to think about the cost to this body and we ought to talk about specifics. The fact is we have 1,200 policemen that guard this building and our offices, 1,200. If we want to control spending and we are concerned about the costs, let me suggest that we can get by with less than half that.

Mr. DREIER of California. How many elevator operators?

Mr. BROWN of Colorado. We have in the past spent close to a million a year for elevator operators. Actually that sum is down, but there is still a large number of them.

The folks who are listening to these proceedings should understand that those are elevators that are automatic, that require no operator.

I would just mention with regard to the committees, it was mentioned as to the cost of the Congress in the past. The district that I represented when I came to Congress is the Fourth District of Colorado. The chairman for many, many years of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs in the

House of Representatives was a Democratic Member. When Wayne Aspinall came to Congress there were four full-time staffers on the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee. They did more work when they had four staffers than at any time since. That is not a subjective judgment. I mean the number of bills and the number of bills referred to the committee, and the number of bills passed and acted on, and the legislation performed by four full-time staffers.

I think Americans would be shocked to realize that we had 73 full-time staffers last year and they do less work than the 4 people did.

I mean any time we want to talk about cost around this place, let me assure the gentleman all we have to do is drive in the garage and you pass seven parking attendants to get to your parking spot in this place. Now you know even Members of Congress can find their parking spot after a while.

If we want to talk about waste and extravagance and expense, I think it is an important subject and I would hope that we might deal with that subject directly, because, believe me, there is no part of the Government, the executive, the judicial or anything involved in the legislative process that has overspent and wasted money as badly as this House of Representatives. And I hope that we will take that subject up as we consider the debate.

I thank the gentleman from California for yielding.

Mr. McCANDLESS. I thank the gentleman from Colorado for his comments. They are well taken and I certainly subscribe to some of the cost cutting that I also have observed.

Mr. COBLE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCANDLESS. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina [Mr. COBLE] who has been very patient.

Mr. COBLE. The gentleman from Pennsylvania earlier when we were discussing costs indicated that all of the majority have voted to pay two Congressmen or two Members from Indiana. I believe technically there were four or five on the other side who voted with us, so technically they all did not vote in an exercise of extravagance. That is a technical point and I think the gentleman probably did not intend to imply they all did. I think four or five did vote to seat McIntyre.

I will be very brief. I thank the gentleman again for having yielded.

Someone called attention to the fact that the Washington Post did not agree with the descriptions that were used on this floor last evening regarding the rape that was committed against the minority Members of this House in the task force decision to refuse to seat McIntyre in the Indiana contest. I think that is subject to in-

terpretation as to whether or not a rape occurred.

The fact that the Washington Post has in fact called for a special election in the case clearly indicates to me that the Post editorial board was not happy with the manner in which the task force conducted itself. Certainly the majority members of that task force, and I am in agreement, I think perhaps that, as was said earlier, Mr. Speaker, the word "rape" very likely was an appropriate descriptive term as to what occurred to the voters in the Eighth District of Indiana.

I thank the gentleman from California for yielding.

Mr. McCANDLESS. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. DREIER of California. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McCANDLESS. I yield to the gentleman from California [Mr. DREIER].

Mr. DREIER of California. I thank my California colleague for yielding. I must say what I said just a few moments ago, that precedent had been set by not seating a Representative from the Eighth District of Indiana. But really there has been a continual performance of abuse by the majority party in several processes. One of the most important was that of the process of redistricting in California.

In the last election we received as Republicans 49.6 percent of the votes to the Democrat's 48.4 percent of the vote. Yet because of that process of gerrymandering we, as Republicans, only hold 40 percent of those seats while the majority party holds 60 percent of the seats.

We have one of the victims, fortunately having returned as a new Member of Congress, but he was a victim of that redistricting process, and that is my good friend from California [Mr. DORNAN]. I would like to hear from him a little assessment of what that process did to him and if there was in fact continued abuse on the part of the majority party.

Mr. McCANDLESS. I yield to my other colleague from California [Mr. DORNAN].

Mr. DORNAN of California. I thank the gentleman. There is a great sociological as well as adventure work of written art called "Lord of the Rings" by a famous British author, and it shows how a group of young students in an airplane crash on an island, without the benefit of adult supervision passing on tradition to them eventually returned to a barbaric and a primitive state. It has been stated by many anthropologists and sociologists that civilization is only 18 years at any given point from barbarism, assuming that it takes from 1 to 18 years of educating our young daughters and sons into our civilization to save them from reverting to this barbaric state.

Now, if that is true, that means that the depth of our civility, our traditions, and in a House like this the word we discussed at length last night, the comity, the good feeling that we have for one another, those traditions are built up over a long time. And they can unravel very quickly.

I maintain since my distinguished friend from California has brought it up that the reapportionment, butchery would be a better way to describe it than gerrymandering, because Gov. Elbridge Gerry from Massachusetts, who did his handicraft work with maps in the period of 1809, 1810 and gave the name salamander to a district that has a long swooping tail on it and probably included the Cape Cod area, that rough use of the pencil to craft out maps to someone's political advantage is nothing resembling the butchery that took place in California.

□ 2330

Now I maintain that the arrogance of what the Democratic majority got away with in the State of California so impressed, in an ugly and negative way, some of the Members on the majority side of the aisle in this House that it began to desensitize them to civility, to decency, to the comity in the House.

Mr. DREIER. I would like to ask my friend about his particular case. What exactly happened?

Mr. DORNAN of California. My district was a coastal district that had been slowly put together through two prior reapportionments. Because people tend to hold onto their property longer when it is near the ocean and has a beautiful ocean breeze and my prior district with the number of 27, much different than the 27th represented now by MEL LEVINE of California, was really a district that was smog-free because the ocean breezes blowing off beautiful Santa Monica Bay held back the infamous Los Angeles smog. That district was a string of pearls, I call it, of Republican cities along the coast because they had deep tradition of people putting down roots and staying in these beautiful cities.

When it was conceded to the Republican Party, adjoining four Democratic districts as it did, after the 1960 census and the 1970 census I knew getting elected in 1976 that I would be up against it in 1982 to hold onto this seat if the Democratic majority played with it at all.

Now the late gentleman that some Members here are trying to break precedent and name Federal parks after, Mr. Phillip Burton, carried a longstanding grudge against me. I do not mind talking about the past. He is probably in heaven now so he could not care.

He came on my television show in Los Angeles in another life and he ac-

cused a great Senator, George Murphy, of being a racist.

Senator Murphy, when he got elected, jerked the appointment of a gentleman who he didn't even know, they were just names on a piece of paper. One of them I believe was called Cecil Poole, who happened to be a fine black attorney from the San Francisco area, a Democrat, an activist. Senator Murphy did not know who he was. He just jerked the name to put in his appointee. After all, he had beaten Pierre Salinger.

With this, Burton, who was either in the assembly in California or just in the State senate, said that George Murphy was a racist. I told him there was not a racist bone in Senator Murphy's body. He is still alive and well and can take care for himself. He was in Washington. This was in Los Angeles.

So I said "Retract that statement and if you do not retract that statement you are not half the man he is and if you do not I will throw you off my television show."

Burton would not retract the statement so I threw him off my television show.

Well, Phil Burton had a long memory. So he told our colleague, JERRY LEWIS, told our colleague, BILL THOMAS, "I am going to get DORNAN if it is the last thing I do." So I got on the train on the way to the Rayburn Building one day and I said, "Phil, tell me, would you really carry a grudge for over a decade? Are you going to do any particular carving on my seat?" And he looked at me with that big innocent look that he could affect and he said "I am a mere servant of the Lord." That is why I have to assume he is in heaven because he is a servant of the Lord.

Mr. DREIER of California. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORNAN of California. Well, he proceeded to cut my seat up, if you want to step on my punchline. But no, go ahead. He cut it in three pieces is what he did. And the northern piece is now represented by a fine Congressman, MEL LEVINE, a middle piece is kind of spread out over several areas. The bottom half, beautiful Palos Verdes, is represented by our colleague, DAN LUNGREN, very well. So that was the end of the 27th District. He did me a favor. He pushed me into the U.S. Senate primary. I got to see northern California. That was a delightful year for me. Then I was on the beach for 2 years. I was hanging around the Cloakroom, walking around the floor; sometimes you guys would say hello to me, sometimes you would not. Usually you are nice to me.

Then BILL DANNEMEYER said, "DORNAN, I found your seat. What was left of the 27th District slid into Orange County and some guy named Jerry Patterson has it. Go take it back

from him." And I did and it is a happy ending. I was even walking through the halls today thinking what a lucky fellow I am.

Mr. DREIER of California. We are very happy that you took that seat back. I think what you have just demonstrated is the arrogance that we are seeing and the treatment of the election of the Eighth District of Indiana is a continuation of behavioral patterns that we have seen in the past on the part of the majority party.

I thank my friend from California for yielding.

Mr. DORNAN of California. If the gentleman from California would allow me to just bridge this assumption of mine which I think is quite valid, I do believe that that act of arrogance in chopping up our California congressional, senate, and State assembly seats was so overdone that even Phillip Burton in his wildest dreams never thought he would get away with it. They thought with Reagan's big victory in 1980, his tremendous legislative victories in this House in 1981 and 1982 that they were doomed in 1982. Now this is early 1982. They thought they were going to get wiped out again in the 1982 midterm elections.

Well, Burton said, "I will draw the most outlandish district in the history of this Nation in two centuries." And he proceeded to do it and announced to the world, "This is my contribution to abstract modern art." And he laughed, expecting to get his knuckles rapped.

When the American public did nothing, when the Republican Party did nothing, a few thousand dollars were allocated to fight back, and they got away with it, they passed around the maps in the Democratic Cloakroom and they said, "My God, what is this crap? These are your maps in California? Why the Republicans are doormats. Let's walk on their faces. We can get away with anything. Look at these stupid maps."

Mr. DREIER of California. So they are doing the same to us in Indiana right now.

Mr. DORNAN of California. That set the pattern of what we are seeing here with a sleazy three-vote margin. Three votes was not good enough, three. I told TONY COELHO in the hall 2 days earlier, "Tony, you had better come up with five. Anything else really stinks, reeks to high heaven like a rotting fish held up to the moonlight." You know what? They could not quite get it to five because they had the three win and they know that sounds kind of funny. Three, twee. A twee-vote win. They looked at it. They had 22 ballots that cut 11/11. So that would have brought it up, both sides even still with the three spread.

Ask BILL THOMAS about that ugly last session with much yelling. Again

they decided, "Well, here is a ballot that has a mark on it. Is that a mark? I don't know. Get the magnifying glass. Yes, it looks like a mark to me. Throw it out. Then it will only come up 10 and 11." Or I think it was 12 and 11. They squeaked out in the last session, THOMAS shouting back no and the other two saying, "Sorry, 2-1, we whipped you." They even took the fourth vote. So then it had the ring of four instead of twee.

And that is the sleazy way this whole operation went. The truth is I am embarrassed for the majority party, I am embarrassed for my friends in that party, I am embarrassed for this House. It seems like a bad dream. I do not believe this is happening.

Mr. DREIER of California. Does it surprise you, though, based on the California redistricting?

Mr. DORNAN of California. Yes, I admit to being stupidly naive. I sat over here with our good friend, HENRY HYDE, when Rick McIntyre was not sworn in and he was seated a few chairs away. I said, "HENRY, I think they have got themselves in a bind. They have got their juices flowing a little overeagerly. It happens sometimes in the NRCC. TONY COELHO is trying to play catch-up with GUY VANDER JAGT in the money department. He is falling way short. He is a little bit jealous and angry. So they are reaching here. The Speaker is a tough Irish politician. I love him because I like to think of myself as a tough Irish politician at least one day a week." And I said further, "The Speaker is uncomfortable with this. So is the very eloquent gentleman, the articulate gentleman from Texas. They are going to go through some motions here and they will eventually seat Rick McIntyre. Why not put up a little fight? The sad thing, it is going to cost them some money."

Now we find out we are going to pay them.

You know what HENRY HYDE did? He pulled back in his chair and he looked at me and he said, "Bob, you have got to be kidding. What is the matter with you? Don't you know they will not go through this operation without stealing this seat? What do you think they did to you in California with these ugly maps out there that you showed me that I still can hardly believe?"

I said, "HENRY, this is before the public. This is a man's congressional seat. No way."

Well, I was wrong. I mean I am shocked, surprised, abused; I feel like a little kid in school who had my balloons blown up in front of me. I do not believe yet that they can pull this off. I still think there is a chance that wiser heads like our great Speaker and our great majority leader will pull back from this and say, "Let's have a

special election and let's have Tony and Guy duke it out in the Eighth District of Indiana with great 30-second spots. We'll all go up into the precinct. It will be a great catharsis and we will all be satisfied with whomever wins."

□ 2340

I do not believe they are going to get away with three votes pushed up to four, and pull off this rape. I do not believe they will do it.

Mr. McCANDLESS. I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee.

Mr. SUNDQUIST. Mr. Speaker, with a great deal of reluctance to subject the citizens of Indiana to more politicking than anyone should have to endure just to have a voice in Congress, there is only one way to settle the mess in the Eighth District of Indiana once and for all.

We must conduct a special election in that district, and if the majority party in this House has any shred of decency and fair play left, they will agree to do so.

From the very beginning, this has been a case which the majority party has used to shatter precedents.

I should note that it hasn't been just Republicans crying foul play on this case. Newspapers all over the country, including the Washington Post, have editorialized that Mr. McIntyre should have been seated regardless of whether the House conducted a recount—for the obvious reason that no district should be denied representation in Congress, regardless of how close the election was.

Unfortunately, it wasn't enough for the House leadership to deny the people of that district representation for 4 months. The task force has held out of the count 29 nonnotarized absentee ballots, even though many other ballots improperly marked and identified have been counted in this recount. It's not surprising to learn that those 29 ballots are held by county clerks in counties that McIntyre won.

Mr. Speaker, this entire episode has reminded me of an Aesop's Fable, a fable that clearly reminds us of the importance of taking responsible action—and having the courage to do what is right.

This fable was recorded more than 2,500 years ago, but its message speaks clearly to our responsibility here today:

A certain cat that lived in a large country house was so vigilant and active, that the mice, finding their numbers grievously thinned, held a council, with closed doors, to consider what they had best do.

Many plans had been started and dismissed, when a young mouse, rising and catching the eye of the president, said that he had proposal to make, that he was sure must meet with the approval of all. "If," said he, "the cat wore around her neck a little bell, every step she took would make it tinkle; then, ever forewarned of her ap-

proach, we should have time to reach our holes. By this simple means we should live in safety, and defy her power."

The speaker resumed his seat with a complacent air, and a murmur of applause arose from the audience. An old gray mouse, with a merry twinkle in his eye, now got up, said that the plan of the last speaker was an admirable one; but he feared it had one drawback. He had told them who should put the bell around the cat's neck.

Mr. Speaker, it is time the majority party in this House does what is right—by conducting a special election to settle this matter once and for all.

Together, Mr. Speaker, we must put the bell on the cat.

Mr. McCANDLESS. I thank the gentleman from Tennessee.

I yield to the gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. STRANG. I thank the gentleman from California, and I congratulate those gentlemen from California who were here at this particular historic moment, Mr. Speaker, notwithstanding the fact that the speaker himself is from California; probably had not planned to spend his time on this historic occasion, but I think it is an important one.

Briefly, Mr. Speaker, we are going to be faced with a decision in the next day or two to decide on whether or not to seat Frank McCloskey from Indiana in a seat which he lost and never contested.

This was an election—and we must remember this—in which the proper procedures in the State of Indiana were followed at all times. The proper Representative was sent here with certification. The loser, Mr. McCloskey, never disputed this election.

The procedures followed by this House of Representatives in counting the ballots have been totally and entirely in contravention of Indiana law. There is no provision in Indiana law for the kinds of procedures and countings that went forth.

The problem comes even beyond that. That was the failure of our Representatives to follow out their own plan of counting. And so we find, we get down to the end, we find ballots that were counted that should not have been counted, ballots that should have been counted that were not counted, and in some cases, more ballots counted than there were people registered on the lists.

Mr. Speaker, this is an appalling charade, and I hope and I trust that the words from the distinguished gentleman from Washington will be heeded by his colleagues.

Let us look at these items one by one by one, and I, for one, will join them in comity to try to resolve this terrible problem.

Mr. McCANDLESS. I thank the gentleman from Colorado for his remarks.

A lot has been said in the prior hours of the special orders, a lot of partisanship has surfaced, uninten-

tionally, and probably will be felt for many years to come.

□ 2350

Unfortunately, what we have here in the way of an issue does have to take on the partisan aspect of the House. It is difficult to work in a subcommittee, to work in a committee, work here on the floor of the House, without the cooperation of your colleagues. That cooperation is essential not only for the legislative process but for the good and long-term benefit of the Nation as well as this House of Representatives. But in this particular case, irrespective of whether this went on all last night, or whatever took place, the subject matter is so deep and so strongly felt by some of us—in my case, a person who spent 12 years in county government responsible for the electoral process—that we had to vent our spleen, so to speak.

But, in summary, I would like to bring up four points that I feel are relevant to the subject that have a direct bearing on why that one straw, when it hit the camel, the camel went down, his back broken. The House Democrats claim that Indiana's election law failed to produce an election result upon which the House can confidently rely. They demand a process that was timely, regular and fair, one untainted by partisan pressures.

The task force failed to meet these standards. But to say they failed to meet these standards, one must say why, and there are four basic reasons. One, inconsistency, the unnotarization of absentee ballots. Let me explain.

In their second hearing when McCloskey was behind 12 votes in the running totals, the task force voted to count unopened, unnotarized, absentee ballots mistakenly sent to precincts on election day. In their final hearing, when McCloskey had moved into a three-vote margin, the task force voted not to count the identical ballots held by and kept secure by county clerks.

Item 2, the ad hoc rulemaking on distinguishing marks. In deciding whether to count more than 30 ballots bearing stray marks, the task force made numerous, subjective and inconsistent decisions. In its final meeting, the task force counted the ballots bearing a large star or an asterisk as the voter's mark, despite the fact that the task force recount director used that very symbol as an example of a prohibited distinguishing mark when instructing the GAO auditors.

Item 3, not a full, fair count ballot reconciliation. In 103 instances, there were more votes than voters or more voters than votes. When McCloskey needed votes, spoiled or invalid ballots were counted, despite this problem. When a McIntyre ballot was at issue, the task force used a reconciliation of

the poll book figures and ballots to invalidate the vote.

Four, a blatantly political process, conclusions before reasons. Indiana was never given the opportunity to rebut unsubstantiated charges that its election certification and recount were inconsistent and haphazard. The task force simply adopted so-called counting rules which replaced Indiana election law with procedures claiming to count every ballot on which the intent of the voter could be determined.

When McCloskey took a slim lead, the task force majority concluded that the remaining absentee ballots were of a different class and should not be counted.

So much for the intent of the voters. Mr. Speaker, I yield back the balance of my time.

RICK MCINTYRE SHOULD HAVE BEEN HERE TO VOTE TODAY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from California [Mr. DORNAN] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker and my colleagues, there have been many votes in this House that have been decided by one, two or three votes. It is not just the affront to our Constitution that concerns us about the seating of Rick McIntyre in Indiana's Eighth District; it is the fact that over this next year and 8 months there may be a vote before this distinguished deliberative body that actually will be determined by one vote.

If Mr. Rick McIntyre had been here today—and I have heard the gentleman speak, he is very articulate, he is eloquent—I believe he would have spoken in support of the President.

There is an historical piece out of Time magazine dated May 5, 1947, that I came across today, and it reminded me of two of the beautiful statues, one the heroic figure of a woman and one of a man on the north side of our Archives Building here in Washington, DC. The beautiful statue's base to the east side of the northern facade of the building has emblazoned on the front of the stand, "What is past is prologue." On the other side is the admonition, "Study the past."

Well, as far as studying the past of this House, it was mentioned several times that there was a direct analogy to the debate in this Chamber and the other body over the assistance in 1947 and 1948 to Greece and to Turkey, the Greek freedom fighters being those very people fighting in the shadow of the Acropolis and the beautiful Parthenon to keep Greece part of the free world, and that was a successful struggle.

Here is something to jog our memories in that Time magazine of May 5, 1947 that begins with the vote tally, 67

to 23, in support of Democratic President Harry Truman to help the Greeks and Turks.

It opens up with this paragraph:

If Congress fails to act, aggression will get the green light and the rest of the world, including America, will get the red light.

They way Sen. Arthur Vandenberg defined the issue last week, the Truman Doctrine was sure to win Senate approval. However reluctant some Senators might be, they concurred with Vandenberg's warning against "the cost of noncompliance. Even the opposition floor leader, Sen. Edwin C. Johnson, who charged the \$400 million program to bulwark Greece and Turkey against Communist Russia was "in reality a declaration of war"—

We had our alarmists then, too—knew he was fighting a losing battle.

By the way, do you know what \$400 million would have been worth in 1947 compared to this paltry \$14 million that we are trying to eke out for the Democratic resistance forces fighting for all of us here on North America's soil in the northern and southern parts of the nation in Nicaragua? I believe \$400 million in 1947—and this is a wild guess—would be equivalent to about \$2 billion of economic and military aid today.

Back to the short Time story:

"Once 2 weeks of soul-searching debate ended on last Tuesday, April 22"—incidentally, Lenin's birthday—"the Senate voted 67-23"—no 10 hours of debate. We thought we were being so gracious here today deciding Nicaragua's fate in 10 hours, they debated 2 weeks in the Senate about the Greek and the Turkish aid. Then once the voting was over, here is the breakdown: 35 Republicans for aid to Greece and Turkey and 32 Democrats. There is a bipartisan foreign policy that stops division once you cross the beach to face out to the rest of the world with a unified foreign policy.

"The noes comprised a rare alliance of 16 Republicans (mostly Midwestern isolationists)"—and we saw a few of those today—"4 conservative Democrats"—names consigned to history—"Johnson, Kenneth McKellar, Harry S. Byrd"—I overlap him by a few years—"and W. Lee O'Daniel, and 3 Wallace-minded leftwing Democrats . . ." can you believe that Newsweek and Time and the networks used words like "leftwing" in those days? Today they only use words like "rightwing." Everybody else is just an honorable liberal. But three leftwing Wallace-minded Democrats. Get these names: James E. Murray, Glen Taylor and CLAUDE PEPPER.

□ 2400

Senator CLAUDE PEPPER, our own, beloved Congressman CLAUDE PEPPER. It shows that you can mature and change in your positions, because we were pleased to see not only my chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Honorable DANTE FASCELL,

voting with President Reagan today, but there was CLAUDE PEPPER. Educated over the years by all of the great and honorable Cubans who have fled to his beautiful State of Florida, and all of the Nicaraguans that are already there, and the Salvadorans, and the Hondos, and the Tikas and the Nikas and the Guadmateks, and all the people fleeing Central America to watch Miami Vice, in Miami, on Friday nights.

Now, the story concludes:

Specifically, the Senate voted, one: To send \$150 million in Greek economic rehabilitation; an equal amount for Greek military aid. No pikers then; they know you have to send military aid to protect the economic aid. And \$100 million for Turkish military aid. Even then the Greek lobby was stronger than the Turkish lobby here in the Halls of Congress.

Two, furnish military equipment. And three; this would send shivers through some of the majority speakers today; send military missions and civilian supervisory staffs. That was to see where the money was going.

By the way, in those days we all had only two or three staffers, so we needed a little help to see where the money was going. And four, here is the idealism, four: Authorize the United Nations to take over the program should it be willing and able; the United Nations that is.

The concluding paragraph. Broadly, the Senate's vote was a vote against the traditional ideas of isolationism and neutrality. A vote in favor of containing communism; thank you, President Truman. A vote for shouldering international burdens formerly carried by the British Empire. A vote to support President Truman's plan to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes.

But although the Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, attached the highest order of urgency to immediate passage, the Greek-Turkish aid ran into delay in the House of Representatives because of bitter bickering.

What has changed since 1947? The bickering goes on here; the Contra freedom fighters, the Democratic Resistance in Nicaragua runs lower and lower on ammunition. Some mother's sons are fighting for our freedom down there, and the disinformation goes on.

However, we turned a corner today. El Salvador was not woven into the debate today as an integral part of the debate with much hot rhetoric about right wing death squads and the terrible mess that El Salvador is in. Why? Because Mr. JIM JONES on the other side, with me, and Mr. VIN WEBER of Minnesota saw democracy in action on

Palm Sunday. Beautiful processions with Jesus Christ statues being held and palms being laid at the feet of the processionists. No "Turbas Devinas," undevine, ugly mobs beating up on people, practicing their religion as goes on in the neighboring country of Nicaragua.

Intermixed with all of these Palm Sunday processions was the great celebration of a free, open election in the small country named after Jesus Christ himself. The formal name being, "Nuestro Senor El Salvador del Mundo." In that country named, "Our Lord, the Savior of the World," Jose Durate had a great victory, and in the midst of his euphoria reminding me of all of us politicians on our election nights, I asked the President, "Are you having this great election freedom and this fine triumph for you in the National Assembly because kids are dying in Nicaragua taking the pressure off you?"

He said, "That is precisely correct, Congressman." Congressman JIM JONES was sitting there as he said it, and so was VIN WEBER of Minnesota.

I wish that Rick McIntyre had been with us to vote today. Then, although we lost 40 Republicans, that would have been one more Republican with us. It would have made the vote that much closer, because I repeat, we have turned the corner on this.

I think what I will do, out of deference to the great staff that we have here in the House, the unsung heroes in all of the various rooms and performing all of the very necessary functions to make this great Congress of the United States function. I completely associate myself with the words of my distinguished colleague from Arkansas [Mr. BILL ALEXANDER], that everybody has shown great forbearance and respect for the system by just loyally carrying on during this, the longest session in the history of the Congress of the United States in 196½ years.

I hope that the staff knows that although we do not say it nearly as often as we should, we do appreciate their great efforts on our behalf and in working for their country with such diligence.

With those well-deserved words for our great staff here in the Congress of the United States, I would like to move that we adjourn.

LEAVE OF ABSENCE

By unanimous consent, leave of absence was granted to:

Mr. BADHAM (at the request of Mr. MICHEL), for today, on account of illness in the family.

Mr. DANIEL (at his own request), until further notice, on account of personal reasons.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED

By unanimous consent, permission to address the House, following the legislative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MILLER of Washington) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. YOUNG of Florida, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO, for 10 minutes, today.

Mr. McCANDLESS, for 60 minutes, today.

Mr. WOLF, for 60 minutes, today.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. HOYER) to revise and extend their remarks and include extraneous material:)

Mr. ALEXANDER, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. PENNY, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. NELSON of Florida, for 5 minutes, today.

Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, for 60 minutes, on April 24.

Mr. FRANK, for 60 minutes, on April 25.

Mr. ROSE, for 60 minutes, on April 25.

Mr. RODINO, for 5 minutes, today.

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

By unanimous consent, permission to revise and extend remarks was granted to:

Mr. LIVINGSTON, to include extraneous material with his preceding statements.

Mr. LIGHTFOOT, prior to vote on House Joint Resolution 239.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. MILLER of Washington) and to include extraneous matter:)

Ms. SNOWE.

Mr. BARTON of Texas.

Mr. MOLINARI.

Mr. FIELDS in two instances.

Mr. HYDE.

Mr. YOUNG of Florida in two instances.

Mr. MADIGAN.

Mr. LOWERY of California.

Mr. DANNEMEYER.

Mr. LEWIS of California.

Mr. MCKINNEY.

Mr. WYLLIE.

Mr. BATEMAN.

Mr. STANGELAND.

Mrs. VUCANOVICH.

Mr. STRANG.

Mr. HARTNETT.

Mr. SOLOMON.

Mr. GRADISON.

Mr. DIOGUARDI.

Mr. SHUSTER.

Mr. KINDNESS in two instances.

(The following Members (at the request of Mr. HOYER) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. BEDELL.

Mr. LUNDINE.

Mr. OBEY.

Mr. GUARINI in two instances.

Mr. LIPINSKI.

Mr. GAYDOS.

Mr. GARCIA in two instances.

Mr. DOWNEY of New York.

Mr. FASCELL in two instances.

Mr. ROE.

Mr. HOYER.

Mrs. COLLINS.

Mr. MINETA.

Mr. EVANS of Illinois.

Mr. LANTOS in two instances.

Mr. LEHMAN of Florida.

Mr. CLAY.

Mr. TRAFICANT.

Mr. MOAKLEY.

Mr. RODINO.

Mr. TAUZIN.

Mr. DONNELLY.

Mr. FEIGHAN.

Mr. MARKEY.

Mr. SOLARZ in two instances.

Mr. COELHO.

Mr. SMITH of Iowa.

Mr. FRANK.

Mr. LEHMAN of California.

Mr. TORRES.

Mr. SYNAR.

Mr. MILLER of California.

Mr. BERMAN.

Mr. NICHOLS.

Mr. MATSUI.

Mr. WAXMAN.

SENATE ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTION SIGNED

The SPEAKER announced his signature to an enrolled joint resolution of the Senate of the following title:

S.J. Res. 63. Joint resolution to designate the week of April 21, 1985, through April 27, 1985, as "National DES Awareness Week."

ADJOURNMENT

Mr. DORNAN of California. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 12 o'clock and 6 minutes a.m.), under its previous order, the House adjourned until Wednesday, April 23, 1985, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

[April 23 (legislative day, April 22), 1985]

1091. A letter from the Acting General Counsel, Department of Energy, transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to authorize appropriations for exploration, prospecting, conservation, development, use, and operation of the naval petroleum reserves, for fiscal year 1986 and fiscal year 1987 and for other purposes; to the Committee on Armed Services.

1092. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislation and Public Affairs, Department of Education, transmitting the Department's annual report for fiscal year

1984, pursuant to Public Law 96-88, section 426; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

1093. A letter from the Chairman, National Advisory Board for International Education Programs, Department of Education, transmitting the Board's annual report for fiscal year 1984, pursuant to GEPA, section 443(a)(2); to the Committee on Education and Labor.

1094. A letter from the Executive Director, Intergovernmental Advisory Council on Education, Department of Education, transmitting the Council's annual report for fiscal year 1984, pursuant to Public Law 96-88, section 213(b)(1)(D); to the Committee on Education and Labor.

1095. A letter from the Under Secretary, Department of Labor, transmitting the initial report on the experimental projects undertaken, pursuant to Public Law 89-73, section 502(e)(3)(C) (95 Stat. 1606); to the Committee on Education and Labor.

1096. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a copy of Presidential Determination 85-4, signed on February 4, 1985, pursuant to section 3(a)(1) of the AECA, which finds that the sale of defense articles and defense services to the Government of Malawi will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1097. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a copy of Presidential Determination 85-6, signed on February 11, 1985, pursuant to section 3(a)(1) of the AECA, which finds that the sale of defense articles and defense services to the Government of Togo will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1098. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a copy of Presidential Determination 85-12, signed on April 10, 1985, pursuant to section 3(a)(1) of the AECA, which finds that the sale of defense articles and defense services to the Government of Algeria will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1099. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a copy of Presidential Determination 85-7, signed on February 11, 1985, pursuant to section 3(a)(1) of the AECA, which finds that the sale of defense articles and defense services to the Government of Mozambique will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1100. A letter from the Assistant Secretary for Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, Department of State, transmitting a copy of Presidential Determination 85-5, signed on February 5, 1985, pursuant to section 3(a)(1) of the AECA, which finds that the sale of defense articles and defense services to the Government of Sierra Leone will strengthen the security of the United States and promote world peace; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

1101. A letter from the Chairman, Federal Election Commission, transmitting recommendations for legislative action, pursuant to Public Law 92-225, section 307(d)(2) (93 Stat. 1354, 1356); to the Committee on House Administration.

1102. A letter from the Clerk, U.S. Claims Court, transmitting a certified copy of the court's judgment order of April 1, 1985, entering judgment for the plaintiffs in case No. 228; *Gila River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community v. The United States*; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

1103. A letter from the Deputy Under Secretary for Intergovernmental and Interagency Affairs, Department of Education, transmitting a report on the activities of the Advisory Council on Dependents, Education during calendar year 1984, pursuant to GEPA, section 443(a)(2); jointly, to the Committees on Armed Services and Education and Labor.

1104. A letter from the Comptroller of the Currency, transmitting the annual report on consumer complaint processing activities for calendar year 1984, pursuant to the act of September 26, 1914, chapter 311, section 18(f)(6) (88 Stat. 2197; 93 Stat. 95; 94 Stat. 174); jointly, to the Committees on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs and Energy and Commerce.

1105. A letter from the Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, transmitting a report on the activities of the Merit System Protection Board and the Office of Personnel Management covering fiscal year 1984, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 2304(b); jointly, to the Committees on Government Operations and Post Office and Civil Service.

1106. A letter from the Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, transmitting a report on the examination of the Panama Canal Commission's financial statements for the years ended September 30, 1983 and 1982 (GAO/NSIAD-85-26; April 17, 1985), pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 3723(b); jointly, to the Committees on Government Operations and Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 5 of rule X and clause 4 of rule XXII, public bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

[April 23 (legislative day, April 22), 1985]

By Mr. BROYHILL:

H.R. 2166. A bill to extend for 5 years the existing temporary duty-free treatment of double-headed latch needles; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BURTON of Indiana:

H.R. 2167. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to permit flexible billing and payment arrangements where a physician substitutes on an occasional basis for another physician in solo practice; jointly, to the Committees on Ways and Means and Energy and Commerce.

By Mrs. COLLINS:

H.R. 2168. A bill to amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to freeze at 50 percent the proportion of hospital payments made on the basis of DRG prospective payment rates, and to freeze the current blend of regional and national rates in determining the DRG prospective payment rates, under the Medicare Program; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. DANNEMEYER:

H.R. 2169. A bill to amend the Clean Air Act to promote competitiveness in the motor vehicle aftermarket and to preserve consumer freedom of choice to select parts and service, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. DARDEN (for himself, Mr. THOMAS of Georgia, Mr. JENKINS,

Mr. HATCHER, Mr. BARNARD, Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia, and Mr. GINGRICH):

H.R. 2170. A bill to amend the section of the Revised Statutes of the United States amended by the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976 to provide that attorneys fees may not be assessed under that section against members of the judiciary acting in judicial capacity; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DERRICK:

H.R. 2171. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to provide that Veterans' Administration grants to States for construction of State veterans' homes be made on the basis of need rather than by the order of application to the Veterans' Administration; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. DOWNEY of New York (for himself and Mr. NELSON of Florida):

H.R. 2172. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to clarify the application of the investment tax credit, the deduction for depreciation, and the income source rules with respect to property used, and services performed, in space; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. EVANS of Illinois:

H.R. 2173. A bill to amend title XVI of the Social Security Act to increase from \$25 to \$50 a month the amount of the personal allowance which is presently provided for eligible individuals and eligible spouses who are in medical institutions, with subsequent annual increases in the amount of such allowance to reflect changes in the cost of living; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. FOLEY (for himself and Mr. MORRISON of Washington):

H.R. 2174. A bill to provide for the transfer to the Colville Business Council of any undistributed portion of amounts appropriated in satisfaction of certain judgments awarded the Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation before the Indian Claims Commission; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. GEJDESEN:

H.R. 2175. A bill to amend chapter 30 of title 38, United States Code, to allow certain Vietnam-era veterans with a break in service to become eligible for benefits under the new GI bill educational assistance program; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. KAPTUR:

H.R. 2176. A bill to require the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to provide grants to public housing agencies to assist such agencies in providing child care services for lower income families; to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

By Mr. MADIGAN (for himself and Mr. BROYHILL):

H.R. 2177. A bill to amend the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and related statutes, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. MOLINARI:

H.R. 2178. A bill to require reporting to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of certain employee exposures to hazardous substances under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and of certain releases of hazardous substances under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980; jointly, to the Committees on Education and Labor, Energy and Commerce, and Public Works and Transportation.

By Mr. MONTGOMERY (by request):
H.R. 2179. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to authorize the Administrator to provide respite care to chronically ill service-connected disabled veterans on a 3-year pilot test basis; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. ROYBAL:

H.R. 2180. A bill to amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to revise and reform the immigration and nationality laws, and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. MONTGOMERY (by request):

H.R. 2181. A bill to amend title 38, United States Code, to increase the rates of compensation for disabled veterans and the rates of dependency and indemnity compensation for surviving spouses and children of veterans; and for other purposes; to the Committee on Veterans' Affairs.

By Mr. OBEY (for himself and Mr. MOODY):

H.R. 2182. A bill to authorize the inclusion of certain additional lands within the Apostle Islands National Lakeshore; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. RODINO:

H.R. 2183. A bill to amend title 28 of the United States Code to make certain changes with respect to the participation of judges of the Court of International Trade in judicial conferences and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 2184. A bill to amend title III of the Immigration and Naturalization Act to provide for administrative naturalization; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SLATTERY (for himself and Mr. COATS):

H.R. 2185. A bill to repeal certain sections of the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 and to repeal the incremental pricing requirements of the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978; to the Committee on Energy and Commerce.

By Mr. VANDER JAGT:

H.R. 2186. A bill relating to the tariff classifications of certain silicone resins and materials; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. RALPH M. HALL:

H.R. 2187. A bill to amend section 456 of title 28, United States Code, to provide for payment of commuting expenses for justices and judges who reside within 300 miles of their official duty stations; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. JACOBS:

H.R. 2188. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to reinstate the tax on interest received by foreigners on certain portfolio investments; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. KINDNESS:

H.R. 2189. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to exempt college and university fraternities and sororities from the tax imposed on certain income; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. SEIBERLING:

H.R. 2190. A bill to require the Secretary of the Treasury to reduce the amount of any deficiency assessed against a taxpayer by the amount of any credit or refund of any overpayment of tax to which such taxpayer would be entitled but for the expiration of any period of limitation if the Secretary determines an inequity would otherwise result; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mrs. JOHNSON (for herself, Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut, and Mr. MCKINNEY)

H.R. 2191. A bill to designate the West Branch of the Farmington River as a study area for inclusion in the National Wild and Scenic Rivers System, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Ms. KAPTUR:

H.J. Res. 248. Joint resolution designating the week of May 5, 1985, through May 11, 1985, as "Women In Human Resources Management Week"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. BURTON of Indiana (for himself, Mr. KEMP, Mr. HYDE, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. CHENEY, Mr. HUNTER, Mr. SILJANDER, Mr. CRAIG, Mr. SCHAEFER, and Mr. COBEY):

H.J. Res. 249. Joint resolution to express congressional commitment to aid all nations and peoples in Latin America in their efforts to halt the spread of communism; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. KINDNESS:

H.J. Res. 250. Joint resolution designating the week beginning July 8, 1985, as "National Bowhunter's Week"; to the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service.

By Mr. YATES:

H.J. Res. 251. Joint resolution to provide that a special gold medal honoring George Gershwin be presented to his sister, Frances Gershwin Godowsky, and a special gold medal honoring Ira Gershwin be presented to his widow, Lenore Gershwin, and to provide for the production of bronze duplicates of such medals for sale to the public; to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

By Mr. SHUMWAY:

H. Con. Res. 127. Concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the Congress that the English language is the official language of the United States; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII,

[April 23 (legislative day, April 22), 1985]

89. Mr. RUDD Presented a memorial of the Legislature of the State of Arizona, relative to the Nation's money system; to the Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

[April 23 (legislative day, April 22), 1985]

By Mrs. BURTON of California:

H.R. 2192. A bill for the relief of Chun Wei Wong; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FRANK:

H.R. 2193. A bill for the relief of Lawrence R. Machado; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. FUSTER:

H.R. 2194. A bill for the relief of Mireille Laffite; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. YOUNG of Florida:

H.R. 2195. A bill for the relief of Stanislav Levchenko; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

ADDITIONAL SPONSORS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were added to public bills and resolutions as follows:

[Submitted April 22, 1985]

H. Res. 125: Mr. GALLO, Mr. DENNY SMITH, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. WHITTAKER, Mr. SAXTON, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma, Mr. HANSEN, Mr. ORTIZ, Mr. DARDEN, Mr. CRANE, Mr. FORD of Tennessee, Mr. McGRATH, Mr. SLAUGHTER, Mr. PORTER, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire, Mr. MAVROULES, Mr. ADDABO, Mr. MOLINARI, Mr. COURTER, Mr. PRICE, and Mr. STRATTON.

[April 23 (legislative day, April 22), 1985]

H.R. 3: Mr. WIRTH, Mr. MORRISON of Washington, Mr. SCHAEFER, and Mr. MACKAY.

H.R. 241: Mr. COMBEST.

H.R. 242: Mr. COMBEST.

H.R. 288: Mr. CLAY, Mr. STOKES, and Mr. FORD of Tennessee.

H.R. 367: Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. SUNDQUIST, Mr. HILLIS, Mr. SOLOMON, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. RIDGE, Mrs. JOHNSON, Mr. HENDON, and Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut.

H.R. 512: Mr. BOUCHER and Mr. HORTON.

H.R. 585: Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma and Mr. BERREUTER.

H.R. 659: Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia, Mr. McEWEEN, Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT, Mrs. HOLT, Mr. MANTON, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. WYLIE, Mr. HENDON, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. FLIPPO, Mr. WATKINS, Mr. ALEXANDER, Mr. LOTT, Mr. GREGG, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. FISH, Mr. ROE, Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Mr. KANJORSKI, Mr. ROBINSON, and Mr. SNYDER.

H.R. 781: Mr. OWENS, Mr. RANGEL, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. LEHMAN of Florida, Mr. STOKES, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. FAUNTROY, Ms. MIKULSKI, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. HAYES, Mr. TOWNS, Mr. CROCKETT, Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois, and Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut.

H.R. 796: Mr. CLINGER, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. PASHAYAN, Mr. RITTER, Mr. ROGERS, Mr. TRAFICANT, and Mr. EVANS of Iowa.

H.R. 825: Mrs. KENNELLY, Mr. FOWLER, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. JACOBS, and Mr. RANGEL.

H.R. 870: Mr. BADHAM, Mr. BARTON of Texas, Mr. BLAZ, Mr. DANIEL, Mr. DAUB, Mr. DERRICK, Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi, Mr. FISH, Mr. FUSTER, Mr. GEKAS, Mr. JONES of North Carolina, Mr. LIGHTFOOT, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. SHUMWAY, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Mr. SPRATT, Mr. STALLINGS, Mr. STUMP, Mr. VOLEMER, Mr. WHITLEY, Mr. WHITTAKER, Mr. WOLFE, and Mr. YATRON.

H.R. 874: Mr. BEDELL.

H.R. 883: Mr. EMERSON.

H.R. 947: Mr. DYALLY, Mr. LEHMAN of Florida, Mr. CLAY, Mr. FRANK, Mr. STOKES, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. OWENS, Mr. MOODY, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. WHEAT, Mr. BIAGGI, and Mr. LOWRY of Washington.

H.R. 999: Mrs. BENTLEY.

H.R. 1124: Mr. MITCHELL.

H.R. 1140: Mr. GONZALEZ and Mr. VENTO.

H.R. 1141: Mr. GALLO, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. FUSTER, Mr. BEVILL, Mr. STOKES, Mr. BRYANT, Mr. LUNDINE, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. ENGLISH, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. HORTON, Mr. ROSE, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. ROE, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. OBERSTAR, Mr. MACK, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. MRAZEK, Mr. FAUNTROY, Mrs. BENTLEY, Mr. BLAZ, Mr. RIDGE, Mr. BARNES, Mr. BILEY, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. BROWN of California, and Mr. MURPHY.

H.R. 1205: Mr. BARNARD, Mr. SCHAEFER, Mrs. BENTLEY, Mr. BOULTER, Mr. DORNAN of California, Ms. FIEDLER, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. GINGRICH, Mr. KASICH, Mr. MILLER of Washington, and Mr. MARTIN of New York.

H.R. 1309: Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. PEASE, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. GEDDENSON, Mr. WOLPE, Mr. BARNES, and Mr. MILLER of California.

H.R. 1349: Mr. LIGHTFOOT, Mr. HORTON, Mr. CLINGER, Mr. MCCANDLESS, Mr. PURSELL, and Mr. MONSON.

H.R. 1353: Mr. MATSUI, Mr. CARNEY, Mr. RICHARDSON, and Mr. DOWNEY of New York.

H.R. 1453: Mr. WOLPE and Mr. EDWARDS of California.

H.R. 1454: Mr. WOLPE and Mr. EDWARDS of California.

H.R. 1458: Mrs. BENTLEY, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. MCCOLLUM, and Mr. SOLARZ.

H.R. 1474: Mr. MAZZOLI and Mr. MATSUI.

H.R. 1515: Mr. OWENS and Mr. CROCKETT.

H.R. 1553: Mr. DONNELLY, Mr. CARPER, Mr. SEIBERLING, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. SAVAGE, Mr. VENTO, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. GLICKMAN, Mr. EVANS of Illinois, Mr. JEFFORDS, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. LIPINSKI, and Mr. ANDREWS.

H.R. 1607: Mr. ADDABBO.

H.R. 1612: Mr. SCHUETTE.

H.R. 1613: Mr. WEAVER and Mr. EDWARDS of California.

H.R. 1630: Mr. OXLEY, Mr. SENSENBRENNER, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, and Mr. STOKES.

H.R. 1650: Mr. BEDELL, Mr. ADDABBO, Mr. FRANK, Mr. SEIBERLING, Mr. BOLAND, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mrs. BURTON of California, Mr. GREEN, Mr. ROE, Mr. EVANS of Illinois, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. REGULA, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. HORTON, and Mr. BOSCO.

H.R. 1706: Mr. KEMP.

H.R. 1771: Mr. DICKINSON.

H.R. 1785: Mr. TOWNS, Mr. WHEAT, Mr. EVANS of Illinois, Mr. DELLUMS, and Mr. LELAND.

H.R. 1907: Mr. DANIEL.

H.R. 1908: Mr. COATS.

H.R. 1909: Mr. BEILSON, Mr. WILSON, and Mr. SABO.

H.R. 1910: Mr. FOGLIETTA and Mr. FAUNTER.

H.R. 2016: Mr. FRENZEL and Mr. WHITTAKER.

H.R. 2021: Mrs. MIKULSKI.

H.R. 2069: Mr. PORTER, Mr. COELHO, Mr. DOWDY of Mississippi, Mr. FOGLIETTA, Mr. GROTEBERG, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. STUMP, Mr. WHITEHURST, Mr. SEIBERLING, Mrs. LLOYD, Mr. PASHAYAN, Mr. LAGOMARSINO, Mr. TAUZIN, Mr. DANIEL, Mr. CHAPPELL, Mrs. SCHROEDER, Mr. HUBBARD, Mrs. BENTLEY, Mr. DIXON, Mr. EDWARDS of Oklahoma, Mr. BLILEY, Mr. DARDEN, Mr. HUTTO, Mr. CARPER, Mr. FAWELL, Mr. KANJORSKI, Mr. CHAPPIE, Mr. MCDADE, Mr. GREGG, and Mr. BARNES.

H.R. 2158: Mr. MONTGOMERY, Mr. RITTER, Mr. SKEEN, Mr. SILJANDER, Mr. MYERS of Indiana, and Mr. SENSENBRENNER.

H.J. Res. 4: Mr. MILLER of Ohio and Mr. SHELBY.

H.J. Res. 41: Mr. CHAPPELL.

H.J. Res. 46: Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. LEACH of Iowa, Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois, Mr. WHITLEY, Mr. CHANDLER, Mr. SPRATT, Mr. GREGG, Mr. OLIN, Mr. BOLAND, Mr. VOLKMER, Mr. BROYHILL, Mr. VENTO, Mr. LELAND, Mr. COELHO, Mr. BATES, Mr. BROOKS, Mr. BEDELL, Mr. DYSON, Mr. WISE, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. HENDON, Mr. ROTH, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, Mr. VALENTINE, Mr. TRAXLER, Mr. MINETA, Mr. SHUMWAY, Mr. GARCIA, Mr. SISISKY, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. MCDADE, Mr. MCGRATH, Mr. FLORIO, Mr. WEBER, Mrs. ROUKEMA, Mr. MOODY, Mr. WALGREN, and Mrs. VUCANOVICH.

H.J. Res. 49: Mr. COMBEST.

H.J. Res. 78: Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia.

H.J. Res. 131: Mr. SHAW, Mr. MCGRATH, Mr. SPRATT, Mr. ADDABBO, Mr. KASICH, Mr. DONNELLY, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. HUTTO, Ms. KAPTUR, Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. CONTE, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. PRICE, Mr. KOLTER, and Mr. DYACKERMAN.

H.J. Res. 154: Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. LEWIS of Florida, Mr. GUNDERSON, Mr. LOEFFLER, Mr. PEPPER, Mr. RODINO, Mr. FISH, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. MOORHEAD, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. MCKINNEY, Mr. CARNEY, Mr. HEFFNER, Mr. LIVINGSTON, Mr. MOLINARI, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. MCDADE, Mr. THOMAS of Georgia, Mr. VALENTINE, Mr. WHEAT, Mr. WYDEN, Mr. KILDEE, Mr. McMILLAN, and Mr. ACKERMAN.

H.J. Res. 156: Mr. AKAKA, Mr. HORTON, Mr. HYDE, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. NELSON of Utah, Ms. OAKAR, and Mr. TRAXLER.

H.J. Res. 169: Mr. YOUNG of Florida, Mr. FRANKLIN, Mr. HOYER, Mr. VALENTINE, Mr. BIAGGI, Mr. HAYES, Mrs. BURTON of California, Mr. EMERSON, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. HEFTTEL of Hawaii, Mr. EVANS of Iowa, Mr. COLEMAN of Texas, Mr. WIRTH, Mr. YOUNG of Missouri, Mr. GEKAS, Mr. SCHAEFER, Mr. SPRATT, Mr. MINETA, Mr. GARCIA, and Mr. IRELAND.

H.J. Res. 175: Mr. GEPHARDT, Mr. WHEAT, Mr. DREIER of California, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. MOLLOHAN, and Mr. ACKERMAN.

H.J. Res. 183: Mr. VENTO, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. DIXON, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. LAFALCE, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. SAVAGE, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. SPRATT, Mr. SLAUGHTER, and Mr. GEKAS.

H.J. Res. 192: Mr. NOWAK, Mr. KOSTMAYER, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. SNYDER, Mr. LUKE, Mr. DICKS, Mr. ROBERT F. SMITH, Mr. DIOGUARDI, Mr. LOWERY of California, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota, Mrs. COLLINS, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. WIRTH, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, and Mr. DELLUMS.

H.J. Res. 193: Mr. BEVILL, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. DAUB, Mr. FISH, Mr. SHELBY, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. CALLAHAN, Mr. ERDREICH, Mr. HUGHES, Mr. CROCKETT, Mr. FORD of Tennessee, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. ORTIZ, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. WEISS, Mr. STOKES, Mr. BENNETT, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. ROE, Mr. SAVAGE, Mr. HAYES, Mr. LOWRY of Washington, Mr. MANTON, Mr. RALPH M. HALL, Mr. GINGRICH, Mr. ROWLAND of Connecticut, Mr. TORRICELLI, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. ROBINSON, Mr. ACKERMAN, Mr. APPELGATE, Mr. BOULTER, Mr. COBEY, Mr. COBLE, Mr. DORNAN of California, Mr. ECKERT of New York, Mr. FIEDLER, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. HENRY, Mr. KASICH, Mr. KOLBE, Mr. LOTT, Mr. McMILLAN, Mr. MARTIN of New York, Mr. MYERS of Indiana, Mr. MILLER of Washington, Mr. MONSON, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. GEKAS, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. GALLO, Mr. DE LA GARZA, Mr. BATEMAN, Mr. BEDELL, Mr. SHAW, Mr. BIAGGI, Mr. MORRISON of Washington, Mr. YOUNG of Missouri, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. WOLF, Mr. BONIOR of Michigan, and Mrs. LLOYD.

H.J. Res. 204: Mr. MANTON, Mr. BRYANT, Mr. SPRATT, Mr. KOLTER, Mr. GEKAS, Mr. MOODY, Mr. WAXMAN, Mrs. HOLT, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. FISH, Mr. CARPER, and Mr. GREEN.

H.J. Res. 216: Mr. HAYES, Mr. HUTTO, Mr. PERKINS, Mr. BILIRAKIS, Mr. ROWLAND of Georgia, Mr. BATEMAN, Mr. RAHALL, Mr. HOWARD, Mr. FRANK, Mr. YOUNG of Alaska, Mr. BERMAN, Mr. ADDABBO, Mr. FUSTER, Mrs. BURTON of California, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. WEISS, Mr. EVANS of Illinois, Mr. ROE, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. JACOBS, Mr. DANIEL, Mr. KAS-

TENMEIER, Mr. MCKERNAN, Mr. FISH, Mr. KLECZKA, and Mr. FAZIO.

H.J. Res. 230: Mr. DANNEMEYER, Mr. DE LA GARZA, Mrs. MARTIN of Illinois, Mr. CARNEY, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. KINDNESS, Mr. WILSON, Mr. MAVROULES, and Mr. BONER of Tennessee.

H. Con. Res. 10: Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. STOKES, Mr. SCHUMER, Mr. OWENS, Mr. DIXON, Mr. SAVAGE, Mr. GARCIA, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. MINETA, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. DURBIN, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. FISH, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. GRAY of Illinois, Mr. HORTON, Mrs. BENTLEY, Mr. WAXMAN, and Mr. WIRTH.

H. Con. Res. 18: Mr. KLECZKA.

H. Con. Res. 37: Mr. ROEMER, Mr. CARR, Mr. THOMAS of Georgia, Mr. HATCHER, and Mr. GINGRICH.

H. Con. Res. 60: Mr. CONYERS, Mr. COYNE, Mr. EVANS of Iowa, Mr. TOWNS, and Mr. YATES.

H. Con. Res. 64: Mr. SOLARZ, Mr. DWYER of New Jersey, Mr. LANTOS, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. SYNAR, Mr. DIXON, Mr. LEVINE of California, and Mr. KILDEE.

H. Con. Res. 68: Mr. WILLIAMS, Mr. ROBERTS, Mr. CLAY, Mrs. BOGGS, Mr. RICHARDSON, and Mr. FAZIO.

H. Con. Res. 69: Mr. EMERSON.

H. Con. Res. 74: Mrs. BENTLEY.

H. Con. Res. 77: Mr. OWENS, Ms. MIKULSKI, Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. PURSELL, Mr. GREEN, Mr. SAVAGE, Mr. RICHARDSON, Mr. SPRATT, and Mr. DASCHLE.

H. Con. Res. 89: Mr. EVANS of Illinois.

H. Con. Res. 96: Mr. COLEMAN of Texas, Mr. RANGEL, and Mr. MITCHELL.

H. Con. Res. 125: Mr. ROEMER, Mr. FOGLIETTA, Mr. CARPER, Mr. BOUCHER, Mr. BRYANT, Mr. EDWARDS of California, Mr. CLAY, Mr. YATES, Mr. COOPER, Mr. FLORIO, Mr. RODINO, Mr. COLEMAN of Texas, Mr. HEFTTEL of Hawaii, Mr. KILDEE, Mrs. SCHROEDER, Mr. PEASE, Mr. ECKART of Ohio, Mr. OWENS, Mr. MARTINEZ, Mr. EDGAR, Mr. GUARINI, Mr. SAXTON, Mr. DELLUMS, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. COYNE, Mr. ERDREICH, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. LOWRY of Washington, Ms. KAPTUR, Mrs. KENNELLY, Mr. WEAVER, Mr. BONIOR of Michigan, Mr. GONZALEZ, and Mr. SIKORSKI.

H. Res. 56: Mrs. BENTLEY, Mr. CARNEY, Mr. COURTER, Mr. DASCHLE, Mr. DICKINSON, Mr. DIOGUARDI, Mr. DORGAN of North Dakota, Mr. HALL of Ohio, Mr. HAMMERSCHMIDT, Mr. HYDE, Mrs. JOHNSON, Mr. LEVIN of Michigan, Mr. LIPINSKI, Mr. MCEWEN, Mr. MCKINNEY, Mr. MANTON, Mr. MINETA, Mr. MOAKLEY, Mr. NOWAK, Mr. PORTER, Mr. RINALDO, Mr. VANDER JAGT, Mr. VUCANOVICH, Mr. WILSON, Mr. WIRTH, Mr. MURPHY, Ms. SNOWE, and Mr. MARTINEZ.

H. Res. 82: Mr. DWYER of New Jersey and Mr. FORD of Tennessee.

H. Res. 91: Mr. STENHOLM, Mr. BUSTAMANTE, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. LELAND, Mr. COELHO, Mr. BOEHLERT, Mr. BONER of Tennessee, Mr. KINDNESS, Mr. RUDD, Mr. DAUB, Mrs. VUCANOVICH, Mr. LOEFFLER, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. LOWERY of California, Mr. WORTLEY, and Mr. WHITTAKER.

H. Res. 104: Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. CONTE, Mr. ROE, Mr. ZSCHAU, Mr. BEDELL, Mr. DIXON, Mr. ADDABBO, Mr. BRYANT, Mr. FAZIO, Mr. WEISS, and Mr. LOWRY of Washington.

H. Res. 127: Mr. LEVINE of California, Mr. COBEY, Mr. BROWN of California, Mr. GEKAS, Mr. SMITH of Florida, Mr. BLILEY, Mr. LATTI, Mr. WOLPE, Mr. MICHEL, Mrs. HOLT, Mr. BERREUTER, Mr. AKAKA, Mr. WEISS, Mr. HARTNETT, Mr. OXLEY, Mrs. ROUKEMA, Mr. HOYER, Mr. WAXMAN, Mr. WILSON, Mr. MILLER of Washington, Mr. MORRISON of Connecticut, Mr. VOLKMER, Mrs. BOXER, Mr.

GROTEBERG, Mr. FRENZEL, Mr. MATSUI, Mr. SIKORSKI, Mr. RITTER, Mr. COURTER, Mr. BROOMFIELD, Mr. PURSELL, Mr. FIEDLER, Mr. MILLER of Ohio, and Mr. REGULA.

H. Res. 134: Mr. ROE, Mr. KLECZKA, Mr. STALLINGS, Mr. DINGELL, Mr. HENRY, and Mr. MARTINEZ.

DELETIONS OF SPONSORS FROM PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, sponsors were deleted from public bills and resolutions as follows:

[April 23 (legislative day, April 22), 1985]

H.R. 1402: Mr. KOLTER.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII,

[April 23 (legislative day, April 22), 1985]

86. The SPEAKER presented a petition of the American Foreign Service Association, Washington, DC, relative to comments on the fourth annual report on implementation of the Foreign Service Act of 1980; which was referred, jointly, to the Committees on Foreign Affairs and Post Office and Civil Service.

AMENDMENTS

Under clause 6 of rule XXIII, proposed amendments were submitted as follows:

[April 23 (legislative day, April 22), 1985]

H.R. 2068

By Mr. PETRI:

—Page 28, after line 25, add the following new section:

SEC. 128. AN OFFICIAL RESIDENCE OF SECRETARY OF STATE.

(a) PROHIBITION.—Until the Congress expressly authorizes such acceptance by law, the United States may not accept a gift of any residence or other structure for the purpose of providing a place of official residence for the Secretary of State or any other official of the Department of State.

(b) STUDY AND REPORT.—The Secretary of State shall conduct a study of any offer of a gift described in subsection (a). Such study shall include an examination of the costs to the United States associated with accepting such gift which relate to the proposed acquisition, maintenance, security, and daily operation of a residence. The Secretary shall transmit the report of any study conducted under this section to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Public Works and Transportation of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate.